ontology not ways,'^ theso, also, shall in many ways be spoken thfdWe?sSyin ^^i ^^*» nevertheless, it is the province of one meaning of its sciencc to make known all such; for even though subject-matter. ^^j^.y |jg spokcu of in many ways, on that account it is not the province of a different science to in- vestigate them: if, however, neither the definitions are capable of being reduced in accordance with one, nor in reference to one, then is it the province of a different science. But since all such are referred to what is first — as, for example; as many things as are styled one are spoken of in reference to the first one — in the same manner may the assertion be made, that this science is concerning sameness and diversity, and the rest of the contraries. Wherefore, in dividing how many modes each is expressed by, in this way must reference be made to what is first or original in each category, in order to ascertain how it is expressed in reference to that. For things will be denominated partly by reason of having those primaries, and partly that they are causes of them, and partly according to other such modes. Tliero- fore, is it evident, as has been stated in the doubts, that it if * Vide book IX. chap. vi.
* Vide book IV. chap, vi., and book IX. chap. L CH. II.] SUBJECTS OF INQVIBT IN ( NTOLOOT. ^3 the prorince of one science to institute an inquiry concerning these and concerning substance. But this was one of those mquiries that have been mentioned in the doubts.
And it is the part of the philosopher to be ^ xhe fore- able to speculate about all the foregoing sub- going subjectf, jects of inquiry. For, if it be not the province J^?|!^J^ ^j^ of the philosopher, who shall there be that will ®"*®"y!*V ^ be likely to examine whether he be the same Srom^i^ ana- person, Socrates, and Socrates sitting; or whether ^gy of number, one be contrary to one, or what a contrary is, or in how many ways it is denominated? In like manner, also, is it in the case of the rest of such points for investiga- tion. Since, therefore, these of themselves are affections ci unity, so &r forth as it is unity, and of entity, so far forth as it is entity, but not so far forth as they are numbers, or lines, or fire, it is evident that it is ^e province of that science of ontology to make known both what these are, and the accidents that are inherent in them. And not in this respect do they err who examine concerning these, as not philosophising, but because substance, about which they understand nothing, is a thing prior in existence. Since, as there are peculiar affections of number, as far as it is number, (for instance, oddness, evenness, commensurability, equality, excess, defect,) and as these both absolutely and relatively to one another are inherent in numbers, and since in a similajr way there are other peculiar qualities, in what is solid and inca- pable of motion, and in what is being moved, both that which is without weight, and that which has weight, so, also, in entity, so &r forth as it is entity, are there certain peculiar properties; and these are they about the truth of which it is the province of the philosopher or ontologist to inquire.
Now, a proof of this is the following:^ for j secondly, dialecticians and sophists assume, indeed, the fromarefexence same figure as the philosopher, (for sophistical ^ ^^^ *^'* is only apparent wisdom, and dialecticians dispute about all thmgs;) to all, however, is entity common. But they dispute concerning these, evidently, firom the cause of these being proper subjects of inquiry for philosophy. For, in- ^ Ariitotle seems to think tliat for the sophist or dialeoticiMi t« abim the title of philosopher was a mere piece of assmnptlon; an^ buUed, to disouBS at all subjects of ontology. See note, p. ^ ;84 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ^^BOOKHL >deed, sophistry and dialectics are employed about the samt genus as philosophy is; but philosophy differs from the one in the mode of power, and from the other in the choice of life.^ And again, dialectic science is merely tentative of the knowledge of those things that philosophy has already tictually reached; but sophistic science is only apparent, and 8 Thirdly ftom ^^* '^^ ^ *^^ Same is further proved from the reduction of the fact that a different co-ordination of ccm- Snity"^' ^ traries is privation, and all things are referred to entity and nonentity, and to unity and plurality: as, for instance, rest in its nature partakes of unity, and motion of plurality. But that entities and substance are compounded of contraries almost all men acknowledge — all, at least, assert the first principles to be contraries: according to some, indeed, these principles being odd and even; and according to others, hot and cold; and according to others, finite and infinite; and others, harmony and discord. But all the rest of such are referred appar- ently to unity and plurality; for let this reduction be received by us as is done in the first book of our work " Concerning the Good." 2 Now, there it appears that first principles, both altogether and as is acknowledged by others, fall under these genera. 9. Converse From these statements, therefore, is it also Sen?"o?theTi ©^^i^©^* *^* *© investigate entity, so far forth 5v, is the sub- as it is entity, is the province of one science. raVoiog^^'^ For all things are either contraries or com- ' T^ TpoKtp ^uydfi€0)s: by these words Aristotle means tliat though there is a demonstrative or apodeiktic power contained in common in the science of the dialectician and ontologist, yet that the latter sways this power over truth, and so as to retam truth under his authority; whereas the former does not extend its influence beyond mere proba- bility. Upoaipefffi rod ^lov; in this lies the difference between sophistry and metaphysics, that the latter is cultivated by one who can hare recourse to stores of real knowledge, whereas the former is a mere fantastic or apparent system of science.
