1 And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken.
2 Which latter would be the case if we should take the two genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative identification of the man and the sacrifice.
3 If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the sacrifice; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice.
teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and in the second place that the Self and the other beings enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see that the passage, ‘Of him who thus knows,’ &c., follows upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self coupled with sazzznyasa, we apprehend that the Taittiriyaka-chapter is not an independent vidya but merely supplementary to the instruction previously given. In agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Taittiriyaka promises only one result for both chapters, viz. the one stated in the passage, ‘ He obtains the greatness of Brahman.’—On the other hand the text embodying the purusha-vidya in the jOandogya is an independent text; for we see that an independent result is attached to it, viz. an increase of length of life, ‘ He who knows this lives on to a hundred and sixteen years.’—Hence the particulars mentioned in the purusha-vidya of another vSakha, such as formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be com¬ bined with the Taittiriya-text of the vidya.
25. Because the matter (of certain mantras) such as piercing and so on is different (from the matter of the approximate vidyds) (the former have not to be combined with the latter).
At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Atharvazzikas the following mantra is recorded, £ Pierce him (the enemy) whole, pierce his heart: crush his veins, crush his head; thrice crushed,’ &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Tazzz/ins we have the mantra, c O God Savitar, pro¬ duce the sacrifice.’ At the beginning of that of the 5 a/yayanins, ‘ Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass/ &c.; at the beginning of that of the Ka//zas and theTaittiriyakas, 'May Mitra be propitious to us and Varuzza/ &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Va^asaneyins we have a Brahma/za-passage about the pravargya-ceremony, ‘ The gods indeed sat down to a sattra; ’ and at the begin¬ ning of that of the Kaushitakins there is a Brahmazza-passage about the agnish/oma, ‘Brahman indeed is the Agnishfoma, Brahman is that day; through Brahman they pass into Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.’— The point to be inquired into with reference to all these mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brahma/^a-passages is whether they are to be combined with the vidyas (contained in the Upanishads) or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that they are so to be combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to the Upanishad-portions of the Brahma/zas whose chief contents are formed by the vidyas.—But we do not observe those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as sub¬ ordinate members of the vidyas!—True, but in spite of this we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected with the vidyas. For we have no right to set aside the fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can be established on it.—But we are unable to see that the mantras have anything to do with the vidyas, and how can it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the pravargya which scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices, and so on, stand in any relation to the vidyas!—Never mind, the purvapakshin replies. In the case of mantras we can always imagine some meaning which connects them with the vidyas; the first mantra quoted, e. g. may be viewed as glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the body are often represented, in the vidyas, as abodes of meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c., may appropriately form subordinate members of those vidyas. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be enjoined with reference to vidyas, so, e.g. the mantra, ‘I turn to Bhu /5 with such and such 5 (. Kh. Up. Ill, 15, 3).
Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion with other occasions; yet there is no reason why they should not also be applied to the vidyas, just as the offering called Brzhaspatisava is a subordinate part of the Va^apeya-sacrifice h To this we make the following reply. The mantras and 1 The Bnhaspatisava, although enjoined with special reference to him who is desirous of Brahmavar^as, is yet at the same time a subordinate part of the Va^apeya-sacrifice. Cp. Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3 > 2 9 - ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion with the vidyas, 4 because their matter, such as piercing the heart, &c., is different (from the matter of the vidyas)/ and therefore cannot be connected with the latter.—But has it not been said above that the mantras may be connected with the meditations enjoined in the vidyas, on the ground of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c.?— The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like; but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted, e. g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is there¬ fore to be connected, not with the vidyas of the Upanishads, but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The mantra of the Ta/zafins again, ‘ O God Savitar, produce the sacrifice, 5 indicates by its very words that it is connected with some sacrifice; with what particular sacrifice it is connected has to be established by other means of proof.
Similarly other mantras also—which, either by ‘ indica¬ tion 5 (linga), or ‘syntactical connexion 5 (vakya), or some other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to certain sacrificial actions—cannot, because they occur in the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyas on the ground of mere proximity. For that ‘ proximity/ as a means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enun¬ ciation (Sruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former science (i.e. in the Purva Mimawsa) under III, 3, 14. Of sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are pri¬ marily enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyas with which they have nothing in common. The case of the Brzhaspatisava, quoted by the purvapakshin, is of an altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member of the Va^apeya, viz. c Having offered the Va£*apeya he offers the Brzhaspatisava/ And, moreover, if the one pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the means of proof were not apprehended; but in our case this latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength and weakness of the various means of proof is fully appre¬ hended (on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the Purva Mima^sa).—For these reasons the mentioned man¬ tras and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collo¬ cation, to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyas of the Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual colloca¬ tion with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c. as well as the vidy&s have to be studied, &c. in the woods.
26. Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by others has to be added) because the statement about the obtaining is supplementary (to the statement about the getting rid of), as in the case of the kui-as, the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e. the reason for this) has been stated (in the Purva Mimawsa).
In the text of the Ta;^ins we meet with the following passage: ‘ Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rahu, I obtain self made and satisfied the uncreated world of Brahman’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 13). Again, in the text of the Atharvamkas, we read, ‘ Then knowing, shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness, free from passion’ (Mu. Up. III. 1, 3). The Sa/yayanins read, 4 His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.’ And the Kaushitakins, 4 He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done’ (Kau. Up. I, 4).—Of these texts two state that the man who has reached true know¬ ledge rids himself of his good and evil deeds; one, that his friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respec¬ tively; and one finally declares that both things take place. [ 38 ] Q This latter text calls for no remark; nor again that one which refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good and evil deeds; for in order that they may obtain those he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a man’s shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by his friends and enemies, or not. Here the purvapakshin maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied in the two passages mentioned—firstly because the text does not state it; secondly because what other 5 akhas say about it falls within the sphere of a different vidya; and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good deeds is something done by the man himself, while the obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no right to supply the latter on the basis of the former.
To this we make the following reply. Although the text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added, because the statement concerning the latter is merely supplementary to the statement about the former, as appears from the text of the Kaushitakins.—In reply to the arguments brought forward by the purvapakshin we offer the following remarks.
The separation of the different passages would indeed have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce an injunction about something to be done, which is con¬ tained in one text only, into some other text also. But in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of— and the act of obtaining—the good and evil deeds are not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely as implying a glorification of knowledge; the intended sense being, c Glorious indeed is that knowledge through whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the sawsara, are shaken off by him who knows, and are trans¬ ferred to his friends and enemies.’ The passage thus being glorificatory only, the teacher is of opinion that, to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies— which in some passages is represented as the consequence of their being shaken off by the man who knows—must be supplied in those passages also which mention only the shaking off. That one arthavada-passage often depends on another arthavada-passage is a well-known fact; the following passage, e.g. 4 The twenty-first indeed from this world is that sun,’ would be unintelligible if no regard were paid to the other passage, ‘Twelve are the months, five the seasons, three these worlds; that sun is the twentyfirst.’ Similarly the passage, ‘The two Trish/ubh verses are for strengthening,’ necessarily requires to be taken in connexion with the other passage, ‘ Strength of the senses indeed is Trish/ubh.’ And as the statement about the obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own account), we need not insist too much on the question how the results of actions done by one man can be obtained by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is connected with their being got rid of by the man who knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge, the Sutrakara moreover indicates by making use of the expression, ‘because the statement about obtaining is supplementary to,’ &c.; for if he wished to intimate that the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man’s good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyas where it is not mentioned he would say, ‘because the fact of obtaining,’ &c. The Sutra therefore, availing itself of the opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting.
The remaining part of the Sutra, ‘ Like the kujas, the metres, the praise and the singing,’ introduces some analo¬ gous instances.—The case under discussion is analogous to the case of the kiuas 1. Those, a mantra of the Bhal- 1 I.e. according to the commentators, small wooden rods used by the Udgatrzs in counting the stotras.
Q 2 lavins (‘You ku.yas are the children of the tree, do you protect me! ’) represents as coming from trees in general, without any specification. The corresponding mantra of the vSa/yayanins on the other hand is, ‘You kuj*as are the children of the Udumbara-tree; 5 a particularizing statement which must be considered as valid for the koras in general.—Another analogous case is that of the metres. In some places no special statement is made about their order of succession; but the text of the Paingins, ‘ The metres of the Devas come first, 5 determines the general priority of the metres of the Devas to those of the Asuras 1.— Similarly the time of the stotra accompanying the perform¬ ance of the Sho^ajin-rite which in some texts is left undefined is settled by the text of the i?zg-vedins (ar k&h), £ when the Sun has half risen.’—And similarly a particu¬ larizing text of the Bhallavins defines what priests have to join in the singing; a point left unsettled in other Srutis 2.—As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to define a general text by another more particular one, we should be driven to assume optional procedure (vikalpa), and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a wellknown principle. This is stated in the Purva Mima^sasutras X, 8, 15.
