SigPhi · Aristotle

The Metaphysics of Aristotle (MacMahon)

English · translated by John Henry MacMahon

Page 14 of 54

10. The bearing But the Pythagoreans, in the same manner, ofthePy^A- iiave spoken of two first principles; but thus on the present much have they added, — which, also, is peculiar Inquiry. ^^ themsclves,^ — namely, that they do not regard the finite, and the infinite, and the one, to be certain dif- ferent natures; as, for instance, fire, or earth, or any other such thing: but that the infinite itself, and the one itself constitute the substance of those things of which they are predicated. Wherefore, also, they affirmed that number is ^ The commentators on this passage — for example Alexander — contend that the force of the word ai<xp< is* that it is used by Aristotle to denote those whose opinions may be classed exclusively of the Italics, that is, of the Pythagoreans; for Pythagoras opened a school in Taren- tum. Mexp* <io6s ^^^* they say, refer to time; for that Empedocles was not before Pythagoras, and yet his tenets are ranked 4y rois /xexpi ruv *lTa\cov. I confess, however, that the word x»pis following fxexpi quite «ecures all this, without forcing any unusual signification upon fi4xfi; and therefore I agree with Averroes in translating it as I do, and making it to refer to time. The word fitrpi^Ttpov some of the MSS read fiovifx<&T*pou, or fiovax^rtpovy or fidKaucdimpoVf or, lastly, •lopoxoiTiptt:'^ which they explain by the word o-Korcii/bTcpof.

€H. VI.] PLATO'S THEORY OP IDEAS. 27 the substance of all things. Respecting, then, these points^ likewise, in tliis manner have they declared theiikgpjjHOfis; and respecting quiddity they began, indeed, to make asser- tions and to frame definitions; but they treated of mattera with great simplicity. For they both framed their definitions superficially, and in whatever first an alleged definition should be inherent, this they considered to be the substance of the thing; as if any one should think that twofold is the same thing with the duad, since the twofold first is inherent in the two; yet perhaps the being in what is twofold is not the same thing as being in a duad; but if not, unity will be plurality, which also was the result with them.

From our predecessors, indeed, therefore, and from the rest^ it is possible for us to acquire thus much information.

CHAPTER VI.

After the schools of philosophy enumerated, i. wato's ideal supervenes the system of Plato;^ in most points Surce'onu^*^* treading on the heels of these Pythagoreans: but adoption, also having peculiar tenets of its own, differing from the phi- losophy of the Italics. For from a young man having ai the first been associated with Cratylus,^ and being conversant with the opinions of Heraclitus, — that all sensible objects are in a state of continual flux, and that scientific knowledge concerning them had no existence, — he, indeed, subsequently in this way came to entertain these suppositions. But while ^ Plato was a native of Athens, being bom there 430 years befor« Christ. He belonged to the family of Solon. He was the great literary opponent of Aristotle. Indeed, from Aristotle we learn much about the Platonic system. It has been dilated upon by many; but perhaps more fiilly by Clemens Alexandrinus, in the first and second books oi the Stromata, than by any other writer. There is an Essay thereupon by Sam. Parker, an author of the s^Tenteenth century, and one by Gfeddes, in the eighteenth. Far before these is Sleiermacher s Ix bro- duction to the Platonic Dialogues, who seems to have caught some of the Platonic spirit. This last has been translated.

' Of Cratylus little is known. According to Diogenes Laertiufr, after the death of Socrates, Plato attached himself to Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus; this, however, does not harmonize with what is stated ia the text.

28 THE HBTAPHrsiOB OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOE!• Socrates^ was engaged about the formation of systems of Ethics, indeed, and that he broached no theory as regards the entire of Nature, seeing that he was searching, doubtless. In morals for the universal, and that he was* the first to apply his understanding to the subject of definitions, Plato, having applauded him^ on account of this his investigation of uni* yersals, was led to entertain thus much of his supposition, — as that this took place in regard of other things, and not in regard of certain of the objects that are cognisant by the senses; for it is impossible, in his opinion, that there should be a common definition of any of the sensible natures, seeing that they are continually in a state of undergoing a change. This philosopher, indeed, therefore, termed such things amongst entities, ideas; and asserted that all things are styled sensible according as they were different from these, or as they subsisted in accordance with these: for his theory was this, — that, according to participation, the most of things synonymous are homonymous with the forms. Employing, however, the import of the term participation, he changed the name merely; for the Pythagoreans, indeed, affirm that entities subsist by an imitation of numbers: but Plato, by a participation of them, changing the name. At all events, as to participation at least, or imitation, what it may be, in the case of forms, they both in common omitted to investigate. 2. Platonic ^^^» Dioreovcr, besides sensibles and forms, he opinion con- affirms that mathematical entities are things of MiaSca! suti. ^ an intermediate nature; differing, on the one hand, stances. froim scusibles in being eternal and immovable; * Socrates was bom at Athens, b.o. 470, and gave such an impulse to philosophy as to be the instrument of producing its subsequent forms of development in Greece. His history being sufficiently well known, does not require any remarks here. Much thereupon may be learned by consulting the chapters of Grote which illustrate this period of Greek history. Socrates committed none of his opinions to writing; but they have been recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, and by Plato in the Apology.

