the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of the means of proof—general subject-matter and so on— which determine such subordinate relation?—The purvapakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, on the ground of the means of proof called vakya (sentence; syntactical unity ) 1. But this we deny because in the present case ‘ sentence ’ has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacri¬ fices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of ‘sentence,’ through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application 2; but the agent is an inter¬ mediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice.—Your objection is not valid, the purvapakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible the entire sacrifice. Analogously in the case of the sazwskara— the anointing—which fits the sacrificer for performing the sacrifice, and in the case of the praya^as and anuya^as which are merely subordinate members of the danrapur/zamasa.
1 The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole, in which the agent is the same.
2 Thus the quality of being made of parzza-wood is connected with the sacrifices on the ground of the vakya implied in ‘ yasya par/zamayi guhur bhavati,’ because here we have as an intermediate link the guhu, i. e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices only, and therefore is not of too wide an application.
were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there.— But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to the Self, such as £ free from sin/ and the like, it appears that the doctrine of the Upanishads refers to that Self which stands outside the sa^sara and cannot therefore be subordinate to activity.—This objection too is without force; for what the Upanishads teach as the object of cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly referred to in such terms as ‘dear’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 5). Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand, may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of that Self.—But in more than one place Brahman, the cause of the world, which is additional to the trans¬ migrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration has been established, and the Upanishads teach that this very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the trans¬ migrating Self!—True, that has been established; but in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their refutation are again set forth with reference to the question as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self).
3. On account of scripture showing (certain lines of) conduct. c Uanaka the king of the Videhas sacrificed with a sacri¬ fice at which many presents were given to the priests’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 1, 1); ‘Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice’ (Kh. Up. V, 11, 5)5 these and similar passages—which occur in sections that have another purport—show that those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial action also. And similarly we apprehend from the fact that according to scripture Uddalaka and others taught their sons and so on, that they were connected with the condition of life of householders. If mere knowledge could effect the purpose of man, why should the persons men¬ tioned have performed works troublesome in many respects?
‘ If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should he go to the forest? ’ 4. Because scripture directly states that.
‘ What a man does with knowledge, faith and the Upanishad is more powerful’ ( Kh. Up. I, 1, 10); this passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to work 1, and from this it follows that mere knowledge cannot effect the purpose of man.
5. On account of the taking hold together.
‘Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him 5 ( Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2); as this passage shows that knowledge and work begin together to manifest their fruits, it follows that knowledge is not independent.
6. And because scripture enjoins (works) for such (only as understand the purport of the Veda). ‘ He who has learnt (lit. “ read ”) the Veda from a family of teachers, according to the sacred injunction, in the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the Guru; who after having received his discharge has settled in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred spot 5 ( Kh. Up. VIII, 15); such passages also show that those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified for sacrificial action, and that hence knowledge does not independently bring about a result—But the expression ‘ who has read 5 directly states only that the Veda is read, not that its purport is understood!—Not so, we reply. The reading of the Veda extends up to the comprehension of its purport, as thus the reading has a visible purpose 2 * *.
7. And on account of definite rules.
* Performing works here (i. e. in this life) let a man wish to live a hundred years; thus work will not cling to thee, man; there is no other way than that’ (tra. Up. 2); ‘ The 1 For the instrumental case ‘ vidyaya 5 directly represents know¬ ledge as a means of work.
2 According to the Mima^sa principle that, wherever possible, actions enjoined must be understood to have a visible purpose (a supersensuous result being admitted only where no visible result can be made out).
[38] U Agnihotra is a sattra lasting up to old age and death; for through old age one is freed from it or through death ’ (6at. Bra. XII, 4, 1, 1); from such definite rules also it follows that knowledge is merely supplementary to works.
Against all these objections the Sfitrakara upholds his view in the following Sutra.
