lastly, in respect of truth, whether things are true such aa appear so to the sleeping, or such as seem so to tho9e who are awake) for that they do not, in reality, think so, at leasts k evident; for ho one, if even he supposes when asleep hy night that he were in Athens, when he is in Libya, goes, when he awakes, to the Odeion.^ And, further, respecting the future, as also lo. secondly, Plato says, doubtlesis, not similarly decisive is d"gS^?rt?cre!* the opinion of the physician and that of the ditto be at- ignorant quack; for example, as to the likelihood ISstimonVor that one will he sound, or that one will not be j®^*^*JJg ^ so: smd, farther, in the case of the senses them- different cir- advea, not similarly decisive is the testimony cwmttances. ^ moae In respect of what is foreign, and in respect of wbait is its peculiar province, or of that which is near and of that which is remote from itself. But respecting oolour it is sight and not taste that judges; and respect- ing juices it is taste but not sight, each of which never at the same time affirms about the same thing that simultaneously a thing is so and not so disposed. But neither in a difierent period have the senses doubted about the passion, at least, to which they are subject, but about that in which the passion is an accident. Now, I say, for example, that the same wine, either from being changed, Or from the bodily organ being changed, might so appear at One time to be sweet, and at another time not sweet; but the sweet then, at least, when it is sweet is not such, for it never has undergone a change; but always verification thereof is possible, and of necessity is it that such will be a thing that is sweet All these theories, however, overturn this con- clusion, since, also, if there is not a substance of anything neither is there anything necessarily subsisting; for it is not admissible for the necessary to be at one time disposed one ' The Odeion is mentioned by Plutarch in his Life of Pericles. It was built by Pericles in imitation of the king of Persia's payilion. H«re the contests for prizes in music were decided. This is a practical argument against his opponents; for the phenomenon of dreaming shows that tiiough things may appear so and so to them, yet that they do not in their conduct, when they awake from such dreams, make it manifest that they consider the real and the apparent as tiie same: tiiey thus acknowledge, though perhaps unwillhigly, one case wheri ike r6 ip€uir6/ityoy is not t6 d\i$04u lOi THE HBTAPHTBIOS OF ABISrOTLE. [bOOK 171 way, and at another time another: wherefore, if there ia anything of necessity, it will not be disposed both so and not so.
ii.ThinUy.that If, also, UDon the whole, what is sensible exkts asyXmof • nierely, nothing wonld there be subsisting, inas- nmnism, and much as animated beings would have no exists ohaia. ence; for sense would have no existence. Perhaps, then, on the supposition of the non-existence of sense, the truth would be, that neither sensibles nor sensations exist, (for of the percipient is sense an affection;) but that it is im- possible that the subjects tiiemselves which produce sense have not any existence, even though sense exist not. For, doubtless, sense itself is not of itself; but there is something else, also, different ^m, and ind6|)endent of, sense, which must needs be prior to sense; for the moving cause is prior in nature to that which is being moved: and if these asser- tions are made one with another, not a whit the less is the same theory true.
CHAPTER VI.!
CHAPTER VI.!
1 The absurd- ^^"^ there are some who doubt and are sceptics ityofscepti- both amopgst those who are persuaded of the ^kSoJS^^gSd^ reality of these opinions and those who merely by sceptics afl&rm thcsc theories, for they ask, who is it that erase ves. ju(jgetii \^yccl that is in good health, and him that, upon the whole, is capable of forming his decision cor- rectly about each particular? Now, doubts of such a sort as this are similar to one's doubting whether we now sleep or are awake. For all such doubts are tantamount to the same; for these persons demand that there should be a reason of all things: for they seek for a first principle, and expect to obtain this by demonstration, whereas, at least, that they are not persuaded of the validity of their position they make manifest in their act& But, as we have said, this is the characteristic property ^ of these philosophers, for they seek ^ Aristotle still continues to overthrow this fundamental principle of the sceptical philosophy; adapting his refiitations to the nature of his adversaries' ground.
