according to accident, in the first instance our examina- tion must be instituted concerning entity in this point of view. That, indeed, therefore, no one of the sciences that kave been handed down from former geneiutions is employed about what is accidental is evident; for neither does that (elating to house-building or architectural art investigate into what is likely to be accidental with those who will make use rf the house; for example, as to whether they will dwell there sorrowfully or the contrary: nor is it so with the art of weaving, nor of shoe- making, nor the cooking ai-t. Each of these sciences, however, examines into that which is peculiar to its own department only; and this is its appropriate end. Neither does it consider a person so far as he is a musician and a grammarian, nor does it assert that he who is a musician, should he become a grammarian, will at the same time be both, though he were not so previously. But that which is not always an entity, this was generated at some time or other; so that such a person would at the same time become ' Vide book V. chap, ii eU. VlIl.J NO SOIENOB OT THE AOCIDENT. 299 a musician and a grammarian. This, however, no one of those that are confessedly sciences examines into, with the exception of the science of the Sophist; for this alone is employed about what is accidental. Wherefore, Plato has not inaptly expressed himself when he affirms that the sophist wastes his time in the consideration of nonentity.
But that it is not a thing that is admissible that, ^ there should be in existence a science of the of the accident accidental, will be manifest to those who attempt there couw not to discern what an accident is at all. Therefore, ^ » science as regards everything, we affirm one thing, indeed, ^"^ * to subsist always and from necessity — now, I mean by neces- sity not that which is denominated according to what is violent, but what we employ in cases pertaining to demon* strations — but another thing we affiim as subsisting for the most part, and another, neither as for the most part, nor always, and from necessity, but as may happen at any time to be casual; for example, cold might be prevalent when the sun is in Canis: but a thing of this soil would take place neither as always from necessity, nor as for the most part, but might, nevertheless, accidentally occur sometimes. There- fore, does that constitute an accident which is pro<iuced, not always, nor from necessity, nor as for the most part. What, indeed, then, an accident is, has been declared; but why there is not a science of a thing of this kind is evident: for every science is conversant about that which is an entity always, or as for the most part; but the accidental is not ranked amongst either of these.
But it is evident that of what subsists accord- 3. The same ing to accident there are not causes and first?u5I!lff"S.«« ?.,«,,.,.,, « the principles ol pnnciples of such a description as there are of the accidental that which is an entity that involves an essential ^J heS»g"1^i^ subsistence; for, if this be admitted, all things ^^^^ will be from necessity. For, if on the supposition of this particular thing being a consequence of that particular entity, but this a result from that, and if this sul^ists not from its being casual, but from necessity, from necessity will be like- wise that of which this was the cause, tmtil that which is denominated the last effect; this, however, subsisted accord- ing to accident. So that all things will be from necessity, and the possibility for anything whatsoever casually to occui; SOO THB METAPHYSICS OF ARI&TOTLE. [dOOK ^ and the existence of contingency, and the being generated, and the not being generated, will altogether be taken away from things that are being generated. For, although a cause may be supposed not to be an entity, but that also which is being generated, the same consequences will ensue; for every- thing will be generated from necessity. For, to give an in- stance, to-morrow's eclipse ^ will take place if this particular thing may happen, and this will happen if something else does, and this last if something else ensues; and, do'ibtless, in this manner, on the supposition that a portion of duration be taken away from that definite time which may be mea- sured from the present moment until to-morrow, one will ultimately arrive at that which is in being. Wherefore, since this is the case, all things that are subsequent to this will be from necessity: wherefore, will it be the case that all things will be generated from necessity.
As regards, however, that which is entity in pectof wituy^ reality, and not according to accident, one kind, omitted in on- indeed, is that which is contained in the com- prehension of the mtellect,' and is a passive con- dition in this. Wherefore, respecting that which constitutes entity in this way first principles are not investigated; but respecting that which is an entity external to this, and pos- sessing a separable subsistence, they are; and that which subsists according to accident is not necessary, but indefinite — ^now I mean, what subsists according to what is accidental, as in a less degree; but the causes of a thing of this sort are inordinate and infinite.
But that on account of which a thing subsists^ fined as? cause that is, the final cause, is classified amongst those i/ien^tedper thiugs that are generated by Nature, or that spring from Intellect. It is chance, however, that generates them when any of these may be generated according to accident; for, in like manner, just as also entity constitutes in one respect that which is essential, but in another that which subsists according to accident, so also is it the ^ This is the mode of reasoning already adopted by Aristotle in ^ Aristotle here alludes to a certain signification of the ** ens'* in refer> ^uce to truth and falsehood, which he examines in book Y. chap. ilL and book Vill. chap. z.