The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as giving rise to a different discussion also, and the Sutra can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The question can be raised whether the ‘ shaking 5 means the getting rid of one’s good and evil deeds or something else.— The purvapaksha will in that case have to be established in the following manner. Shaking (dhu) here does not mean * getting rid of,’ since the root ‘dhu 5 according to grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or trembling; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for 1 Metres of less than ten syllables belong to the Asuras, those of ten and more to the Devas.
2 The general text is, according to the commentators, ‘The priests join in the singing;' the defining text of the Bhallavins, ‘The adhvaryu does not join in the singing/ instance, 4 the flags are shaking ’ (dodhuyante). We there¬ fore take the word in the same sense in the passages under discussion and understand by the 4 trembling ’ of the good and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain time, with their results.
To this purvapaksha we make the following reply. The word ‘shaking 5 has to be taken in the sense of 4 getting rid of,’ because it is supplemented by the statement of others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that 4 shaking 5 means 4 getting rid of. 5 And although only in some passages the statement about the obtaining is actually found in proximity to the statement about the shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason of decision (viz. that ‘shaking’ means ‘getting rid of’). Against the purvapakshin’s view we further remark that good and evil deeds cannot be said to 4 tremble ’ in the literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since they are not of substantial nature.—(Nor must it be said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking^ the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it casts anything off, for) the horse when shaking itself shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking (which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly compares the shaking (off) of evil.—Nor do we when assigning different meanings to one and the same root enter thereby into conflict with Smrzti (grammar). The clause 4 this has been stated ’ we have already explained.
27. At the (moment of) departing (he frees him¬ self from his works), there being nothing to be reached (by him, on the way to Brahman, through those works); for thus others (declare, in their sacred texts).
2 30 The Kaushitakins record in the paryanka-vidya how the man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way from his good and evil deeds, ‘ He having reached the path of the gods comes to the world of Agni,’ &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3), and later on ( 1,4), ‘ He comes to the river Vi^arS, and crosses it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil deeds.’—The question here arises whether in strict agree¬ ment with the text we have to understand that the deceased man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he departs from his body.
The letter of the text favouring the former alternative, the Sutrakara rebuts it by declaring ‘ at the going, 5 i.e. at the time of departing from the body the man frees himself, through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the words,‘On account of the absence of anything to be reached.’ For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the way through his good and evil works, and we therefore have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced during a certain number of moments. We rather have to conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by the power of the latter; and that hence the moment of their destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the fruit of his knowledge (i.e. the world of Brahman).—The conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in the text of the Kaushitakins.—Thus other Vakhas also, as that of the Tkndms and Sa/yayanins, declare that he frees himself from his deeds at an earlier stage; cp. the passages, ‘ Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, 5 and ‘ His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done. 5 28. And because (on the above interpretation) 23I there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man’s making an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually freeing himself) according to his liking.
Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way—after having departed from the body and having entered on the path of the gods —we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities; for after the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish, according to his liking, that effort which consists in selfrestraint and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and con¬ sequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made— and its result takes place —at an earlier moment, viz. in the state in which man is able to effect it, and that in conse¬ quence thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds.
Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption moreover agrees with the statements of the Ta/z^ins and Sa/yayanins.
29. A purpose has to be attributed to the going (on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner; otherwise there would be contradiction of scripture. In some scriptural texts the (dead man’s) going on the path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing himself from good and evil; in other texts it is not men¬ tioned. The doubt then arises whether the two things go together in all cases or only in certain cases.—The purvapabshin maintains that the two are to be connected in all cases, just as the man’s freeing himself from his good and evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his friends and enemies.
To this we make the following reply. That a man’s going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only. His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men, in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. Ill, i, 3, ‘ Shaking off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest unity,’ refers to actual going through which another place is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason. For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not to be reached by a man transporting himself to another locality.
30. (The twofold view taken above) is justified because we observe a purpose characterised thereby (i.e. a purpose of the going); as in ordinary life.
Our view of the matter, viz. that a man’s proceeding on the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not in others, is justified by the following consideration. In meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the paryankavidya we see a reason for the man’s proceeding on the path of the gods; for the text mentions certain results which can be reached only by the man going to different places, such as his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the path of the gods has anything to do with perfect know¬ ledge. For those who have risen to the intuition of the Selfs unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below, have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the body; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the gods would be purposeless.—The distinction is analogous to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach some village we have to proceed on a path leading there; but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain freedom from sickness.—The distinction made here will be established more carefully in the fourth adhyaya.
