1 Scripture enjoins the ish/i in question merely on the occasion of the house being burned, not as annulling the mischief done.
[38] a a To this we make the following reply. On the obtainment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior ones.—‘ On account of this being declared/ For in a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scrip¬ ture expressly declares that future sins which might be presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him who knows: ‘ As water does not cling to a lotus-leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this’ (. Kh. Up.
IV, 14, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction of previously accumulated evil deeds: ‘ As the fibres of the Ishika reed when thrown into the fire are burned, thus all his sins are burned ’ ( Kh. Up. V, 24, 3). The extinction of works the following passage also declares, ‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld who is high and low 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).—Nor is there any force in the averment that the assumption of works being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny the fruit-producing power of works; this power actually exists; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only with the existence of this power in general, not with its obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the Smrzti passage, ‘ For work is not extinguished/ expresses the general rule; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural and Smrzti passages such as ‘All sins transcends he, the murder of a Brahma^a transcends he who offers the aivamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus’ (Tai. Sawh.
V, 3, 12, 1).—Nor is there any truth in the assertion that expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences (without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil, IV ADHYAYA, I PA DA, 1 3.
and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit. —Against the objection that knowledge is not actually enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding complementary passages declare that he who possesses such knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin. Now there is no reason why the passages should not expressly aim at declaring these two things 1, and we therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyas is the acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment of all sin. In the case of vidyas referring to Brahman devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding in¬ junction; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent. (With relation to these vidyds about Brahman as devoid of qualities) the term ‘ non-clinging' shows that, as far as future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works past, although he has entered as it were into that state owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are dissolved when, through the power of knowledge, wrong cognition comes to an end; this is conveyed by the term ‘ destruction.’ ‘ That Brahman whose nature it is to be at all times neither agent nor enjoyer, and which is thus opposed in being to the (soul’s) previously established state of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I; hence I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time, nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such at any future time; ’ this is the cognition of the man who knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which have been running on from eternity could not be cut short, release 1 I. e. there is no reason to assume that those passages mention the acquisition of lordly power and the cessation of sin merely for the purpose of glorifying the injunction, and not for the purpose of stating the result of our compliance with the injunction.
a a 2 could never take place.—Nor can final release be dependent on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is; for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is non-permanent and cannot be.
It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining Brahman there results the extinction of all sin.
14. Of the other (i. e. good works) also there is, in the same way, non-clinging; but at death.
In the preceding adhikara/za it has been shown that, according to scriptural statements, all natural sin—which is the cause of the soul’s bondage—does, owing to the power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo destruction. One might now think that works of religious duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel this notion the reasoning of the last adhikarazza is formally extended to the case under discussion. For him who knows there is ‘ in the same way,’ i.e. as in the case of sin, ‘non-clinging’ and destruction ‘of the other also,’ i.e. of good works also; because such works also, as productive of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the result of knowledge. Scripture also—in passages such as ‘He overcomes both’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22)—declares that good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and the extinction of works which depends on the cognition of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage making a general statement without any distinction, viz. ‘And his works are extinguished’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And even there where the text mentions evil works only, we must consider good works also to be implied therein, because the results of the latter also are inferior to the result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the term ‘ evil works ’ to good works also, viz. in the passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1, ‘ Day and night do not pass that bank,’ where good works are mentioned together with evil works, and finally the term ‘ evil ’ is without any distinction applied to all things mentioned before, ‘All evil things turn back from it.’—‘ But at death.’ The word ‘ but 9 is meant for emphatical assertion. As it is established that good as well as evil works—which are both causes of bondage—do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo de¬ struction, there necessarily results final release of him who knows as soon as death takes place.
15. But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge); because (scripture states) that (i. e. the death of the body) to be the term.
In the two preceding adhikara/zas it has been proved that good as well as evil works are annihilated through knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those works whose effects have already begun to operate as well as to those whose effects have not yet begun; or only to works of the latter kind.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that on the ground of scriptural passages such as £ He thereby overcomes both,’ which refer to all works without any distinction, all works whatever must be considered to undergo destruction. To this we reply, ‘ But only those whose effects have not begun.’ Former works, i. e. works, whether good or evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of existence as well as in the current form of existence before the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attain¬ ment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed— i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises— are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is founded on the scriptural passage, ‘ For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body) ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2), which fixes the death of the body as the term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise, .>58 i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge, there would be no reason for the continuance of the current form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would there¬ fore be immediately followed by the state of final release; in which case scripture would not teach that one has to wait for the death of the body.—But, an objection is raised, the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works; how then should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected? We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and seeds come into contact the germinative power of some seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains un¬ impaired!—The origination of knowledge, we reply, can¬ not take place without dependence on an aggregate of works whose effects have already begun to operate, and when this dependence has once been entered into, we must —as in the case of the potter’s wheel—wait until the motion of that which once has begun to move comes to an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim. The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge; but wrong knowledge—comparable to the appearance of a double moon—lasts for some time even after it has been refuted, owing to the impression it has made.—Moreover it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his heart’s conviction—and at the same time continuing to enjoy bodily existence? This same point is explained in scripture and Smrz’ti, where they describe him who stands firm in the highest knowledge.—The final decision therefore is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works only—whether good or evil—whose effects have not yet begun to operate.
16. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards the same effect; scripture showing this.
The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this extension comprehends all good works alike; the Sutrakara remarks, ‘ But the Agnihotra and so on. 5 —The word ‘but 5 is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra, tend ‘towards the same effect, 5 i. e. have the same effect as knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the following one, ‘ Brahma;zas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22).— But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have different effects, it is impossible that they should have one and the same effect!—It is observed, we reply, that sour milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the poison taken while certain mantras are recited; in the same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final release.—But final release is something not to be effected at all; how then can you declare it to be the effect of works?—Works, we reply, may subserve final release mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release.
For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment of the Self of Brahman—which Brahman is not subject to injunction—lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are not excluded. Such works also—because they have no other effect if undertaken without a view to reward—may be brought into connexion with knowledge.
To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction, and to what works the following statement made in some.S&kha about the application of works, 4 His sons enter upon vedanta-sOtras.
his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies upon his evil works?’—To this question the next Sutra replies.
17. For (there is) also (a class of good works) other than this, according to some. (There is agree¬ ment) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those works.)
‘ For also one other than this,’ i. e. there is also a class of good works different from works of permanent obligation, viz. those good works which are performed with a view to a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above from some.Sakha (‘ His friends enter on his good works’) teaches the application. And first of those works Sutra 14 teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers, Gaimini as well as Badaraya;?a, are agreed that such works, undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.
18. For (the text) ‘ whatever he does with know¬ ledge ’ (intimates that). In the preceding adhikara^a the following conclusion has been established:—Works of permanent obligation such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purifi¬ cation of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of Brahman, which leads to final release; they therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are either connected with a special knowledge based on the constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute (non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from scriptural texts such as £ He who knowing this sacrifices; he who knowing this makes an offering; he who knowing this recites; he who knowing this sings; therefore let a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest (Kh. Up. IV, 17, 1); therefore both perform the work, he who knows this and he who does not know it * ( Kh. Up. I, 1, 10).—We have now to consider the question whether only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires release and thus operate towards the same effect as knowledge; or whether both kinds of works—those con¬ nected with knowledge and those not so connected—equally act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on the one hand from scriptural passages such as 4 That Self they seek to know by sacrifice 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22), which represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to Agnihotras, &c., if connected with knowledge.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that only such sacri¬ ficial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from various scriptural and Smrzti passages that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of know¬ ledge; cp. e. g. 4 On the very day on which he sacrifices on that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this 5 (B ri. Up. I, 5, 2); and 4 Possesser of this knowledge thou wilt cast off the bonds of action; 5 4 Action is far inferior to concentration of mind 5 (Bha. Gita II, 39; 49).
To this the Sutrak&ra replies, 4 For what with knowledge only.’ It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge, in the same way as a Brahma/za possessed of knowledge is superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with know¬ ledge are not altogether ineffective; for certain scriptural texts declare that such works are, all of them without any difference, causes of knowledge; so e. g. the passage, 4 That Self they seek to know through sacrifices. 5 —But, as we understand from scripture that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge, we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if un¬ accompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the vedanta-sCtras.
cognition of the Self!—By no means, we reply. The proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self; while the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agni¬ hotra and similar works which scripture, without making any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. ‘ they seek to know through sacrifices’) should not subserve it.
With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, ‘What¬ ever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad that is more powerful’ (Kk. Up. I, i, to); for this text— in speaking of the greater power of work joined with knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such work with regard to its effect—intimates thereby that work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards the same effect. By the ‘power’ of work we understand its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept as settled the following conclusion: All works of perma¬ nent obligation, such as the Agnihotra—whether joined with or devoid of knowledge—which have been performed before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous of release with a view to release; all such works act, according to their several capacities, as means of the extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment, subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devo¬ tion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman.
19. But having destroyed by fruition the two other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman.
It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose effects have not yet begun are extinguished by the power of knowledge. ‘ The two others,’ on the other hand, i. e. those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences, and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears from scriptural passages such as f For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); and c Being Brahman he goes to Brahman 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6). —But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue after the death of the body, just as it continued before death; analogously to the visual appearance of a double moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized as false).—Not so, we reply. After the death of the body there no longer exists any cause for such continuance; while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction of the remainder of works to be enjoyed.—But a new aggregate of works will originate a new fruition!—Not so, we reply; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed. What, on the death of the body, could originate a new period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works depend on false knowledge; but such false knowledge is completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect isolation.
vedanta-sOtras.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. Speech (is merged) in mind, on account of this being seen, and of the scriptural statement. Being about to describe the path of the gods which leads those who possess the lower kind of knowledge towards the attainment of their reward, the Sutrakara begins by explaining, on the basis of scriptural statements, the successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body; for, as will be stated later on, the departure of the soul is the same in the case of him who possesses the (lower) knowledge and of him who is devoid of all knowledge.