CH. IX.] OHAMOB AB A OAUU OF GENERATION. SOl case with a cause. But chance is a cause according to acci- dent in those things that are being generated in accordance with free-will, for the sake of something. Wherefore, chance and intellect are conversant about the same object,^ for free- will is not devoid of a connexion with intellect. The causes, however, are indefinite from which might be generated that which arises from chance: wherefore, obscure to human cal- culation is chance, even as a cause subsisting according to accident, but, absolutely considered, such is not a cause of anything; and chance is good and evil when what is good or worthless may happen to be the result: but mischance and misfortune are conversant about the magnitude of these. But since nothing that subsists according to accident is ante- cedent to those things that possess an essential subsisteut;e, neither, then, are causes so. If, then, chance, or even spon- taneity,^ be a cause of the firmament, prior as a cause will be Mind and Nature.
CHAPTER IX.»
CHAPTER IX.»
Now, one thing subsists in energy only, but i. As many another subsists in capacity, and a third in capa- tion"M%°here°" city and energy; and of these one constitutes an «« of entity. entity, but the other a quantity, and the third something else of the rest of the categories. There is not, however, any motion beside the things themselves; for the change invari- ably takes place in accordance with the categories of entity. Bat in the case of these there is not anything that is com- mon, nor is there a thing of this sort in a single category. Everything, however, subsists in all things in a twofold manner; as, for instance, this particular thing: for this is the form of it, but that is its privation; and according to quality ^ This is a remarkable sentence. The connexion between the understanding and the will, in regard of the freedom of the latter, is discussed by Cousin in his review of Locke's theory. Vide Cousin s Psychology, chap x.; Henry's translation: in which are to be found most lucid notes on this important philosophic point. ' The word I have thus translated is rd ahr6iw.rov, ' Aristotle has already touched upon this subject — in book Till. «hap8 ill. and vi. — without noticing, however, the " entelecheia," which IS explained now; and which must not be confounded — as is ^one Vj Cicero— with ivZiKtx^ia^ a perfectly diiitinct word.
802 THE HETAPHTSIOB OF IBISTOTLE. [BOOK X one thing is white, but another black; and according to quantity one is perfect, whereas the other imperfect; and ac- cording to motion this tends upwards and that downwards, or the one is light, but the other heavy. Wherefore, there are as many species of motion and of change as there are of entity. 2. Motion, But On account of there being a division iu fin7d to'refer^ ®*^^ genus, of the one into potentiality or capa- •nee to energy, city, of the Other, howover, into actuality, I 2?uaiify,*4lT«- Style energy the motion of that which subsists in xex««a. potentiality, so fiir forth as it does subsist in potentiality. And that we make a true assertion in this point is evident from the following circumstance; for when a material is fit for being built, so &r forth as it is a thing of this sort, we say that this very thing subsists in energy, so far forth as it is being built; and this constitutes the structure, or the mode of building. In like manner stands the case with disciplinary learning, healing, and rolling, walking, leaping, growing old, advancing towards a state of maturity. It happens,.. however, that a thing is in motion when the actuality itself may exist, and when it is a thing neither antecedent nor subsequent to this. Therefore, ente- lecheia, or actuality, belonging to that which subsists iu capacity, when subsisting in actuality it energizes either as that which it is, or something else, so far forth as it is movable — this constitutes motion. Now, I mean by the expression " so far forth " a subsistence whose mode I would illustrate as follows.
For brass is a statue in capacity; but, never- V a statue, and thelcss, actuality of the brass, so far forth as it eontraries." °^ ^^ brass, does not constitute motion. For it is not the same thing, the belonging to brass and to a certain capacity; since if it were the same, absolutely speaking, accoidiu'^ to definition, the entelecheiay or actuality, of the brass would amount to a certain motion: it is not, however, the same. And this statement is evident as regards contraries; for the capacity of being in sound health, and the capacity of being indisposed, are not the same; for in such a case would the actual conditions of health and sick- ness be the same: but the subject that is capable of being ■made both healthy and diseased, whether it be moisture, or whether it be blood, is one and the same thing. Since^ howevei.
OH. IZ.j MOTION, ENERGY, AND ACTUALITY. 30» the being of a thing is not the same with the being of a certain capacity, in the same way as neither is colour the same with what is visible, so the enteUcheia,^ or actuality, of that which is potential, so far forth as it is a thing that is potential, constitutes motion.
