The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there would exist no deter¬ mining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquiesce in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad actions. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, as it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions of wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions h Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that—on the doc- 1 Ragadveshamoha r&gadayas te ka, purushaw dukhadibhi^ klhyantiti kle^as tesha/rc vasana^ karmapravrfttyanuguwas t&bhir dkshipta m dharm&dilaksha«aw karma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.
trine of the world having a beginning—we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.—Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in *Sruti and Smrzti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, { Let me enter with this living Self (^iva), 3 &c. ( Kh. Up. VI, 3, a). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, c the living Self 5 —a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the pranas — shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the pranas would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world’s beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those pranas? Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the pra/zas; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.—Moreover, we have the mantra,‘As the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon’ (. Ri. Saz^h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Smrzti also declares the world to be without a beginning, ‘ Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the Pur&zza also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teach¬ ers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which vedanta-sOtras.
it was to show why his view should be accepted.—Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present—Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Maya,—on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis). Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocin¬ ation, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sankhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedcinta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.
Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta¬ tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.—There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sankhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appear¬ ance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.
But, it might be said, the Sankhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhydya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 38); why, then, controvert them again?—The task—we reply—which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sankhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedantatexts.
The Sctnkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.—Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and ani¬ mate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness 1 have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spon¬ taneously into multiform modifications 2, in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.—The existence of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limita¬ tion of all effects and the like 3.
Against this doctrine we argue as follows.—If you San¬ khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point 1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. K£. 12, 13.
2 Viz. the great principle (mahat), ahankara, &c. S L Ka. 3.
8 The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the S&. K&. 15; Sa. Sfitras I, 129 ff.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like—things which according to circumstances afe con¬ ducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradh&na also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c. 1 Nor (if remem¬ bering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.
cause exists.—For the reason detailed in the above, i. e. on account of the impossibility of the 4 orderly arrangement 5 (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.—The word £ and’ (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. £ on account of the non-possibility of endowment/ &c. For it cannot be maintained 1 that all outward and inward effects are £ endowed ’ with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i. e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c. 2 And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on 3.—(Turning to the next Sarikhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunc¬ tion of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several 1 As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring there¬ from, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.
2 And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.
3 Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sarikhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.— £ If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.—And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sarikhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also/ Bh L antecedents 1; for they also are limited 2.—Further 3, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.
2. And on account of (the impossibility of) ac¬ tivity. Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.—The three gu;zas, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.—Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots—which are in their own nature nonintelligent—enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.
But, the Sankhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.—But, the Sankhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel- 1 Sawsargapurvakatvaprasanga iti guninam sa^srfsh/anekavastuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi. 2 For they limit one another.
3 To proceed to the argument ‘from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sa. K L 15).
ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.—Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sankhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?—We must, the Sankhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i. e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The 1 existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.—Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.
To all this we—the Vedantins—make the following reply.—We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed 1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per¬ ception.—Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asankya anuman&d ity aha, pravrz'ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya Manasya na pravrfttyiyrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw su^ayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw prsbadimattvam. An. Gi.
to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.—But—an objection will be raised—your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov¬ ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.—If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience.—Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.
3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence). Well, the Sankhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.—As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind; so the pradhana also, although nonintelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.
This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ‘ He who dwells in [34] b b 37° 37° the water and within the water, who rules the water within, 5 Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4; and, 4 By the command of that Akshara, O Gargt, some rivers flow to the East, 5 &c., Bri. Up. Ill, 8,9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle 1 cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide.—Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence—for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances—or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases.—If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 2,4 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a con¬ clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.
4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela¬ tion; (it cannot be active.) The three gu/zas of the Sankhyas when in a state of equi¬ poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradMna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor restrains from—action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, 1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.—Sadhyapakshanikshiptatvazra sadhyavati pakshe pravish/atvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalakshazzam, anupanyaso na vyabhi&trabhumir ity avthah. An. Gi.
IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5.
on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con¬ nected with the power of illusion (maya).
5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal). Let this be (the Sankhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instru¬ mental cause; we reply, 4 Because no such cause is ob¬ served.’ For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.
To this we make the following reply.—The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 4 Because it does not exist elsewhere.’ For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow’s body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only 1. The fact, however, is that men ako are able, by 1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow’s B b 2 37 2 applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.—For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.
6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob¬ jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).
Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sankhya’s) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ‘on account of the absence of a purpose/ For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to any thing else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse¬ quently your doctrine that the pradh&na is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different pos¬ sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy¬ ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) 1? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release 2. —If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha. 1 Anadheyatbayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihararfipati.yaya.dinyasyety artha^. An. Gi.
2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims—ex hypothesi— only at the soul’s undergoing varied experience.
state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &C. 1 —If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul) 2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con¬ sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.—If, finally, you should assume the pradhctna to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul’s power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place 3.—It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.
7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradh&na) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).
Well then—the Sankhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances—let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana.—Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old 1 I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.
2 Tritiye * pi katipayajabdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir v& bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti^ syad iti manvano dvitiyaz# pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.
8 The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sawsaranu^edat; the Bh&-mati’s reading is: Sarga^aktyanu^^edavad drz’kraktyanuM^edat.
position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.—The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release.— Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana’s part) have to be considered h— The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Miya and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas).
8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/zas).
For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible.—The condition of the pradhana 1 On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana’s activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul’s enjoyment or for its release, &c.
consists in the three guzzas, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the guzzas cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential character¬ istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the guzzas, the production of the great principle and the other effects—which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the guzzas—is impossible.
9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradh&na) being devoid of the power of intelligence. But—the Sankhya resumes—we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the guzzas to be ch iracterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the character¬ istics of the guzzas from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the guzzas are admitted to be of an unsteady nature; hence the guzzas themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.
Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sankhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.—Moreover, if the guzzas were capable of entering into the relation of mutual in¬ equality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two