In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word c Self ’ can—in such phrases as ‘ Bhadrasena is my Self’—be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by per¬ ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ( Self 9 may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word c ^yotis ’ signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ‘ Self 5 in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative 1 Cp. above, p. 30.
attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as ‘ the Self of the elements/ ‘the Self of the senses/ And even if we assume that the word ‘ Self ’ primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determina¬ tive attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and *Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with 6Vetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word ‘ Self’ here to be something intelli¬ gent. The word ‘^yotis’ does moreover not furnish an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of ‘light’ only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.
A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding Sfttra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word ‘Self’ having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sfttra is to be explained as con¬ taining an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.
Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word ‘ Self/ This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.
8. And (the pradh&na cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.
If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term ‘Being’ (Sat), and if the passage ‘That is the Self, that art thou, O >SVetaketu/ referred to the pradhana; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the vedanta-s6tras.
true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying ‘ that is Arundhati,’ although it is really not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/^aka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).
The word ‘ and’ (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapa/^aka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, ‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely/ &c. Now if the term ‘ Sat ’ denoted the pradhana, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not denoted by the term ‘ Sat.’—For this the Sutrakara gives a further reason.
9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).
With reference to the cause denoted by the word 4 Sat/ Scripture says, 4 When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, 44 he sleeps ” (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita)/ (Kk. Up. VI, 8,1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 4 to sleep/ with refer¬ ence to the soul. The word, 4 his own/ denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i, which means * to be resolved into/ The individual soul (^iva) is called awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind—which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul—it apprehends those external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external objects 1. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 4 mind 2 / When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modi¬ fications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word 4 hrzdaya ’ is given by jruti, 4 That Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he is in the heart (hrzdi ayam)/ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words a^anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised: ‘ water is carrying away what has been eaten by him; ’ 4 fire carries away what has been drunk by him 5 (. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 4 Sat/ by means of the etymology of the word 4 sleep/ But the intelligent 1 So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.
2 With reference to Kh, Up. VI, 8, 2.
6o Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again, it were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word ‘ own/ because belonging to the Self (as being the Self’s own), there would remain the same ab¬ surd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. ‘ embraced by the intelligent— pr&gna.—Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within/ Bn. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in the condition of dream¬ less sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word ‘ Sat/ and not the pradhana.—A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is subjoined.
io. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Ved&nta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause).
If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts also, there were set forth different views con¬ cerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine, and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in with the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all the Vedanta-texts uni¬ formly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, ‘ As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pranas proceed each towards its place; from the pranas the gods, from the gods the worlds ’ (Kau. Up. Ill, 3). And ‘from that Self sprang ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, i). And ‘all this springs from the Self’ (. Kh. Up. VII, 26,1). And ‘this pra^a is born from the Self’ (Pr. Up. Ill, 3); all which passages declare the Self to he the cause. That the word ‘Self’ denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, II.
And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a uniform character re-f garding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is\ therefore to be considered the cause of the world, ‘ on account \ of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta^texts)/—A further / reason for this conclusion is advanced.
ii. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).
That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the following passage of the mantropanishad of the 6Veta.svataras (VI, 9) where the word ‘ he ’ refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord, ‘He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord.’ It is therefore finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent pradhana or anything else.
In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate arguments, that the Vedanta^texts exhibited \ under Sutras I, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all-; knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view ( 1,10), that all Vedclnta-texts whatever maintain an intelli¬ gent cause. The question might therefore be asked, ‘ What reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedantasfitras?’ (as the chief point is settled already.)
To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is appre¬ hended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolu¬ tions of name and form (i. e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the opposite of this, i. e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare the following passages: B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15, ‘For where there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another? ’ Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1, ‘Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else, under¬ stands something else, that is the little. The greatest is immortal; the little is mortal;’ Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7, ‘The wise one, who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by their names 1 ); 5 Sv. Up. VI, 19,‘Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immor¬ tality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel; 5 B ri. Up. II, 3, 6, ‘Not so, not so; 5 B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8, ‘It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long; 5 and ‘ defective is one place, perfect the other.’ All these passages, with many others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, accord¬ ing as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience.