8. But on account of (scripture teaching) the additional one (i.e. the Lord), (the view) of Badaraya/za (is valid); as that is seen thus (in scriptural passages). The word £ but ’ discards the purvapaksha.—The assertion made in Sfitra 2 cannot be maintained ‘ on account of the text teaching the additional one.’ If the Vedanta-texts taught that the transmigrating embodied Self which is an agent and enjoyer is something different from the mere body, the statements as to the fruit of the knowledge of the Self would, for the reasons indicated above, be mere arthavadas. But what the Vedanta-texts really teach as the object of knowledge is something different from the embodied Self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is free from all attributes of transmigratory existence such as agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin and so on, the highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self does not only not promote action but rather cuts all action short, as will be declared in Sutra 16. Hence the view of the reverend Badarayazza which was stated in Sutra 1 remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning about the subordination of knowledge to action and the like. That the Lord who is superior to the embodied Self is the Self many scriptural texts declare; compare £ He who perceives all and knows all* (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 4 From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises’ (Taitt. Up. II, 8); ‘ It is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt’ (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2); ‘By the command of that imperishable one, O Gargi’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 9); £ It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3). There are indeed passages in 29I 29I which the transmigrating Self—hinted at by such terms as ‘dear*—is referred to as the object of knowledge, such as 8 But for the love of the Self everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 8 He who breathes in the up-breathing he is thy Self and within all’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘The person that is seen in the eye that is thy Self/ up to 8 But I shall explain him further to you’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 7 ff.). But as there are at the same time complementary passages connected with the passages quoted above—viz. ‘There has been breathed forth from this great Being the Rig-ve da, Ya^ur-veda,’ &c. (B ri. Up. II, 4, 10); 8 He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow, passion, old age and death ’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 5, 1); 8 Having approached the highest light he appears in his own form. That is the highest person’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3)—which aim at giving instruction about the superior Self; it follows that the two sets of passages do not mean to teach an absolute difference of the two Selfs and that thus con¬ tradiction is avoided. For the Self of the highest Lord is the real nature of the embodied Self, while the state of being embodied is due to the limiting adjuncts, as appears from scriptural passages such as 8 Thou art that; ’ 8 There is no other seer but he.’ All which has been demonstrated by us at length in the earlier parts of this commentary in more than one place.
9. But the declarations (of scripture) are equal (on the other side). In reply to the averment made in Sutra 3, we point out that there are declarations of scripture, of equal weight, in favour of the view that knowledge is not complementary to action. For there are scriptural passages such as, 8 Knowing this the rishis descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the Ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra; ’ and 8 When Brahma^as know that Self and have risen above the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as men¬ dicants’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 5). Scripture moreover shows that U 2 Ya^avalkya and others who knew Brahman did not take their stand on works. ‘Thus far goes immortality. Having said so Ya^Tzavalkya went away into the forest’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15). With reference to the indicatory sign (as to the dependence of knowledge to work) which is implied in the passage, ‘ Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice/ we remark that it belongs to a section which treats of Vabvanara. Now, the text may declare that a vidya of Brahman as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works; but all the same the vidya does not stand in a subordinate relation to works since ‘leading subject-matter’ and the other means of proof are absent.
We now reply to the averment made in Sutra 4.
10. (The direct statement is) non-comprehensive. The direct scriptural statement implied in ‘ What a man does with knowledge’ &c. does not refer to all knowledge, as it is connected with the knowledge forming the subjectmatter of the section. And the latter is the knowledge of the udgitha only, ‘ Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha.’
11. There is distribution (of the work and know¬ ledge) as in the case of the hundred.
In reply to the averment (Sutra 5) that the passage, ‘ Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him,’ indicates the non-independence of knowledge, we point out that the passage must be understood in a distributed sense, knowledge taking hold of one man and work of another. The case is analogous to that of the ‘ hundred.’ When it is said, ‘ Let a hundred be given to these two men,’ the hundred are divided in that way that fifty are given to one man and fifty to the other.—Moreover what the text says about the laying hold does not refer to him who is about to obtain final release; for the concluding passage, ‘ So much for the man who desires,’ indicates that the whole section refers to the soul implicated in the sa^sara, and a new beginning is made for him who is about to be released, in the clause, ‘ But as to the man who does not desire. 5 The clause about the laying hold thus comprises all knowledge which falls within the sphere of the trans¬ migrating soul whether it be enjoined or prohibited 1, since there is no reason for distinction, and to all action whether enjoined or prohibited, the clause embodying a reference to knowledge and work as established elsewhere. And on this interpretation there is room for the clause even without our having recourse to the distribution of knowledge and work.
The next Sutra replies to the averment made in Sutra 6.
12. Of him who has merely read the Veda (there is qualification for works).
As the clause, ‘ Having learnt (read) the Veda from a family of teachers, 5 speaks only of the reading, we de¬ termine that acts are there enjoined for him who has only read the Veda.—But from this it would follow that on account of being destitute of knowledge such a person would not be qualified for works!—Never mind; we do not mean to deny that the understanding of sacrificial acts which springs from the reading of the texts is the cause of qualification for their performance; we only wish to establish that the knowledge of the Self derived from the Upanishads is seen to have an independent purpose of its own and therefore does not supply a reason of qualification for acts. Analogously a person who is qualified for one act does not require the knowledge of another act.