^ This is the title of a treatise of Aristotle which has, unfortunately, been lost; though perhaps, indeed, some might contend that there is merely a reference made to book II. of this treatise, where he speaks upon a subject pretty much akin to the one mentioned in the text. There is discoverable in the Metaphysics the name of another of the Peripatetic writings which has not come down to us, namely, the ixXvyii T»y ivoaniwv, already noticed, p, 81.
in. XQ.] OtfTOLOGT AND AFODEIKTIO PBIKOiPLES. 35 poded from contraries: but the first principles, also, of contraries are unity and plurality; and these are belonging to the department of one science, whether the predication be made according to one or not, as, perhaps, the truth is. But, nevertheless, even though unity be spoken of in many ways, to the first will the rest be reduced, and the contraries in like manner. And for this reason, even though entity and unity be not universal and the same, in the case of all things, or separable, as, perhaps, they are not, yet some things, no doubi^ are referred to unity, but others to that next in order; and for this reason it is not the business of the geometer to in- vestigate into what the contrary is, or the perfect, or unity, or entity, or identity, or diversity, save only from hypothesis. That» therefore, it is the province of one lo. Recapituia- science to investigate entity, so far forth as it is ^^°"' entity, and the things therein existing, so &r forth as they constitute entity, is evident; and that the same science is speculative not only of substances, but also of things that are inherent in substances, and of the particulars enumerated, l)ofch concerning priority and subsequence, and genus and species^ and whole and part, and the rest of each, this is evident also.
CHAPTER III.
But we must determine whether it is the |, whether on province of one science,^ or a different one, to spe- to^oH^ takes culato concerning axioms, as they are called, m apodeiktic first mathematics; and concerning substance? Doubt- Jubgt^^JeJ?"*^ less, it is manifest that it is belonging to one, and that the science of the philosopher, and the investigation of such inquirer is respecting these; for in all entities are they inherent, but not in any genus separate distinctly from the rest. And all investigators employ them, indeed, because they belong to entity, so far forth as it is entity; each genus, however, constitutes entity. And thus far do they employ > Thifl, it may be remembered, was a question put forward by Aria- toUe in tiie early portions of his treatise; and he now enters more at larga into a discussion of the point. As to the relation between 6ubstmc« and ontology, he defers the discussion of this subject to books YL and VIL; ^6 THB METAPHYSICS OV ABISTOTLB. [BOOK UL them as is sufficient for their purpose, but that is as far fM they comprise the genus about which they brin^ forward their demonstrations. Wherefore, since it is eyment that they are inherent in all things, as ^ as they are entities, (for this is held by these in common,) the speculation of them belongs to the philosohper, whose business it is to make known the truth concerning entity,^ so &r forth as it is entity, and concerning these. Therefore, no one of those who are partial inqmrers attempts to say aught concerning these, whether they are true or not, neither, for instance, the geometer nor the arithmetician.
2. An apparent Some of the natural philosophers, however, areaUxceptiOT ^^ doiug SO, act reasonably; for they alone are to the forego- accustomed to think that it is their province ^* to examine concerning the whole of nature, and concerning entity. But since there is something of a higher order than the physical,^ (for nature is merely one certain genus of entity,) the investigation in regard of these should belong to the universal, and to that which is specu- lative of the first substance. Now, I admit there is a certain wisdom, namely, even the physical; but it is not the first. As many things, however, as certain of those who speak con- cerning the truth of axioms attempt to lay down, in what way they ought to be admitted, they do this from ignorance of analytics;^ for they ought to approJEush such a subject who are instructed therein beforehand: but whilst hearers they should not be investigators. That, therefore, it is the part of the philosopher, and of the inquirer concerning substance in its entirety, so &r forth as it is such by nature, to examine, also, in regard of syllogistic principles, is evident.