As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the like 2. The different modes of devotion lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works; those modes are distinct on accouht of the distinction of the different qualities and limiting conditions 3 *. And although the one highest Self only, i. e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different qualities. Thus Scripture says, ‘According as man wor¬ ships him, that he becomes; 5 and, ‘ According to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed 1 The wise one, i. e. the highest Self; which as givatman is con¬ versant with the names and forms of individual things.
2 I. e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.
3 Qualities, i. e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i. e. the localities—such as the heart and the like—which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, II.
this life’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). Smrzti also makes an analo¬ gous statement, ‘ Remembering whatever form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters, being impressed with it through his constant meditation ’ (Bha. Gita VIII, 6).
Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself 1 2 in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II, 3, 2,1), ‘ He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him V &c. Similarly Smrzti remarks, ‘ Whatever being there is of power, splendour or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gita X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i. e. in the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on ac¬ count of an indicating sign, viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su. 1,1,20); the same is to be observed with regard to 1,1, 22 and other Sutras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instan¬ taneous release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special con¬ nexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the 1 Ananda Giri reads avish/asya for avishkrftasya.
2 Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying differ¬ ent places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the satt&, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.
6 4 vedanta-s6tras.
knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, r, 12 1. From all this it appears that the following part of the Sastra has a special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta -texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and on the other hand* as being free from the connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge. The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from Brahman, which in I, 1,10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sutrakara, who, while explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.
12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of the repetition (of the word * bliss/ as denoting the highest Self).
The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enume¬ rated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says, £ Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss/ Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, ‘that which con¬ sists of bliss, 5 denotes the highest Brahman of which it had been said previously, that £ It is true Being, Knowledge, with¬ out end/ or something different from Brahman, just as the 1 Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from ‘thus here also:* na kevalazra dvaividhyam brahmawa^ jrutismntyor eva siddha/rc ki m tu sfitrakrzto^pi matam ity dha, evam iti,.mitismrz’tyor iva prakrzte*pi.rastre dvairftpyam brahmawo bhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/zam udaharati adityeti; uktanyayazrc tulyade^eshu prasarayati evam iti; sopadhikopadejavan nirupadhikopade^a^ dawayati evam ityadina, atma^anaw nimetavyam iti sambandha^; nirwayaprasangam aha pareti; annamayddyupadhidvdroktasya katham paravidyavishayatva/ra tatraha tfpddhiti; ninzayakramam dha vakyeti, uktartham adhikarazzaw kvdstity asahkyoktazrc yatheti.
Self consisting of food, &c., is different from it.—The purvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a Secondary (not the principal) Self, and something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says ‘Joy is its head; 5 and about its being em¬ bodied we read, ‘ Of that former one this one is the em¬ bodied Self 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self. And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the transmigrating Soul.
To this reasoning we make the following reply:—By the Self consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, ‘on account of repetition. 5 For the word ‘bliss 5 is repeatedly applied to the highest Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause ‘ That is flavour 5 —which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and declares it to be of the nature of flavour—we read, ‘For only after having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether (of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;’ and again, II, 8, ‘Now this is an examination of Bliss; 5 ‘ He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss; 5 and again, II, 9, ‘ He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing; 5 and in addition, ‘ He understood that Bliss is Brahman 5 (III, 6). And in another scriptural passage also (Bn. Up. Ill, 9, 28), ‘ Knowledge and bliss is Brahman, 5 we see the word ‘ bliss 5 applied just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word ‘bliss 5 is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote [34] F the secondary Self (the SaMsarin), because it forms a link in a series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the innermost of all. The.Sastra, wishing to convey information about the primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self 1, which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star Arundhati to another man, at first points to several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati; so here also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the innermost (i. e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of understanding, the so-called vi^anako^a), and does not really belong to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman.