Against the reasoning of Sutra 7 we make the following remark. 13. There being no specification (the rule does) not (specially apply to him who knows).
In passages such as ‘ Performing works here let a man live 5 &c., which state definite rules, there is no specification 1 Pratishiddha £a nagnastridanranadirupa. An. Gi. — Pratishid¬ dha £a yathasa^Mstradhigamanalakshawa (not ‘ yatha sa^Mastra 5 as in the Biblioth. Indica edition). Bhamati.
VEDANTA-stlTRAS.
of him who knows, since the definite rule is enjoined with¬ out any such specification.
14. Or else the permission (of works) is for the glorification (of knowledge).
The passage 6 Performing works here’ may be treated in another way also. Even if, owing to the influence of the general subject-matter, only he who knows is to be viewed as he who performs works, yet the permission to perform works must be viewed as aiming at the glorifica¬ tion of knowledge; as appears from the subsequent clause, 4 no work clings to the man/ The meaning of the entire passage thus is: To a man who knows no work will cling, should he perform works during his whole life even, owing to the power of knowledge. And this clearly glorifies knowledge.
15. Some also by proceeding according to their liking (evince their disregard of anything but know¬ ledge). Moreover some who know, having obtained the intuition of the fruit of knowledge, express, in reliance thereon, the purposelessness of the means of all other results, viz. by proceeding according to their liking (and abandoning those means). A scriptural text of the Va^asaneyins runs as follows: ‘ Knowing this the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this Self and this world’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22). And that the fruit of knowledge, being present to intuition, does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits of actions do, we have explained more than once. From this also it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to action, and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense.
16. And (scripture teaches) the destruction (of the qualification for works, by knowledge).
Moreover scripture teaches that this whole apparent world-—which springs from Nescience, is characterised by actions, agents and results of actions and is the cause of all qualification for works—is essentially destroyed by the power of knowledge. Compare such passages as 4 But when all has become the Self of him, wherewith should he see another, wherewith should he smell another?’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15). For him now who should teach that the qualification for works has for its necessary antecedent the knowledge of the Self which the Ved&nta-texts teach, it would follow that the qualification for works is cut short altogether. From this also it follows that knowledge is independent.
17. And (knowledge belongs) to those who are bound to chastity; for in scripture (that condition of life is mentioned). Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for those stages of life for which chastity is prescribed. Now in their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work because work is absent; for the works prescribed by the Veda such as the Agnihotra are no longer performed by men who have reached those stages.—But, an objection is raised, those stages of life are not even mentioned in the Veda!—This is not so, we reply. Certain Vedic passages clearly intimate them; so e. g. ‘ There are three branches of the law’ ( Kh. Up. II, 23, 1); ‘Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity’ {Kh. Up. V, 10, 1); ‘Those who practise penance and faith in the forest ’ (Mu. Up. I, 10, 11); ‘Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth ’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22); ‘Let him wander forth at once from the state of studentship.’—That the stages requiring chastity are open to men whether they have reached householdership or not, and whether they have paid the debts (of procreating a son, &c.) or not, is known from scripture and Smrzti. Herefrom also follows the independence of knowledge.
18. (Taimini (considers that scriptural passages mentioning those stages of life in which chastity is obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages); they are not injunctions; for (other scriptural pas¬ sages) forbid (those stages).
The Vedic texts which have been quoted to the end of showing the existence of the stages of life on which chastity is binding—such as c There are three branches of the law 5 and so on—have no power to establish those stages. For the teacher Gaimini is of opinion that those passages contain only a reference to the other stages of life, not an injunction (of them).—Why?—Because they contain no words expressive of injunction such as imperative verbal forms, and because each of them is seen to have some other purport. In the passage, ‘There are three’ &c., the text at first refers to three stages of life (‘ Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first ’ &c. &c.), thereupon declares them not to have unbounded results ( c All these obtain the world of the blessed ’), and finally glorifies ‘ the state of being grounded on Brahman ’ as having unbounded results (‘the Brahmasa#zstha obtains immortality’).—But is not a mere reference even sufficient to intimate the existence of those stages of life?—True; but they are established (enjoined) not by direct scriptural statements, but only by Smrzti and custom, and therefore when contradicted by direct scriptural statement 1 are either to be disregarded or else to be viewed as concerning those who (for some reason or other) are disqualified (for active worship, sacrifices and the like).—But together with the stages demanding chastity the text refers to the condition of the householder also 2.
