Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, J.
nadfts and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it.
Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the na^/is, the pericardium and Brahman respectively), the na^is and the pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the limiting adjuncts of the soul; in them the soul’s organs abide x. For apart from its connexion with the limiting adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide any¬ where, because being non-different from Brahman it rests in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a difference between the abode and that which abides, but that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text says, ‘ With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to his Self; * which means that the sleeping person has entered into his true nature.—It cannot, moreover, be said that the soul is at any time not united with Brahman—for its true nature can never pass away—; but considering that in the state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else, as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes not 1 2. Moreover, even if we admit that there are different places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result, from that difference of place, any difference in the quality of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the ces¬ sation of special cognition; it is, therefore, more appro¬ priate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize on account of its oneness, having become united with Brah¬ man; according to the Sruti, ‘How should he know an¬ other? ’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).—If, further, the sleeping soul did rest in the na</is and the puritat, it would be impossible 1 An. Gi. explains karawani by karmawi: na^/ishu puritati kz. ^ivasyopadhyantarbhfitani karawani karmawi tish//^antity upadhyadharatvam, ^ivasya tv adharo brahmaiva.
2 But with the na</is or the pericardium only.
to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that case it would continue to have diversity for its object; according to the Sruti, i When there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other,’ &c.—But in the case of him also who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like may be reasons for absence of cognition!—What you say might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknow¬ ledged to be limited in itself; then its case would be analogous to that of Vish/zumitra, who, when staying in a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation.—Well, then, great distance, &c., residing in the adjuncts may be the reason of non-cognition!—Yes, but that leads us to the conclu¬ sion already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become one with Brahman.
Nor do we finally maintain that the naz/is, the pericar¬ dium, and Brahman are to be added to each other as being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge that the naz/is and the pericardium are places of sleep, nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is the subordinate member of some work, &c., connected with certain results. We, on the other hand, do want to prove that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state of deep sleep; that is a knowledge which has its own uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the place of deep sleep.
8. Hence the awaking from that (viz. Brahman).
And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep inva¬ riably teach that the awaking takes place from that Self. In the B ri. Up. when the time comes for the answer to the question, ‘Whence did he come back?’ (II, 1, 16), the text says, f As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all pranas come forth from that Self’ (II, 1, 20). And Kh. Up. VI, 10, 2, we read: ‘ When they have come back from the True they do not know that they have come back from the True.’ If there were optional places to which the soul might resort in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes some¬ times from the na^/is, sometimes from the pericardium, sometimes from the Self.—For that reason also the Self is the place of deep sleep.
9. But the same (soul returns from Brahman); on account of work, remembrance, text, and precept. Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking from the union with Brahman is the same which entered into union with Brahman, or another one.—The purvapakshin maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point. For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quan¬ tity of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it should be the very same drop; thus the sleeping soul, when it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul.—To this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred text, and precept; which four reasons we will treat sepa¬ rately. In the first place the person who wakes from sleep must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left un¬ finished before. Men finish in the morning what they had left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible that one man should proceed to complete work half done by another man, because this would imply too much l.
1 There would follow from it, e. g. that in the case of sacrifices occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrificers, and that consequently it would be doubtful to whom the fruit of the sacrifice, as promised by the Veda, belongs. And this would imply a stultification of the sacred text.
L 2 Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former.— In the second place the person rising from sleep is the same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day before; for what one man sees another cannot remember. And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of personal identity (atmanusmara^a) expressed in the words, 4 I am the same I was before,’ would not be possible.—In the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the same person rises again, 4 He hastens back again as he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 16); 4 All these creatures go day after day into the Brahma-world and yet do not discover it’ (. Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2 ); 4 Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again and again ’ (Kh. Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper sense only if the same soul rises again.—In the fourth place we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the in¬ junctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period, and of knowledge?—Moreover on the hypothesis of another person rising from sleep, that other person would either be a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal life in another body; in that case it would follow that the practical existence carried on by means of that body would be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B would rise in A’s body and A in B’s body), we reply that that would be an altogether useless hypothesis; for what ad¬ vantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in another?—Or else the soul rising (in A’s body) would be Ill ADHYAYA, 2 rADA, IO. 149 one which had obtained final release, and that would imply that final release can have an end. But it is impossible that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience.—Further, on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be diffi¬ cult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited for what they have done.—From all this it follows that the person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.— Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from the mass of water into which it had been poured. We admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge (of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not analogous.—Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g.
is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of distinguishing.—Moreover, what is called individual soul is not really different from the highest Self, so that it might be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop of water from the mass of water; but, as we have explained repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep as well as of waking; in the former it is like a seed, in the latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
10. In him who is senseless (in a swoon, &c.)
150 vedanta-s6tras.
there is half-union; on account of this remaining (as the only possible hypothesis).