About the process of dying we have the following passage, 4 When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the highest deity’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 6, 1). A doubt here arises whether the passage means to say that speech itself, together with its function, is merged in the mind, or only the function of speech.
The purvapakshin maintains that speech itself is merged in the mind. For this explanation only is in agreement with the direct statement of the sacred text, while the other alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied meaning; now wherever direct enunciation and implied meaning are in conflict the preference has to be given to the former, and we therefore maintain that speech itself is merged in the mind.
To this we reply that only the function of speech is merged in the mind.—But how can this interpretation be maintained, considering that the teacher (in the Sutra) expressly says ‘Speech in the mind?’—True, we reply; but later on he says ‘ There is non-division, according to scriptural statement’ (Sutra 16), and we therefrom conclude that what is meant in the present Sutra is merely cessation of the function of speech. For if the intention were to IV ADHVAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 365 express absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech) itself, there would be ‘non-division’ in all cases, and for what reason then should ‘ non-division ’ be specially stated in another case (i.e. in the case of which Sutra 16 treats)? The meaning therefore is that the different functions are retracted, and that while the function of the mind continues to go on the function of speech is retracted first.—Why so?—‘ Because this is seen.’ It is a matter of observation that while the mind continues to act the function of speech comes to an end; nobody, on the other hand, is able to see that the organ of speech itself, together with its function, is merged in the mind.— But are we not justified in assuming such a merging of speech in the mind, on the ground of scriptural statement?—This is impossible, we reply, since mind is not the causal substance of speech. We are entitled to assume only that a thing is merged in what is its causal substance; a pot e. g. (when destroyed) is merged in clay.
But there is no proof whatever for speech originating from mind. On the other hand we observe that functions originate and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal substances. The function of fire, e.g. which is of the nature of heat, springs from fuel which is of the nature of earth, and it is extinguished in water.—But how do you, on this interpretation, account for the scriptural statement that ‘ speech is merged in the mind? 5 —‘ And on account of the scriptural statement,’ the Sutrakara replies. The scriptural statement also may be reconciled with our interpretation, in so far as the function and the thing to which the function belongs are viewed as non-different.
2. And for the same reason all (sense-organs) (follow) after (mind).
‘ Therefore he whose light has gone out comes to a new birth with his senses merged in the mind ’ (Pr. Up. Ill, 9); this passage states that all senses without difference are merged in the mind. ‘For the same reason,’ i.e. because there also as in the case of speech, it is observed that the eye and so on discontinue their functions, while the mind together with its functions persists, and because the organs vedanta-s£jtras.
themselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text admits of that interpretation; we conclude that the different organs follow after, i.e. are merged in, the mind only as far as their functions are concerned.—As all organs 1 without difference are merged in the mind, the special mention made of speech (in Sutra i) must be viewed as made in agreement with the special example referred to by scripture, ‘ Speech is merged in mind.’
3. That mind (is merged) in breath, owing to the subsequent clause. It has been shown that the passage, £ Speech is merged in mind,’ means a merging of the function only.—A doubt here arises whether the subsequent clause, c mind in breath,’ also means to intimate a merging of the function only or of that to which the function belongs.—The purvapakshin maintains the latter alternative. For that, he says, agrees with scripture, and moreover breath may be viewed as the causal substance of mind. For scripture—‘ Mind is made of earth, breath of water’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5)—states that mind comes from earth and breath from water, and scripture further states that ‘Water sent forth earth’ [Kh. Up. VI, 2, 4). When mind therefore is merged in breath, it is the same as earth being merged in water; for mind is earth and breath is water, causal substance and effect being nondifferent.
To this we reply as follows. c The subsequent clause ’ intimates that the mind, after having absorbed within itself the functions of the outer senses, is merged in breath only in the way of its function being so merged. For we observe in the case of persons lying in deep sleep or about to die that, while the function of breath persists, the functions of the mind are stopped. Nor is the mind capable of being itself merged in breath, since breath does not constitute its causal substance.—But it has been shown above that breath is the causal substance of mind!—This is not valid, I. e. the functions of all organs.
we reply. For the relation of causality, made out in such an indirect way, does not suffice to show that mind is really merged in breath. Were it so, then mind would also be merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor is there, on the alternative contemplated, any proof of mind having originated from that water which had passed over into breath.—Mind cannot therefore, in itself, be merged in breath. And that the scriptural statement is satisfied by a mere merging of the function—the function and that to which the function belongs being viewed as identical— has been shown already under the preceding Sutra.
4. That (viz. breath) (is merged) in the ruler (i. e. the individual soul), on account of the (state¬ ments as to the pranas) coming to it and so on.