9 Qn«.«.fh.n* It thercfore remains that equality be opposed as regards this either as negation or as privation. Now, certainly, opposition..|. jg ^^^ possible that it should be in opposition to either; for why should it be opposed to the large more than to the small? in such,then,there would subsist a privative negation of both. Wherefore, also, the question " whether " is predicated in respect of both, but not in respect of either; as we do not say whether a thing is greater or equal, or whether it is equal or less; but the question of ''whether" invariably subsists in reference to three things. It does not, however, constitute privation from necessity; for it does not follow that everything is equal which is not greater or less: but that takes place in the case of the things in which those — I mean, the greater or less— *are naturally^ inherent. Now equality is that which ia neither great nor small, but that which by nature is adapted for becoming great or little; and as privative negation is it opposed to both. Wherefore, also, it is a thing that is a ' The discussions in this book of the Metaphysics are illostratlye ol the subtlety of the verbal distinctions of the Aristotelians, and, as loiiie Tfould say, of their inanity also.
aa.Ti.j oPFosiTiOM of ujcttt to plurality. 261 medium; and that which is neither evil nor good is in opposi* Hon tQ both, but without a name: for in many ways is each denominated, and that which is receptive is not one thing, but rather that which is neither wiiite nor black. Neither, however, is this styled one thing; but colours are somehow defined in respect of which this negation is affirmed priva- tively; for it is requisite tfalt this be either a negation of white and black, or that it^ a thing devoid of colour, or something else of the sort Wherefore, those persons do not correctly 3. Repels the reprehend our remark on this point who are of reS^by hS m'-" opinion that all things are expressed similarly:^ count of this wherefore, there will be between a shoe and a «>pp«>"^«° hand something that is a medium which will be neither shoe nor hand; since, also, that which is neither good nor bad will be a medium between what is good and what is bad; as if there were likely to be something intermediate between nW things. It is not, however, necessary that this result should 'ensue; for this co-negation of things that are opposed be- longs to those things of which there is a certain medium, and between which a certain interval has been fitted by nature to exist; but as regards these there is not a difierence in existence, for in another genus are those things to be classed of which there are co-negations: wherefore, the subject ol them is not one.
CHAPTER VI.
CHAPTER VI.
And, in like manner, also, concerning unity ^ Question in and plurality a person might express the follow- regard of the ing doubt For if plurality be opposed to unity, "S^^^lilln^ absolutely or simply considered, there ensue cer- unity and piu- tain consequences that are impossible; for unity ' **^' will be a thing that is few in number, or will amount to few Uiings, for plurality is likewise opposed to the few. Further, are two things many, since the twofold is manifold; and fO also is two denominated twofold. Wherefore, unity is a ting that is few in number; for relatively to what are two * Notwithstanding all his verbal niceties, Aristotle will not allow ^t they are mere distinctions without a difference.
308 THE KETAPHTSIOS OF ABIBTOTLI. [dOOK IX Uiings styled many, unless in reference to unity and fewness! fox nothing else appears to be less. Further, must this be admitted, if as what in length are the long and the short, so in multi- tude are the much and the few; and wh;:teyer may be much is also many, and the many is also much: unless there is some difference, then, in a thing that is continuous and easily defined, fewness will be a certain multitude Wherefore, wiU unity be a certain multitude if, also, it be that which is few. And this must needs be so if two things are many.
