2. Illustrated ^^ ^^ ^® *^® ^^^^ ^i^ auimaL If, therefore, in the case of animal will be the same and one thing in horse *°"^ and man, as yourself in yourself, how will it be one in things that subsist separately % and why will not this animal subsist, likewise, apart from itself 1 If, in the next place, it will participate in the properties of two-footed and many-footed, something which is impossible ensues; for con- traries, at the same time, will be inherent in this, which is one thing, and this certain particular thing. And if this is not the case, what is the mode of subsistence when one affirms that an animal is two-footed, or adapted for walking t Perchance, however, they are composites, and are in contact with one another, or have been mingled together. But all such suppositions as to the mode of ftubsistence in this case are absurd. Shall we say, however, that in each thing there \ Vide the chapter following.
' Some MSS. have the word Sjm here after oia-(as.
H.XVJ ITS BBABINa ON IDBALISH. 203 subsists something that is different 1 Therefore, to speak the word, those things will be infinite of which the substance is animal; for not according to accident is man from animal: moreover, many things will animal itself be, for animal which is contained in each individual is substance, for it is not pre- dicated of anything else. And if this be not admitted, from that will man subsist, and that will be a genus of man. And, further, all things from which man consists will be ideas; therefore, idea will not be an idea of one thing, but a sub- stance of another, for this is impossible; for, in such a case, each of those things that are contained in animals will be an animal itself. Further, will it subsist from this certain par- ticular thing 1 and how will it subsist from this actual cmimal 1 or how is it possible that animal should subsist — which is substance — as this very thing beside animal itself?
Further, also, in the case of sensibles, both 3. These proofs these consequences ensue, and consequences still confirmed, more absurd than these; if, therefore, it is impossible that this can be the case, it is evident that there is not an idea pf them after such a mode as some would afi&rm.
CHAPTER XV.i But since both entirety and the formal cause 1. poms are are a different substance, — now, I say that the in^enerabie. former is substance in this way as the formal cause that is comprehended along with matter, and that the latter is the formal cause in general, — in regard of as many things, then, as are so denominated, of these, truly, is there corrup- tion, for of these also is there generation; with form, how- ever, there is not a disruption of parts in such a way as for dissolution to ensue, for neither exists there generation in this case; for the being of a house is not generated, but the being of this particular house: but forms subsist without any connexion with generation and corruption, and do not 1 What Aristotle labours to show in this chapter is this, that the cTSos not subsisting apart from the v\fi, whose form it determines, but merely in conjunction with it, cauuut be said to be generated. The proper mode of speaking is to say that the whole substance consisting ttf matter and form is generated.
JO^ THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOKVI subsist in a state of dependence upon either; for it has been demonstrated that no one generates cr produces these. And 2. Singulars, ^^ ^^^ accouut, also, of Sensible substances — I toSr^^^' *°^*' niean, such as are singulars — there is neither definition nor demonstration, because they inyolve matter the nature of which is such as to admit of the possi- bility both of being and not being; wherefore, all the singulars of such are things subject to decay or corruption. If, ther^ fore, also, demonstration be of those things that are neces- sary, as well as that which is a scientific definition, and if it does not admit of being the case, as neither with scientific knowledge that at one time it should be scientific know- ledge, and at another time should be ignorance, (but a thing of this kind is opinion,) so neither is it to be admitted that demonstration nor definition should subsist after this mode; but such is an opinion, in regard of that which admits of being disposed otherwise. It is evident, therefore, that there would not be either definition or demonstration of those things that may subsist differently; for, also, things that are subject to corruption or decay are obscure to those even that are in possession of scientific knowledge, when they pass away from under the notice of sense; and though the same reasons or principles be preserved in the soul, still will there not further exist thereof either definition or demonstra- tion. Wherefore, as regards things relating to.definition, when one defines any of the singulars it is right that he should not be ignorant that always is it possible to overturn this definition, for a thing of this sort does not admit of definition. 8. Ideas are in- Neither, therefore, is it possible for any idea definable. ^^ \^q defined; for the idea ranks amongst singulars, as they say, and has, likewise, a separable subsistence. And it is necessary, also, that definition consist from names; but the person who is framing the definition will not create a name or nominative term, for it will be a thing unknown. The things, however, that are posited or acknowledged are common to all. It is necessary, then, that these also subsist in other things; for instance, even just as if one should define yourself, he would say that you are an animal which is attenuated or white, or something else that will be inherent ♦. Reply to an also in another. If any one, however, would say njectioa ^i^Q^^ there is no hindrance to all things being CB, XY.] IDEAS INDEFINABLE. 205 separatdly inherent in many, but that all collectively bebng to this alone, wo must, in the first place, say that also they would belong to both; namely, animal biped to animal and biped. And this must needs ensue, likewise, in the case of tlungs that are everlasting; since, at any rate, they are prior existences, and are parts of that which is a composite. But, assuredly, also, are they separable, if the thing — man — be separable; for either nothing will be separable, or both will be 80. If, indeed, then, nothing may possess the capacity of a separate subsistence, there will not exist genus besides species; but if both are separable, there will exist the dif- ference likewise. In the next place, because they are prior existences in respect of being, these, also, on the contraiy, will not be exposed to decay. And then, if ideas spring from ideas, (for more uncompounded are those things from which other composites arise,) it will be necessary that those things from which the idea consists should be predicated, further, of many; for instance, take the case of animal and biped. But if this be not admitted, how shall a knowledge of these be attained? for there will be a certain idea which it will be impossible to predicate in the case of more things than one.