That, indeed, therefore, motion actually exists, 4. tms connex- and that a thing happens to be moved at the m"tion^n^d name time with its being itself actuality, and energy, &c., that it is a thing that is neither antecedent nor '®*®""®*^' subsequent to this, is evident; for everything admits of sub- sisting at one time in energy, but at another time not in this state: as, for example, that which is fit for being built, so far forth as it is fit for being built, and the energy ol that which is fit for being built, so far forth as it is fit for being built, constitute the mode or act of building; for the energy of this amounts either to the mode of building or the house built. But when the house may be finished — that is, when it con- stitutes the energy — it will no longer be a thing that is fit for being built; but, on the other hand, that which is fit for being built is actually built. It is necessary, then, that the mode or act of building amount to energy: but the mode or act of building amounts, likewise, to a certain motion. And the same reasoning holds good in the case of other motions.
Now, that these assertions have been made - -,,. correctly is evident from the statements which of defining mo- other philosophers have from time to time put by a reJerem^e'* forward in regard to motion; as also from the to other phUo- fact of its not being an easy matter to frame *°^ ^^^' a definition of it in a different manner from the foregoing: for neither is one able to set it down as being contained in mother genus. And it is evident from what these specu- ktors say on the subject; for some of them, indeed, regard it as equivalent with diversity, and inequality, and nonentity; and yet not one of these necessarily should have motion impai-ted to it. But neither does there exist change or mutation into these either, nor from things of this kind more than from such as are opposed. But a cause of their setting down motion amongst things of this kind is as follows,—- * As to the import of this Peripatetic term, vide Suidas (Gaisford's Ed.) •n th« words iyre^ix^la and Bvyofus: Donaldaon's New Cratylu8| p. 41& i SOI THZ MBTAPHTSTCS OF ABI8TOTLB. [BOOK X.
because motion appears with them as something that is inde- finite. Now, the first principles of a different co-ordinate series, from the fact of their being privative, are indefinite; for not one of these is either this particular thing, or any other of the rest of the categories.
6. AVhat hat ^^* * cause of this view of motion — I mean, led these spec^ of its appealing to be a thing that is indefinite motion J what — ^Tcsults from the &ct that it is not possible to it indefinite, gg^j j^ down under the category of the poten- tiality of entities, or under that of their energy or activity; for neither that which involves a capacity of being quantity has motion imparted to it necessarily, nor that which sub- sists as quantity in energy. And motion appears to amount to a certain energy or activity, no doubt,* but an energy or activity which is imperfect: and a cause of this is the fol- lowing— that that which is potential to which the energy belongs is itself imperfect, aud on this account it would be difficult, as regards this, to apprehend what it is; for it must necessarily be classed either into privation, or into capacity, or into simple energy; and not one of these does it appear admissible that motion should be considered. Wherefore, it remains that it be what it has been declared to be — namely, both an energy or activity; and yet not such an energy as has been mentioned, for this would be an energy difficult to discern, indeed; but, nevertheless, one which it is admissible should subsist 7 Moti - '^^^ *^^ motion is to be found in that which aides in a mo- is Capable of being moved is evident; for the tive nature. actuality of this lies under the influence of that which is capable of being moved. And the energy of that which is movable is not different from this; for it is neces- sary, surely, that there shoiUd subsist actuality in both; for a thing is movable in respect of its involving a capability of having motion impressed upon it, and that which imparts motion does so from energy or activity, but it thus acts from this energy in regard of that which is adapted for motion. Wherefore, in like manner, there resides one energy in both, just as from one to two is the same interval as from two to one. And in regard of ascent and descent the case 19 the same; but the essence in this instance is not one. Ana 1 Viile book VIII. chaps, lii. and vL, already referred to CH. X.J THB INFINITE DEFIN£D. 305 the same remark holds good, in like manner, with the power that imparts motion, and that which has motion impressed upon it thereby.
CHAPTER X.1 But the Infinite either is that which it is j Theinfiaite impossible to pass through, in respect of its not fo ajr««pui», de-' being adapted by nature to be permeated, in the same way as the voice is invisible, or it is that which possessei a passage without an end, or that which is scarcely so, or that which by nature is adapted to have, but has not, a passage or termination. Further, a thing is infinite from subsisting by addition, or subtraction, or both.