^ Upon the sources of the Platonic philosophy, its connexion with Socraticism, the meaning of its idioms, the validity or the invalidity of Aristotle's attack upon it — for information upon these points, the student should consult the Commentary of Thomas Aquinas upon the tenth section. There is one remarkable expression of Aquinas, in that portion of his remarks on niatheui<*i/ical entities, where he distinctly objects to the existence of universais separate from singulars — '^iiui versalia oraoter singularia."

OH. VI.] PLATO OOMFARfilS W^llH PTTHAOORAS. 29 but, on the other, from forms, in the fact that the most of such are similar, but that every form itself constituted one thing merely.

But since the forms are causes of other things, 3 piatonic the elements of all these he supposed to be ele- theory, "de ments of entities. Therefore, indeed, he regarded p^is^'' compared ^e great and the little to be first principles as J^^J* ^^^^ °^ matter, but unity as substance; for from these, ^ ^ by participation of unity, that the forms are numbers. That, doubtless, unity at least is as substance, and that not any other entity is denominated so, Plato affirmed, similarly with the Pythagorics; and the dogma, that numbers are causes to other things of their substance, he in like mannei asserted with them.

But, in place of the infinite considered as one, 4. Twofold dif- the having made a duad, and the having made PythagoraranS the infinite, out of the great and the small, this Plato- was peculiar to him: and, moreover, Plato affirmed the existence of numbers independent of sensibles; whereas the Pythagoreans say that numbers constitute the things them- selves, and they do not set down mathematical entities a^ intermediate between these.

The principle of his having made unity, there- cause of this fore, and numbers, as different from things, and difference. not as the Pythagoreans, who regarded them the same, as well as the introduction of forms, ensued on account of his logical * investigations; for his predecesiiors took no share in dia- lectical science. But the constituting, a duad, as a different nature from the one, arose from the fact that the numbers, liith the exception of those that are first, are suitably gene- ratea from this as from a certain express image.

And yet it happens in a contrary way; for it The error of would not be reasonable that it should take ^^^to therein. place thus: for, indeed, at present, from matter they make many things, whereas form generates only once. And from one matter there appears to be produced one table; but he who introduces form, though being one, makes many tables ' The logical system of Plato, which intertwines itself very closely with his ethics, was held in a(imiratiou till supplanted by that ol Aristotle. Its outlines may be gathered from the CratyluB, the Pa):m» aides, the Sophist, and the ii ico/uruch.

I so THB MlSTAPHTSICS OB ARISTOTLE. [BOOK L f Q like manner, also, the male stands in relation to the female ^ for the one is impregnated from a single copulation, whereas the male impregnates many. These, however, are imitations of those first principles. Plato, indeed, therefore, respecting these objects of investigation, laid down distinctions in this way.

5 Plato's ^^* ^* ^ manifest, from the things that have duction of his been stated, that Plato only employed two causes; genui^'llf cSuse, T^^^^J^ both the formal cause and the material cause: for, according to him, forms are the causes of what anything is to the rest of the entities, and unity to the forms; and that there is a certain cause which subsists according to matter, which is that subject through which the forms have a subsistence that are resident in sensibles, and through which unity is said to be in the forms, because the actual duad constitutes the great and the small. Further, the cause of " the well and the ill " he ascribed severally to the several elements; which particular point we affirm certain philosophers — such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras — to have investigated more elaborately than the early speculators.

CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

1 Reca ituia- CONCISELY, indeed, therefore, and by way ol xion of the fore- Summary,^ we have recounted both who they are menu''brought *^^ ^^^® declared their opinions, and in what to bdar on this manner they happen to have spoken concerning •iquury. ^^^^ ^^^ principles and truth. Nevertheless, however, we have received thus much information from them, — that no one of those who have declared their sentiments, concerning a first principle and a cause, has made any asser- tion beyond those definitions that have been set down in our Physics; but notwithstanding that all of them have unfolded their views with obscurity, indeed, yet in a manner they appear as persons engaged in cursorily treating those foui causes enumerated above and elsewhere.

