1 Each passage mentions at least one of the stages of the road leading to the world of Brahman, and we thus conclude that the same road—of which the stations are the attributes—is meant everywhere.
Up. V, 10, 1); ‘Whatever victory, whatever greatness belongs to Brahman, that victory he gives, that greatness he reaches ’ (Kail. Up. I, 2); ‘ Those who find the world of Brahman by Brahma^arya’ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 3).—To the remark that the emphatical assertion (made in the passage, ‘Just by those rays,’ &c.) would be contradicted by our admitting light and so on as stages of the road, we reply that no such difficulty exists, because that passage aims only at establishing the rays (as part of the road). For the one word ‘just’ cannot at the same time establish the rays and discard light and so on. The passage therefore must be understood as only emphasising the connexion with the rays.—Nor does the regard paid by us to the statements about light and so on being stages of the way contradict what one passage says about speed; for that passage means to say that one goes (to the world of Brahman) more quickly than anywhere else, so that its sense is, ‘ In the twinkling of an eye one goes there 1.’—Moreover the passage, ‘On neither of these two ways’ ( Kh. Up. V, 10, 8)—in teaching that there is a third inferior road for those who have missed the other two roads—shows that besides the road of the fathers there is only one further road, viz. the road of the gods, of which light and so on are stages. The text about light and so on mentioning a greater number of stages while other texts mention a smaller number, it stands to reason that the less numerous should be explained in conformity with the more numerous. For this reason also the Sutra says, ‘ On the road beginning with light, on account of its being widely known.’
2. From the year to Vayu; on account of the absence and presence of specification.
But by what special combination can we establish between 1 Read in the text—tvarava^anaw tv ar&radyapekshayam api gantavyantarapekshaya kshaipryartha 0.—Anandagiri comments — tvareti, ar/dradimargasyaikye^pi kuta^id anyato gantavyad anenopayena satyalokazrc g&t iti ga^Mantiti gantavyabhedapekshaya va^ana m yuktam ity artha^.
the different attributes of the road the relation of what is determined by attributes and of determining attributes? The teacher out of kindness to us connects them as follows.— The Kaushitakins describe the road of the gods as follows, £ Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vayu, to the world of Varu/za, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pra^cLpati, to the world of Brahman’ (Kau. Up. I, 3). Now the world of Agni means the same as light, since both terms denote burning, and we therefore need not, with regard to them, search for the order in which they are to be combined. Vayu, on the other hand, is not mentioned in the road beginning with light; in what place then is he to be inserted?—We read, Kh. Up. V, 10, 1, 4 They go to the light, from light to day, from day to the waxing half of the moon, from the waxing half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the north, from those months to the year, from the year to Aditya.’ Here they reach Vayu after the year and before Aditya.—Why so?— 4 On account of the absence and presence of specification.’ About Vayu—concerning whom the passage, 4 He goes to the world of Vayu,’ contains no specification—another passage does state such a specification, viz. B ri. Up. V, 10, 1, 4 When the person goes away from this world he comes to Vayu. Then Vayu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel, and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Aditya.’ On account of this specification which shows Vayu to come before Aditya, Vayu must be inserted between the year and Aditya.—But as there is a specification showing that Vayu comes after Agni, why is he not inserted after the light?—There is no such specification, we reply.—But a scriptural passage has been quoted which runs as follows, 4 Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vayu.’—In that passage, we reply, we have only two clauses, of which the text exhibits one before the other, but there is no word express¬ ing order of succession. We have there only a simple statement of facts, 4 He goes to this and to that.’ But in the other text we perceive a regular order of succession; [38] c c for it intimates that after having mounted on high through an opening as large as the wheel of a chariot, granted by Vayu, he approaches the sun. The Sutra therefore rightly says, ‘ On account of the absence and presence of specifica¬ tion.’—The Vd^asaneyins in their text record that he proceeds 4 from the months to the world of the gods, from the world of the gods to the sun’ (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 15). Here, in order to maintain the immediate succession of Vayu and Aditya, we must suppose the souls to go from the world of the gods to Vayu. What the Sutra says about the soul going to Vayu from the year has reference to the text of the ATMndogya. As between the Va^asaneyaka and the Khk ndogya, the world of the gods is absent from one, the year from the other. As both texts are authoritative, both stages have to be inserted in each, and the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connexion with the months, the year has the first place (i.e. after the months and before the world of the gods), and the world of the gods the second place.
