The Matters wherein men are obnoxious to Injury are, Those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly. And those things which are easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered. And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered. And those things wherein prosecution of Injury, may be thought a love of contention.
Of those Things which are necessary to be known for the Definition of Just and Unjust.
Wuen the fact is evident, the next Inquiry is, whether it be Just, or Unjust.
For the Definition of Just and Unjust, we must know what Law is: that is, what the Law of Nature, what the Law of 294 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [Boox 1.
Nations; what the Law Civil, what written Law, and what unwritten Law is: and what Persons, that is, what a publick Person, or the City is; and what a private Person, or Citizen is.
_ Unjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature.
Unjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffick and come together, is that which is contrary to the Law common to those Nations.
Unjust only in one Common-wealth, is that which is contrary to the Law Civil, or Law of that Common-wealth.
He that is accused to have doné any thing against the Publick, or a private Person, is accused to do it either ignorantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation.
And because the Defendant does many times confess the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he took, but did not steal; and did, but not adultery; it is necessary to know the Definitions of Theft, Adultery, and all other crimes.
What facts are contrary to the written Laws, may be known by the Laws themselves.
Besides written Laws, whatsoever is Just, proceeds from Equity or Goodness.
From Goodness proceeds that which we are praised, or honoured for.
From Equity proceed those actions, which though the written Law command not, yet being interpreted reasonably, and supplyed, seems to require at our hands.
Actions of Equity are such as these, Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mischances, or Injuries.
To pardon the faults that adhere to Mankind.
And not to consider the Law so much, as the Law-makers mind; and not the Words so much, as the meaning of the Law’.
And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer is, but what he has been always, or for the most part. Ἂὑ“-ἠ ' For, as the Quarterly Reviewer but too justly remarks, “‘ To violate the spirit by obeying the letter, is often the painful duty of the judge; to make the letter conform to the spirit, is the privilege of the legislator;” and (he might have added) of the arbitrator, whose standard is equity. See Quarterly Review, vol. xxvii. p. 133.
CHAP. XV., ART OF RHETORICK. 295 And to remember better the Good received, than the Il.
And to endure injuries patiently.
And to submit rather to the sentence of a Judge, than of the Sword.
And to the sentence of an Arbitrator, rather than of a Judge.
Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively.
COMMON Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively, are such as these: Greater is the Injury which proceed from greater Iniquity.
And from which proceedeth greater damage, And of which there is no revenge.
And for which there is no remedy.
And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mischief to himself.
He does the greater Znjury, that does it first, or alone, or with few.
And he that does it often.
Greater Injury is that, against which Laws and Penalties were first made.
And that which is more brutal, or more approaching to the actions of beasts.
And that which is done upon more premeditation.
And by which more Laws are broken.
And which is done in the place of Execution.
And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the Injury.
And which is committed against well deservers.
And which is committed against the unwritten Law; because good men should observe the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.
And which is committed against the written Law; because he that will do Injury, neglecting the penalty set down in the written Law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten Law, where there is no penalty at all.
296 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE TRoox ὦ Of Proofs Inartificial.
Or Artificial Proofs we have already spoken. © Inartificial Proofs, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.
1. Laws. And those are Civil, or written Law: the Law or Custom of Nations: and the universal Law of Nature.
2. Witness. And those are such as concern Matter; and such as concern Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present.
3. Evidences, or Writings.
4. Question, or Torture.
5. Oaths. And those be either given, or taken, or both, or neither.
For Laws, we use them thus: When the written Law makes against us, we appeal to the Law of Nature, alledging, That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.
That the Law of Nature is immutable; the written Law mutable.
That the written Law is but seeming justice; the Law of Nature very Justice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.
That the Judge ought to discern between true and adulterate Justice.
That they are better men that obey unwritten, than written Laws.
That the Law against us does contradict some other Law. And when the Law has a double interpretation, that is the true one, which makes for us.
And that the cause.of the Law being abolished, the Law 1s no more of Validity.
But when the written Law makes for us, and Equity for the Adversary, we must alledge, That a man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judge against the Law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the Law.
