There is, however, the following difference between the two passages. The AV/andogya-vidya has for its object the qualified Brahman, as we see from the passage VIII, 1, 6, ‘ But those who depart from hence after having dis¬ covered the Self and those true desires,’ in which certain desires are represented as objects of knowledge equally as the Self. In the Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, the highest Brahman devoid of all qualities forms the object of instruction, as we conclude from the consideration of the request made by (kanaka, c Speak on for the sake of eman¬ cipation,’ and the reply given by Ya^avalkya, £ For that person is not attached to anything’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 15). That the text ascribes to the Self such qualities as being the Lord of all and the like is (not for the purpose of teaching that the Self really possesses those qualities, but is) merely meant to glorify the Self. Later on also (IV, 5? i 5 ) the chapter winds up with a passage clearly referring to the Self devoid of all qualities, 4 That Self is to be described by No, no! J But as the qualified Brahman is (fundamentally) one (with the unqualified Brahman), we must conclude that the Sutra teaches the combination of the qualities to the end of setting forth the glory of Brahman, not for the purpose of devout meditation.
40. On account of (the passage showing) respect, there is non-omission (of the pra/zagnihotra) (even when the eating of food is omitted). We read in the iTMndogya under the heading of the Vauvanara-vidya, 4 Therefore the first food which comes is in the place of Homa. And he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Pra/za, saying Svclhct’ ( Kh. Up. V, 19, 1). The text thereupon enjoins five oblations, and later on applies to them the term 4 Agnihotra; 5 4 He who thus knowing this offers the agnihotra,’ and ‘As hungry children here on earth sit round their mother, so do all beings sit round the agnihotra ’ (V, 24, 2; 4).
Here the doubt arises whether the agnihotra offered to the pranas is to be omitted when the eating itself is omitted or not.—As, according to the clause, 4 The first food which comes,’ &c., the oblation is connected with the coming of food, and as the coming of food subserves the eating, the agnihotra offered to the pranas is omitted when the eating is omitted.—Against this conclusion the Sutra (embodying the purvapaksha) declares, 4 It is not omitted.’—Why?— ‘ On account of the respect.’ This means: In their version of the Vauvanara-vidya the Cabalas read as follows: 4 He (i. e. the host) is to eat before his guests; for (if he would make them eat first) it would be as if he without having himself offered the agnihotra offered that of another person.’ This passage, which objects to the priority of the eating on the part of the guests and establishes priority on the part of the host, thereby intimates respect for the agnihotra offered to the pra/zas. For as it does not allow the omission of priority it will allow all the less the omission of that which is characterised by priority, viz.
the agnihotra offered to the pra/zas.—But (as mentioned above) the connexion—established by the iT/zandogyapassage—of the oblation with the coming of food—which subserves the eating—establishes the omission of the oblation in the case of the eating being omitted!—Not so, the purvapakshin replies. The purpose of that passage is to enjoin some particular material (to be offered). For the fundamental agnihotra certain materials, such as milk and so on, are exclusively prescribed. Now, as through the term ‘ agnihotra 5 (which the text applies to the offering to the prazzas) all the particulars belonging to the funda¬ mental agnihotra are already established for the secondary agnihotra also (viz. the oblation made to the prazzas), just as in the case of the ayana of the Kuzz^apayins 1; the clause, 'the first food which comes,’ &c., is meant to enjoin, for the prazzagnihotra, some particular secondary matter, viz. the circumstance of food constituting the material of the oblation 2. Hence, considering the Mimazzzsa principle that the omission of a secondary matter does not involve the omission of the principal matter, we conclude that even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the prazzas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the Mimazzzsa principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted.
To this purvapaksha the next Sutra replies.
41. When (eating) is taking place, (the pra^agnihotra has to be performed) from that (i.e. the food first eaten); on the ground of the passage declaring this.
When eating is actually taking place,' from that/ i.e. with that material of food which first presents itself, the agni¬ hotra offered to the prazzas is to be effected.—On what 1 For one of the great sacrifices lasting a whole year—called the ayana of the Kuzz^/apayins—the texts enjoin the offering of the 'agnihotra’ during a full month (cp. e.g. Tazz^/ya Mahabrahmazza XXV, 4). Now from the term ‘agnihotra’ we conclude that all the details of the ordinary agnihotra are valid for the agnihotra of the ayana also.