* Aristotle again shows that the early speculators had not advanced beyond the causes mentioned in th^ Physics; and that even l^eir trea^ meut of tlies? was superficial and obaoiue.

Ce. 7II.1 BUMMARY OF THE FOREOOIKO 31 For, indeed, some speculators speak of the, Early phuo- first principle sus matter, whether they may sup- aophen *m the pose one principle or more to exist, and whetner they consider it as body, and whether as a thing that is incorporeal: as, for instance, Plato, indeed, in his mention of the great and the small; and the Italics, in their theory of the infinite; and Empedocles, in that of fire, and earth, and water, and air; and Anaxagoras, in his system of the infinity of homogeneous things. Now, truly, all these touched upon a cause of this kind: and, further, as many as affirmed the existence, as a first principle, of air, or fire, or water, or a substance of greater density than fire, but of greater rarity than air; for certain philosophers have also declared a thing of this sort to be the first element. All these, indeed, there- fore, adopted this cause merely in a superficial way.

But certain others introduce the second cause; s. Early theo- namely, the origin of the principle of motion: Jjlnt^^callie I?d as, for instance, as many as make a first principle the formal of harmony and discord, or mind or love. But *'*"**' of the essence^ and the substance — that is, of the formal cause — not one, indeed, has rendered a clear account: most especially do those make assertions respecting it who adopt the hypothesis of forms, and the things inherent in forms; for neither do they suppose that forms, and the things inhe- rent in forms, subsist as matter to sensibles; nor, as though from thence were derived the principle of motion; (for, in preference, they assert them to be causes of immobility, and of things being in a state of rest;) but, in regard of the essence, to each of the other things do forms supply this, ^ud unity imparts it to the forms.

But the final cause of actions, and changes, and motions, in a certain manner, they assert to nlons re'spJct. be a cause: yet in this way they do not assert it *"^ ***® ^"*^ to be a cause; nor do they speak of it in a way conformably to what it naturally is. For they, indeed, who assign mind or harmony as such, have laid down these causes as, doubtless, a something that is good;^ they do not, however, ^ Aristotle seems to think that the essence, or the formal cause, had for its author Plato; and that Plato probably was indebted for his di»> eovery to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Parmenides.

* Asto viewing '* the good" iu the light of a final caufie, we hav« 82 VHE METAPHTSI08 OF ABISTOTLIL [BOOK 1 affirm that from these, as final causes, anythiug amongst entities either is in existence, or is being produced, but that, as it wore, from these the Emotions of these things were derived So, also, in like manner, they who say that either unity or entity is such a nature of this kind, affirm it to be a cause of substance, indeed; yet they do not, for a certainty, affirm that anything either exists or is produced from this as a final cause. Wherefore, it happens unto them, in a manner, both to affirm, and not to affirm, that the good is a cause of this sort; for they do not make the assertion absolutely, but by accident.

5. Aristotle's That, therefore, our distinctions have been laid division of down correctlv respecting causes, both as to how cated from the numerous and what sort they are, do even all foregoing. thcsc early philosophers appear to us to bear witness, in not being able to fix upon any other cause. And, in addition to the testimony of these speculators, it is evident that first principles must be investigated, either all in this way, or in some such mode as has been adopted by these philosophers. Now, how each of these has declared his opinions, and how the case stands, in regard of the possible doubts respecting first principles, let us, after this, proceed to pass through a review of such points.

CHAPTER VIII.1 1. Faults of the -^.8 many, indeed, therefore, as set down the early theories universe as both one and a certain single nature, on SBtiolotry.

First and ' as matter, and this such as is corporeal and in- second, volving magnitude, it is obvious that they labour under manifold errors. For they have established the ele- ments of bodies merely, but not of incorporeals, when even there are in existence, I mean, things that are incorporeaL And in endeavouring to assign causes of generation and coralready commented in a previous note. Consult the remarks of Thomas Aquinas upon this section.

' Aristotle having already enumerated the opinions of the early 1>hilosuphera in this department of aetiology, now proceeds to lay down >i8 own opinions thereupon; first, in regard of the naturaligts, and secondly, of the BupnmaturaliBta.

Cte. VIII.l FATJLTS OF THE EARLY ^TIOLOOIBTS. 33 ruption, ana drawing up, concerning all bodies in..nature, systeras of physiology, th^_take^:^ay. the cause of motion. Further, the not positing also the substance as a cause of anything, nor as such the formal principle, or the very essence of a thing, this was erroneous.