3. Beyond lightning (there is) Varima, on account of the connexion (of the two). The jVMndogya continues, 4 From Aditya to the moon, from the moon to lightning.’ Here Varu/^a (mentioned in the Kaushitaki-upan.) has to be brought in so that above that lightning he goes to the world of Varu7/a. For there is a connexion between lightning and Varu;/a; the broad lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the sound of deep thunder, and then water falls down. And a Brahma^a also says, 4 It lightens, it thunders, it will rain’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 11, 1). But the lord of all water is Vanma, as known from vSruti and Smr/ti.—And above Varu/za there come Indra and Pra^apati, as there is no other place for them, and according to the force of the text, as it stands. Varu^a and so on should be inserted at the end, for that reason also that they are merely additional, no particular place being assigned to them. And lightning is the end of the road beginning with light h So that Varu/za and so on are to be placed after lightning.
4. (They are) conductors, this being indicated. With regard to those beginning with light a doubt arises whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment, or leaders of the travelling souls.—The first possible view of the question is that light and so on are marks of the road, because the instruction has that character. For as in ordinary life a man wishing to go to a village or a town is told, ‘ Go from here to that hill, from there to a fig-tree, from that to a river, from that to a village; after that you will reach the town;’ so here the text also says, ‘from light to day, from day to the waxing half of the month/ &c.— Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoy¬ ment. For the text connects Agni and so on with the word ‘world’; ‘ He comes to the world of Agni/ &c. Now the term ‘world ’ is used to denote places of enjoyment of living beings, as when we say, ‘ The world of men; the world of the Fathers; the world of the gods.’ A Brahma/za passage also says, ‘ They remain attached to the worlds which consist of day and night 5 (Nat. Bra. X, 2, 6, 8). Therefore light and the rest are not conductors. Moreover, they cannot be conductors because they are without intelli¬ gence. For in ordinary life intelligent men only are appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult roads.
To all this we reply as follows. They must be con¬ ductors, because the text indicates this. For we read, ‘ From the moon to the lightning; there a person that is not a man leads them to Brahman; ’ which shows their conductorship to be something settled. Should it be objected that this last sentence exhausts itself in conveying its own purport 1; we say No; for the attribute (‘that is not a man ’) has only the meaning of excluding his previously established humanity. Only if in the case of the light and the rest personal conductors are settled, and those of human nature, it is appropriate to use the attribute 1 And has not the additional power of indicating, i. e. enabling us to infer that also the beings previously mentioned are ‘ leaders ’ of the soul.
C C 2 3 88 ‘ amanava/ to the end of excluding this (previously estab¬ lished) humanity 1.
But mere indication has no force, as there is nothing to prove (that there must be such personal conductors).— To this objection the next Sutra replies.
5. (There are personal conductors) because that is established on the ground of both (i. e. road and travellers) being bewildered (i. e. unconscious). As, owing to their separation from a body, the organs of those who go on the road beginning with light are wrapped up, they are incapable of ruling themselves; and the light &c., as they are without intelligence, are equally incapable. Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities who represent light and the rest are appointed to the conductorship. For in ordinary life also drunken or senseless people whose sense-organs are wrapped up follow a road as com¬ manded by others.—Again light and the rest cannot be taken for marks of the road because they are not always present. A man who dies in the night cannot come to day in its true (physical) nature; and he cannot wait (for the break of day), as we have already explained above (IV, 2, 19). But this objection does not apply to gods who are permanent. And gods may be called light and so on, because they represent light and so on. Nor is the ex¬ pression, ‘ From light to day/ &c. objectionable, even if we adopt the sense of conductorship; for it means, through the light as cause they come to the day; through the day as cause, to the waxing half of the moon. And such instruction is seen also in the case of conductors known in ordinary life, for they say, Go hence to Balavarman, thence (i. e. Balavarman conducting you) to Cayasiraha, thence to 1 Why should it be specially stated that this last ‘ conducting person ’ is amanava? Only, because it is a settled matter that the previously mentioned beings are also ‘ conducting persons,’ and at the same time ‘manava/ The last clause therefore does not only directly teach that a person conducts the souls to Brahman, but at the same time ‘ indicates ’ that the beings mentioned before in connexion with the road are also ‘ personal conductors/ Krzsh;/agupta. Moreover, in the beginning where the text says that they go to the light, a relation in general only is expressed, not a special relation; at the end, however, where it is said he leads them to Brahman, a special relation is expressed, viz. that between conducted and conductor. Therefore this is accepted for the beginning also.—And as the organs of the wandering souls are wrapped up together there is no possibility of their enjoying any¬ thing. Although, however, the wanderers do not enjoy anything, the word ‘world’ may be explained on the ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other beings dwelling there.—The conclusion therefore is that he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni. and he who has reached the world ruled by Vayu, by Vayu.