2.Propowd«o. ^^^ perhaps, plurality ^ is styled somehow lutionofthis also as the much, yet as being a thing that question. j^ different, as water, which is much, but not many. But in respect of as many things as are divisible therein subsists the many, or plumlity, in one way, if the multitude inyolves superabundancy either absolutely or rela- tively to something — and, in like manner, it is the caBe with fewness, if the multitude should involve deficiency — ^but, in another way, plurality subsists as number, which also alone is opposed to unity. For in this way do we denominate unity, or plurality, just as if one should say unit and units^ or a white thing and white things, and things that have been measured in respect of measure, and that which is capable of being measured. So, also, things which are manifold are de- nominated many; for each number is many because it is one,^ and because each is measurable by one, and as being that which is opposed to unity, not to fewness. So, indeed, then, two things are many, likewise; yet they are not so as a mul- titude involving superabundancy either relatively or absolutely, but primarily. And two things are simply what are few; for it is the first multitude which involves deficiency, and two is the first multitude in number.^ 3. Error of Wherefore, Anaxagoras did not correctly with- Anaxacoras on draw his asscut from the current opinion when **^ ^ ^' he laid down that all things had a subsistence at the same time,^ and were infinite both in multitude and ^ Vide book XII. chap. iz.
' Some copies have tva and some Ms, I have followed the former reading.
^ These words are added to complete the sense.
* On this dogma, vide book III. chap. iv.; Cudworth, vol. IIL p. 84: and Tenneman's History of Philosophy, «ect. 107, translated in '*Bohn'i Philolog' jal Library."
CB. VLJ this OFl*OBmON BZAMINSD. 269 Binallness; but he ought to have said, instead of this expres* sioD, that things were infinite both in smallness and paucity, for paucity or fewness does not constitute infinity, since few- ness does not subsist on account of unity, as some philosophers would make out, but through duality.
Unity, therefore, and plurality, such as are to be found in numbers, are opposed in the way a tion beuf<^? measure is opposed to that which is measurable; "[J^JJi^*^ and these things are opposed as those that are ^ ^' relative to something — I mean, as many things of those that are relative as do not involve an essential subsistence. Now, a distinction has been drawn by us elsewhere,^ to the effect that relatives are predicated in a twofold way, — ^partly as contraries, and partly as scientific knowledge is related to that which may be made an object of science, because something else is predicated with respect to them. But that the one may be less than a certain thing — as, for example, than two — ^there is no hindrance to this being the case; for though it be less, it does not follow that it also be what is few in number. Multitude, however, is, as it were, the genus of number, for number constitutes multitude, which is mea- surable by one: and unity and number are, in a manner, opposed, — not as a thing that is contraiy, but, as has been stated, as some of those things that are relatives; for as far forth as unity is a measure, and number that which may be measured, thus far are they opposed to each other. Wherefore, not everything that may be one constitutes number; as, for example, on the supposition that there is anything that is indivisible.
But though science is denominated in like 5. This opposi- manner in relation to that which may be made **<>« illustrated, an object of scientific knowledge, it is not yet similarly attributed as such; for science would appear to be a mea- sure, but that which may be an object of science would appear as that which is being measured. ^ It happens, how- ever, that every science is a thing fit to be an object of scientific knowledge; yet everything that is an object of icience is not a science, because, in a certain respect, is science > The subject of relation is fuTiy examined into in book IX. chap zv« • This illustration is Tv^rthy if our attention.
270 THE UETiFHTSTtlB OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IX measured by that which may be made an object of scientific inquiry.
6. Multitude ^^* neither is multitude contrary to fewness; not opposed to but the much is opposed to this as a multitude which is excessive is opposed to a multitude that is exceeded. Nor is multitude contrary to unity altogether; but in respect of unity the case stands just as has been stated, namely, that one sort is divisible, but another indi- visible, and again, a third subsists as a relative, just as science subsists with respect to what may be made an object of science, on the supposition that science constituted number, and that unity were a measure.
CHAPTER VII.1 1. The relation -^^^ ^^^^ between contraries there is a possi- between media bility of there being something that is a medium, — and of some there is a medium, — it is neces- sary that media should derive their being from contraries; for all media, and the things of which they are media, are contained in the same genus. For we denominate those things media into whatsoever a thing that is undergoing a change must needs be changed in the first instance; foi example, if one should pass from the hypate to the nete,^ if the transition be made in a short space of time, he will pre- viously reach the intermediate sounds; and the case i& the same in colours, — if one will pass from white to black, he will come to the purple and that which is duskish previously to his rc%iching what is black: and in like manner is it with other things. But that a change should take place from one genus to another genus is not possible, except according to accident; as, for instance, in a transition from colour into figure. It is requisite, then, that media, and the things of which they are media, should be contained in the same genus also with themselves.