This does not, however, seem to be the case; but every idea appears to be participable.
As, therefore, it has been declared, it is over-..,^^„..
looked by these persons that it is impossible to finable proved frame any definitions or distinctions in the case ^fTteroa"?.*"'* of things that are eternal, and eminently in the case of as many things as are single; for instance, the sun^ and moon: for not only do persons err in the addition of things of this sort, in the event of which being taken away still the sun will continue as that body which revolves round the earth, or which is hid by night. For if the sun were to stand still in his orbit, or were to become apparent by night, in such a case no longer will he be the sun; but the thing would be absurd if he were not, for the sun signifies a certain substance. Further, such persons take for granted whatsoever points admit of being affirmed of another thing, •ust as if something else should become a thing of this sort, 1 There is no article in the original before?un, but there is befor« moon; the words are, fjKtos kqI t) (reX-nvvj. I lave in my -translatioij, therefore, ventured to t.rar»<»no«M» thip arf.iola.
S06 THB METAPHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOKTI it is eviden that it will be the sun. The definition, then, ia common; bat the sun was classed amongst singulars in snch a way as Cleon or Socrates, whereas, why does no one of these bring forward a definition of idea? for it would become mani- fest, to those who would attempt to prove the existence of such, that what is now stated is true.
CHAPTER XVU I. capaddcB of It is evident^ also, that, likewise, the majority substance mi8- of thosc things which sccm substances are capa« stances^'hem- cities and parts of animals, for none of these selves. involves a separate subsistence; but when they may be separated, then, also, are they all of them as matter — I mean, such as both earth, and fire, and air; for none of these is one thing, but each, as it were, a heap of immatured things before they be digested, and some one thing produced JBrom their being blended together. But particularly would one suppose the parts of animated beings, and those of the soul, to be both of them contiguous to an existence in this manner, as well in actuality as also in capacity, in respect of having the first principles of motion from something in their joints or flexures. Wherefore, some animals continue to retain life after being divided: but, nevertheless, will all of them subsist in capacity when they may be one thing, and that which is continuous by nature, but not by force, or by connascence, that is, growth in conjunction with something else; for a thing' of this kind is mutilation.
Since, however, unity is denominated ^ as also supposing the entity is, and since the substance of unity is tobethe^s^ub?" single, and those things of which there is cne stances of substancc in number are one in number, it is things. evident that neither unity nor entity can possibly be the substance of things, as neither can the being of an ' We are now warned agwnst the needless multiplication of sub- stances. We should, however, to avoid error, bear in mind that the substance is matter developing itself to our observation under a certain form, but that the qualities reside in this compound Kara Hvyofxtp, •.& K>tentially. These qualities are not, therefore, substances.
' Vide book XL chap, iv.
CH. XVI.] CAPACITY NOT SIBSTANCB. 20T element or first principle be. the substance of things. But we are actually engaged in the inquiry, what, therefore, the first principle is, in order to conduct our investigation to that which is more known. The substance, then, indeed, of these is rather entity and unity, than both the first principle, and the element, and the cause; but by no means are these substances either, if there be not anything else which is in common with substance; for in nothing is the substance inherent but in itself, and in that which is in possession of itself of which it is the substance. Further, unity would not subsist in many places at the same time; that which is common, however, does subsist in many places at the same time: wherefore, it is evident that nothing of those things that are universals can possess a subsistence separate from singulars. But they who affirm the existence of forms,^ 3. The Platonic speak partly correct in assigning them a separable '73 ^'howfM *' subsistence, if they be substances, but speak true, and how partly incorrect, because they assert unity to be ^*' '^^*®' a form in the case of many things. And the cause of this position with these Platonists is the following: that they have no rational account to render as to what are substances of this kind — I mean, such as are incorruptible, and have a subsistence independent of singulars and sensibles; therefore do they constitute them as the same in the species with things that are corruptible (for we know these), namely, ideal man and ideal horse, adding to sensibles the thing signified by the term ideal; ^ although, indeed, if we had not beheld the stars, yet this would be no hindrance, I presume, to the existence of eternal substances, in addition to those which we had already attained a knowledge of. Wherefore, also, though even now we may not have it in our power to see what eternal substances are, yet, perhaps, it will be necessary that there be some eternal substances in existence, at any rate.* That, indeed, therefore, neither any of those reputed universals is substance, nor that there is any substance com- posed of substances, is evident.
