certain one thing, and a certain particular thing of this sort. Multitade, then, indeed, is a certain quantity if it maj be numerable, but magnitude if it may be measurable; and multitude is styled that which is divisible in capacity into what ia not continuous, but magnitude into that which is continuous. Now, of magnitude that which is continuous in one direction is length, and that in two directions breadth, and that in three, depth. But of these finite multitude is number, and length is a line, and breadth a superficies, and depth a body.
Moreover, some things are said to be certain j QuaBtity quantities in themselves, or to be essential quan* either essen- titles; but others, quantities according to acci- ^^ ' dent: as a line, to wit, is a certain essential quantity, whereas what is musical is a quantity according to acci- dent. Now, of quantities that are so essentially, some are a certain quantity according to substance; as, for instance, a line, (for in the definition expressive of what anything is, a certain, quantity is inherent;) but other quantities are pas- sions and habits of such a substance: as, for example, much and little, and long and short, and broad and narrow, and high and low, and heavy and light, and the rest of such properties. Likewise, both the great and the little, and the greater and less, expressed both in reference to themselves and in relation to one another, are the essential passions of quantity. These names, indeed, are also transfen*ed to other things. Of quantities, however, that are or according to expressed according to accident, some are so accident, expressed as has been declared, because what is musical is quantity, and what is white is so in reject of there being a certain quantity in that subject wherein they are inherent; and other things are quantities as motion and duration: for these, also, are termed certain quantities, and things con- tinuous in respect of those things being divisible of which these are passive states. Now, I mean not that which is in a state of motion, but that which has had motion imparted to it; for from the fietct of that being quantity, motion is like- • the Categories. The reader is referred to this portion of the Meta- physics by Mr. Owen, in his translation of the Organon, in '^Bohh** ClaaBsical Libmry," as one with which Aristotle's remarks ofi quantity ia il&e Categoriet ought to be compared.
13S THE METAFHY8IGS OP ARIHTOTLE. [BOOKIV; wise quantity, and duration,^ from the fact of this latter being quantity, is regarded as quantity itself also.
CHAPTER XIV.
I Four modes QUALITY^ is styled in one way the difference df quality, of substance; as, man is a certain quality of gSshed!***"* animal because he is a biped, and horse is a certain quality of animal because he is a quadru-* ped, and a circle is a certain quality of figure because it is without angles: so that the difference constitutes the quality according to the substance. Now, in this one way is quality styled the difference of substance, but in another, as things incapable of motion and mathematical entities, just as num-^ bers are certain qualities; for example, those that are com- pound, and not only those which subsist in respect of one, but those of which sur&ce and solid are an imitation, (now these are plane,' square, or cube numbers,) and, in general, whatever be« sides quantity inheres in substance, for the being assumed once is the substance of each thing; as, for example, the substance of the six is not twice three, or thrice two, but the being taken once, for once six is six. Moreover, as many things as are passive conditions of substances in a state of motion are called qualities, as heat and cold, and whiteness and blackness, and gravity and lightness, and whatever such-like properties there are according to which the bodies of those things that are undergoing a change are said to be altered. Further, are things qualities^ so far as they subsist according to virtue and vice, and, in general, to what is bad and good.
' In connecting motion and duration together, the reader can hardly fail to recur to Locke in his remarks on succession. Locke's th^ry, however, is combated by Brown, and by Victor Cousin in his Examinar ti:in of Locke's Essay, chap. iii.
^ iro7otft which is defined in this chapter, is treated of likewise in thtt Categories, chap. viiL, which the student would do well to consult^ as well as Mr. Owen's notes on that chapter. Taylor reads this paaen^ with an interrogation.
' oi TcoaaKis voffoi ^ ol iroffdKis v&rot voadjcts, I have adopted Tayl^a translation of these words; and, on reference, I find that he luus followed Alexander.