' rh irdOos — ^that is, this is their constitutional error; meaning thai tJie great fault in the philosophy of these theorists was that they CKTl.] ABOVMENIS AGAINST THIS THBOBT. 105 for a reason of things of which there is no reason; for th« principle of demonstration is not demonstration. These^ therifore, indeed, would be easily persuaded of this, for it is not difficult to apprehend They, however, who seek in reason compulsion », if tbet^ merely, seek an impossibility; for what is contrary ^^^l^ they deem it right to speak, immediately utter- lute ezisteneet ing contrary things. But if all things are not "* *«*»*«*• relatiyes, but some are also themselves by themselves, that ifl^ absolute, in such a case everything apparent would not be true, for the apparent is apparent to some one: therefore, he that says that all things apparent are true, makes all entitieis relatives. Wherefore, also, must the precaution be adopted by those who seek for compulsion in reason, and at die same time, also, think ri^t to subjoin a reason tiiat not «the apparent is true, but that the apparent is true to whom<^ soever it appears so, and when it appears, and how far, and in what manner.
But if they subjoin a reason, to be sure, but do 3. Admitting not in this way subjoin it, it will happen speedily iense fa which unto them that they should speak things that the rd 0aiv6- are contrary. For it is possible for the same '**»"'•'" *'^* thing to appear honey, as far as the sight goes, and not to appear so to the taste; and, as we have two eyes, not the same will a thing appear to each organ of vision if they be dis- similar. Whereas, in reply to those, at least, who, on account of the causes originally enumerated, afi&rm the apparent to be true, and for this reason contend that all things in like manner are false and true; in reply to these, I say, it may be affirmed that neither the same things appear the same to all men, nor to the same person do the same things invaria- bly appear the same,^ but frequently things contrary at the same time; for the touch, in the alteration of the fingers, says that there are two objects, but the organ of sight one; required a demonstration of everything, forgetting that there were certain ultimate principles which must be assumed as the basis of all reasoning, and, as such, are themselves indemonstrable. This subject is well hancll^d by the metaphysicians in modem days.
^ Any one familiar with the writings of modem sceptics, «.^. Thomas Hope, in his '* Origin and Prospects of Man,*' will remember the use made of this fact, and how it is set up as a pillar to support their lystem.
106 THE METAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK III; but neither to the same sense, at least, do the same things Beem the same, and according to the same, and in like man^^ ner, also, in the same moment of time: wherefore, this woulci be true. But, perhaps, for this cause it is necessary to say to those who speak not on account of doubt, but for talk's aake^ tbiat this is not absolutely true, but that it is true relatively to this person.
4. The genena And, 88 doubtless it has been formerly af- §rSfthe°rath firmed, it is necessary, also, to make aU thmga of the apparent, relative, both iu reference to opinion and sensej; 80 that nothing either has been produced or will arise except on the supposition of some person previously exercising thought. But if anything has been generated or will arise, it is evident that all things would not be according to opinion. Further, if one thing exists, it exists in relation to one, or in relation to a definite thing; and if the same thing is both half and equal, such exists in relation to these; yet. the equal is not in reference to the double. Now, in relation to opinion, if man and the subject of the opinion be the same, man will not be the thinking subject, but the subjeet of opinion. But if each thing will be in relation to the thinking subject, the thinking subject will subsist in re- lation to things infinite in species. That^ indeed, there- fore, most indisputable of all is the opinion, that assertions in opposition are not at the same time true; and what happens in the way of consequence unto those who say that they are true, and why they say so, let thus much suffice to have been spoken.
j|.Toa»thata But sinco it is impossible that contradiction oontndictionof ^ould be true of the same subject at the same Is true is to say tmic, it IS evident that neither can contranes pos- roay S"foSd' ^^^J subsist at the same time in the same subject, in the same For, indeed, of contraries one or other is not the subject. Yosa privation. But privation of substance is negation from some definite genus. If, therefore, it is im- possible at the same time to affirm and deny with truth, it is impossible that also contraries should be inherent in the same subject at the same time; but either both must be in- herent partially, or the one partially and the other simply oi absolutely.
QH, yilJ ko mean between contradiction. 107 CHAPTER VIL* But, truly, neither is it possible that there is i. No new it any mean between a contradiction; but there coSSiSSk? is a necessity either of asserting or denying proved; first, any one thing whatsoeyer of one. Now, in 5?Si,^*md"* the first place, this is evident to those who de- wwhood, fine what truth and fiJsehood are. For, indeed, the asser- tion that entity does not exist, and that nonentity does,?s a fidsehood, but that entity exists, and that nonentity does not exist, is truth. Wherefore, the person who affirms that this medium is in existence or is not will speak truth or utter falsehood. But neither is entity nor nonentity said not to exist or to exist.