' Vide book I. chap, vii., and also book XII. chap. iv.
« That is, T^ avTo.
' This is another of those passajres that Christian writers woidd adduce to show Aristotle'^ coldness, at least, in his method of handling ft&jtiiinfi inrolvin^ a reli^iuu» interest.
J08 THE UETAPHTS:OS OF ABISTOTIE. [BOOK Vl CHAPTER XVII.
View of what to define substance let us again declare, just aa if having made another commencement; for, perhaps, from these statements will be evident the circfum- stances also concerning that substance which is separated from sensible substances. Since, therefore, substance is a certain first principle and cause, j&'om this starting point must we pass onwards in our investigation.
But the inquiry why a thing subsists is invari- gi^ouJS on"' ahly carried on in this way; namely, why one the assumption thiuff is inherent in a certain other: for the investnat substance is a cause as to tigatiou why a musical man is a musical man, •uifsista^"*^ indeed, is to engage in the inquiry that has been mentioned, namely, why, or on what accoimt a man is musical 1 or it is to engage in the inquiry of something else. Therefore, in sooth, the investigation why this thing is the thing which it is, is no investigation at all; for it is necessary that the wherefore,^ and the existence of a thing, should inhere as manifest entities. Now, I say, for instance, the moon undergoes an eclipse: and of the inquiry why a thing is that thing which it is, there is one principle and one cause in the case of all things, as on what account a man is a man, or a musician a musician, except some one say that each thing is indivisible in regard to itself; but this would be to constitute unity: but this is both common in the case of all things, and is a thing that is concise. One, however, might inquire why man is that kind of an animal that he is. This, then, is evident, that such a one does not investigate why he who is a man is a man. Accordingly, he engages in the inquiry why a certain thing subsists, as what is common in the case of something; but that it does so subsist ought to be evident; for, if it be not thus, he inquires after nothing: as, to take an instance, why does it thunder? why, because sound is produced in the clouds: for so one thing as the cause of another is that which is under investi- gation. And on what account do these things, as bricks and * r6 Sr.: other MSS. read rb tv ri, which diminishes the f irco and moaning of the passage.
OH. XV 1L] what SUBSTAN3B IS, RECONSIDERED. 209 Btones, constitute a house; it is evident, then, that he inves- tigates the cai3e; but this is the eseence or very nature of a thing, (that is, if one is to express himself logically,) which, in the case of some things, is that for the sake of which a thing subsists, that is, the final cause; as, perhaps, in the case of a house or a bed: but in the case of other things it is [Something that has imparted motion in the first instance; for this also is a cause. But a cause of tlxis kind is such a cause as is sought for in the case of a thing that is being produced and destroyed; but the other cause also is sought for in the case of a thing already in existence. The subject of investigation, however, is in an eminent degree latent — I mean, such a one as is involved in the things that are mu- tually not predicated of one another; as, for instance, in the inquiry what man is, on account of its being asserted that ho is simply so and so; but not from any definition being framed to the effect that he is this or that. It is requisite, however, if they conduct the inquiry correctly, to investigate such; but if not, it will be the case that nothing will be under investigation, and something under investigation in common. But since it is requisite to have in possession the being of a thing, and that it should subsist, it is evident that the inquiry is about matter, why it subsists: as, for instance, these particulars constitute a house — whyl because these subsist as that which is the being of a house.