* This was quite the language of the last century, to specify virtue and vice as the quality of actiona. Vide Smith's Miral Sentimenti^ pp. 461 sqq Bohu's editiQiL CH. ZY.] ^UALin DEFKRD. 139 So that almost in two ways may quality be ex- s. Reduction pressed; and in one of these which would he the ^^^^ to two. most strict or appropriate; for first, indeed, as quality, is the difference of substance. And a certain part of this, also, is the quality contained in numbers; for this is a certain diffe- rence of. substances, yet either not of things that are being moved or not so &r forth as they are being moved. These, however, are passive conditions of things that are in motion, 10 &r forth as they are being moved and are differences of motions. And virtue and vice are a certain portion of such passions; for they make manifest the differences of motion and of energy in accordance with which those things that are in motion are agents and are passive in an excellent or a worthless manner: for that which in this way possesses the power of motion, or of energizing in this way, is good, and that which is moved and energizes in that way, and in a con- trary manner, is worthless. And most especially do what is good and bad signify quality in the case of animated natures, and amongst these particularly does this apply ^ to the case of those that possess free-will.
CHAPTER XV.
CHAPTER XV.
With respect to relatives,' they are denomi-,^ Three modes nated, some of them, as a twofold to a half, and of the relative, a threefold to a third, and, in general, a multiple ^^ **' to a submultiple, and excess to that which is exceeded; and others of them, as the calorific to that which is heated, and the divisible to the divided, and, in general, the active to the passive; and others of them, as the measurable to the measure, and the object of scientific knowledge to science, and the sensible to sense.
Now, regarding these relatives, the first of them «• The Hret, are expressed according to number, either smiply a relation ao- ^ These words are w«>Tthy of note, in drawing a line of demarcation in the animal economy between those that are possessed and those that are devoid of free-will, woocdp€ffi5. It is this distinction which defines the precise limits of (iod s moral government over his creatures.
' Relatives, ra wpot ri, are now discussed, as well elsewhere, vis. ia the seventh chapter of the Categories, and book IV. of the Topioi| obap. iv.
140 THE UETAPHT8ICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT.
cording to or by definition, in respect of them or in respect number. ^f q^q. ^^ f^j, example, the twofold in respect i>f one is a definite number, and the multiple is according to number in respect of one, but such as is not defined; as, for example, this or this particular number; but the sesquialiter, in relation to the subsesquialiter, is according to number in relation to a definite number, ^perpartient, in relation to superpartient, is according to the indefinite in the same man- ner as the multiple is in relation to one. But that which exceeds, in relation to that which is exceeded, is, in shcrt, in- definite according to number; for number is commensurable: but the excess and what is exceeded are denominated accord- ing to a non-commensurable number; for that which exceeds is such in relation to that which is exceeded, and something further than this: but this is indefinite; for whatsoever chances to be the result is either equal or not equal. These things, therefore, which are relatives, are all denominated accord- ing to number, and are jiassive properties of numbers: and, further, the equal, and similar, and same, according to another manner, are termed thus; for all these are expressed according to the one. For the same, indeed, are those things of which the substance is one; but similar are those things of which the quality is one; and equal are those of which the quantity is one. And the one is the first principle and measure of number; so that all these are denominated relations according to number, indeed, yet not in the same manner. 3 The d Things active and passive, however, subsist according to ' according to an active and passive potentiality, mnvaxion!" ^'' *^^ according to energies that belong to potenti- alities; as that capable of promoting heat to that which is heated, because of its being endued with poten- tiality: and again, the making warm in relation to that which is made warm; and one who severs in relation to that which is severed — as things energizing — are relatives. But of those things that are relatives according to number, these are not energies, save only in the manner it has been mentioned elsewhere; but energies according to motion do not subsist in iiumbers. And of those things that are relatives according to potentiality, some are already styled so according to psfiods of duration; as, for example, that which forms in relation to that which has been formed^ and that which ii fH. XT.] BXLATICN DEFINXD. 14i likely to form in relation to that which is likely to be formed For so, also, is a father called a father of a son; for there u something that partly has been active and partly passive. Further, are some things considered relations according to the privation of potentiality; for instance, ju8t as the im- possible, and as many things as are expressed in this way as, for example, the invisible.