It is, indeed, possible, therefore, that the In- g ^j^^ infinite finite should constitute a certain entity that involves a involves a separable subsistence,^ but that it is sfstenwIVut^u cognisant by sense is not possible: for, if it con- not cognisant Dy the senses Dy the senses stitutes neither magnitude nor multitude, and if the Infinite be a substance, and not an accident of this, it will be indivisible; for that which is divisible amounts either to magnitude or multitude: but if it be indivisible it will not be infinite, unless in the same way as the voice is in- visible. They do not, however, say so, nor do we inquire into the subject; but we consider it as a thing without any passage, or, in other words, impermeable. Further, let me ask, how is it possible that what is essentially infinite should exist, unless there should happen to subsist number and ^ The subject of the Infinite, discuBsed in this chapter, is most im- portant. The best modem author on this point is the late Sir William Hamilton, in his review of Cousin's doctrine of the Infinito-absolute. Vide also Calderwood's Philosophy of the Infinite; Vera's Inquiry into Speculative Philosophy; and Professor Ferrier's Institutes of Meta- physics, sect. I. props, xx. xxi.; sect. III. props. L — ^viii inclusive.
^ I have not followed Taylor in his erroneous rendering of this passage. A carelessness in language, in translating the Greek, might convey the notion that Aristotle in these words was actually denying the separate existence of the Infinite, when nothing could be further from his intention. The Latin version paraphi'ases the passage thus " Separatum sane ipsum quum sit, sensibus percipi impossibile est. It must, however, be acknowledged that upon the whole Aristotle does not express himself on the subject of the Infinite as fully or aa determinately as we might havQ pxpec^d. His de^xutipili of \% \$ almost entirely inade up of negationa.
\ 306 THE METAFHTSICS OP AKISTOTLB. [BOOK X.
magnitude, of which two tho Infinite is a passive condition I Moreover, if the Infinite subsists according to accident, il would not constitute an element of entities, as far forth as it is a thing that is infinite, in the same manner as neither is that which is invisible an element of speech although th9 voice is invisible, •. Nor can the ^^^ *^^* ^* ^^ ^^* possiblc for the Infinite to Infinite sub- subsist in energy ^ is evident, for any part whatfor the being of the infinite and a thing which is infinite are the same, if the Infinite be substance and not that which is predicated of a subject. Wherefore, it is either indivisible, or divisible in a progression ad infinitum, if it be made up of partis that are or may be divisible. That many infinites, however, should be the same thing is impossible; for as air is a part of air, so infinite is a part of that which is infinite, if it is a sub* stance and a first principle. The infinite, then, is devoid norinactu- of parts and indivisible. But it is impossible ^*^y- that an entity that subsists in actuality should be infinite, for it must needs constitute quantity. It sub- sists, then, according to accident: but if this be the case, it has been declared that it is not possible that it should be a first principle; but this must be afl&rmed of that to which it happens that number or evenness should be such. The investigation, therefore, is itself universal.
That the Infinite, however, does not subsist in finile^does^iot" things that are cognisant by sense is evident subsist in sen- from the following circumstances: — for, on the frora*itrn^ot Supposition that the definition of body amounts p^su^ nature™ *^ *^^* which is bounded by surfaces, body would not be infinite, either that which is cognisable by sense or by the understanding; nor will it be number as actually separated and infinite, for number is that which is numerable, or which involves number. That the Infinite, however, cannot subsist in things cognisant to the senses — regarded in a physical point of view — is evident from these following reasons: — for neither is it possible that it should be ^ Aristotle, therefore, whaterer positive notion he had formed of the Infinite, cannot be said to have identified it with the Deity, for th« •naence of the Divine Nature he laid in energy, ivefrytta. This will b« m what follows.
X.] THi! IKFIinTE SUBSISTS NOT IN SENSIBLES. 30 ^ A oomposite nature, nor one which is simple. For if you admit that it is a composite nature it will not be a body, if the elements are limited in multitude; for it is requisite that we should equalise the contraries, and that one of them should not be infinite: for if in any degree whatsoever the potentiality of the other body fails, the finite will be cor- rupted by the infinite body. But it is impossible that each of the elements should be infinite, for body is that wliioh in every direction involves an interval; but that which is in- finite is that which involves an interval without end. Where- fore, if there is in existence an infinite body, it will be infinite in every direction.