13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya, consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word denoting a modifica- 1 After which no other Self is mentioned.
tion (or product); (we declare the objection to be) not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed by the affix maya.)
Here the pftrvapakshin raises the objection that the word anandamaya (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.—Why?—Because the word anandamaya is understood to denote something different from the original word (i. e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya), viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya. ‘Anandamaya ’ therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do.
This objection is, however, not valid, because 4 maya ’ is also used in the sense of abundance, i. e. denotes that where there is abundance of what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 4 the sacrifice is annamaya ’ means ‘ the sacrifice is abounding in food 5 (not 4 is some modifica¬ tion or product of food ’). Thus here Brahman also, as abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman does abound in bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man, has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.
14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i. e. of bliss; therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)
Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 4 For he alone causes bliss ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, there¬ fore, maya may be taken to mean 4 abundant, 5 the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.
15. Moreover (the Anandamaya is Brahman be- VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
cause) the same (Brahman) which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i. e. proclaimed in the Brahmazza passage as the anandamaya.)
The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following reason also h On the introductory words 4 he who knows Brahman attains the highest 5 (Taitt. Up. II, i), there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses the quali¬ ties of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all; thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different Selfs (‘ different from this is the inner Self, 5 &c.) are enumerated, and then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, ‘different from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss. 5 To assume that a mantra and the Brahma/za passage be¬ longing to it have the same sense is only proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome in¬ ference that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether new subject.
Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self con¬ sisting of food, &c. 1 2 On the same (i. e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded, 4 This same knowledge of Bhrzgu and Varu/za; he understood that bliss is Brahman 5 (Taitt. Up. Ill, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.
1 The previous proofs were founded on linga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakara/za.
2 While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, there¬ fore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.
16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other (i. e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assump¬ tion).
And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self only, not the other, i. e. the one which is other than the Lord, i. e. the transmigrating in¬ dividual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the term ‘the one consisting of bliss/ Why? On account of the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, ‘ He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever there is/ Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body, &c., the non¬ separation of the effects created from the creator, and the creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self different from the highest Self.
17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the anandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).
The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7,‘It (i. e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive bliss/ For he who perceives cannot be that which is per¬ ceived.—But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the following Sruti- and Smnti-passages, ‘ The Self is to be sought‘ Nothing higher is known than the attain¬ ment of the Self 1?*—This objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything 1 Yadi labdM na labdhavyaA katha m tarhi paramatmano vastuto Abhinnena ^ivatmana paramatm^ labhyata ity artha^. Bha,mati.
but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the truth, identified with the Non-Self, i. e. the body and so on; whereby it becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like. Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as ' there is no other seer but he 5 (B ru Up. Ill, 7, 23), that there is in reality any seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal individual soul; for) 1 the Lord differs from the soul(vi^anatman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self, the two last Sutras have been propounded.
18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the anandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i. e. to the pradh&na inferred by the Sankhyas.)
Since in the passage ‘ he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth/ which occurs in the chapter treating of the anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II, 6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred, i. e. the non-intelligent pradhana assumed by the Sankhyas, cannot be regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the 1 Yatha parame^varad bhinno ^ivatma drash/a na bhavaty evam £-ivatmano*pi drash/ur na bhinna^ paramewara iti ^ivasydnirva^-yatve parame^varo^py anirva^ya^ syad ity ata aha parame^varas tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.
cause of the world, has already been refuted in the Sutra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scrip¬ tural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all scriptural passages).
19. And, moreover, it (i. e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known).
And for the following reason also the term, ‘the Self consisting of bliss,’ cannot denote either the pradhana or the individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge is joined, i. e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion, i. e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up. II, 7),^ 4 When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which ^ is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him.’ That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we understand by the Self con¬ sisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not either the pra¬ dhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.