Sankara’s method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical development, to recognise clearly existing differences which other system¬ atisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by Sankara between Brahman and l^vara is known to the Upanishads; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu^a, and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, Sankara is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind.
The Brahman of the old Upanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual consciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back temporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in death, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly per¬ sonal l^vara of Ramanuja, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and hence Sankara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatised personal l^vara 1 a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate 1 The Uvara who allots to the individual souls their new forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal conscious being is at the same time iden¬ tified with the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid altogether.
of the soul, we have already remarked above. And although the Maya doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads, it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark.
The later growth of the Maya doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a development from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought which finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Maya theory may be traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a more and more strict sense, as implying not only the ex¬ clusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of texts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman’s nature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a more thorough following out of the conception that the union with Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally led to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous notion, an illusion.—A further circumstance which may not impossibly have co-operated to further the de¬ velopment of the theory of the world’s unreality will be referred to later on 1.
1 That section of the introduction in which the point referred to in the text We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-stitras, although reason was shown for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more closely related to the system of Ramanuja than to that of Sankara. If so, the philosophy of Sankara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras of Badaraya^a. This would indeed be a somewhat un¬ expected conclusion—for, judging a priori, we should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya^a to San¬ kara—but a priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, more¬ over, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility of B 4 daraya;za’s Shtras already setting forth a doctrine that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most pro¬ bably had sprung up in altogether different—priestly or non-priestly—communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgita.
The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a personal highest being— Krishna, or Vishnu—which in many respects approximates very closely to the system of the Bhagavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedanta, i. e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in Badaraya^a’s Sfttras (at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to 5 ruti only in authority. The Sutras, is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.
moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic por¬ tions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book, several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly dif¬ fering from.Sankara’s teaching, and closely related to the system of the Bhagavatas.
Facts of this nature—from entering into the details of which we are prevented by want of space—tend to mitigate the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position between the Upanishads and.Sankara, should yet diverge in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gaiu/apada and Sankara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads.
But although this form of doctrine has ever since Sankara’s time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sym¬ pathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet ‘ to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite 1.’ The only forms of Vedantic philosophy which are—and can at any time have been—really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inac¬ cessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory prin¬ ciple of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion Cosi tra questa Immensita s’ annega il pensier mio, E il naufrago m’ e dolce in questo mare.
Leopardi.
cxxviii vedanta-s6tras.
to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.
The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly follows Sankara’s inter¬ pretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with the views held by Badariyazza has been discussed above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a translation of Sankara's commentary with an independent version of the Sutras which it ex¬ plains. Similar considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads re¬ ferred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by Sankara. There also the views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of the comment would appear de¬ void of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor Max Muller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render intelligible Sankara’s explanations and reasonings. I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.
I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on the tfkas composed by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.
My best thanks are due to Pazzafits Rama Mirra 5 &strin and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to 'Pandit Ke^ava Gastrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct.
VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SANKARA BHASHYA.
FIRST ADHYAYA.
FIRST pAda.
Reverence to the August Vasudeva!
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject 1 whose respective spheres are the notion of the ‘ Thou ’ (the Non-Ego 2 ) and the ‘ Ego/ and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose 3 upon the subject—whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego—the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural 4 procedure— 1 The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (£it); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense-organs, interna] organs, and the objects of the senses, i. e. the external material world.
2 The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the * thou ’ (yushmat), not the notion of the 4 this ’ or ‘ that' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan¬ guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person (‘It is 1/ ‘I am he who/ &c.; ete vayam, ime vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.
3 Adhyasa, literally ‘ superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.
4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech B 2 which has its cause in wrong knowledge—not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal 1, to make use of expressions such as ‘That am 1/ ‘ That is mine 2.’—But what have we to understand by the term ‘ superimposition? ’— The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing 3.
Some indeed define the term ‘ superimposition 5 as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing 4. Others, again, define superimposition as the error and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.
1 I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.
2 ‘The body, &c. is my Self;’ ‘sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.’
3 Literally ‘ in some other place.’ The clause ‘ in the form of remembrance ’ is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre¬ viously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.
4 The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhy&sa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super¬ imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, motherof-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is super¬ imposed 1. Others 2, again, define it as the fictitious as¬ sumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following: ‘ Mother-of-pearl appears like silver/ ‘ The moon although one only appears as if she were double.’ But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i. e. in contact with his sense organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego 3, and the interior Self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation 4. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition.
1 This is the definition of the akhyativ&dins.
2 Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.
3 The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayampraklya, self-luminous, i. e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne¬ science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i. e. in so far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: ‘&datmaiva svayamprakjtro*pi buddhyadivishayavi^Murawat katha^w^id asmatpratyayavishayoxha^kardspadaw £iva iti kz, ^-antur iti kz, kshetra^a iti ^akhyayate.’
4 Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs; for non¬ discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi¬ nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition 1. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre¬ supposition on which there base all the practical distinc¬ tions—those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release 2.—But how can the means of right may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani¬ fested either by itself or by anything else.—It is known or mani¬ fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatv&bbavat tasminn ahankar&dyadhyasa ity artha^. Aparokshatvam api kah&d atmano nesh/am ity sUahkyaha pratyagatmeti.
1 Tatraivazzz sati evambhutavastutattvavadharazze sati. Bha. Tas¬ minn adhyase uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani buddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadina*tmana va krztemwanayadidoshezza jfcaitanyaguzzena Mtmanatmd va vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri.
2 Whether they belong to the karmakazz^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^zianakazz^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scrip¬ tural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience 1?—Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per¬ sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, per¬ ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2 ) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3.
Nor can, in the absence of all that 4, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de¬ pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when 1 It being of course the function of the means of right know¬ ledge to determine Truth and Reality, 2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend¬ ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super¬ intending principle, i. e. the individual soul.
8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.
4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.
they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour.
We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also—although distinguished by superior intelligence—proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Veddntatexts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Br&hma^a and Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis¬ tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra¬ dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 4 A Brahma^a is to sacrifice,’ are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out¬ ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo¬ sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attri¬ butes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man