2 Whereby the materials offered in the ordinary agnihotra are superseded.
ground?—‘ On the ground of the passage declaring this.’ For the clause, ‘ The first food which a man may take is in the place of a homa,’ enjoins the circumstance of the obla¬ tions to the pranas being effected by means of a material (primarily) subserving another purpose (viz. eating), as appears from its referring to the presentation of food as something accomplished (i. e. accomplished independently of the oblations; not tending to accomplish the oblations). How then should these oblations—which are characterised as not having any motive power with regard to the employ¬ ment of the food—be capable of causing us to substitute, in the absence of eating, some other material (than food)?— Nor is it true that there are already established, for the prazzagnihotra, all the details belonging to the fundamental agnihotra. In the case of the ayana of the Kuzz^apayins, the term ‘agnihotra’ forms part of the injunctive pas¬ sage, ‘ They offer the agnihotra during a month,’ and therefore may have the force of enjoining a general character of the sacrifice identical with that of the funda¬ mental agnihotra; and it is therefore appropriate to con¬ sider the details of the latter as valid for the agnihotra of the Kuzzz/apayins also. In the case of the so-called prazzagnihotra, on the other hand, the term ‘ agnihotra’ occurs in an arthavada-passage only, and does not therefore possess an analogous injunctive force. If, again, we admitted that the details of the fundamental agnihotra are valid for the prazzagnihotra also, such details as the transference of the fire (from the garhapatya fire to the two other fires) would be likewise valid. But this is impossible, as the transference of the fire is made for the purpose of establishing a fire¬ place in which the oblations are made; in our case, on the other hand, the oblations are not made in the fire at all— because that would interfere with their being used as food, and because they are connected with a material procured for the purpose of eating,—but are made in the mouth (of the eater). Thus the text of the Cabalas also, ‘ He is to eat before the guests,’ shows that the accomplishment of the oblation has the mouth for its abode. For the same reason (i. e. because the details of the fundamental agnihotra are not valid for the prazzagnihotra) the text declares the sub¬ ordinate members of the agnihotra to be present here (i.e.
in the prazzagnihotra) in the way of fanciful combination only, ‘ the chest is the vedi, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharyapa^ana fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.’ By the vedi mentioned in this passage we have to understand a levelled spot, as in the fundamental agnihotra there is no vedi, and as the intention of the passage is to effect a fanciful combi¬ nation of the members of the fundamental agnihotra (with members of the prazzagnihotra).—And as the prazzagnihotra is connected with eating which has its definite times, it is also not possible that it should be restricted to the time enjoined for the fundamental agnihotra. In the same way other particulars also of the fundamental agnihotra, such as the so-called upasthana, cannot be reconciled with the re¬ quirements of the pr&zzagnihotra. From all this it follows that the five oblations, as connected with their respective mantras, materials, and divinities, have to be performed only in the case of food being eaten.—With reference to the pas¬ sage showing 6 respect,’ we remark that it is meant to inti¬ mate priority (of the host), in the case of food being actually eaten. But the passage has no power to declare that the offering of the prazzagnihotra is of permanent obligation.— It therefore is a settled conclusion that the prazzagnihotra is omitted when the eating of food is omitted.
42. There is non-restriction of the assertions concerning them (i.e. the assertions made concerning certain sacrificial acts are not permanently connected with those acts), because this is seen (in scripture); for a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction (of the success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them).
We meet in the Vedanta-texts with certain vidyas which are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To this class belongs, e. g. the first vidya of the iTMndogya Upanishad, c Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgitha.’—We now enter on an inquiry whether those vidyas are permanently connected with the acts in the same way as the circumstance of being made of par;/a-wood is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the ^uhu (the sacrificial ladle) is used; or if they are non¬ permanent like the vessel called godohana L The purvapakshin maintains that the meditations are permanently connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning performances. For they also do not stand under some special heading 1 2, and as they are connected with the sacrifice through the udgitha and so on, they combine themselves, like other subordinate members, with the scriptural state¬ ments as to the performance of the sacrifice.