* The student will do well to compare the statements in this chapter with those in chap, x., and in book XI. chap. x.
^ These tenns have been already explained in a note, in bock IV CIL YIl. I RELATION BETWEEN MEDIA AND CONTRABIBS. 271 But, unquestionably, is it the case that all media 2. ah media ire, at any rate, media of certain things that are presuppose op- opposed; for from these alone is it possible should p****'*®"* arise a change that is essential. Wherefore, it is impossible that there should subsist any medium of things that are not opposed; for otherwise would there be a change, and that not from things that are opposed. But there is no medium of contradiction in things that are opposed, for this consti- tutes coHtradiction, and amounts to antithesis or opposition; and to an opposition of which, in any respect whatever, one of the membera is present, having no medium ^ between that of which, in any respect, either of the members — ^the yes or the DO — is present, or, in other words, not having any medium at all. But of the rest some are relatives, but others are privation, and some are contraries. But as many things belongiug to those that are relatives as are not contraries do not involve a medium. And a cause of this is the following, inasmuch as they are not contained in the same genus; for what is there that is a medium between science and that which may be made an object of scientific knowledge 1 but there is a medium between the great and the small.
Now, if media are contained in the same genus, as has been demonstmted, and are media be- posed of co^ tween things that are* contrary, it is necessary ii^^e^ljj*^ that these, likewise, be compounded of these con- traries; for either will there be a certain genus of them, or there will not be any such. And if there will be a genus of them in such a way as that there be something antecedent to the contraries, those contrary differences will be antecedent which may make the contraries as species of genus: for from genus and differences subsist species; fox* example, if white and black be contraries, and the one is a segregative colour, but the other a congregative colour, these actual differences — I mean, discretive and syncre- tive colours — will have an antecedent subsistence. Where- fore, these contraries involve a subsistence prior to one another; but, surely, contraries, at any rate, that are dif- ferent are contraries in preference. And the other thingi ftnd the media will arise from genus and differences; as, for 1 The words which follow ov8iy firra^h are not found in all the MSSL tkA Leii^ic edition adopts them; not bo, however, Didot'ii 272 THE MKTAPHTSDS OF ARiBTOTLB. [BOoK IZ.
instance, whatever coloiirs are media between white and black, these it is necessary should be denominated as consisting from ffenus, (but colour is a genus,) and from certain differences. They themselves, however, will not constitute primary con- traries; and if this be not the case, everything will be either white or black. These, then, are other colours; accordingly, these will be the media between primary contraries: primary differences, however, are those which are segregative and con- gregative. Wherefore, in regard of these primaries (as many as are contraries not in genus), we must investigate the fol- lowing point, — ^from what the media of these consist; for it is necessary that things contained in the same genus should be compounded either of things incomposite in that genus, or that they should be incomposite natures. Therefore, are contraries uncompounded one of another, so that they are first principles; but the media constitute either all things or aot any at all: and from things contrary something is gene- rated. Wherefore, there wiU ensue a change into this pre- viously to a change into contraries; for of each thing will where be both less and more: accordingly, will there subsist % medium, and this a medium between contraries. And all the other things that are media are composites then; for that which is a medium is more than one thing and less than another, and is in a manner compounded of those things of which it is said to consist, — ^as greater than one of them and less than the other. And since, as regards contraries, things that have an antecedent existence are not homogeneous, all media would arise from contraries; wherefore, both all things to be found in the scale of existence downwards, and con- traries and media, will consist from primary contraries. 4. Recapituia- That, indeed, therefore, the media are all con- 'ion* tained in the same genus, and that they are media between contraries, and that these media are all com* poted of contraries, this is evident.