And, in addition to the foregoing, the assertion 2. Third error that anything whatsoever might readily be a thJ^eTof aeti- fii-st principle of simple bodies, except earth, oiogy. but at the same time not examining into their mode of gene- ration one from another, how they are produced, — now I mean 'fire and water, and earth and air, for partly by concretion, and partly by separation, are things produced from one another, — this was an error of theirs. But this, in regard of the being prior and posterior, will involve the greatest difference; for, indeed, earth would appear to be a thing most elementary of all, from which, as a first prin- ciple, elements are produced by concretion: but a thing of tliis kind would be most minute in its parts, and a thing most refined amongst bodies. Wherefore, as many as esta- blish fire as a first principle would make assertions particularly in consonance with this theory. But each philosopher also acknowledges something of this sort to be an element of other things, — I mean an element of bodies.

No one, at least of subsequent speculator, „,, ^ even of those who assert the universe to be one, sjrstem of a has thought fit to maintain earth to be an ele- ""^^® materia] ment, doubtless, on account 01 the size of the component ptirticles, but each of the three elements haiJ obtained a certain umpire; for, indeed, some assert' fire to be this, but others, water, and some, air. Although why, pray, do they not assert this of earth, as the majority of~meu daf for they say that earth constitutes all things. But Hesiod, also, says that earth was the first produced amongst bodies: thus it has happened that the supposition is an ancient an J vulgar one. According, indeed, therefore, to this account, A one affirms to be this either any one thing belonging to these save fire, or if one lays down, as such, a thing denser than air, indeed, but more refined than water, he would not make such an assertion as this coireotly. But if that which is subsequent in generation be prior in Nature, and if that which has been digested and compounded together bo & thing H THB METAFHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. ]^BOOK I.

that is subsequent iu its production, there would take place that which is the contrary of these, — ^water, for instance, would be a thing prior to air, and earth, to water. With regard to those who are for establishing one such cause as we have declared, let these remarks be sufficient.

4. Threefold But the samc assertion may be made even if Sinst Empe- ^^J ^^^ posites thesc corporeal principles as being docies in his many in number; as, for example, Empedodes, raut^ofmatch' ^^^ ^V^ ^^^^ ^^^^ bodics, elementarily, consti- riai causes. tute matter. For, likewise, to this philosopher partly, indeed, the same consequences, but partly those that are peculiar to his own system, must needs happen. For, also, we see, in the case of things that are being produced one from another, that the fire and earth do not sdways con- tinue as of the same body. But we have spoken on these subjects in our Physics. And respecting the cause of things that are being moved, whether we must assign one or two such, we should be inclined to think that we have not ex- pressed ourselves either correctly or altogether irrationally. And, in short, must the principle of alteration be overturned by those who make assertions in this way; for not from heat will arise cold, nor from cold, heat. For what change the contraries themselves would undergo, and what would be the one nature which should become fire and water, that very philosopher (I mean Kmpedodes) does not declare.

5. The system But if any one should suppose that Anaxa- examtneT^^" goras meutious two elements, he would form his shown to be opinion most especially in accordance with a and ^rtfy * theory which, although that philosopher himself ^ong. did uot enunciate distinctly, yet, indeed, would, as a necessary consequence, follow in the footsteps of those who introduced this dogma. For, otherwise, would even the assertion be absurd, — that all things from the beginning have been in a state of mixture; both on account of its happening that all things prior /to this should pre-exist in an unmixed state, and on account of its not being consonant to Nature, that anything at random should be mingled with anything at random too; and, in addition to these rea9ons, we may add, that, according to this doctrine, their passive states and acci- dents would be separated from substances, (for to the same things belong mixtm^ and sepai*ation.) If any one, how* CH. thlJ emfrbocles and anaxagoras. 35 ever, follows up the subjeci, arranging into clauses together those stfitements which he wishes to make, he would, in all probability, utter assertions that would assume an air oi novelty. For when there was nothing in existence that has been sepamted, it is obvious that no true assertion could be put forward in regard of that substance; now, I say, for instance, that it would not necessarily be a thing either white, or black, or darkish, or any other colour, but a thing necessarily colourless, for otherwise it would possess some one of these colours. In like manner would it be with that which is insipid, according to this same mode of reasoning: nor eould it be so with anything else of those things that are similar; for neither is it possible that it could possess any actual thing of a certain quality or quantity, or that any- thing else be so. For therein would be inherent something of those termed partial forms; yet this is impossible when all things have been in his system mingled together, for already it would subsist in a state of separation: but, with the exception of mind, he affirms all things to be mingled, and that mind only is unmixed and pure. Now, from these statements it is consequential with him that he should denominate, as the first principles, both unity (for this is simple and unmixed) and another thing, as if it were an entity such as we are for establishing — viz., the indefinite prior to its having been defined, and to partaking of a certain form. Therefore, the assertion is made neither correctly nor clearly, notwithstanding that he intends something similar with both- those who subsequently make statements to this effect, and more in hasmony with the present phenomena. For these, however, happen only to be femiliar with the theories apper- taining to generation, and corruption, and motion • for, also, with regard tp such a substance, they investigate almost only both the first principles and the causes.