Things, therefore, denominated relatives ac- ^ The third wording to number and potentiality are all of as the objective them so called because each derives that which Jj^^^« '^^iec- it is from reference to another, but not because something else is denominated with reference to it; and the measurable, and that which may be scientifically known, and that which is an object of the intellect,^ on account of some- thing else beiug deuomiuated in respect of them, are styled relatives. For, also, being an object of the intellect, signifies tl.at the intellect is exercised about this; the intellect how- ever, does not subsist in relation to that about which the intellect is conversant, for the same thhig, doubtless, would be said twice. In like manner, also, the power of sight is that of something, and not of him to whom the sight belongs. This, however, is a true statement, but it is in relation to colour, or something else of this kind; yet in that way the. same thing would be expressed twice: I mean that sight is the sight of him of whom it is the sight.
Things, indeed, therefore, called relatives es- g Q^^er senses sentially are denominated partly in this way, of the word and partly if their genera ai*e of this kind; as, '*^ " ^^' for instance, the art of healing belongs to those things that are relative, because the science which is the genus of it seems to belong to those that are relatives. We may sub- join, as such, those things according to which, whatever they may be, things that possess them are spoken of as relatives; for example, equality is a relation because of the equal being relative, and similarity is a relation because of the similar being relative. Some things, however, are called e. Relation, i>er relatives according to accident, as man is a rela- «ccw«w.
1 It is the investigation of the nature of this relation that, literally speaking, has conyulsed the metaphyBical world in modem times. It was earnestly sought after by the scholastics, and it has led to thA rite of a system like that >f Kant.
142 THE MBTAXUTBIOS OF jJtiSTOTLE. [boOKIT tive because it is accidental to bim his being twofold; aiid this belongs to those things that are relatives; or the white is a r'jlative if it is accidental to the same thing to be two- fold and white.
CHAPTER XVI. . «« ^. Perfect is denominated that beyond which T6w\eiov, its it IS not possiblc to assumo anythmg cr any anTfigiuaUv"* ^^® singk portion; as, for instance, the time of each thing is perfect beyond which it is not possible to assume any period of duration which is a portion of this time: and that which according to virtue, and to what belongs to the excellent, doth not involve excess with respect to any genus; as, for instance, a perfect or finished physician, and a perfect or finished musiciau, are such when they are in no wise deficient as far as regards the species of the excellence that is proper to their professions, so, also, transferring our remarks to the case of evil things, we say a perfect or finished sycophant, and a finished thief, since we also denominate these characters good, as a good thief, and a good sycophant. And virtue is a certain perfection;^ for each thing is then perfect, and every substance is then perfect, when, in accordance with the species of its proper excellence or virtue, no portion of the natural magnitude is deficient. Further, in whatever things resides an admirable end, these are styled perfect; for in respect of involving an end are they perfect. Wherefore, since the end is something belonging to extremes, and transferring, also, our remarks to the case of things that are worthless, we say that a thing is perfectly lost and perfectly corrupted when nought of the corruption and of what is bad is deficient, but when it has arrived at the ultimate limit of these. Wherefore, also, * This is the Aristotelian view of virtue, and a most remarkable one it is — ^Man, by cultivating principles of virtue, is acting up to the per- fection of his being. Who does not remember, as suggested by this passage, the words of the Apostle in the sixth chapter of the Hebrews, and first verse, where, in recommending an improvement beyond the mere elemex^-al knowledge of Christianity, he exclaims, iwl t^i '^cAetc^rin-a ^ipdutda. See also chap. vii. 11; Col. iii. 14.
GB^ZVn.] FERFECTION AND TEBMINATION. 143 death, metapborically, is called the termination,!>3caii8e both are extremes. The end, however, together with the final 4ause, is a thing that is ultimate.