That men seek not Equity because ’tis good simply, but because good for them.
CHAP. XVI. ] ART OF RHETORICK. 297 That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law. That as in other Arts, and namely in Physick, fallacies are pernitious; so in a Common-wealth ’tis pernitious to use pretexts against the Law. And that in Common-wealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the Laws, is prohibited. é For Witnesses, we must use them thus: When we have them not, we must stand for Preswmptions, and say,! That in Equity sentence ought to be given according to the most probability. That Presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed. That they cannot lye. When we have Witnesses, against him that has them not, we must say, That Presumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished. That if Presumptions were enough, Witnesses were superfluous. For Writings, when they favour us, we must say, That Writings are private and particular Laws; and he that takes away the use of Evidences, abolisheth the Law. That since Contracts and Negotiations pass by Writings, he that bars their use, dissolves humane Society. Against them, if they favour the Adversary, we may say, That since Laws do not bind, that are fraudulently made to pass, much less Writings. And that the Judge being to dispense Justice, ought rather to consider what is just, than what is in the Writing. That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither. That the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civil, or Natural; or to Justice; or to Honesty.
That ’tis repugnant to some other Writing before, or after. That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said directly, but implyed cunningly). ‘For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say, That ’tis the only testimony that is certain. But if it make for the Adversary, we may say, That men inforced by Torture, speak as well that which ig false, as that which is true.
298 THE ART OF RHETORICK. " [Book τ.
That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.
For Oaths; he that will not put his Adversary to his Oath, may alledge, That he makes no scruple to be forsworn.
That by swearing, he will carry the cause; which not swearing, he must lose.
That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Judge, than of the Adversary.
He that refuseth to take the Oath, may say, That the matter is not worth so much.
That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carryed his cause.
That to try it by swearing for a religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in combate.
He that is willing to take the Oath, may pretend, That he had rather trust himself, than his Adversary; and that ’tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the Oath.
That ’tis his duty to take the Oath, since he has required to have sworn Judges.
He that offers the Oath may pretend, That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.
That he makes his Adversary himself Judge.
That ’twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the Judges fo be sworn.
And of these are to be compounded the Forms we are to use, when we would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give and take; or neither give nor take.
But if one have sworn contrary to a former Oath, he may pretend, | That he was forced.
That he was deceived, and that neither of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.
But if the Adversary do so, he may say, ‘That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth humane Society.
And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judge our cause; when we will not stand to that we swear ourselves.
And so much for Proofs inartificial.
BOOK Ii.
CHAP. I. The Introduction.
Or Belief proceeding from our Invention, that part which consisteth in Proof, is already spoken of.
The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the manners of the Speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer..
The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions upon which a mans belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning Vertue, book i. chap. 9, partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the Passions. For a man is believed either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are Vertues; or for Good Will: of. which among the Passions.
The Principles concerning Belief, arising from the Passion of the Hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several Passzons in order.
In every one of which three things are to be considered: 1. First, how men are affected.
2. Secondly, towards whom.
3. Thirdly, for what.
CHAP. IT, Of Anger.
ANGER is desire of Revenge, joyned with grief for that he, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.
The object of Anger is always some particular, or individual thing.
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In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.
To Neglect, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.
1. Contempt.
2. Crossing.
3. Contumely. | Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.
Crossing, is the hinderance of another mans will without design to profit himself.
Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.
The common Opinions concerning Anger are therefore such as follow: They are easily Angry that think they are neglected.
That think they excell others; as the Rich with the Poor; the Noble with the Obscure, etc.
And such as think they deserve well.
And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and generally all that desire and attain not, are angry with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.
And such as having expected good, find evil.
Those that men are angry with, are, Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.
And such as shew any kind of Contumely, towards them.
And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon: and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein.
And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends.
And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.
And such as requite not our courtesie.
And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiours.
And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.
And such as give not eare to our intreaty.
And such as are joyful, or calm in our distress.
And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.
And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.
And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire; of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence; and of those that reverence us.
CHAP III.] ART OF RHETORICK. 80] And such as should help us, and neglect it.
And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.
And such as forget us, or our Names.