3. Respecting But it is becoming that one especially fum- S??/*LE:^*'^" ishing information about each genus should be pie of demon- "xxj. ii»xu j.»»i •tration, what competent to spcak of the very surest pnnciples K and'Sn what of the thing; and, therefore, the same holds true basis it rests, of a pcrsou that is engaged in the investiga- ^ As is shown in book V.
' These words prore that Aristotle was aware of the importance of transcendental knowledge.
^ That is, most likely, of Aristotle's own treatise on the subject; for in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, and third chapter, we have a discussion on apodeiktio principles, and the same mode of reasoning pursued as here.
OIL in.]. THB nB8T PRIRaiLB OF DEMONSTRATION. 87 lion of entities, so &r forth as they are entities — I mean, that he should be able to adduce the most firm principles of alL^ Now, this is the philosopher; and the most firm first principle of all is that concerning which there can be no possibility of deception, for such must needs be that which is most known; for those points respecting which men do not impart knowledge are all exposed to deception in; and it must needs, likewise, be a thing independent of hypothesis. For a principle which one must be in possession of who under- stands any entity whatsoever, this is not an hypothesis; but Ivhat one must make known, in the manifestation of anything whatsoever, he must also needs come forward furnished with thia That, therefore, indeed, such is the most firm first prin- ^ple of all is evident. Now, what this principle is we shall after this declare. For the same thing to be present and not be present at the same time in the same subject, and according to the same, is impossible, (and whatsoever things we have further defined, let these be so defined in respect of their logical diffi- culties.) This, however, is the most firm of all first principles; for it involves the distinction Bpoken of above. For it is impossible to suppose that anything whatsoever is the same, and is not the same, as certain think that Heraclitus ^ asserts; for it is not necessary, as far as concerns what one asserts to exist, to suppose that these also do exist. But if it is not ad- missible that contraries at the same time should subsist in the same subject, (now the usual definitions have been additionally tnade by us to this proposition,) and if an opinion contrary to an opinion be that of contradiction, it is evident that it is impossible for the same inquirer to suppose that at the same time the same thing should be and not be; for one labouring under deception in regard of this would entertain contrary opinions at the same time. Wherefore, all who employ de- monstration reduce the matter to this last opinion; for by nature this, also, is the fii-st principle of all the rest of the axioms.
^ By a reference to the doubts enumerated in book 11., we shall that Aristotle has already laid out for himself the inquiry now pursued. • ' Aaclepius defends Heraclitus, and maintains that Aristotle con* aide rod Heraclitus not to have made these statements at all; or that, if he did, it was merely symbolically, or yvija^offriKtis: by way of IBQntal exercise or recreation; just as Zeuu the Eleatic is said, in thia spirit merely, to have denied the exiatence of motion.
58 THE METAFHT8IG8 OF ABISTOirLB. [bOOK m.
CHAPTER IV.^ 1. Th« axioms- Now^ there are certain philosophers who, as thMJ^ho deny ^® ^^^® intimated, themselves both aflBrm that this funda- it is possiblo that the same thing may and may KmoSJJrT not be, and that they really think so. This prin- tion. ciple, however, do many of the investigators of Nature employ. But we just now have assumed it as a thing impossible, in the case of an entity, that it should be and not be at the same time; and by means of this have we demon- strated that this is the most firm of all first principles. Now, some also demand a demonstration of this, from ignorance; for it is ignorance the not knowing what things one ought to seek a demonstration of, and of what things he ought not. For, indeed, upon the whole, it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of all things; for one would go on in this case to infinity, so that there would not be any demonstration at all in this way. If, however, there be some things of which we should not seek a demonstration, what they in pre- ference require such a first principle to be they have not the 2. This anomaly ability to affirm. But it is possible to demonstrate confirmed. concerning this, by refutation, that it is impossible, if only he would affirm anything who doubts; but if he makes no assertion, it would be ridiculous the seeking an argu- ment against him who had not a reason to put forward about anything, so ^ as he had no such reason; for an adversary of this sort, as far now as he is such, would be like unto a plant. Now, I say, demonstration by refutation differs from demon- stration simply or properly so called, because he that employs demonstration would seem to require what is the principle in the beginning; but, on the supposition of the existence of another cause of such a kind, it would be a refutation^ and not a demonstration.
s. Seven argu- Now, a Commencement of a discussion in fho^*whf Jay regard of all such points is, not the demand- that eontradic- ing the declaration that either a thing exists ftrst'argument. or doth uot cxist, (for this, ouc would imagine, 1 This dogma, by many thus supposed as originating with the Horaclitice, Aristotle now proceeds to discuss in the most ample man* ner. In ranking it as a tenet of the school of the physicists, or natural philosophers, he points at Ueraclitua, or probably to the followers of Democritus and Protagoras.
