1 From which it appears that the iTMndogya enjoins throughout a meditation on the syllable Om which is only a part of the udgitha; while the object of meditation enjoined in the Br/'hadarazzyaka is the whole udgitha.
2 Viz. for the purpose of making out that the object of medita¬ tion is the same in the ^andogya and the Brzhad-arazzyaka.
X 95 impossibly be an udgatrz, and that on that account our inter¬ pretation of the Brzhad-clra;zyaka passage is erroneous; for with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent the prana as udgatrz as well as udgitha. And, moreover, the Udgcltrz* actually performs his work by the strength of his breath; hence the pra;za may be called udgatrz. In accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24), 4 He sang it indeed as speech and breath.’—And if we understand that the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities of expression that only one matter is intended to be ex¬ pressed. To quote an analogous instance from the karmaka/zda: In the section relative to the unexpected rising of the moon during the dans-a-sacrifice, as well as in the section about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the follow¬ ing one, 4 He is to divide the grains into three portions, and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,’ &c.; nevertheless it follows from the difference of the introductory passages of the two sections that the offerings to be made on account of the moon’s rising are indeed not connected with the divinities of the dan*a-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new sacrifice separate from the darsa), while the section about him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial performance h—Analogously a difference in the nature of the introductory clauses effects a difference of the vidyas, 4 As in the case of that which is greater than great.’ That means: Just as the meditation on the udgitha enjoined in the passage, 4 Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest; he is indeed the udgitha, greater than great, he is without end’ (Kk. Up. 1,9,1), and the other meditation on the ud¬ githa as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye and the sun, &c. ( Kh. Up. I, 6), are separate meditations, although in both the udgitha is identified with the highest Self; so it is with vidyas in general. The special features of different vidyas are not to be combined even when the Cp. Taitt. Samh. II, 5, 5, 2; Pu. Mi. Su. VI, 5, 1. O 2 vidy&s belong to one and the same >Sakha; much less then when they belong to different Vakhas.
8. If it be said (that the vidyas are one) on account of (the identity of) name; (we reply that) that is explained (already); moreover that (identity of name) is (found in the case of admittedly separate vidyas).
Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two vidyas discussed must be admitted, since they are called by one and the same name, viz. ‘ the science of the udgitha.’ —But this argument is of no avail against what has been said under the preceding Sutra. The decision there advo¬ cated has the advantage of following the letter of the revealed text; the name ‘ udgitha-vidya ’ on the other hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the vidyds for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason that the word ‘ udgitha * is met with in the text.—More¬ over, we observe that admittedly separate meditations such as the two mentioned under the last Shtra have one and the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial performances, such as the agnihotra, the darrapur/zamasa, and so on, are all comprised under the one name Ka/Zzaka, merely because they are recorded in the one book called Ka^/zaka.—Where, on the other hand, there is no special reason for assuming the difference of vidyas, their unity may be declared on the ground of identity of name; as, e.g. in the case of the Saz/zvargavidyas.
9. And on account of the (omkara) extending over the whole (Veda), (the view that the term udgitha expresses a specialisation) is appropriate.
In the passage, ‘Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha,’ the two words ‘ omkara ’ and ‘ udgitha ’ are placed in co-ordination h The question then arises 1 Samanadhikarazzya, i. e. literally, ‘ the relation of abiding in a common substratum/—The two words are shown to stand in that relation by their being exhibited in the same case.
whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these two words stand to each other is the relation of super¬ imposition (adhyasa) or sublation (apavada) or unity (ekatva) or specification (vuesha;/a); for prima facie each of these relations may present itself to the mind.—Adhyasa takes place when the idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is superimposed on that of the first thing; so that together with the superimposed idea the former idea remains attached to the thing on which the second idea is super¬ imposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the superimposition of the idea of the god Vish/zu on a statue of Vishnu. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea of the udgitha may be superimposed on the omkara or the idea of the omkara on the udgitha.—We, in the second place, have apavada when an idea previously attached to some object is recognised as false and driven out by the true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later—and expressed by judgments such as ‘Thou art that’—that the idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgitha may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versa.—The relation would, in the third place, be that of 4 unity 5 if the terms f omkara 5 and 4 udgitha 5 were co-extensive in mean¬ ing; just as the terms, c the Best of the Twice-born/ ‘ the Brahma;za,’ 4 the god among men, 5 all denote an individual of the noblest caste.—The relation will, finally, be that of specification if, there being a possibility of our understand¬ ing the omkara in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas, the term 4 udgitha’ calls up the idea of the sphere of action of the udgatrz. The passage would then mean, 4 Let a man meditate on that omkara which is the udgitha, 5 and would vedanta-sCtras.