An Orator therefore must so frame his Judge or Auditor by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Adversary appear such as men use to be angry withal.
CHAP, III. Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.
RECONCILIATION is the appeasing of Anger. Those to whom men are easily reconciled, are, Such as have not offended out of neglect. And such as have done it against their will. And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done And such as have done as much to themselves. And such as confess and repent. And such as are humbled, And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously. And such as have done them more good heretofore, than now hurt. And such as sue to them for any thing. And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters οὗ others in their own disposition. And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withal. And such as they fear or reverence. And such as reverence them. And such as have offended their Anger. Reconcileable are, Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we have said before to be easily angry. And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief. And such as have given their anger time. Men lay down their Anger for these Causes. Because they have gotten the Victory. Because the Offender has suffered more than they meant to inflict. 3 302 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [nook 1, Because they have been revenged of another.
Because they think they suffer justly.
And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.
And because the Offender is dead.
Whosoever therefore would asswage the anger of his Auditor, must make himself appear such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such opinions, as make him reconcileable.
Of Love and Friends, To Love, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.
A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.
Friends one to another, are they that naturally love one another.; A Friend therefore is he, That rejoyceth at anothers Good.
And that grieves at his hurt.
And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good, or hurt.
And that is Enemy or Friend to the same man.
We love them, That have done good to us, or ours; especially if much, readily, or in season.
That are our Friends Friends.
That are our Enemies Enemies.
That are Liberal.
That are Valiant.
That are Just.
And that we would have love us, And good Companions.
And such as can abide Jests, And such as break Jests. ἡ And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in our selves.
And such as are neat.
And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits. © CHAP. ly.] ART OF RHETORICK. 802 And such as quickly forget injuries.
And such as least observe our Errors.
And such as are not of ill Tongue.
And those that are ignorant of our Vices.
And such as cross us not when we are busie, or angry.
And such as are officious towards us.
And those that are like us.
And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.
And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be. satisfied.
And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the World, rather than their own Consciences condemns.
And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.
And such as we would have honour us, and not envie, but imitate us.
And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to our selves.
And such as continue their Friendship to the dead.
And such as speak their mind.
And such as are not terrible.
And such as we may rely on.
The several kinds of Friendship, are Society, FOREN Consanguinity, Affinity, etc.
The things that beget Love, are, The bestowing } panes, of Benefits, ᾿Ἰρανοχῇ Of Enmity and Hatred, Tue Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those, which concern Love and Friendship. Hatred differs from Anger in this, That Anger regards only what is done to ones self; but Hatred not.
And in this, that Anger regards particulars only; the other universals also.
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And in this, that Anger is curable, Hatred not.
And in this, that Anger seeks the vexation, Hatred the damage of ones Adversary.
‘That with Anger there is always joined Grief; with Hatred not always.
That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.
Hence it appears how the Judge or Auditor may be made Friend or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made appear Friend or Enemy to the Judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear Enemies to him.
Of Fear.
FEAR is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may ‘hurt or destroy. Danger is the nearness of the evil feared. The things to be feared, are, Such as have power to hurt. And the signs of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerful men. And Injustice joyned with Power. And Valour provoked, joyned with Power. And the fear of powerful men. The men that are to be feared, are. Such as know our Faults. And such as can do us Injury. And such as think they are injured by us. And such as have done us Injury. And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both. And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are. And such as have destroyed greater men than we are. And such as use to invade their inferiours. And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be feared than those that are hasty and free. The things especially to be feared, are, Such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure. And such as admit either none, or not easie help.
CHAP. VII. | ART OF RHETORICK. 303 And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them. They that fear not, are, Such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these.
And therefore men fear little in prosperity.
And men fear little that think they have suffered already.
An Orator therefore that would put Fear into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer, and have suffered from those, and at those times they least thought.
CHAP, VII. Of Assurance.
ASSURANCE is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off. The things therefore that beget Assurance are, The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries.
And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.
And neither to have done, nor received Injury.
And to have no Competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.
And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.
Assured, or Confident, are, They that have oft escaped danger.
And they to whom most things have succeeded well.