0&, lY.J CONTRADICTIONS NOT AROUMKKT. 82^ perhaps, was the asking the principle assumed originally,) but the demanding the signification, at least, of a thing, both as for oneself and for another. For this also amounts to a necessity, if he is to say anything at all; for if he does not, there would be no possibility of a rational discussion with Buoh a one, neither for himself relatively to himself, nor to another. If any one, however, would grant this, there will be a demonstration in existence; for now will there actually be in existence something that has been determined. But the csause is not the person demonstrating, but the person sus- taining ^ the argument; for, by overturning the discussion, he yet sustains the discussion. And further,^ he that ac- quiesces in this, hath acquiesced in the truth of something independent of demonstration; so that not everything would be so and not so.
In the first place, indeed, therefore, it is evi- ^ Deductions dent that this very assertion is true, because therefrom; nist, the name signifies the existence or the non- off th'fn/irjig- existence of this particular thing; so that not nwcant with the everything would be so, and not so in this parti- ^'^^^ <> ^ « • cular way. Further, if man signifies one thing, let this be ^ two-footed animal. Now, I say, that this signifies one thing; if this be man, whatever is a man, this, namely, the being a two-footed animal, is the being in man: but there is no dif- ference should any one assert that more is thereby signified, provided only they have been reduced under proper defini- tions; for grant that upon each definition a difierent name may have been imposed. Now, I say, for example, if he would not assert that man signifies one, but many things, of one of which there is a single definition, namely, two- footed animal, yet, also, are there many others, but defined according to number; for its own proper denomination might be set down according to each of the definitions. But if it^ proper denomination should not be thus set down, but one would say that such signified an infinity of things, it is pal- pable that there would not be a definition of it at all; for the signifying not any one thing Is the signifying nothing. And ^ That ifl, in the endeavour made by such to overtum the contra- ^lotion, the very statements which he makes, by the mere foTce of trutl^ fKivluci him to a refutation of himself.
* This clause is inserted in Didot'a edition.
90 THB METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ffiOOK. IT1.
when the denominations are devoid of meaning, there is an end to mutual discussion, and, also, in reality, to discussion on the part of a man with himself. For it is not possible that a person should imderstand anything that is not capable of understanding one thing: but, if it were possible, one name would be imposed on this thing. Let it, doubtless, be granted, as has been stated in the commencement, that a name significant of something be significant of one thing also.
5. Secondly, ^^ ^ i^ot, therefore, possible that being in man that the being, Bignifies the Same particular thins as the not beinst being, of man, m man, if man IS significant not merely of what la lame'either predicated of ouc, but even one thing itself; for nominausr or this WO do not require that the one should signify "*^* that which is predicated of one: since, if the case stands in this way, at least, the musical, and the white, and the man, would signify one thing; so that all things would be one, for they would be synonymous;. and it will not be possible that the same thing be and not be, save by equivocation; just as if we would call any one a man whom others would call a not-man. The subject of doubt, how- ever, is not this, if it is possible that the same thing at the fiame time should be and not be the man nominally, but really. But if the name man, and the name not-man, do not signify anything different, it is evident that the not being man will not difier from the being man. Wherefore, the being man will be the not being man, for they will be one thing; for this sig- nifies that they are one — as a tunic and a cloak — ^if there is one definition of each. And if they shall be one, the being man and the not being man signify one thing: but it hap heen demonstrated that they signify a difierent thing.