But how, if we adopt the view of conductorship, can this apply to Varu/za and the rest? Varu/za and the rest were inserted above the lightning; but scripture states that after the lightning until Brahman is reached a person leads who is not a man.—To this doubt the next Sutra replies.
6. From thence (the souls are led) by him only who belongs to the lightning; the sacred text stating that.
From thence, i. e. after they have come to the lightning they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the worlds of Varu//a and the rest by the person, not a man, who follows immediately after the lightning. For that that person leads them is stated in the following passage, 4 When they have reached the place of lightning a person, not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman’ (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 15). Varu;za and the rest, we must understand, favour them either by not hindering or somehow assisting them.—Therefore it is well said that light and so on are the gods who act as conductors.
7. To the effected (Brahman) (the souls are led); (thus opines) Badari; because going to him is possible.
With regard to the passage, ‘He leads them to Brahman,’ the doubt arises whether that person leads the souls to the effected, lower, Brahman, or to the highest, non-modified, chief Brahman.—Whence the doubt?—Because the (am¬ biguous) word Brahman is used, and because scripture speaks of going.—The opinion of the teacher Badari is that the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower, qualified, effected Brahman; because it is possible to go to that. For the effected Brahman which occupies a definite place can be the goal of a journey. With the highest Brahman, on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas of one who goes, or object of going, or act of going; for that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self of all.
8. And on account of (the Brahman to which the souls are led) being qualified (in another passage). That the soul’s going has for its object the effected Brahman, we conclude from another scriptural passage also which qualifies Brahman in a certain way, 4 He leads them to the worlds of Brahman; in these worlds of Brahman they live for ever and ever’ (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). For it would be impossible to qualify the highest Brahman by means of the plural number ( 4 worlds ’); while the plural number may be applied to the lower Brahman which may abide in different conditions.—The term 4 world ’ also can directly denote only some place of enjoyment falling within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of being entered into, while it must be understood in a meta¬ phorical sense in passages 1 such as 4 Brahman is that world 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).—And also what the text says concerning an abode and some one abiding within it (‘in these worlds of Brahman,’ &c.), cannot be directly understood of the highest Brahman.—For all these reasons the leading of the souls has the lower Brahman for its goal.
But even on this interpretation the word 4 Brahman 5 is inappropriate, as it has been proved that Brahman is the Where the term 4 world ’ is applied to the highest Brahman.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO.
cause of the origination and so on of the entire world.— To this objection the next Sutra replies. 9. But on account of its proximity (to the higher Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman) as that.
The word ‘but 5 indicates the setting aside of the doubt.— As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one, there is nothing unreasonable in the word ‘ Brahman 5 being applied to the former also. For when the higher Brahman is. for the purposes of pious meditation, described as possessing certain effected qualities—such as consisting of mind and the rest—which qualities depend on its connexion with certain pure limiting adjuncts; then it is what we call the lower Brahman.—But with the assumption of the lower Brahman there does not agree what scripture says about the souls not returning; for there is no permanence any¬ where apart from the highest Brahman. And scripture declares that those who have set out on the road of the gods do not return, ‘ They who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man 5 (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6 ); c For them there is no return here 5 (B ru Up. VI, 2, 15); ‘ Moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality 5 (. Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5).
