Smrzti also says, ‘No higher road is possible for any one; for they speak of inequality only where there are qualities.’—The repetition of the clause ‘ on account of the assertions as to that condition ’ indicates the termina¬ tion of the adhyaya.
FOURTH ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
i. Repetition (of the mental functions of know¬ ing, meditating, &c., is required) on account of the text giving instruction more than once.
The third adhyaya was taken up chiefly with a discussion of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and lower vidyas. In the fourth adhyaya we shall now discuss the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some other topics also.—In the beginning, however, we shall carry on, in a few adhikara/;as, a special discussion connected with the means of knowledge. ‘Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on ’ (B ru Up. II, 4, 5); ‘ Let a wise Brahma^a after he has discovered him practise wisdom’ (B ru Up. IV, 4, 21); ‘That it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand 5 (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1).
Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises whether the mental action referred to in them is to be performed once only or repeatedly.—Once only, the purvapakshin says; as in the case of the praya^a-offerings and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is accomplished; while to practise repetitions not demanded by scripture would be to accomplish what is not the pur¬ pose of scripture.—But passages have been quoted which teach repetition ‘it is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on,’ &c.!—Let us then repeat exactly as scripture says, i. e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where scripture teaches something once only—viz. in such passages as ‘ He knows,’ ‘ Let him meditate,’ &c.—no repetition has to be practised.—To this we reply as vedanta-sOtras.
follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction contained in passages such as ‘He is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on 5 intimates the repetition of the required mental acts. — But the purvapakshin has said above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what scripture says and not to go further!—This is wrong, we reply, because all those mental activities have for their end intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the action of beating, &c., terminates in freeing the rice grains from their husks. Moreover also such terms as ‘ medi¬ tating,’ ‘ being devoted to,’ and 4 reflecting ’ denote actions in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say in ordinary life that a person 4 is devoted ’ to a teacher or a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him; and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him with longing. And (that also ‘ knowing ’ implies repetition, follows from the fact that) in the Vedanta-texts the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘meditating 5 are seen to be used one in the place of the other. In some passages the term ‘ know¬ ing ’ is used in the beginning and the term ‘ meditating 5 in the end; thus e. g. ‘He who knows what he knows is thus spoken of by me,’ and: Teach me, sir, the deity which you meditate on’ (.Kh. Up. IV, i, 4; 2, 2). In other places the text at first speaks of 4 meditating ’ and later on of ‘knowing;’ thus e.g. ‘Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,’ and 4 He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance ’ [Kh. Up. Ill, 18, 1; 6). —From this it follows that repetition has to be practised there also, where the text gives in¬ struction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is directly intimated.
2. And on account of an indicatory mark.
An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repe¬ tition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation IV ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 2.
on the udgitha, the text rejects the meditation on the udgitha viewed as the sun, because its result is one sun only, and (in the clause ‘ Do thou resolve his rays/ &c.) enjoins a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the pos¬ session of many suns (Kh. Up. I, 5, 1; 2); which shows that the repetition of meditations is something well known. Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all of them.
Here the following objection may be raised. With regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us Brahman as the universal Self characterised by eternal purity, thought, and freedom? Should it be said that repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing a text once only, we reply that in that case it will not spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text such as ‘ Thou art that’ does not originate the true notion of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the desired effect should be produced by its repetition?— Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuite Brahman as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition would be useless; for the reasoning will lead to the desired intuition even if gone through once only.—Again it will perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object known, not of its specific individual character. When, to exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart another person can infer from this statement—and certain accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs— only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to intuite its specific character; all he knows is c This man suffers a pain/ But what removes ignorance is (not vedanta-sOtras.
a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the specific character of something. And repetition serves to produce such knowledge.—This also is not so. For if so much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case they will do so even if acting once only; and repetition therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a bind¬ ing rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no case produce intuitive knowledge; for their effect will after all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition may be admitted in the case of worldly things which consist of several parts and possess generic character as well as individual difference; for there the student may grasp by one act of attention one part of the object, and by another act another part; so e. g. in the case of long chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true knowledge of Brahman whose Self is mere intelligence and which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition.
To this we make the following reply. Repetition would indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the sentence 4 Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the teacher in the.Oandogya, having given instruction in the sentence c Thou art that, O Svetaketu,’ and being again and again asked by his pupil— 4 Please, sir, inform me still more ’—removes his pupil’s reasons for doubt, and again and again repeats the instruction 4 Thou art that.’ We have already given an analogous explanation of the passage 4 The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected upon.’—But has not the purvapakshin declared that if the first enunciation of the sentence 4 Thou art that ’ is not able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will likewise fail of the desired effect?—This objection, we reply, is without force, because the alleged impossibility is not con¬ firmed by observation. For we observe that men by again and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full under¬ standing of the true sense.—Moreover the sentence 4 Thou art that 5 teaches that what is denoted by the term 4 thou 5 is identical with what is denoted by 4 that/ Now the latter term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the think¬ ing Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of the world; which is known from other passages such as 4 Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite 5 (Taitt. Up. II, i); 4 Brahman that is knowledge and bliss 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 28); 4 That Brahman is unseen, but seeing; unknown, but know¬ ing 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 11); 4 not produced 5 (Mu. Up. II, 1,2); 4 not subject to old age, not subject to death 9 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 4 not coarse, not fine; not short, not long 5 (Bn. Up. Ill, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as 4 not produced 5 deny the different phases of existence such as origination; such terms as 4 not coarse 5 deny of it the qualities of substances such as coarseness; and such terms as 4 knowledge 5 declare that the luminousness of intelligence constitutes its nature. The entity thus described—which is free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman—is known, by all students of the Vedanta, as what is denoted by the term 4 that. 5 They likewise know that what is denoted by the term 4 thou 5 is the inward Self (pratyagatman); which is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) appre¬ hended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, the sentence 4 Thou art that 5 cannot produce a right know¬ ledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the words; for them therefore the repetition of the scriptural text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose, viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words.—And although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body, the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses, the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we may discard one of these parts, and by another act of attention another part; so that a successively progressing cognition may very well take place. This however is merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self (in which there can be no successive stages).
Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of the sentence ‘ Thou art that ’ on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged.—All this might be so—an objection is raised—if cognition did spring up in any mind in the way described. (But this is not the case); for the cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all absence of pain and so on.—This objection, we reply, is without force; for it can be shown that the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less than the conceit of the body being the Self. For we clearly observe that when the body is cut or burned a wrong notion springs up, ‘ I am being cut,’ ‘ I am being burned and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c.—who are even more external to the Self than one’s own body— suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the Self. Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c.; for like the body and so on, the condition of being subject to pain is observed as something external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and the like; while scripture expressly declares that in deep sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, c And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing,’ &c. (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 22). Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, ‘ My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.’ For him who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. Thus scripture says, 4 What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smrzti also says, 4 But that man who loves the Self, is satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the Self only, for him there is no further work' (Bha. Gita III, 12 ).—For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the teaching, 4 Thou art that.’ In the mind of one on whom repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as 4 1 have a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent; this is to be done by me 1.’ But if a learner, naturally slowminded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the under¬ standing of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on.—All this establishes the conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition may be repeated.
3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us comprehend (the Lord). The Sutrak&ra now considers the question whether the highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is 1 Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is identical with Brahman s Self, to which no notions of duty or action apply.
to be understood as the 4 1 5 or as different from me.—But how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits the term £ Self’ whose sphere is the inward Self?—This term ‘Self’—a reply maybe given—maybe taken in its primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual soul and the Lord as non-different; but in the other case the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only 1.
The purvapakshin maintains that the term ‘Self’ is not to be taken as meaning the 4 1.’ For that which possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., cannot be under¬ stood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of a contrary nature.—Moreover, if the transmigrating soul constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning; while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and know¬ ledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning. The latter assumption would moreover run counter to perception and the other means of proof.—Should it be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different, they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis of scripture, just as Vishnu and other divinities are con¬ templated in images and so on; the answer is that this contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the trans¬ migrating soul.
To all this we make the following reply. The highest Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter treating of the highest Lord the Cabalas acknowledge him to be the Self, 4 Thou indeed I am, O holy divinity; I indeed thou art, O divinity! ’—In the same light other 1 And in that case the identity of the highest Self and the 4 1 * would not follow from the term 4 Self/ texts have to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord as the Self, such as ‘I am Brahman’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover certain Vedanta-texts make us comprehend the Lord as the Self, 4 Thy Self is this which is within all’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 3); ‘That is the True, that is the Self, thou art that’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7).—Nor can we admit the truth of the assertion, made by the purvapakshin, that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contem¬ plation of Vish/zu in an image. For that would firstly involve that the texts have not to be understood in their primary sense 1; and in the second place there is a difference of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the con¬ templation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning through a single enunciation such as ‘ Brahman is Mind ’ (. Kh. Up. Ill, 18, 1), or ‘ Brahman is Aditya’ (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says, f I am Thou and thou art 1 / As here the form of ex¬ pression differs from that of texts teaching the contem¬ plation of symbols, the passage must be understood as teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the express prohibition of the view of difference which a number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e. g. ‘Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10); ‘ From death to death goes he who here perceives any diversity’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19); ‘Whosoever looks for any¬ thing elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything ’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 6).—Nor is there any force in the objection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false.—Nor is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmi- 1 And this is objectionable as long as it has not been demon¬ strated that the primary meaning is altogether inadmissible.
grating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmi¬ grating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error.—Nor is it true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody is entitled to works, &c., and is contrary to perception and so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as 4 But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another? ’ &c., teach that as soon as true knowledge springs up, perception, &c., are no longer valid.—Nor do we mind your objecting that if perception, &c., cease to be valid, scrip¬ ture itself ceases to be so; for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the ground of the text, 4 Then a father is not a father’ up to ‘Then the Vedas are not Vedas’ (Bri.
Up. IV, 3, 22 ), we ourselves assume that when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to be valid.—And should you ask who then is characterised by the absence of true know¬ ledge, we reply: You yourself who ask this question!— And if you retort, 4 But I am the Lord as declared by scripture,’ we reply, £ Very well, if you have arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess such knowledge.’—This also disposes of the objection, urged by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience.
Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the Self.
4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contem¬ plated); for he (the meditating person) (may) not (view symbols as being the Self).
4 Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman; this is said with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether as Brahman; this is said with reference to the Devas ’ (Kh. Up. Ill, 18, 1); ‘Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine’ (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); 4 He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Kk. Up. VII, t, 5). With regard to these and similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that it is right to apprehend the Self in them also because Brahman is known from scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well.
We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea of Brahman. For he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the nature of the Self.—Nor is it true that the symbols are of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman they are of the nature of Brahman; for (from their being of the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of (them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far as the individual character of those effects of Brahman is sublated; and when that character is sublated how then can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be apprehended in them? Nor does it follow from the fact of Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self can be established on the ground of texts teaching a con¬ templation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman is the Self depends on the doing away with agentship and all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on the ground of the meditating person being the same as the symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold constitutes