31. There is no restriction (as to the going on the path of the gods) for any vidya; nor any contradiction (of the general subject-matter), according to scripture and inference (i.e. Smrzti).
We have shown that the going on the path of the gods is valid only for the vidyas of the qualified Brahman, not for the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of all qualities.—Now we observe that the going on the path of the gods is mentioned only in some of the qualified vidyas, such as the paryanka-vidya, the pa;X£agni-vidya, the upakoj-ala-vidya, the dahara-vidya; while it is not men¬ tioned in others,such as the madhu-vidya,the ici/zzfilya-vidya, the sho^ai'akala-vidya, the vauvanara-vidyct.—The doubt then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to be connected with those vidyas only in which it is actually mentioned or generally with all vidyas of that kind.
The purvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of each particular section compels us to connect the going on the path of the gods with those vidy&s only which actually mention it If we transferred it to other vidyas also, the authoritativeness of scripture would suffer; for then any¬ thing might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the details about the path of the gods beginning with light and so on are given equally in the upakoj*ala-vidya and the pazz/fagni-vidya, which would be a useless repetition if as a matter of course the going on the path of the gods were connected with all vidyas.
To this we make the following reply. The going on the path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected equally with all those qualified vidyas which have exaltation (abhyudaya) for their result. The objection above raised by the purvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and Sm/'zti. Scripture in the first place declares that not only those ‘who know this,’ i.e. the pazz/£agni-vidya ( Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who understand other vidyas, ‘ and also those who in the forest follow faith and austerities.’—But how do we know that the latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other vidyas? The text certainly speaks of those only who are intent on faith and austerities!—Not by faith and austerities alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be attained; for another scriptural passage says, 4 Through knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge’ (Nat. Bra. X,5, 4, id). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities denote at the same time other vidyas.—The Va^'asaneyins again read in the Pa£/£agni-vidya, ‘ Those who thus know this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.’ The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean, ‘ Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e. Brahman; 5 the term ‘the True’ being often employed to denote Brahman. And as those who know the pa?X£agnividya are in the above passage referred to as ‘ those who thus know this,’ we must understand the clause, c and those who in the forest,’ &c., as referring to men in the possession of other vidy&s. And, moreover, also the passage, £ Those, however, who know neither of these two paths become worms, birds, and creeping things ’ (VI, 2, 16), which teaches that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards, intimates that those who possess other vidyas have to pro¬ ceed either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers, and as their vidyas are as such not different from the pa/zMgni-vidya, we conclude that they proceed on the path of the gods (not on that of the fathers) 1.
In the second place Smrfti also confirms the same doctrine, £ These two, the white and the black path, are known as the eternal paths of the world; on the one man goes not to return, on the other he again returns ’ (Bha. Gi. VIII, 26).
With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details about the path of the gods are given in the Upako^ala- 1 Ita^ k& vidjantara^ilina^ gatir iti lingadar^ana^ samu^inoti atheti, etan iti vidyantarapara gr/hyante, tathapi katha m devayanayogas tesham ity a^ankya yogyatayety aha tatrapiti. An. Gi.
vidya as well as the Pa/zMgni-vidya, we remark that the repetition is meant to assist reflection.
For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods is not limited to those vidyas in which it is actually mentioned.
32. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts.
The question here is whether for him who has reached true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted with the old one or not.—But, an objection is here raised at the outset, there is really no occasion for inquiring whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self from all bodies or not; not any more than there is room for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after the process of cooking has reached its due termination; or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or not.—Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the inquiry proposed, as we know from itihasa and pura/za that some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new bodies. Tradition informs us, e. g. that Apantaratamas, an ancient rishi and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the order of Vishnu, born on this earth as Krishna. Dvaipayana at the time when the Dvctparayuga was succeeded by the Kaliyuga. Similarly Vasish/^a, the son of Brahman’s mind, having parted from his former body in consequence of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again procreated by Mitra and Varu//a. Smrzti further relates that Bhrz'gu and other sons of Brahman’s mind were again born at the sacrifice of Varwza. Sanatkumara also, who likewise was a son of Brahman’s mind, was, in consequence of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda. And there are similar tales about Daksha, Narada, and others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies. Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and arthavadas of Nruti. Of some of the persons mentioned it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body had perished; of others that they assumed, through their