6. This con- There is a necessity, therefore, of this con- clusion con- sequence, if there be a particle of truth in the case of *' nou assertion, that man m signification is equipol- *"'•" lent with being a two-footed animal; for this was what the expression man was assumed to signify. Now, if there exists a necessity that this be the case, it is not pos- sible for this very thing not to be a two-footed animal then, for this doth the phrase, " the being a necessity," signify, namely, the impossibility of its not being man. Accordingly, it is not possible to be true to say at the same time that the same iking is both a man and is not a man. But there €!H.rV.] ABSOLUTE EXISTENOB THEREBY IGNORED. 01 prevails the same mode of reasoning in the case of the not being man also; for the being of a man and the not being of a man signify a different thing, if, troly, both the being white and the being man are different; for mnch more is there opposition in this case to justify the difference of signi* fication. But if, also, one would say that the white signifies one and the same thing with the being man, again will we make the same assertion, as has been declared on a former oc- casion, namely, that all things will be one, and not merely things in opposition. But, if this be not possible, that which has been declared will happen, if the question asked be answered. I£ however, when a simple question is put,..
one subjom negations also, the question actu- mode of treat, ally put is not replied to: for nothing hinders S!£^i^* the same thing being both man and white, and other things ten thousand in multitude; but, nevertheless, if the question be asked, if it is true to a£G[rm man to be this^ or not to be so, the reply should be, that it signifies one thing, and no addition should be made that it is both white and large. For, also, it is impossible to go through accidents when, at least, they are infinite; either, therefore, let one go through all or none. In like manner, therefore, if, also, ten thousand times over they are the same thing, namely, man and not man, the reply to the question, if man is, should not be that at the same time also not man is, unless the reply likewise states, in addition, the rest of whatsoever things are accidents, as many as are so^ and as many as are not; if this, however, be not done by the person asked the question, there is nothing under discussion at all.
But, in general, they who make this assertion g s«»ndaiju- overtum substance^ and essence, or the formal mentagaimt cause and very nature of a thing; for they must that contraSS. themselves needs afl&rm all things to be accidents, tion« are true /» 'iii tney do away and that the essence of man or animal, whatsoever the to -n Jiv it be, has no existence. For if there will exist the •'*^** ^ Aristotle's line of argument against this dogma is to show thttt i^ quite destroys our notions of substance, and form, and definition, and essence; that, if we admit its reality, we must deny the possibility of anything like absolute predication, which, joined to the abeurdil^ of viewing all things as accidents, seems to oyertum any arguments the ■ceptica can bring forward.
n THB METAFBTSIOB OF ABISTOTLS. [bOOK IIL esaential nature of anything whatsoever, such as is that "firhich is to he man this will not he to he not man, or not to be man, although these are negations of this; for it was one thing which it signified, and this was the suhstance of a certain thing. But the signification of the suhstance of a thing is, that not anything else is the being of that thing: but if the being whatsoever man is will be found in this, being either whatsoever is not man, or whatsoever not is man, is a thing impossible; for it will be a something dif- ferent. Wherefore, it will be necessary for them to say that a formal and substantial definition of this kind, and one invariably suited unto the subject, will be one of a nonentity: but all things, as we have supposed, are according to acci- dent; for in this lies the distinction between substance and accident, for the white is an accident in man, because he is white, but not anything whatsoever that is white. 9. Therefore But, if all things are spoken of according Iristenof of * ^ accident, there will be no primary universal, anything, save if an accident always signifies a predication accident. about a certain subject.^ There is a necessity, then, of going on in a progression to infinity. But this is impossible, (for more than two of such are not connected^ together,) for accident is not a thing that is accidental to that which is an accident, unless that both are accidental 'n the same subject. Now, I say this, for example, in the Instance of the white being musical, and the latter being white, because both are accidents in man; but not on this account is Socrates musical, because it happens that both are accidents in a certain other subject. Since accidents, there- fore, are spoken of some in this way and some in that, as ' Of course, every accident involves some subject or other, wherein it resides, and whereof it is predicated. This constitutes the very notion of an accident. Vide book V. chaps, ii. iii.
* There is a difference of opinion amongst the commentators as to the meaning of this passage. Alexander makes out that Aristotle's meaning is to lay down that no more than two accidents can be simul- taneously predicated of a subject; e.g. Hippocrates is the most skilful doctor. Ammonius, on the other hand, adopts quite a diflferent view, and says that what the Stagyrite intends to affirm is, that no more than two definitions are to be found in a proposition, and he refers to the explanation of the word Bpos, in the Prior Analytics, book I. chap. L Vide note, p. 251, in Mr. Owen s Translation of Aristotle's Organon, •* Bohn's Classical Library.*' ea, 17.] THIS DENIAL AMOI/NTS TO PABTHEUlf. 09