be analogous to an injunction such as ‘ Let him bring that lotus-flower which is blue.’
All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the question must remain an unsettled one.
To this purvapaksha-view the Sutra replies, ‘And on account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate/ The word ‘ and ’ stands here in place of ‘ but/ and is meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable; the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be adopted.—The objections lying against the first three alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyasa we should have to admit that the word which expresses the idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense, but in an implied sense 1; and we should moreover have to imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind 2. Nor can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as scripture itself mentions it in the passage, ‘He becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires ’ (I, 1, 7); for this passage indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the udgitha on the omkara, but of the meditation in which the omkara is viewed as the fulfilment of desires.—Against the hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong know¬ ledge can certainly not be alleged as such; for we see no reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkara is udgitha and not omkara or vice versa should be bene¬ ficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other is moreover not even possible in our case; for to the omkara the idea of the omkara remains always attached, and so to the udgitha the idea of the udgitha. The passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true 1 I.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word udgitha means, by implication, the omkara.—Recourse may be had to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly impossible.
2 For a special adhyasa-meditation must be attended with a special result.
nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a certain kind.—The hypothesis of unity again is precluded by the consideration that as in that case one term would suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term ‘ udgitha 5 is never used to denote the omkara in its connexion with the J?/g-veda and Ya^ur-veda; nor is the word ‘omkara’ used to denote that entire second sub¬ division of a saman which is denoted by the word ‘ udgitha.* Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different words only denoting one and the same thing.—There thus remains the fourth alternative, ‘On account of its compris¬ ing all the Vedas.’ That means: In order that the omkara may not be understood here as that one which comprises all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word ‘ udgitha,’ in order that that omkara which constitutes a part of the udgitha may be apprehended.—But does not this inter¬ pretation also involve the admission of implication, as according to it the word ‘ udgitha ’ denotes not the whole udgitha but only a part of it, viz. the omkara?—True, but we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case, we embrace the alternative of adhyasa, we have to assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the alternative of specification, the implication connected there¬ with is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense denotes the whole being understood to denote the part. And that words denoting the whole do duty for words denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence; the words ‘ cloth,’ ‘ village,’ and many others are used in this fashion 1.—For all these reasons we declare that the appro¬ priate view of the iTMndogya-passage is to take the word ‘ udgitha’ as specialising the term ‘ omkara V 1 We say, e.g. ‘ the doth is burned/ even if only a part of the cloth is burned.
2 We therefore, according to Sankara, have to render the passage io. Those (qualities which are attributed to the subject of a vidya in one 6akha only) (are to be inserted) in other places (also), since (the vidyas) are non-different on the whole.
In the colloquy of the pranas recorded by the Va^asaneyins and the.Oandogas the pra^a, endowed with various qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed to the pra^a also, ‘ If I am the richest thou art the richest,’ &c. Now in other Sakhas also, as e.g. that of the Kaushitakins, the former set of qualities such as being the best and so on is ascribed to the pra^a (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, ‘Now follows the Ni/^reyasadana,’ &c.), but at the same time the latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is not mentioned.—The question then is whether those quali¬ ties which are mentioned in some places only are, for the purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where nothing is said about them.
They are not so to be inserted, the purvapakshin main¬ tains, on account of the employment of the word ‘ thus.’ In the Kaushitakin-text we meet with the clause, ‘He who knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in pra^a.’ Now the word ‘thus’ which here indicates the object of knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off, and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in other.Sakhas only. We therefore maintain that each of the colloquies of the pranas must be considered complete with the qualities stated in itself.