. Further, either will there be a mean between 2. secondly, contradiction, as that of a darkish colour between J^^Jjyoived black and white, or it will be as that which is in thenotion of neutral between man and horse. If, therefore, ®^ ' ^ ^^' this subsist in this way, there would be no change, (for a fthange takes place from something that is not good into that which is good, or from this latter into what is not good;) but now it is always apparent as taking place, for there is not a diange existing but one into opposites and media. If, how- ever, there is a mean, so also would there be a certain pro- duction into a thing that is white, not from that which ill not white; but this is not perceived as being the case.
Further, everything intelligible and mental the j. Thirdiy,«h)m anderstanding either affirms or denies; and this is * J| StSuiRiwo manifest from definition when truth is spoken or joined vitii fidsehood; when, indeed, in this way it is composed, "*^" «»»<«•. as an assertion or negation, truth is spoken; but when in that way, fiedsehood. Further, must there be in all contradictioiis a mean, save where the assertion is made only for aigument or talk's sake, so that also one will neither utter truth nor not td^er tmth. And, besides entity and nonentity, there will be 1 Aristotle now prooeeda to discuss the second of the propositions h» undertakes to prove to be false, namely, 88 to there being a mean between contradiction. The first question proposed, and the one just decided is, that if we ask, are oontnulictions true, or oan they be so, w# must reply that they cannot. Vide p. 88.
It>8 TBB XETAFHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLE. [svK)KIU iomethiug iu subsistenoe: wherefore, besides generation and corruption, some change will there be. Moreover, in whatso- ever genera negation introduces tne contrary, in these also will be found this medium; as, for example, in numbers a number neither odd nor not odd: such, however, is impossible, and from the definition is this evident Further, would we go on in a pro- gression to infinity, and not only will there be sesquialterate entities, but even more than this. For, again, it will be possible to deny this in regard of the assertion and negation of the me- dium of the former contradiction; and this will be something, &r there will be a certain other substance of this. Moreover, aa to the question if a thing is white when one says that it is not, nothing has he denied than that it is; but that a thing is not, amounts to a negation.
4. The origin But from the Same source as other paradoxes of paradox. iias this opiuiou reached unto certain speculators; for when they are unable to solve arguments open to dispute, giving in to reason, they consent to the truth of whatever is brought out by syllogism. Some, therefore, make assertions from some such cause as this, but others on account of re- quiring in their investigations the reason of all things. 6 The im "^^^ principle, howcvcr, in respect of all these, tsnce of defiiii. is to be derived from definition. But definition SS^on^mani- a^^scs trom their necessarily signifying some- fests the dif- thing; for the sentence of which the name is a H^ditus^wd sign becomes the definition of a thing. And the Anaxagoras. theory of Heraclitus, affirming all tilings to bo and not to be, appeared to make all things true; but that of Anaxagoras^ was, thajk there is a certain medium between contradiction; so tlmt all things are £a.lse, for when they are mingled, neither is the mixture good nor not good: where- fore, there is nothing that one can affirm as true.
^ Asclepius has a curious remark on this passage. He compare* Anaxagoras in his theory of ** the mixture of all thmgs in all ** to the Manichaeans. The Manichseans, not being able to solve their perplex* ities as to the existence of evil, assumed the existence of a distinct first principle thereof; and, in like manner, the school of Anaxagoras adopted their dogma, from not being cognisant of the various reso- lutions into different forms assumed by matter, while the matter ia itself, per te, remained the same. Vide Tenneman, ss. 107, 199* CHAPTER YLIV Now, these distinctions having been laid down, i. bicae 8o«p. it is evident that the predications made in one tung^to be^ way only, and also those that are made about all, ^^t sonw au it is impossible should be as certain affirm they truef and tome are; some, indeed, saying that nothing is true; (for 2?\Jili*iJS*ii nothmg, they say, hinders all things from bemg SLe. ^ in such a way as that the diagonal of a square is oommensu- Table ^ with its side;) but others afi&rming that all things are true. For almost sll these assertions are the same with those of Heraclitus; for this philosopher, in affirming that all things are true and all things false, affirms also separately each of ^ese theories. Wherefore, if those are impossible, it is im- possible, likewise, that these should be so.