(‘Sacrifice,study, and charity are the first.’)—True; but the existence of the state of the householder is established (not by that passage but) by other scriptural passages, viz. those which enjoin on the householder certain works such as the Agnihotra. Hence the reference in the passage under discussion aims at glorification only, not at injunction.
1 Such as that concerning the permanent obligation of the Agni¬ hotra and so on.
2 And we therefore may conclude that those stages are as valid as the—notoriously valid—state of householdership.
Moreover, direct scriptural enunciations forbid other stages of life; cp. 4 A murderer of the gods is he who removes the fire; 5 c After having brought to thy teacher his proper reward do not cut off the line of children 5 (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 1); 4 To him who is without a son the world does not belong; all beasts even know that/—Similarly the passages, 4 Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity 5 (Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), and the analogous passage (from the Mim^aka), contain instruction not about the other stages of life but about the going on the path of the gods. And of clauses such as 4 austerity is the second 9 it is doubtful whether they speak of a stage of life at all. And a passage like 4 Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth/ does not enjoin the wandering forth but merely glorifies that world.—But there is at any rate one scriptural text which directly and unambiguously enjoins the condition of life of the wandering mendicant, viz. the one of the Cab&las, 4 Let him wander forth at once from the state of studentship/—True, but our discussion is carried on without reference to that passage.
19. (The other stage of life) is to be accom¬ plished, (according to) Badaraya^a; on account of the scriptural statement of equality. The teacher Badaraya^a is of opinion that that other stage of life is something to be accomplished. The view that there is a contradiction because the other stage of life is stated in the Veda and, on the other hand, works such as the Agnihotra must necessarily be performed, and that, in order to remove this contradiction, that other stage of life must be entered upon by those only who are not qualified for active worship, he rejects; being of opinion that that other stage is to be entered upon, in the same way as the state of the householder, even by him who does not wish to do so.—On what ground?— 4 On account of the scriptural statement of equality/ For we have a passage (viz. ‘There are three branches of the law/ &c.) which refers equally to that other stage as to the state of the householder. As the state of the householder which is enjoined in other passages only is here referred to, so also that other stage of life. The case is analogous to the reference made to the wearing of the sacrificial thread round the neck or on the right shoulder—which two modes are established in other scriptural passages—in a passage the purpose of which it is to enjoin the wearing of the thread on the left shoulder. The other stage must therefore be entered upon in the same way as the state of the house¬ holder.—Analogously in the passage, £ Wishing for that world only mendicants leave their homes,’ the last stage of life is mentioned together with the study of the Veda, sacrifice and so on, and in the passage, £ Those who in the forest,’ &c., with the knowledge of the five fires.—The remark, made above by the purvapakshin, that in such passages as £ austerity is the second ’ there is unambiguous reference to a further stage of life, is without force, since there is a reason enabling us to determine what is meant.
The text proclaims in the beginning that there are three subdivisions ( £ There are three branches of the law’). Now the sacrifice and the other duties (which the text enumerates subsequently to the introductory clause) can, because they are more than three, and rest on separate originative injunctions, be comprised within the three branches only if they are connected with one of the stages of life. Now the terms £ sacrifice ’ and so on indicate that the stage of householdership constitutes one branch of the law, and the term £ Brahma/£arin ’ clearly denotes another stage; what then remains but to assume that the term £ austerity ’ also denotes a stage of life, viz. the one in which austerity is the chief thing? Analogously the reference to the forest—in the passage, £ Those who in the forest/—indicates that by the austerity and faith mentioned there we have to understand that stage of life in which austerity and faith are the chief thing.—From all this it follows that the further stage of life has to be gone through, even if the passage under discussion should do nothing but refer to it.