There now arises the question of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we know only of three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body, viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep; to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul’s passing out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from vSruti nor Smr/ti; hence what is called fainting must be one of the four states mentioned.—To this we make the following reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be said to be awake; for he does not perceive external objects by means of his senses.—But, it might be objected, may not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker? Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else; so the man also who is stunned, e.g. by a blow, may be awake, but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time perceive anything else.—No, we reply,the case is different, on account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker says, ‘ For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but the arrow; ’ the man, on the other hand, who returns to con¬ sciousness from a swoon, says, 4 For such a length of time I was shut up in blind darkness; I was conscious of nothing.’ —A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright; while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake.—Nor, in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is alto¬ gether unconscious.—Nor, in the third place, is he dead; for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive Ill ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, TO. I 51 neither warmth nor breath, they conclude that he is dead, and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it; if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath, they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him with cold water so that he may recover consciousness.— That a man who has swooned away is not dead follows, moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious life); for from Yama’s realm none ever return.—Let us then say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead!—No, we reply; this also is impossible, on account of the different characteristics of the two states. A man who has become senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time; his body trembles; his face has a frightful expression; his eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, his body does not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by a gentle stroking with the hand; a person lying in a swoon not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness and sleep have different causes; the former is produced by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that stunned or swooning people are asleep.—It thus remains for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swoon¬ ing, &c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence) \ as it coin¬ cides in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not coincide in so far as it has different characteristics.—But how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c., be called half-coincidence (with deep sleep)? With regard to deep sleep scripture says, ‘ He becomes united with the True 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, 8, i); ‘Then a thief is not a thief’ (Bn. Up.
IV, 3, 21 ); ‘ Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds ’ (. Kh. Up. VIII, 4, i). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but 1 Viz. with deep sleep, as will be explained below.
vedanta-sOtras.
they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a swoon; hence we must maintain that, on account of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place, not only half-union.—To this we make the following reply. —We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman; but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (un¬ requited) work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the senseless person); if no work remains, breath and warmth depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union.—The ob¬ jection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is without much weight; for as that state occurs occasionally only it may not be generally known. All the same it is known from ordinary experience as well as from the ayurveda (medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth state is due to its being avowedly compounded of other states.
ii. Not on account of (difference of) place also twofold characteristics can belong to the highest; for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without any difference).
We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of 5 ruti, the nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts.—The scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double character; some indicate that Brahman is affected by dif¬ ference, so, e.g. ‘ He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes’ {Kh. Up. Ill, 14,2); others, that it is without difference, so, e.g. 4 It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long,’ &c. (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Have we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brahman has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either, that it is affected with difference, or without difference? This is the point to be discussed.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in conformity with the scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double nature is to be ascribed to Brahman.
To this we reply as follows.—At any rate the highest Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics; for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is im¬ possible to admit that one and the same thing should by itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c.,and should not possess them.—Nor is it possible that Brahman should possess double characteristics ‘on account of place,’ i.e. on account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as earth, &cc. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an alto¬ gether different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a limiting adjunct in the form of red colour; for that it is pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erro¬ neous notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely 1. Hence (as the upadhis are the product of Nescience) if we embrace either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all pas¬ sages whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman (such as, ‘It is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay,’ Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) teach that it is free from all difference.
12. If it be objected that it is not so, on account of the difference (taught by the Veda); we reply that it is not so on account of the declaration of (Brahman) 1 The limiting adjunct of the crystal, i.e. the red colour of a thing, e.g. a flower with which the crystal is in contact, is as real as the crystal itself; only the effect is an illusion.—But the limiting adjuncts of Brahman are in themselves illusion.
being not such, with reference to each (declaration of difference).
Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and does not possess double attributes either in itself or on account of difference of station.—Why not?—‘ On account of difference.’ The various vidyas teach different forms of Brahman; it is said to have four feet ( Kh. Up. Ill, 18, i); to consist of sixteen parts (Pr. Up. VI, 1); to be charac¬ terised by dwarfishness (Ka. Up. V, 3); to have the three worlds for its body (B ri. Up. I, 3, 22); to be named Vaijvanara ( Kh. Up. V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit that Brahman is qualified by differences also.—But above it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold characteristics!—That also does not contradict our doctrine; for the difference of Brahman’s forms is due to its limiting adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which refer to those differences would be objectless.
All this reasoning, we say, is without force ‘on account of the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each/ i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the follow¬ ing: ‘This bright immortal person in this earth, and that bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed is the same as that Self’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 1). It, therefore, cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman with various forms is taught by the Veda.
13. Some also (teach) thus.
The members of one jakha also make a statement about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by a censure of the perception of difference, ‘ By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to death 3 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19). Others also (‘By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been de¬ clared to be threefold, and this is Brahman/ 5 Vet. Up. I, 12) record in their text that the entire world, characterised by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman for its true nature.—But as among the scriptural passages referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form, how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not also the contrary?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
14. For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on account of this being the main purport of scripture.
Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form, colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form, and so on.—Why?— 4 On account of this being the main purport (of scripture)/— 4 It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8); ‘That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay 1 (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 4 He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which forms and names are, that is Brahman’ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1); ‘That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 4 That Brahman is without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and om¬ niscient’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19). These and similar passages have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as nonconnected with any world, and have not any other purport, as we have proved under I, 1,4. On the ground of such passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brah¬ man is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class, they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however, contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those of the other kind.—This is the reason for our deciding that although there are two different classes of scriptural texts, Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not