Thus, too, is it in the inquiry why man is 3. And on the this particular thing, or why this body is m ^e may deci.ie, possession of this particular quality, the like J^f^ ^ajJi^uj^r^ inquiry is made. Wherefore, the cause of the thing, matter is under investigation: but this is the form by which anything subsists, and this is substance. It is evident, there- fore, that, in the case of simple substances, there is not any investigation in existence, nor any disciplinary teaching; but there is a different mode of investigation of things of this sort. Since, however, that which is compounded of some- thing, and compounded in such a way as that the whole is one thing, but not as a heap, but as a syllable, yet a syllable is not the elements of speech, nor the same thing with the letters B and A; nor is flesh the same with fire and earth: for when a dissolution of these takes place, flesh and syllable no longer exist, as in the instance of the flesh and t\e syllable; 9 210 THE MBTAFnTSIGS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOK VL but the elements subsist, that is, the fire and earth continue to subsist. The syllable in this case is something besides not only the elements of speech, namely, the vowel and the mute, but also something else; and the flesh not only is fire and earth, or the warm and the cold, but also something else. If, therefore, it is requisite that abo flesh be either an elem^nt^ or that which is compoimded from elements — if it is an element — again will there be the same reasoning, for from this, — even from fire and earth, — will consist the flesh; and, further, from something else something diflerent,^ so that the progression will go on to infinity: but if it be compounded from an element^ it is evident that it will not consist of one, but many, or it will be that very thing itself. Wherefore, again, in the case of this, as in the case of the flesh or syllable, we shall put forward the same reasoning. Now, it would seem that there is something of this sort, and that it is not an element; and the cause, at least, of this thing being flesh, but that a syllable. In like manner, also, is it concerning other things. But the substance of each thing constitutes this, in truth; for this is the first cause of being or substance. Since, however, some things are not substances of things, — but this is the case with as many substances as according to nature are consti- tuted as well as by nature, — ^to some, also, would this nature appear to be substance, or it is not an clement, but a first principle. Now, an element^ is that whereunto as inherent in a thing, as matter, a compound is divided, as, for instance, of the syllable A B, A and B are the elements.
1 "Something dififereni.*' [ have supplied these wordi injiAlf to ■ociplete the senae. s Y¥i€ book IV.:h^». IL BOOK VIL' CHAPTER I.
From tbe statements that have been now made i a i^. it 18 necessary to draw our inference, and, coJlect- as to what «n ing together a summary of the foregoing, to *"*^***"*'®*' impose upon our remarks some termination or conclusion. It has, therefore, been stated that the causes, and the first principles, and the elements of substances, are the subjects under investigation in the present Treatise. Now, as to substances, some are acknowledged to have a subsistence by all philosophers; respecting othera, however, certain spe- culators have put forth from time to time certain peculiar opinions of their own. Physical or natural substances are acknowledged to have a subsistence; for example, fire, earth, water, air, and the rest of simple bodies: in the next place, plants, and the parts of these; animals, also, and their parts; and lastly, the heaven and the parts of the heaven: but those certain philosophers, who hold peculiar sentiments respecting substances, affirm that both forms and mathema- tical entities or species are substances. But, unquestionably, from the foregoing reasonings the consequence ensues of there Doing other substances — I mean, the essence or very nature of a thing, and the subject. Further, in other respects we may assume that the genus is substance in preference to the species, and the universal to the singulars. With the uni- versal, however, and tha genus, the ideas, also, are connected, for they seem to be substances according with the same process of reasoning.
Since, however, the essence or very nature of 2 why Ansto- a thing appears to be substance, and the reason the^cussions or principle of this is definition, on this account found in book we have settled various points respecting defini- ^^* ' In book VII., which is according to others book VIII., we have a sort of application of the logical principles in regard of substance^ arrived at in book VI., to the case of substance regarded as what ia cognisant by the senses.
p2 212 THE METAPHYblCS OF ARIS^luTLB, [bOOK riL tlou, and respecting that which is essential. But since definition is a sentence, and since a sentence has parts, we found it requisite also to examine concerning a part, what sort are the parts of substance, and what sort they are not, and whether these ought to be the same with the parts of the definition likewise 1 Further, then, neither is the uni- vei'sal ^ nor the genus substance. But concerning ideas and mathematical entities w© will subsequently ^ institute an inquiry; for, beside ^ the substances of things cognisant by the 3 The in ui ^cuscs, Certain speculators assert these to have a ill book VII. subsistence. At present, however, let us treat of those substances that are acknowledged to have a subsistence; but these are sensible substances, or the substances of those things that fall beneath the notice of the senses.
4. Substances Now, all Sensible substances involve matter.* cognisant by But substaucc may be considered as those inat^teraJtheir things that may be classed amongst subjects subject. Ij^ qjjq sense as matter, but in another as the definition; now, I mean by matter that which is not this certain particular thing in energy, but in capacity is this certain particular thing; and in a different sense definition and form are subjects. That which is this certain particular thing is separable from the formal principle of it, and third is that which is composed of these, of which alone there are generation and corruption, and which is a thing that simply has a separable subsistence; for of those substances which Subsist according to a formal principle some are capable of a separate subsistence, but some are^not so. But that matter is a substance is evident, for in all opposite changes is tliere something which is the subject of the changes; as, for instance, in place, that which is now here, but again is elsewhere; and according to increase, that which is at the ])rcsent moment of such a size, and the next less or larger; and according to alteration, a person who is now healthy, and * Vide book VI. chap. xiiL * In book XII. ^ Some MSS. read irepl instead of irapd.