The things indeed, therefore, denominated 2. summary of essentially perfect are styled in thus much oflhe**"*"?? number of ways, partly in their being no wise deficient according to subsisting in an excellent manner, nor involving excess in each genus, nor there being anything extrinsic belonging to them; and the other things now are termed essentially perfect in respect either of the doing some such thing, or the having it in possession, or of the adaptation of itself to this,^ or in accordance, at least, with some other mode of expression in relation to things that are primtuily called perfect CHAPTER XVII.
CHAPTER XVII.
A TERMINATION is called the last of each thing, | j,, ^ -^ and beyond which, as first, it is not possible to w'toas, or ter- assume anything, and within which, as first, are Ji^^"* **" comprised all things, and that, likewise, which may be a form of magnitude, or of that which is in possession of magnitude, and which is the end of everything. Now, a thing of this kind is that towards which motion and the mode of an action tend, and not from which they originate. Sometimes, however, a termination is both of these; both that from which motion and action originate, and towards which they tend; also, that for the sake of which other things operate, and the substance of each thing, and the essence or the formal cause of each: for this is a termination of know- lodge, and if of knowledge, also of the thing done. Where- fore, it is evident that even as often as the first principle is predicated so often also is the termination, and still more multifariously; for the first principle, to be sure, is a certain termination: not every terminaticr, however, is a first principle.
* Aeclepius illuBtrates this by the spear of Achilles, which one would term a perfect spear, because it was fitted for the grasp ef onv who was the greatest of heroes.
141 THB HBTA?HTSIG8 (W AilSTOTLB. [BOOKXT CHAPTER XVITI.
1. The phrase " ^^^ according to which " ^ is denominated in TO kar I de- many ways. In one way, indeed, as the species and matter. and the suDstance of each thmg; as, for instance, tiiat in accordance with which a man is good, itself is good; and, in another way, as that in which first a thing has been fitted by nature to rise into being, as colour in a superficies.^ Therefore, what has, indeed, in the first instance been mentioned as '' the according to which " con- stitutes form; but that mentioned secondarily, as such, is aa the matter of each thing, and the first subject in everything And, in general, " the according to which " will have a sub- sistence as often as the cause; for according to what a man has come is an expression of the same import as on account of what he has come; and the inquiry according to what fiilse reasoning, or correct reasoning, may be drawn is the same as an inquiry into what is the cause of the syllogism, or the paralogism, in such cases. Moreover, '^the according to which" is denominated that which subsists according to a position, according to which one stands, or according to which one walks; for all these signify position and locality.
Wherefore, "that according to itself," or the cations oftlie csscutial, is uecessarily expressed in many ways.
ortheMwmiai. ^^^ ^^ ^^® ^^7 ^^ "that according to itselft" or the essential, the very nature of each thing, or the formal cause; as, for example, Callias essentially is the very nature also of Callias; and, secondly, it signifies whatsoever things are inherent in the " what anything is; " as Callias essentially is an animal; for in the definition of Callias is to be found animal, for Callias is a certain description of animal: and, thirdly, may we denominate " that according to itself," or the essential, as a thing that has primarily been a recipient in itself, or a certain part of things that belong to itself; as, for instance, superficies is essentially white, and man * ** Secundum quid." Mr. Maurice illustrates this word by a passage from As You Like It: — " In respect that it is of the country it is a good life, but in respect that it is not of the court it is a vile life." — {7huck8f(me.\ ^ Vide Locke on the coimexioii between ooIoli and the iirfkof w^liorein it residett.
OH.ZX.'] ESSEKOiS, DIBFOBinOK, HABIT. 145 essentially is an animal, for the soul is a certain portion of the man in which vitality is primarily inherent. Fourthly, does it signify that of which there is not any one other cause; for of man there are many causes, such as animal, biped; but, nevertheless, man is man essentially. Fifthly, we consider ''that according to itself,*' or the essential, as many things as are inherent in some one particular thing alone, and as &r forth as it is alone. Wherefore, whatever has a separate has fldso an essential subsistence.
CHAPTER XIX.
' Disposition is styled an arrangement of that i. The tem which has parts either according to place or to **«*'««'«• potentiality, or according to species; for it is necessary that there be a certain position, as also the name disposition makes manifest.