To this objection we make the following reply. 10. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of that (world) to what is higher than that; on account of scriptural declaration.
When the reabsorption of the effected Brahman world draws near, the souls in which meanwhile perfect knowledge has sprung up proceed, together with Hira^yagarbha the ruler of that world, to 4 what is higher than that/ i.e. to the pure highest place of Vishnu. This is the release by successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be directly reached by the act of going.
39 2 vedanta-sOtras.
i i. And on account of Smrzti.
Smrzti also agrees with this view; cp. the following passage, 4 When the pralaya has come and the end of the highest (i. e. Hira/zyagarbha), then they all, together with Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place.’— The final conclusion (siddhanta) therefore is that the going of the souls, of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the effected Brahman.—But what is the prima facie view, with regard to which this final conclusion has been established in Sutras 7-11?— This required prima facie view is now set forth in the following Sutras.
12. To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led); (Taimini (opines); owing to this being the principal sense (of the word ‘ Brahman ’). The teacher Uaimini is of opinion that the passage, 4 He leads them to Brahman/ refers to the highest Brahman. For the highest Brahman constitutes the prin¬ cipal, primary sense, of the word 4 Brahman/ which denotes the lower Brahman only in a secondary, metaphorical way. And where both senses are possible, the primary sense has to be preferred.
13. And because scripture declares that.
The text, 4 Going upwards by that he reaches immortality/ declares that immortality is reached by going. But im¬ mortality is possible only in the highest Brahman, not in the effected one, because the latter is transitory. So scripture says, 4 Where one sees something else, that is little, that is mortal’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1). According to the text of the Ka/^a-upanishad also the going of the soul is towards the highest Brahman; for after the highest Brahman has been introduced there as general subjectmatter—in the passage, 4 That which thou seest/ &c., I, 2, 14, no other kind of knowledge is taken up later on.
14. And the intention of entering (can) not (be referred) to the effected (Brahman).
Moreover the intention of entering into which is expressed in the passage, 4 I enter the hall of Pra^apati, the house 5 (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1), cannot have the lower Brahman for its object. For the immediately preceding passage, 4 That within which these forms and names are contained is the Brahman, 5 shows that the highest Brahman, different in nature from the effected one, is the general subject-matter; and the subsequent passage, T am the glory of the Brahmans, 5 represents the soul as the Self of all; it being known from another scriptural passage that 4 Glory 5 is a name of the highest Brahman, 4 There is no likeness of him whose name is great glory 5 (Va^*. Sa;/di. XXXII, 3). And in the vidya of Brahman within the heart it is said of this same entering the house that it is preceded by going 1, 4 There is the city of Brahman Apara^ita, and the golden hall built by Prabhu 5 {Kk. Up. VIII, 5, 3). And that the performing of a journey is intended follows also from the use of the verb 4 pad, 5 which denotes going (prapadye, I enter).—The other (prima facie) view therefore is that all the passages about the soul’s going refer to the highest Brahman.
These two views have been embodied by the teacher in the Sutras; one in the Sutras 7-11, the other in the Sutras 12-14. Now the arguments contained in the former set are capable of proving the fallaciousness of the arguments in the latter set, but not vice versa; from which it follows that the former set states the final view and the latter set the prima facie view only.—For nobody can compel us to accept the primary sense of a word (such as Brahman) even where it is impossible to do so.—And although met with in a chapter that treats of the highest knowledge, the reference to the going to Brahman—which belongs to another kind of knowledge—may be explained as aiming merely at the glorification of the highest knowledge (not at teaching that the going to Brahman is the result of higher 1 I am not quite sure which passage in the daharavidyd is supposed to prove that the entering of Brahman’s house is preceded by going. Probably VIII, 6, 5, ‘He departs upwards; he is going to the sun.’