And they that see their Equals, or inferiours not afraid.
And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, etc.
And such as have done others no wrong.
And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty.
And such as think they will speed well that are gone before.
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CHAP. VIII, Of Shame.
SHAME is a perturbation of the Mind arising from the apprehension of Evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a mans own, or his friends reputation.
The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which proceed from Vice, as, To throw away ones Arms; to run away; signs of Cowardliness.
To deny that which is committed to ones trust, a sign of Injustice.
To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of Intemperance.
To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; ‘to receive help from meaner men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask; signs of Wretchedness.
To praise one to his face; to praise his vertues too much, and colour his. vices; signs of Flattery.
To be unable to indure such labours as men indure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than he; signs of Effeminacy.
To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholding to him; signs of Pusillanimity.
To speak and promise much of ones self more than is due; signs of Arrogance.
To want those things which ones Equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of.
And to suffer things i ignominious, as to serve about anothers person; or to be imployed in his base Actions.
In Actions of Intemperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly committed; there is shame in Actions of Force, only when they are done unwillingly.
The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as We respect; namely, CHAP, VIII. | ART OF RHETORICK. 307 Those that admire us.
And those whom we desire should admire us.
And those whom we admire.
Those that contend with us for Honour.
Those whose opinion we contemn not.
And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence, Of old and well bred men.
Of those we are always to live with.
Of those that are not guilty of the same fault.
Of those that do not easily pardon.
And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, Backbiters, Scoffers, Comick Poets.
And of those before whom we have had always good success.
And of those who never asked any thing of us before.
And of such as desire our Friendship.
And of our familiars, that know none of our crimes.
And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.
But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are not ashamed.
Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence, Of those whom we reverence.
And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolks actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful.
And of their Rivals..
And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.
The Common Opinions concerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.
CHAP, IX. Of Grace, or Favour.
GRACE is that Vertue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or to do service to a man in need; not for his own but for his cause to whom he does it.
Great Grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard or difficult things that are conferred, or when the time is seasonable, or when he that confers the favour is the only, or the first man that did it.
308 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [Book 11 Need, is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired, Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.
‘Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a Grace, or Favour, must shew that he needeth it to whom it was done.
Grace it is not, Which is done by Chance.
Nor which is done by Necessity.
Nor which has been Requited.
Nor that which is done to ones Enemy, Nor that which is a Trifle.
Nor that which is Nought, if the Giver know the fault, And in this manner a man may go over the Preedicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for being so Much, or for being Such, or for being Wow, ete.
CHAP, X, Of Pity, or Compassion, PITY is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it. - and which he thinks may happen to himself, or his.
And because it appertains to Pity, to think that he, or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it follows that they be most compassionate, Who have passed through Misery, And old Men.
And weak Men.
And timorous Men.
And learned Men.
And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.
And such as think there be honest Men.
And that they are less compassionate, Who are in great despair.
Who are in great prosperity.
And they that are angry; for they consider not.
And they that are very confident; for they also consider nov.
And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these consider.
And they that are astonished with fear, CHAP. X1.] ART OF RHETORICK. 3095 And they that think no Man honest. The things to be pztied are, Such as grieve, and withal hurt.
Such as destroy.
And Calamities of fortune, if they be great; as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, etc.
And evil that arrives where good is expected.
And after extream evil, a little good..
And through a Mans life to have no good offer it self; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.
Men to be pitied are, Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, a their hurt be our own.
And such as be of our own years.
Such as are like us in manners.
Such as are of the same, or like’stock.
And our equals in dignity.
Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past.
And those that have the words or actions of them in the present misery.
CHAP XI. Of Indignation.
OpposiTE in a manner to Pity in good Men, is Indignation, which is grief for the prosperity of a Man unworthy.
With Indignation there is always joyned a joy for the prosperity of a Man worthy, as Pity is always with contentment n the adversity of them that deserve it. In wicked Men the opposite of Pity is, Envy; as also the companions thereof delight in the harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called ἐπικαιρεκακία. But of these in the next Chapter.
Men conceive Jndignation against others, not for their vertues, as Justice, etc.