To this we make the following reply. The qualities mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other cor¬ responding texts also, ‘ Since on the whole they are nondifferent,’ i. e. because the prana-vidyas are recognised to be the same in all essential points. And if they are the same, under discussion as follows, ‘ Let a man meditate on the syllable Om which is (i. e. which is a part of) the udgitha.’
Ill ADHyAyA, 3 PADA, IT.
why should the qualities stated in one not be inserted in the others also?—But how about the objection founded by the purvapakshin on the employment of the word ‘ thus? 5 — Although it is true, we reply, that the word ‘ thus ’ in the Kaushitakin-brahma^a does not denote the set of qualities mentioned in the Va^asaneyin-brahma^a, yet that set of qualities is denoted by the ‘thus 5 met with in the Va^asaneyin-brahma;za, while the vidya is, as proved by us, one and the same; hence no difference has to be made between qualities mentioned in one’s own.Sakha and qualities men¬ tioned in another Sakha, as long as the vidya is one and the same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted by the text. The qualities declared in one Sctkha are valid for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them.
And through better acquaintance his qualities will become manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly the qualities stated in one Sakha may, through special application, be inserted in another Sakha.—Hence the attri¬ butes belonging to one and the same subject have to be combined wherever that subject is referred to, although they may be expressly stated in one place only.
ii. Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to Brahman everywhere).
Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand only those qualities which actually are mentioned there, or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman mentioned anywhere.
The purvapakshin maintains that only the attributes actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each particular scriptural text.—But this view the Sutrakara dis¬ cards by declaring that delight and all the other qualities which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclu¬ sion is the one given in Sutra 10. In all the passages treat¬ ing of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is one, non-different; hence, as explained at length under the preceding Sutra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is spoken of.
But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its head, &c., would have to be ascribed to Brahman every¬ where; for we read in the Taittiriyaka with reference to the Self consisting of Bliss, ‘Joy is its head, satisfaction is its right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk, Brahman is its tail, its support’ (II, 5).
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
12. (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so on have no force (for other passages); for increase and decrease belong to plurality (only).
Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on, which are recorded in the Taittiriyaka, are not to be viewed as having force with regard to other passages treating of Brahman, because the successive terms, ‘Joy,’ 4 Satisfaction,’ 4 Great Satisfaction,’ 4 Bliss,’ indicate qualities possessing lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is room only where there is plurality; and Brahman is without all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages (‘ One only, without a Second’).—Moreover, we have already demonstrated under I, 1, 12, that having joy for one’s head and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of fixing one’s mind on it, not as themselves being objects of Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 13.
PADA, 13.
contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are not valid everywhere 1.—That the AMrya refers to them, in the Sutra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are attributes of the anandamaya ko^a) is merely done for the purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended to all attributes of Brahman—also the undoubted ones— which are stated with a view to a special form of meditation only; such as the quality of being that towards which all blessings go ( Kh. Up. IV, 15, 2), or he whose desires are true ( Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). For those passages may all indeed have to do with the one Brahman as the object of medi¬ tation, but as owing to the different nature of the opening sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella; there also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of ministration themselves are distinct and have each their own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having true desires and the like which are mentioned in some particular place only have no validity for other meditations on Brahman.
13. But other (attributes are valid for all passages relative to Brahman), the purport being the same.
Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages referring to Brahman; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman 1 For if they are not real attributes of Brahman there is all the less reason to maintain them to be universally valid. The mere means of fixing the mind, moreover, are special to each separate upasana.
whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation.
14. (The passage, Kanaka I, 3, 10, gives informa¬ tion about the person) for the purpose of pious meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of the objects being higher than the senses and so on).
We read in the Kanaka (I, 3,10), c Higher than the senses are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind, &c. &c.; higher than the person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road/—Here the doubt arises whether the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding one, or only that the person is higher than all of them.
The purvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects and so on. The objection that the assumption of the passage intend¬ ing to represent many things as successively superior to their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sen¬ tences may represent many things as superior to their antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority of something to other things.
To this we reply as follows.