knowledge).—And with reference to the passage, ‘ I enter the hall of Pra^apati, the house,’ there is no reason why we should not separate that passage from what precedes and refer the intention of entering to the effected Brahman. And the qualified Brahman also may be spoken of as being the Self of all, as shown by other passages such as ' He to whom all works, all desires belong,’ &c. ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2). The texts about the going therefore all belong to the lower knowledge.—Others again, in accordance with the general principle that the earlier Sutras set forth the prima facie view, while the later ones contain the siddhanta view, maintain that the passages about the soul’s going fall within the sphere of the higher knowledge. But this is impossible, because nothing may go to the highest Brahman. * Omnipresent and eternal like the ether; ’ ‘ The Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self that is within all ’ (B ru Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘Self only is all this’ (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman only is all this, it is the best’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11): from all these passages we ascertain that the highest Brahman is present everywhere, within everything, the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is altogether impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For we do not go to what is already reached; ordinary ex¬ perience rather tells us that a person goes to something different from him.— But we observe in ordinary experience also that something already reached may become an object of going, in so far as qualified by a different place; a man living on the earth, e. g. goes to the earth, in so far as he goes to another place on the earth. In the same way we see that a child reaches the adult state which in reality belongs to the child’s identical Self, but is qualified by a difference of time. Analogously Brahman also may be an object of going in so far as it is possessed of all kinds of powers.—This may not be, we reply, because scripture expressly negatives Brahman’s possessing any distinctive qualities.—' Without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint* ( 5 vet. Up. VI, 19); 'Neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8); ‘ He who is without and within, unproduced ’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 4 This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘He is to be described by No, no!’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); from all these scriptural texts, as well as from Smrz’ti and reasoning, it follows that the highest Self cannot be assumed to possess any differences depending on time or space or anything else, and cannot therefore become the object of going.
The cases of places on the earth and of the different ages of man are by no means analogous; for they are affected by differences of locality and so on, and therefore can be gone to or reached.—Nor will it avail our opponent to say that Brahman possesses manifold powers, because scripture declares it to be the cause of the world’s origination, sustentation, and final retractation; for those passages which deny difference have no other sense (but just the absolute denial of all difference).—But in the same way also those passages which state the origination and so on of the world have no other sense! (i.e. cannot be under¬ stood to teach anything but just the origination and so on of the world).—This is not so, we reply; for what they aim at teaching is the absolute oneness of Brahman. For texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay, &c., teach that only that which is, viz. Brahman, is true, while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at teaching the origination, &c. of the world.—But why should the passages about the origination, &c. of the world be sub¬ ordinate to those which deny all difference, and not vice versa?—Because, we reply, the texts which negative all difference effect the cessation of all desire. For when the absolute oneness, permanence, and purity of the Self have once been apprehended, we cognize that the highest aim of man has been attained, and therefore conceive no further desires. Compare the following texts: ‘ What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who beholds that unity?’ (lya-up.
7); c Thou hast reached fearlessness, O Uanaka ’ (Brz.Up.IV, 2,4); ‘ He who knows does not fear anything; he does not distress himself with the thought, Why did I not do what is good? Why did I do what is bad? ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 9.) This also follows from our observing that those who know realise contentment of mind; and from the fact that scripture blames the false notion of (the reality of) effects, ‘From death to death goes he who sees here any difference ’ (Ka. Up. II, 4, io). The texts negativing all difference cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the origination of the world and so on have no similar power of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire. At the same time it is manifest that they have another (than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having said at first, ‘ Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot be without a root’ (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end that Being which is the root of the world is the only object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ‘ That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know that; that is Brahman.’ As thus the passages about origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self, Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers, and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going.— And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6 (‘ Of him the pranas do not depart; being Brahman he goes to Brahman ’), denies any going to the highest Brahman.
Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes, i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from Brahman; for if the two were absolutely identical no going could take place.—Well, what then?—We reply as follows. If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be without parts.—The same objection lies against the hypo¬ thesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman; for also that which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Sawsara state could not be accounted for.—Let then, in the third place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for. The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this work (II, 3, 19 ffi). And from the soul’s being different from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such texts as ‘ Thou art that’ are futile. This latter objection also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different from the whole and the causal substance; for that kind of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense.—From all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the soul cannot obtain final release, because its Saws&ra con¬ dition could never come to an end. Or else, if that condition should come to an end, it would follow that the very essence of the soul perishes; for those theories do not admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.