CHAPTER XX.
CHAPTER XX.
Now habit ^ is denominated, in one way, US a certain energy of the possessor and the lenTef^of the possessed, just as it were a certain action or JJ^j*^'*»*^' motion; for when the one accomplishes, and the other is accomplished, the act of accomplishing is a mean between them, so also between one having in possession a garment, and the garment had in possession, habit is a mean. Therefore, indeed, is it evident that it is not admissible that this should involve another habit; for the thing would go on to infinity if it be the case that one habit should involve the habit of that which is possessed. And in another way is habit styled a disposition according to which that which iis disposed is disposed well or ill; and this either according to itself, that is, essentially, or in relation to another: as, for example, health is a certain habit, for it is a disposition of 1 Habit is not viewed in its ethical aspect here; that is, in reference to the provision natural to the human species, whereby active principles are acquired by the process so admirably analysed by Bishop Butlet. fiabit here is considered merely in a grammatical sense, as a participle of the verb ''habeo." Vide p. 45 in Buhn's edition of the Or^ai<m.
146 THB METAFHTSICa OF ABI8TOTLB. |^BOOK IT.
this sort Further, is a thing called habit in a case where it may be a portion of such a disposition. Wherefore^ also, ia the virtue or excellency of the parts a certain habit ^ CHAPTER XXI.
Passion^ is denominated in one way, quali^ r'a^o^ defined, according to which, a thing admits of alterar tionj as white and black, and sweet and bitter, and gravity and lightness, and whatsoever other such things there are: and in another way now are energies and alter- ations called passions of these; still more than these are noxious alterations and motions, passions, and particularly those motions that along with being noxious or injurious are painful likewise. Further, the crushing burdens of misfortunes, and of things that are fraught with sufferings are called passions.
CHAPTER XXII.
1. Different PRiVATiON^ Is denominated, in one way, in modes of pri- casc a thing does not involve any of the things Ifc^^n regSd that by nature are adapted for being possessed, ®JS? *P*iJ."**J even though itself may not by nature be adapted for the possession of such; as, for example, a plant in this sense is said to be deprived of eyes. And in another way is that termed privation if a thing be by nature fit for possession of a thing, either itself ^* the genus, and yet may not have possession of that thing; v^ in one sense is a blind man deprived of sight, and a mole in another: the latter, indeed, according to the genus, and the former according to itself, or essentially. Further, is that privation if a thing be by nature adapted to possess a quality; and when it is so stdapted by nature to possess it, ^ Any one who has studied the ethical system of Aristotle is familiar with this sentiment.
2 Vide Categories, chap, viil * Vide chap. z. of the Categories on the subject of opposition, and yet possesses it not, for blindness is a certain privation; but for an animal to be blind is not in acoordanee with every age, but with that only in which it is fitted by nature to have sight, and yet may not have it at all. And in like manner may privation be found in " the what," and according to **what," and for "what," and so £str forth as it may be adapted by nature for the possession of such, and yet may not possess them.
Further, the violent removal of each thing is ^ ^^^^ ^^ styled a privation. And as often, also, as are privation in re- expressed negations from A, so often, Hkewise, are ^'n/'"***" expressed privations; for the unequal is denomi- nated thus from the fact of the non-possession of equality when by nature it is fitted for it, but the invisible, both from being entirely without colour and in consequence of having it defectively; and an animal is called "apous," or without feet, both from its being without feet entirely, and in consequence of having them attended with some defect. Further, do we call a thing privation when that thing has anything small; as, for instance, any fruit with a small kernel: and this amounts to the being, in a manner, disposed defectively. And, again, we say privation exists where a thing cannot be effected with facility, or in a proper manner; as, for example, that which cannot be severed is so not only in respect of the incapacity of being severed, but also in respect of the incapacity of being severed easily or properly. Moreover, privation is found in the non-possession of a thing in every way; for a person blind is not called such from being one-eyed, but from being deprived of the power of