But as mamy^ as frame their speculation re- e. Theory of specting all entities, but of entities have set {Jj^^j*"*" down some, indeed, as being cognisant by sense, and others as not being sensibles, it is manifest that they institute for themselves an inquicy concerning both kinds^ ^ Aristotle kaving considered the system of the naturalists in the previouB section, now proceeds to examine that c£ the sopranaturalist^ such as F^rthagoras and Plato.

S6 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [booK 1 Wherefore, one might be induced, in preference, to linger upon an investigation respecting these, as to what they say, well or not well, in regard of the examination of those specu- lations now proposed by us.

7. Pythagoras, Those, indeed, called Pythagoreans^ in a far **'*,*5^®""®"^ more outlandish manner employ their first prinwith the mate- ciplcs and elements than the physiologists. But naiists. ^^Q cause is, because they have not derived them from sensibles; for those natures that are mathematical amongst entities are without motion, except those pertaining t# astrology. They, however, discuss and treat of all points concerning Nature; for they both generate the heaven, and respecting the parts thereof, and the passive conditions and the operations thereof, they closely observe that which takes place; and upon these they lavish their first principles and causes, as if acknowledging to the rest of the natural philo- sophers that whatsoever thing is such as is cognisant by the senses, that this constitutes entity, and such as that which is called heaven comprises. But the causes and the first prin- ciples— as we have said— they affirm are sufficient both to secure a transition even to a higher order of entities?, and that they are more sufficient than those that are in harmony with physical theories. „ „ ^. From what mode, however, there will be 8 Two objec-, 8 Two objec-, tions against motiou, merely on the supposition of the ex- phUosop^r"*' istence of the subjects of finite and infinite, and odd and even, they in no wise declare; or how it may be possible, without motion and change, that there should be generation and corruption, or the operations of those bodies that are whirled along the heaven.

But further, whether one grants to them that from these results magnitude, or whether this should require to be demonstrated, nevertheless, in a certain manner, some bodies will be light, indeed, and some involving weight; for the things from which they adopt for themselves their theories, and make assertions, they in no respect affirm in regard of seusibles in preference to mathematical bodies. Therefore, concerning fire or earth, or the other bodies of such a kind, ' As to the agreement and diflfcrence of the Pytba,'::^oric philosophy with t?ie materi.iHstic Byatem, consult the Commentary of TLomii AqiiinaH upon tbis tjection.

te. txj] ATTACK ON PYTHAGORAB. 31 they have declared nothing whatsoever, inasmuch as affirming, in my opinion, nothing that is peculia?:~l;p tl^?.D(i coiwwiiin^ iehsible natures.

"BuTfurther, how must we receive as causes the 9, ^ third ob- passive conditions of number, and the number jectjon against Pvtnaiioras itself as the cause of entities which subsist in sag^^ested lYom the heaven, and of things that are being pro- ^^**®' duced there both from the beginning and at present, and at the same time allow that there is no other number save this number from which the order of the universe consists? For since, indeed, in this portion of the creation (according to these philosophers) there may be in existence opinion and opportunity, but a little above, or a little below, injustice an(i separation, or mixture; and since they may adduce a demon- stration that each one of these is number, and it happens, from this mode of reasoning in this place, that there subsists already a multitude of constituted magnitudes, from the fact of these affections following each of these places respectively^ on the supposition of the foregoing we may ask whether, therefore, is this owing to the same number as that which is in the heaven, and which we ought to receive because that each of these exists, or, besides this, is there another number 1 For Plato says, indeed, that there is a different number: he, however, also thinks both these, and the causes of these, to be numbers, but numbers that are, indeed, intelligible causes; whereas those are merely sensible, according to Plato. Respecting then, indeed, the Pythagoreans,^ let us leave off our present discussions; for it is sufficient thus far to have touched upon their system.