LTIU.] SPECIFIC DIFFSSRBNOK AXD CONTBARIETT. S78 CHAPTER VIII.!
DiVBRSiTT, however, in species is a something i.DiTenity fliat is diverse from a certain thing; and this Jpederapper- must needs subsist in both; as, for instance, if tains to con- animal were a thing diverse in species, both *'"^"*^- would be animals: it is necessary, then, that in the same genua there be contained those things that are diverse in species. For by genus I mean a thing of sucli a sort as that by which both are styled one and the same thing, not involving a dif- ference according to accident, whether subsisting as matter or after a mode that is different from matter; for not only is it necessary that a certain thing that is common be inherent in them, (for instance, that both should be animals,) but also that this very thing — namely, animal — should be diverse from both: for example, that the one should be horse but the other man. Wherefore, this common characteristic simul- taneously is found in things that are different in species from one another: therefore, this will be such a particular animal essentially, and that will be an animal essentially different; as that will be a horse and this a man. It is necessary, accordingly, that this difference should amount to a diversity of genus; for I term a difference of genus diversity which makes this very thing to be diverse: therefore, will this con- stitute contrariety.
And the same is evident from induction, like- 2. Proof of this wise; for all things are distinguished by things ^^^ induction. that are opposite: and it h»xs been demonstrated that con- traries are contained in the same genus, for contrariety amounts to perfect difference, and every difference which is contained in a species is something belonging to a certain thing. Wherefore is this both the same and a genus in both; wherefore, also, all contraries are contained in the same co- ordination of predication, as many as are different in species and not in genus, and diverse particularly one from another; for perfect is the difference between them, and they are not generated simultaneously with one another. Difference, then, amounts to contrariety, for this constitutes what it is to be ' The inquirieB in this chapter obviously belong to the province oi Logic 274 *B^ IfSTAPHTSICB Of ABIBTOTLJB. [BOOK UC divei*se in species; namely, for things to involye contrariety \^hen they are contained in the same genus, — ^things, I say, that are individual. Now, things are the same in species— as many as do not involve contrariety — when they are individoal existences; for in division and in media are contrarieties gene«> rated, before one comes to those things that are individual.
3 Inference Wherefore, it is evident that respecting that from the fore- which is said to be a genus, neither the same nor going. diverse in species is any of those things which are adapted for being species as of a genus; for matter is made manifest by negation, and genus is the matter of that of which it is termed a genus — not as the genus of the Heracleids,^ but as that which subsists in Nature. Nor is genus denominated in relation to those that are not contained in the same genus, but in relation to those of which there will be a difference from them in genus; and things differing in species differ from those that are in the same genus: for the difference of that from which it is a difference in species must needs be couti-ariety, and contrariety belongs to those things that are aIouo in the same genus.
CHAPTER IX.