Neither, however, can there be in existence ^ Nor a body one infinite simple body, nor — aa certain philo- which is sophers * would lay down — can it subsist as *^™p®' different from, or independent of, the elements from whence they generate these things; for there is not in existence a body of this description beside the elements, for all those things of which they are compounded are resolved into these. This, however, does not appear to subsist beside the simple bodies — either fire or any otiier of the elements; for without some one of them being intinite it is impossible that the Uni- verse, if it may be finite, should either be or be generated from some one of the elements: ^ as Heraclitus says that all things were originally fire. And there is the same mode of reasoning, also, in the case of unity, the existence of which Natural Philosophers introduce besides the elements; for everything undergoes a change from its contraiy, as from heat into cold.
Further, a body cognisant by the senses is 6. Argument situated in a certain place, and there is the same f^t^ce Jf®the place of the whole as of part — of the earth, for infinite in sen- instance, as of one of its clods. Wherefore, if '^ *' ^"^^ * For example, the Ionic and Eleatic schools were celebrated in anti- quity for their inculcution, the one of a materialistic, and the other of an idealistic, unity. All the sects, however, did not agree in investing this unity with the attribute of infinity. Zenophanes, for instance, maintained that it was neither finite nor infinite.
^ This dogma is what Aristotle so frequently impugns — namely, that which sought to establish the existence of some one elementary prin- ciple, in the form of matter, as that which would sufficieptly aocoimt for the genesis of eyerytiiing;— of the rd iray itself > x2 from the reia- the Infinite be of similar^ parts, indeed, it vnii Lndspacef* ^® immovable, or always will be impelled for- wards. But this is impossible; for why, may I ask, should it be moved downwards in preference to upwards, or in any direction whatsoever] for instance, if it were a clod of earth, in what direction will this be moved, or in what place will it remain at resti for the place of the body naturally adapted to this will be infinite. Will it, then, comprise the entire place 1 ^ and how will this be so 1 What, therefore, will be its place of rest and its motion ] or shall we say that it will remain at rest every- where? it will not then be moved; or, shall we say that it will be moved in every direction] it will not then stand stilL If the Universe, however, be of dissimilar parts, places, like- wise, would be dissimilar; and in the first instance, no doubt, the body of the Universe would not be one, save in respect of contact: in the next place, these things will be either finite or infinite in species. That they should be finite is not certainly, then, possible; for some, indeed, will be infinite, and some not so, on the supposition* that the Universe is in- finite— for instance, fire or water: and a thing of this kind will be corruption to contraries. If, however, they are in- finite and simple, both the places will be infinite, and infinite will be the elements; but if this is impossible, and the places be finite in number, the Universe, also, must needs be finite. , ^ ^ ^ And, in general, it is impossible that there can be infinite be an infinite body, and a place for bodies, if KffectioSs; ©vcry body that is cognisant by the senses in- volves gravity or lightness. For it will have an impulse either towards the centre or upwards; it is impossible, however, that the Infinite— either the whole or the half, or any part whatsoever — should undergo a passive state; for in what way would you make a division of iti* or of the Infinite how will there be one portion tending in a ^ This ia Taylors translation. The word in the original is 6fio€iS4si the Latin version renders it by " uniforme.** ' As to the relation between body and space, vide Cousin on Looke^ chap, il, Henry's translation.
* Vide De Coelo, book I. chap. viL * Vide Cousin's Psychology, chap, iii., in his analysis of ipaot asd time.
k 0&. XI.J CORPOREITY NOT INFINITY. 309 direction downwards, and the other in a direction upwards 1 or how will this constitute the extremity, and that the centre 1 Further, every body that fells under the notice of the senses subsists in place;* and there are necessary sub- six species of place: but it is impossible that "1^®"*'^"* these should subsist in a body that is infinite. And, upon the whole, if it is impossible that place should be infinite, it is likewise impossible that body should be so; for that which subsists in place is somewhere, and this signifies a direction either upwards or downwards, or some one of the rest of the categories; and each of these constitutes a certain limit.
But the Infinite is not the same in magnitude, g. The infinite and motion, and duration, as if it were a certain »<>* the same in single nature; but that which is subsequent is Sonirin^ddu^ denominated according to that which is ante- **°°' cedent: as, for instance, motion is denominated according to, or conformably with, the magnitude in regard of which the motion, or the alteration, or the increase, is brought about; time, however, is reckoned or computed in consideration of motion.
CHAPTER XI.
Now, that which undergoes a change is changed partly, indeed, according to accident, inwhk;"ma? — as when we say the musician walks, — and tion or change partly when a thmg is said simply to be changed imparted, in respect of something belonging to this under- going a change; for example, whatsoever things are changed, are changed according to parts: for the body is reduced to a sound state of health because the eye is restored to a healthy oondition.2 Now, there is something which primarily is