20. Or (the passage rather is) an injunction, as in the case of the carrying (of the firewood).
Or the passage is rather to be understood as containing an injunction, not a mere reference.—But, an objection is raised, if we assume it to be an injunction we thereby oppose the conception of the entire passage as a coherent whole, while yet the passage has clearly to be conceived as constituting such a whole, viz. as meaning that while the three branches of the law have for their result the world of the blessed, the condition of being grounded in Brahman has immortality for its result.—True, but all the same we must set aside the conception of the passage as a whole—well founded as it is—and assume it to be an injunction. For it is a new injunction because no other injunction is observed, and as the conception of the other stage of life clearly arises from the passage it is impossible to interpret it as a coherent whole by means of the assumption that it is a mere gu?zavada \ The case is analogous to that of the c carrying.’ There is a scriptural text (relating to the Agnihotra which forms part of the mahapitrzya^a), c Let him approach carrying the firewood below (the ladle holding the offering); for above he carries it for the gods.’ Now this passage may be conceived as an unbroken whole if we view it as referring to the carrying below only; nevertheless we determine that it enjoins the carrying above because that 1 In the clause ‘ vidhyantaradanranat ’ I can see nothing more than an explanation of—or reason for—the < apurvatvat/ If we viewed the passage as glorifying the brahmasazzzsthata compared to the three branches of the law through the statement of its supersensuous results (so that it would constitute an arthavada of the kind called guzzavada), we should indeed preserve the unity of the passage—which is destroyed if we view it as enjoining the different stages of life. But all the same the latter explanation is the true one; for a glorificatory passage presupposes an injunctive one, and as no such injunctive passage is met with elsewhere, it is simpler to assume that the present passage is itself injunctive than to con¬ strue (on the basis of it if viewed as a guzzavada) another injunctive passage. (In Ananda Giri’s gloss on this passage—Biblioth. Indica edition—read ‘vihitatvopagamaprasaktya’ and ‘stutilakshazzayaika 0.’)
is not enjoined anywhere else 1. This is explained in the chapter treating of ‘ complement,’ in the Sutra, ‘But it is an injunction/ &c. (Pu. Mim. Su.). In the same way we assume that our passage referring to the different a^ramas is an injunctory passage only.
Even if (to state an alternative conclusion) the passage contains references only to the other a^ramas, it must be viewed as enjoining at any rate the condition of being grounded in Brahman, owing to the glorification of that condition. The question here arises whether that state belongs to any one comprised within the four a^ramas, or only to the wandering mendicant. If now a reference to the mendicant also is contained within the references to the a^ramas up to the Brahma^arin (i. e. the three dramas the text refers to before the passage about the brahmasa^stha); then, as all four a^ramas are referred to equally and as somebody not belonging to any airama could not possibly be called brahmasaz^stha, it follows that the term ‘ brahmasazzzstha ’ denotes any one standing within one of the four a^ramas. If, on the other hand, the mendicant is not comprised within the references to the three asramas, he alone remains, and this establishes the conclusion that the brahmasaz/zstha is the mendicant only. (We therefore have to inquire which of the two alternatives stated has to be adopted.)—Here some maintain that the term ‘ austerity 5 which denotes the hermit in the woods implies a reference to the mendi¬ cant also. But this is wrong. For as long as any other explanation is possible, we must not assume that a term which expresses a distinctive attribute of the hermits living in the forest comprises the wandering mendicants also. Both the Brahma/£arin and the householder are 1 The ekavakyata is preserved if we take the clause from ‘ above’ as an arthavada meant to give the reason why in sacrifices offered to the Fathers the firewood has to be carried below. Nevertheless the clause must be taken as a vidhi enjoining the carrying above in all sacrifices offered to the gods, because this particular is not enjoined elsewhere.
referred to by distinctive terms applying to them only, and we therefore expect that the mendicant and the hermit also should be referred to by analogous terms. Now ‘austerity* is a distinctive attribute of the hermits living in the woods; for the principal conventional meaning of the word 4 austerity * is mortification of the body. The distinctive attribute of the mendicant, on the other hand, viz. restraint of the senses and so on, cannot be denoted by the term ‘austerity.* Moreover it would be an illegitimate assumption that the dramas which are known to be four should here be referred to as three.
And further the text notifies a distinction, viz. by saying that those three reach the world of the blessed, while one enjoys immortality. Now there is room for such a distinc¬ tion if the hermits and the mendicants are separate; for we do not say ‘ Devadatta and Ya^adatta are stupid, but one of them is clever,* but we say ‘Devadatta and Ya^adatta are stupid, but Vishmimitra is clever.’ The passage therefore has to be understood in that sense, that those belonging to the three former dramas obtain the world of the blessed, while the remaining one, i. e. the wandering mendicant, enjoys immortality.—But how can the term ‘ brahmasa^stha,* which according to its etymological meaning may be applied to members of all a^ramas, be restricted to the mendicant? and, if we agree to take it in its conventional meaning, it follows that immortality may be reached by merely belonging to an a^rama, and hence that knowledge is useless!—To these objections we make the following reply. The term ‘ brahmasa^stha * denotes fulfilment in Brahman, a state of being grounded in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activity. Now such a state is impossible for persons belonging to the three former dramas, as scripture declares that they suffer loss through the non-performance of the works enjoined on their ajrama. The mendicant, on the other hand, who has discarded all works can suffer no loss owing to non¬ performance. Such duties as are incumbent on him, viz.
restraint of the senses and the like, are not opposed to the state of being grounded in Brahman, but rather helpful