If against the doctrine of the meditations forming per¬ manent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be urged, that in the chapters containing them special results are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations into independent acts), as e.g. in the passage, ‘he indeed becomes a fulfiller of desires’ ( Kh. Up. I, 1, 7); we reply that those statements of results being given in the text in the present form only (not in an injunctional form), are mere 1 The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are per¬ manently connected with the latter, i. e. are to be undertaken when¬ ever the sacrificial act is performed, or not.—In the former case they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the par^amayitva, i.e. the quality of being made of par«a-wood, does. Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the guhu —the sacrificial ladle,—so the meditation on the syllable Om, e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable. —In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the sacrifice on certain occasions only, the upasana is analogous to the godohana-vessel which is used in the danrapurwamasa-sacrifice instead of the usual ^amasa, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for cattle.—See Pu. Mi. Sft. Ill, 6, 1; IV, 1, 2.
2 Like the statement about the panzamayitva of the guhiX which the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular prakara^a, but ex abrupto as it were; on which account it is to be connected with the sacrifice in general.
arthavada-passages—like the statement about him whose ^uhu is made of par/za-wood hearing no evil sound—and thus do not aim at enjoining certain results.—Hence, just as the statement about being made of parzza-wood—which does not occur under a definite prakara/za—connects itself, by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice; so the meditations on the udgitha, &c., also form permanent parts of the sacrifices.
To this we make the following reply. ‘There is non¬ restriction of the assertions concerning them.’ That means: the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as the udgitha and so on—as e. g. that the udgitha is the best of all essences ( Kh. Up. I, i, 3), the fulfiller of desires (I, 1, 7), a gratifier of desires (I, 1, 8), the chief prazza (I, 2, 7), Aditya (I, 3,1)—cannot be permanently connected with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent members are, ‘because that is seen,’ i. e. because scripture shows that they are not so permanently connected. For scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions (cp. the passage I, 1, 10, ‘ Therefore both he who knows this,and he who does not,perform the sacrifice’),and declares that even those priests, Prastotrz and so on, who are devoid of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastava and the like, do perform the sacrifices c Prastotrz, if you without knowing the deity which belongs to the prastava are going to sing it,’ &c. (I, 10, 9 and ff.).—The sacred text moreover declares that the vidyas founded on certain elements of sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those acts, viz. ‘ non-obstruction ’ in the accomplishment of the fruit of the sacrifice, i. e. a certain additional success of the sacrifice, cp. the passage I, 1, 10, ‘Therefore he who knows this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful.’ The declaration made in this passage 2 55 that the performances of him who knows and of him who does not know are separate, and the employment of the comparative form ( f more powerful ’) show that even the sacrifice destitute of the vidy& is powerful. But how would that be possible if the vidya formed a permanent necessary part of the sacrifice? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid of that vidya could never be admitted to be powerful; for it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in the section treating of the meditation on the Saman as the worlds and others: 4 The worlds in an ascending and in a descending line belong to him/ &c. (Kh. Up. II, 2, 3).— Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be mere arthavadas; for in that case they would have to be taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if under¬ stood to teach certain results they may be taken in their principal (i. e. direct, literal) sense 1. The case of the results which scripture declares to be connected with the praya^as e. g. is of a different nature. For the praya^as are en¬ joined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the dans*apur/zamasa) which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as the offering of the praya£*as and the like), and hence sub¬ serve that sacrifice; so that the passage stating a fruit for the praya^as has to be considered as a mere arthavada-passage 2. In the case again of the quality of consisting of parzza-wood—which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under a definite heading—no special result can be assumed; for as a quality is not an act it cannot be connected with any result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of 1 The statement as to the result of an action is a ‘ statement of a principal matter ’ if it is really meant to inform us that a certain result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a ‘secondary matter’ if it is only meant to glorify the action.
2 Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the praya^as; for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the danrapur/zamasa and have no special result of their own.
result, for it does possess such an abode—viz. the act of water being carried (in it)—with reference to which it is enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood; for this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case of the quality of consisting of parzza-wood there is no such established abode under the heading of which that quality is enjoined; and if we assumed that the sentence (‘ He whose ^uhu is made of parzza-wood hears no evil sound ’) after intimating that the quality of consisting of parzza-wood resides in the^uhu is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof, we should impute to the text the imperfection called c split of the sentence/—The meditations on the other hand are themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunc¬ tion; hence there is no reason why a special result should not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the medi¬ tations on the udgitha, &c., although based on sacrifices, are yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel. For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sutras have not represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial performances.
43. As in the case of the offerings, (Vayu and Pra^a must be held apart). This has been ex¬ plained (in the Purva Mima^sa-sutra).