But, perhaps, one would raise the question, ries may*beio"g why womau docs uot differ from man in species, Tecies^^^ whcu the female and male are contraries, and when contrariety amounts to difference 1 But neither are female and male diverse in species, although they are the essential differences of animal, and are not as white- ness or blackness, but the male and female are inherent in animal, so far forth as it is animal. Now, the following doubt is almost the same as the foregoing — namely, why it is that oontrariety partly makes things diverse in species, and partly does uot so; for example, why does it make that which has * The HcracleidsD were the descendants of Hercules, and lords of Peloponnesus. Their place in the history of Greece, and the story of their expeditions, and their varied success, need be no more Uian alluded to — they are pretty generally known. The best account of the Heracleid89 is to be found in C. 0. MuUer's History and Antiquities of the Doric Race, voL I. chaps. 3, 11, 12, translated by Messrs. TufiielJ and Lema \ the latter the 4;)reseBt Sir Qeozige Comewall Lewia„ BarL CD. Ul] OOlffTRABIES BELONG TO THE SAKE 8PE0JES. 271 the support of feet, and that which is furnished with wings so^ but does not make whiteness and blackness 1 Is g. Proposed this the case because some things are the proper solution there- aflfoctions of genus, and other things are less so; °^* and since the one is form and the other is matter, as many contrarieties as are contained in form create a difference in Bpecies, and as many as reside in form, when assimied together with matter, do not give rise to a specific difference 1 Wherefore, whiteness does iijt give rise to a s, luustrateu;«i difference of man, nor blackness: nor are these the case of wniteness cincl the specific difference of a white man in relation hiackness in a to a black man, nor would one name be assigned ™^' to both; for man is as matter, but matter does not create a difference: for men are not forms ^ of man. For this reason, although the flesh and bones are diverse from which this man and that are made, yet the entire compound is a thing that is diverse, to be sure, but not different in species, because contrariety does not exist in reason or form, but this entire compound is an individual thing. Now, Callias is form in conjunction 2 with matter; and this, therefore, is the case vith white man, — because Callias is white, therefore man ia white according to accident. Neither, doubtless, do a brazen and wooden circle, nor a brazen triangle and wooden circle, differ in species on account of matter, but because contrariety is present in the form.
But whether shall we say that matter does not 4. Further iiius- render things diverse in species, though being cSe°o" llorse^ somehow diverse itself, or is it the case that it and man com- makes them so partly? for why is this horse p^^^ together. diverse from this man in species, and yet the forms of these Bubsist along with matter ] Is it because contrariety is in- herent in the form? for there is obviously a contrariety sub- sisting between a white man and a black horse. And this, at any rate, is a specific difference, but not so far forth as the one is white aud the other black; since even if both were white, nevertheless in species they would be diverse. But the male and female are appropriate affections of animal; but not ac- cording to substance, but in matter and body. Wherefore, ■ ^ Some copies read etSri, and others eTSct; the Leipsic editi<ni •eads £f A.if. ' I have followed the reading /lerh Sxtjs; some MSS. have irara; 9^ 276 THB METAFBTBIOfl OP AB18T0TUL ^WfK OU the same seed, in consequence of undergoing the flame paaflifp condition, is generated either as female or mal& Whftt^ in- doed, therefore, constitutes diyersity in species, and why boom things differ in species, but others do not, has been dedamL CHAPTER X.
1. Diversitr BuT whereas contraries are diyerse in spedeii^ according to and that which is subject to corruption, and that tains'to^c^n- which is incomiptiblc, are contraries — ^for priTa- trariety. |.Jqjj jg j^ definite impoteiitiality^ — it is requisite that things corruptible be diverse in genus fix)m incorruptible natures.
2. Illustrated Already, indeed, therefore, have we declared comjptSies'' ^^^ sentiments respecting these universal appel- and incorrup- lations.^ So that it would uot appear to be *^^^^** necessary that anything wiiatsoever that is in- corruptible and corruptible should be diverse in species; as neither white and black should be so. For it is admis- sible that the same thing at the same time should be both coiTuptible and incorruptible, if there may be in subsist- ence aught of things that are universal, as man would be both white and black; and the case is similar with the mode of the subsistence of singulars, for the same man would not be white and black at the same time, although what is white is contrary to what is black. Of contraries, however, some according to accident are inherent in certain things; for instance, those that have been just now mentioned, and many others: but in the case of others this is impossible — I mean, those to which both that which is corruptible and that which is incorruptible belong; for nothing is cor- ruptible according to accident: for that which is accidental admits of uot being; but that which is corruptible belongs to those things which subsist of necessity in those things in \vhich it is inherent, or that which is coiTuptible will be one ' Vide book IV. chaps, xii. and xxii ' I presume Aristotle alludes to his investip^ation in the second book, in his treatment of the question ta to whether the first principles of oorruptibles and incorruptibles be the same or different? vide chap, it; of that book, p. 69.
Ck.\.] OBNERO DirFEBENOB AHD OONTBABIBTT. 271