But, further, are those palpably contradictions 2. Oeneiai which, likewise, it is not possible should at the S^nfr^' same time be true. Nor, doubtless, is it possible definitiim. that all should be fidse, although, at least, it would the rather seem to be admissible from what has been stated. But, in reply to all such theories, must the question be asked, (as also has been declared in the discussions above,) not if there is JBomething or if there is not, but if something has a significa- tion. Wherefore, from the definition is the discussion to be drawn, by assuming what falsehood or truth signifies. But if the true and the &lse be nothing else than to assert what is true or deny what is Mse, it is impossible that all things be &lse; for it is necessary that either portion of the contradic- tion be true. Further, if it be necessary either to assert or deny everything, it is impossible for both to be fiJse; for either part of the contradiction is £edse.
^ In this chapter there is a sort of recapitulatory view given of the aceptical dogma previously under examination.
s Aristotle thus illustrates the system of these sceptics by this prin* dple, which is geometrically false, and must be so, because the side of a square is to its diagonal as 1: v^2, between which there is plainly no niunber to be found that will measure both. This principle depends oil A quality of numbers, viz. that if we square two numbers of which one is greater than the other, and yet is not quite the double of the smaller, two other numbers wiU bo the result, one of which will be less than thi quadruple of the other, without being either double or triple cf tt.
ilO THE METAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. (bOOK IIL I. Reftitation Truly, also, doth the common saying^ happen from common unto ftU such theories, that they overthrow or stultify themselves. For the person that says that all things are true renders the statement con- trary to this true also: wherefore, he makes his own affir- mation not true; for the contrary says that it is not true; but he that says that all things are &lse, even liimself fSalsifies his own position. I^ however, they make an exception, the one making an exception in the case of the contrary that it is not alone true, and the other in the case of his own assertion that it is not false, in no wise the less does it happen unto these sceptics that they require the truth and falsehood of an infinite number of assertions j for lie who says that a true theory is true agrees with the affirmation that it is true; but this will go on in a progression infinity.
^ Til *-* A It is evident, however, that neither they in the case of who lay dowu that all thmgs are at rest speak rejt and mo- ^^^ ^^^Yi, nor they who say that all things are in motion. For if, indeed, all things are at rest, the same things will always be true and &lse. Now, this appears to be a thing imdergoing a change. For he who sp^iks once himself was not, and again will not be. It all things, however, are in motion, there will be nothing that is true; all things, in that case, are false. But it has been demonstrated that this is impossible. Further, must entity needs undergo a change; for from something into something is the change made. But, doubtless, neither are all things at rest or in motion at any particular time; but nothing subsists in such a condition of rest or motion eternally: for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first imparter of motion is itself immovable.'
^ This is the line of argument followed in the Thesetetus. The ai*gument from common sense against scepticism adopted by the Scotch school in modem times, however convincing in a practical, is quitt valueless in a speculative point of view.
' rb xp£Toy kwoOv dxivnTor atro. These words mav be considered as e33itaining tke sum and substance of the Aristotelian notion of tiM Divine nature. Vide note, book YIII. chap. viii.
BOOK w: CHAPTER I.
Too.! is called a principle ^ from whence any- ^ Diibreot Hiing Las had motion imparted to it in the first meuiingt or instance; for example, the principle of length and JgJcipie?"* of.a way: from hence, indeed, is the actual joinciple, but from the contrary a different one; but, again, Uiat is called a first principle from whence each thing would spring in the most beautiful manner: as, for instance, even in the case of discipline the beginning must be made some- times not from what is first, and the principle of a thing, but from whence one may learn with the greatest facility.' And, again, that is a principle from whence is produced the first of a thing that is inherent; as, lor example, a keel of a vessel and a foundation of a house: and some suppose the heart of animals to be a thing of this sort; but others the brain, and others whatever else of this kind lliey may happen with. And, again, that is a principle from whence the first of a thing not inherent is produced, and whence motion and change have first been naturally fitted to commence; as, for example, the child from the father and the mother, and the battle from abuse. And that is a first principle according to the free impulse of which things in motion are moved, and things undergoing a change, are changed, as in cities do- ^ IntheCommentariesof Alexander this book stands fourth. Thomas Aquinas regards it as the fifth book of the Metaph^rsics. According to the plan explained previously, Aristotle having settled the "modus considerandi " in the case of the science of ontology, now proceeds to examine into those things that are inherent in entity, or common to it as such, and which are employed by the other sciences. It is, then, a book of definitions; and a most useful one it is, and well worthy of the attention of the metaphysician.