The section of the Va§*asaneyaka which begins, ‘Voice held, I shall speak’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 21), determines Prazza to be the best among the organs of the body, viz. speech and so on, and Vayu to be the best among the Devas, viz. Agni and so on.—Similarly in the AVzandogya, Vayu is affirmed to be the general absorber of the Devas, ‘Vayu in¬ deed is the absorber’ (IV, 3, 1), while Prazza is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body, ‘ Breath indeed is the absorber’ (IV, 3, 3).—The doubt here arises whether Vayu and Prazza are to be conceived as separate or not.
As non-separate, the purvapakshin maintains; because in their true nature they do not differ. And as their true nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon separately. Another scriptural passage also declares that the organs of the body and the divinities are non-different in their true nature, ‘ Agni having become speech entered the mouth, 5 &c. (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4). Moreover, the passage Bri. Up. I, 5,13, 4 These are all alike, all endless, 5 declares that the powers of the Devas constitute the Self of the organs of the body. And various other passages also testify to the fundamental non-difference of the two. In some places we have even a direct identification of the two, ‘ What Pra/za is, that is Vayu. 5 And in the doka concluding the Va^asaneyaka-chapter to which the passage under discussion belongs, the text refers to prazza only (‘ He verily rises from the breath and sets in the breath ’), and thus shows the breath to be one with the previously men¬ tioned Vayu. This conclusion is moreover confirmed by the fact that the observance enjoined in the end refers to prazza only, ‘ Therefore let a man perform one observance only, let him breathe up and let him breathe down 5 (Bri. Up. I, 5, 23). Similarly, the iTMndogya-passage, IV, 3, 6, ‘ One god swallowed the four great ones, 5 intimates that there is one absorber only, and does not say that one god is the absorber of the one set of four, and another the absorber of the other set of four.—From all this it follows that Vayu and Prazza are to be conceived as one.
To this we make the following reply. Vayu and Prazza are to be conceived separately, because the text teaches them in separation. The separate instruction given by the text with reference to the organs and the Devas for the purposes of meditation would be meaningless if the medi¬ tations were not held apart.—But the purvapakshin main¬ tains that owing to the essential non-difference of Vayu and Prazza the meditations are not to be separated!—Although, we reply, there may be non-difference of true nature, yet there may be difference of condition giving rise to dif¬ ference of instruction, and, through the latter, to difference of meditation. And although the introduction of the con¬ cluding j-loka may be accounted for on the ground of its [38] S showing the fundamental non-difference of the two, it yet has no power to sublate the previously declared dif¬ ference of the objects of meditation. Moreover, the text institutes a comparison between Vayu and Prazza, which again shows that the two are different, ‘And as it was with the central breath among the breaths, so it was with Vayu, the wind among those deities ’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 22).—This explains also the mention made of the observance (I, 5, 23). The word c only 5 (in ‘ Let a man perform one observance only ’) has the purpose of establishing the observance with regard to Prazza, by sublating the observances with regard to speech and so on, regarding which the text had re¬ marked previously that they were disturbed by Death (‘ Death having become weariness took them ’), and does not by any means aim at sublating the observance with regard to Vayu; for the section beginning £ Next follows the consideration of the observances’ distinctly asserts that the observances of Vdyu and Prazza were equally unbroken.—Moreover, the text, after having said, ‘ Let a man perform one observance only,’ declares in the end that the fruit of that observance is the obtaining of (union with) Vayu (‘ Then he obtains through it union and one¬ ness with that deity and thus shows that the observance with regard to Vayu is not to be considered as sublated. That by that ‘deity’ we have to understand Vayu, we conclude from the circumstance that what the worshipper wishes to obtain is non-limitation of his Self 1, and that previously the term ‘deity’ had been applied to Vayu, ‘Vayu is the deity that never sets.’—Analogously in the AT/zandogya-passage the text represents Vayu and Pr 4 zza as different, ‘ These are the two absorbers, Vayu among the Devas, Prazza among the prazzas,’ and in the concluding para¬ graph also (IV, 3,8) refers to them as distinct, ‘These five and the other five make ten, and that is the Krzta.’—For these reasons Vayu and Prazza are to be conceived as different.