We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimat¬ ing only that the person is higher than everything. Any information as to the relative superiority of the preceding members of the series would be devoid of all purpose; for of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the know¬ ledge, on the other hand, of the person being higher than the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And so scripture also says, c He who has perceived that is freed from the jaws of death’ (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated only to the end of giving information about the person.— ‘ For the purpose of pious meditation,’ i.e. for the purpose of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its antecedent. For the passage under consideration does not teach pious meditation by itself.
15. And on account of the word ‘ Self/ The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance that the person under discussion is called the Self in I, 3, 12, 4 That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.’ From this we conclude that the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp minds only.—Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 4 A wise man should keep down speech and mind,’ enjoins pious medi¬ tation as a means of the knowledge of the highest person, as we have explained under I, 4, 1.—It thus follows that scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enu¬ merated.—The passage, moreover, 4 He reaches the end of his journey and that is the highest place of Vishnu,’ sug¬ gests the question as to who is the end of the journey and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumera¬ tion of the senses, objects, &c., has merely the purpose of teaching the highest place of Vish;zu (not of teaching any¬ thing about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on).
16. The (highest) Self has to be understood (in Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1), as in other places; on account of the subsequent (qualification).
We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, 1), 4 Verily, in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing vedAnta-s£tras.
else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters, the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.’—Here the doubt presents itself whether the term ‘ Self’ denotes the highest Self or some other being.
The purvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected sense of the whole passage.—But, an objection is raised, an examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that the highest Self is meant; for the passage says that before the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was preceded by thought.—No such conclusion is possible, the purvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements, of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That the worlds are meant by the terms c water,’ &c., appears from the subsequent clause (4), ‘ That water is above the heaven,’ &c.—Now Sruti and Smrzti teach that the creation of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord dif¬ ferent from—and superintended by—the highest Self; cp.
e.g. B ru Up. 1,4,1, ‘ In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person,’ and the Smrzti-passage, ‘ He is the first embodied soul, he is called the person; he the prime creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from Brahman.’ And the Aitareyins themselves record in a pre¬ vious prakara/za (II, 1, 3, 1, ‘ Next follows the origin of seed. The seed of Pra^apati are the Devas ’) that this manifold creation was accomplished by Pra^apati. That to the latter being the word ‘ Self ’ is sometimes applied appears from the passage quoted above from the B ri. Up. And Pra^apati also may be spoken of as being before the creation one only, if we consider that then his products did not yet exist; and thought also may be ascribed to him as he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the passages, ‘ He led a cow towards them; he led a horse towards them; he led man towards them; then they said, 5 &c. (11,4, 2), which are in agreement with what is known about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs belonging to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka also some such qualified Self is meant.
To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aita¬ reyaka ‘as in other places.’ As in other accounts of the creation (‘ From that Self ether was produced,’ Taitt. Up. II, 1, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other cases where the term ‘Self’ is applied to particular Selfs, the ‘ Self within 5 (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in the first place; so it is here also.—In those passages, on the other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attri¬ bute, such as ‘having the shape of a person,’ we must un¬ derstand that some particular Self is meant.—In the Aitare¬ yaka, however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, ‘He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds.’—Hence we maintain that the highest Self is meant.
17. Should it be said that on account of the con¬ nected meaning (of the whole passage) (the highest Self cannot be meant); (we reply that) it is so, on account of the assertion. We now have to refute the objection, made above by the purvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant ‘ on account of the connected meaning of the passage.’—The Sutrakara remarks, ‘ It is so, on account of the assertion.’ That means: It is appropriate to understand the passage as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently to the elements; just as we showed above (11,4, x ) that the passage, ‘ It sent forth fire,’ must be understood to say that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether vedAnta-s6tras.
and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if only the chief subject of the passages is the same.—The details about the activity of the Self referred to by the purvapakshin have likewise to be understood in such a way as to agree with the general matter about which the text de~ sires to make assertions. For we must by no means assume that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of the story on their own account; the knowledge of them would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different worlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so on, were created; explains thereupon the origination of the organs and the body, their abode; and shows how the creator having thought, c How can all this be without me?’