For these make Men worthy; and in Indignation we think Men unworthy.
But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble Men, and handsome Men are worthy of.
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And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for antient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new than antient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs. But the antient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.
And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Ulysses.
And for the comparison of the inferiour is the same thing, as when one valiant is compared with a more valiant; or whether absolutely superiour, as when a good Scholer is compared with a good Man.
Apt to Indignation are, They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.
And they that are good.
And they that are ambitious.
And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, than he that hath it.
Least apt to Indignation are, Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.
Who they are that Rejoyce, or Grieve not, at the adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.
Whosoever therefore would turn away the Compassion of the Judge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evil which happens to him.
Of Envy.
ENVY 15 grief, for the prosperity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive. Such as our selves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means. They are apt to Envy, That are within a little of the highest.
CRAP. XI1.] ART OF RHETORICK, ail And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.
And such as would be thought wise.
And such as catch at glory in every action.
And Men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them, The things which Men Envy in others are, Such as bring Glory.
And goods of Fortune.
And such things as we desire for our selves.
And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.
Obnoxious to Envy are, Men of our own time, of our own Countrey, of our own age, and competitors of our Glory. And therefore, Those whom we strive with for honour.
And those that covet the same things that we do.
And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all.
And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.
And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decayed Men envy the young and lusty.
And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be evvyed by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.
From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other Mens hurt.
He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves Pity, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to Envy; and make his Adversary appear such, as above described, to be subject to the Envy of others.
Of Emulation.
EMULATION is καὶ ἰοῦ arising from that our Equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also.
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No Man therefore Emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable.
Apt to Emulate are, Such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have.
And Young and Magnanimous Men.
_And such as already possess the goods for which Men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.
And those that are esteemed worthy by others.
And those whose Ancestors, Kindred, Familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do Emulate others for that good.
Objects of Emulation are, for things; Vertues.
And things whereby we may profit others.
And things whereby we may please others.
For Persons, They that possess such things.
And such as many desire to be friends or bet, ΒΘΒΌΝΣ with, or like unto.
And they whose praises flie abroad.
The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.
And they that Emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, Contemn such as have them not: and thence it is, that Men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which Men honour, are nevertheless Contemned.
Of the Manners of Youth.
Or Passions we have already spoken.
We are next to speak of Manners.
Manners are distinguished by Passions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.
What kind of Manners proceed from Passions, and from Vertues and Vices (which are Habits), hath been already shewed.
There remains to be spoken of the Manners, that are pe< culiar to several Ages and Fortunes.
The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old-Age.
And first of Youth.
Young Men are, CHAP. XIV.] ART OF RHETORKICK ᾿ 313 Violent in their desires. Prompt to execute their desires. Incontinent. Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before. Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.
Apt to anger, and in their anger violent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.
Lovers of Honour and of Victory more than Money, as having not been yet in Want.
Well natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice.
Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of natural drunkenness. Besides, hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.
Credulous, because not yet often deceived.
Easily deceived, because full of hope.
Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off Fear.
Bashful, because they estimate the Honour of Action by the precepts of the Law.
Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life.
And lovers of Honour more than Profit, because they live. more by Custom than by Reason; and by Reason we acquire Profit, but Vertue by Custom.
Lovers of their Friends and Companions.
Apt to err in the excess, rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they overdo every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.
Doers of Injury rather for contumely than for Dammage.
Mercifull, because measuring others by their own innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pity.
And lovers of Mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others.
Jesting is witty Contumely, 314 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE {Boox πὶ CHAP, XV. Of the Manners of Old Men.
Tue Munners of Old Men are in a manner the contraries of those of Youth.
They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently than is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say, perhaps, and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.
They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.
And suspicious through Incredulity, and incredulous by reason of their Experience.
They love and hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.
Are of poor spirits, as having been huntbled by the chances of life.
And covetous, as knowing how easie ’tis to lose, and hard to get.
And timorous, as having been cooled by years.
And greedy of life: for good things seem greater by the want of them.
And lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.
And seek Profit more than Honour, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.
And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.
And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.
And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old Men have good store.