The Sutra compares the case under discussion to a 1 Agnyadin apekshyanavaM^ino devo vayus te tu tenaivavakkhmrA iti sazzzvargaguzzo vayur anava^inna devata. An. Gi.
parallel one from the karmaka;z^a, by means of the clause, ‘ as in the case of the offerings.’ With regard to the ish/i comprising three sacrificial cakes, which is enjoined in the passage, Taitt. Samh. II, 3, 6, ‘ A puroa^a on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the over-ruler, to Indra the self-ruler/ it might be supposed that the three cakes are to be offered together because they are offered to one and the same Indra, and because the concluding sentence says, ‘ conveying to all (gods) he cuts off to pre¬ clude purposelessness.’ But as the attributes (viz. ‘ruler’ and so on) differ, and as scripture enjoins that the yagya and anuvakyamantras are to exchange places with regard to the different cakes 1, the divinity is each time a different one according to the address, and from this it follows that the three offerings also are separate.—Thus, in the case under discussion, Vayu and Pra^a, although fundamentally non-different, are to be held apart as objects of meditation, and we have therefore to do with two separate medita¬ tions.—This is explained in the Sankarsha-ka/z^a, ‘The divinities are separate on account of their being cognized thus.’
But while in the case of the three puro^/a^as the dif¬ ference of material and divinity involves a difference on the part of the oblations, we have in the case under discussion to do with one vidya only; for that the text enjoins one vidya only we conclude from the introductory and con¬ cluding statements. There is contained, however, in this one vidya a double meditative activity with regard to the bodily organs and the divinities, just as the agnihotra which is offered in the morning as well as in the evening requires a double activity. In this sense the Sutra says, ‘as in the case of the offerings.’
44. On account of the majority of indicatory marks (the fire-altars built of mind, &c. do not form elements of any act); for this (i. e. the indicatory 1 The yagya-mantra of the first offering being used as anuvakya in the second one and so on.
26 o mark) is stronger (than the general subject-matter); this also (has been explained in the Pu. Mi. Sutras). In the Agnirahasya of the Va^asaneyins, in the Brahmazza beginning ‘ for in the beginning indeed this was not exis¬ tent/ we read with reference to mind (manas), ‘ It saw thirtysix thousand shining fire-altars, belonging to itself, made of mind, built of mind/ And, further on, the text makes similar statements about other fanciful fire-altars built of speech, built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of work, built of fire.—A doubt here arises whether these fire-altars built of mind and so on are connected with the act (i. e. the construction of the fire-altar made of bricks), and supplementary to it, or whether they are independent, constituting a mere vidya.
Against the primd facie view that those agnis are con¬ nected with the sacrificial act under whose heading the text records them, the Sutra maintains their independence, 6 on account of the majority of indicatory marks/ For we meet in that Brahmazza with a number of indicatory marks confirming that those agnis constitute a mere vidya; cp. e. g. the following passages: ‘ Whatever these beings con¬ ceive in their minds, that is a means for those fire-altars/ and ‘All beings always pile up those fire-altars for him who thus knows, even when he sleeps,’ and so on 1.—And that indicatory marks (linga) are of greater force than the leading subject-matter (prakara/za) has been explained in the Purva Mima//zsa (III, 3,14).
45. (The agni built of mind, &c.) is a particular form of the preceding one (i.e. the agni built of bricks), on account of the leading subject-matter; it is (part of) the act; as in the case of the manasa cup.
Your supposition, the purvapakshin objects, as to those fire-altars being not supplementary to the sacrificial act, 1 For something which forms part of an act cannot be brought about by something so indefinite as ‘ whatever these beings conceive in their minds/ nor can it be accomplished indifferently at any time by any beings.
26l but altogether independent of it, is untenable. The in¬ fluence of the leading subject-matter rather compels us to conclude that the instruction given by the text about the agni made of mind and so on, enjoins some particular mode of the same agni which the preceding sections describe as the outcome of a real act 1.—But are not indicatory marks stronger than the leading subject-matter?—True in general; but indicatory marks such as those contained in the pas¬ sages quoted above are by no means stronger than the general subject-matter. For as those passages are of the nature of glorifications of the fanciful fire-altars, the lingas (have no proving power in themselves but) merely illustrate some other matter (viz. the injunction to which those passages are arthavadas); and as they are of that nature they may, there being no other proof, be taken as mere guzzavadas, and as such are not able to sublate the influence of the prakara/za. On the ground of the latter, therefore, all those fanciful agnis must be viewed as forming parts of the sacrificial action.