' There are seven different senses of the word ipxh given here. 'Vx^ is a prominent term in metaphysics, as we are informed in the fint eha|^ of the first book. Origen entitles a certain physioo-theol igioal (metaphysical) work of his Ilepl Apx^"* ' Vide the Categories* chap, viii 112 THfi HETAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [boOK lY.
minions^ and dynasties, and kingdoms and tyrannies are styled principles. And both the arts, and especially those of them that are architectonic, are called principles. Further, whence a thing is known first, this is called a principle of that thing; as, for example, the hypotheses are principles of de- moQstration. In as many ways, also, as first principles are styled are causes in like manner denominated; for all causes are first principles.
t. What is Common to all first principles is the beir g the common to all original fix)m whence a thing either is, or is U4>x<u a c. pi^Q^^^j^^ QY is known. But of these principles some, indeed, are inherent, and others are extrinsic. Where* fore. Nature constitutes both a first principle, and an element is so likewise, and understanding, and free-will, and sub- stance, and the final cause; for, in the case of many things, the principle of knowledge and of motion is the good and the Mr,^ CHAPTER 11.
1. Definitions ^^ ^"^ ^^J ^^^ ^ cslled causc ' from which, as of the exprcs- inherent, anything is produced; as, for example, the brass of a statue, and the silver of a cup, and the genera of these; but, in another way, the form and exemplar are regarded as causes: and this is the reason of the formal cause and the genera of these; as, for instance, in the diapason^ the cause is the ratio of two to one; and, in general, number and the parts, those that are in the ratio, belong to this order of cause. But, further, that constitutes a cause fix)m whence is the first principle of change or of rest; as, for instance, the designing cause and ^ This word is used in the Epistles of St. Paul in reference to an order in the celestial hiei-archy. Vide Eph. L 21; CoL il 10.
* Some MSS. read Kcucdy, ' Aristotle now considers the meaning of the term cause, ana next in order after that of apxv '• because he says that the significations of both are equivalent in regard of their number. What is laid down in this chapter we find in the second book of the Physics, chap, iii., whero Aristotle is likewise discussing the subject of aetiology.
* Diapason, ^ Bih muroiv: this is a phrase taken from music, as the filling up, the ellipsis as follows will show; ri 8t^ ircurvv x^P^^^ avfju^vlof or, in Cither words, the concord of the first and last note, that id, th# •ctaye. Vide Philo Judeeus, voL L p. 13, Bobn's edition.
OB. n.] PRINOIFLB AND CAUSE DEFINED. 113 the father of a child; and, generally speaking, the forming of that which is heing formed, and that capable of effecting a change of that which is undergoing a change. Further, a eause is as the end; this, however, is the final cause, as, for instance, health of walking. For why does one walk? we say, that he may have good health; and, saying so, we think that we have assigned the cause. And as many opera- tions, doubtless, as take place between any other source of motion and the end are regarded as causes; for example, of health, tenuity, or purging, or medicines, or instruments, for all these are on account of the end; but they differ from one another in respect of being, some as instruments, and others as things done. Causes, indeed, therefore, are enumerated almost somehow after this manner.
And seeing that causes are thus multifariously 2. Results denominated, it happens that many of them are from these de. causes of the same thing, not according to acci- dent; for instance, of the statue both the statuary art and the brass, not according to anything that is different, but so far forth as it is a statue; this, however, does not take place in the same manner, but the brass is as matter, and the ai*t as the origin of motion, or the efficient cause. And 4ome things are reciprocally^ causes of one another; as, for sample, labour of a good habit of body, and this latter, again, of labour: yet not in the same manner, but the one is as the end, and the other as the principle of motion. Fur- ther, the same thing sometimes is the cause of things that are contrary; for that which when present is the cause of this particular thing, this when absent we sometimes denominate the cause of the contrary: for example, the absence of the pilot is the cause of the capsizing of the boat, the presence of whom is the cause of its preservation. Both, however, as well the presence as the absence of the pilot, are as efficient causes, that is, causes imparting motion.