^ Vide the remarks of Theoiistius in a note in the beginning of this chapter.
* Aristotle, if he lived in modem times, would have been less dogmatic in pronouncing his opinions as to the phenomena of the heavens. Every student in astronomy knows well how the extent of the science has widened, how the heavenly bodies themselves have been multiplied, by successive improvements in the instruments of obser- vation. Any increase of power in the Telescope crowds with stan quarters of the celestial arch regarded hitherto as % oid and empty spao^ ^ This point is discussed in the De Coelo, book I. chap. is.
tH.yin.] TRADITIONAL AND FABULOUS THEOLOGY. 330 trst principle as is one in species, but in number many, at least. Such things, however, as are many in number. iiivolve a connexion with matter; for tl ere is one and the | « same mode of reasoning applicable to th3 case of many^ — I take the instance of a man — yet Socrates is one. But that \. which ranks as fii-st amongst formal causes does not involve i ^V a connexion with matter, for it subsists in actuality. Accord- | ' ingly, in both reason and number, that which primarily I C imparts motion is immovable, and that which has motion / impressed upon it in this case is always and uninterruptedly / one thing merely; such being true, there is consequently in / existence one solitary heaven. / Traditions, however, have been handed down lo.Traditionary from our predecessors, and the veiy ancient SiJ'^f**^ V'® philosophers, and left to their posterity in the heayeiuy° form of a Myth, to the effect that these many ^^«*- heavens — supposing them to exist — both are gods, and that the Divinity encompasses the entire of Nature. And the remainder of these traditions,^ in the present day, have been brought forward, clothed in a fabulous garb, for the purpose of winning the assent of the multitude, and enforcing the utility that is urged in &vour of the laws, and of general expediency.
For they speak of these a& subsisting in the ^ form of the human species, and as being Hke in ^;oSS^e!yI appearance to certain of the rest of the animal anthropomor- kingdom.^ And other statements consequential p*^™* ^ It appears from the commentators that there is another reading for this passi^re, viz., ercpos yhp 6 \^os roS Mp^ov Koff 6 Mponros 6 di SiMfwnff cfs.
^ This is a remarkable and well-knowji passage. Its bearing on the theism of Aristotle is examined in the Analysis accompanying this Translation.
^ The tendencies towards investing the Deity with a human shape have at all times, and amongst all nations, displayed themselves in a more gross or subtle form. One of the early heresies in the Christian Chiirch took its rise from them, and was branded with the condemnatory title of Anthropomorphism. The Greeks were essentially an anthropo- morphic nation. As to the assimilation of Qod to the likeness ot animals, that was an error that flourished chiefly in Egypt; and hence we find the Israelites cautioned against it in the law of Moses, eg, in thi Ricood Commandmeut. Jide Notes, pu 61, 291, 838.
S40 TBB HETAFHY8ICS OF ARISTOTLE. ^BOOR XI.
apon these, and similar to those that have heen declared, da they put forward.
12. Aristotle's Now, if as regards these traditions any one theory, there- having Separated this from amongst the others lupporrof^a. may receive merely the first assertion — namely, dition. that they -supposed the Fint. -Substances to be gods— he would consider that this statement had been made i after a divine manner; and in accordance with what is to be j expected in the discovery — ^as frequently as is consistent with j possibility — as well of every art as of every system of philo- I Bophy, and in the loss of these, again, he must conclude that ' likewise these opinions of those very ancient philosophers, as relics,^ have been preserved up to the time of the present day. This opinion, therefore, of our forefathers, and that which has been traditionally handed down from the very earliest speculators, is evident to us thus far, and no more.
CHAPTER IX.2 1. Certain ques- Therb are poiuts, howevcr, respecting Mind tions as regards which involvc Certain subjects of doubt: for it seems, certainly, to constitute the most divine existence amongst phenomena: but after what manner it is disposed, so as that it should be a thing of this sort, is attended with certain difficulties. For whether it be void of the faculty of understanding anything, but is like one who is sleeping, what, may I ask, would there be reverential in such a con- dition of being % Or, supposing that it possesses the fistculty of understanding, and yet that there be something which is dominant over this faculty — ^for in this case that which is its substance is not intelligence, but capacity — should the fore- going be true, we could not say that Mind would be the most excellent substance; for it is through the faculty of the under- standing that that which is entitled to reverence is inherent in the mind.
^ K^i^vra. I have followed the rendering of the Latin version, ''quan quasdam reliquias." This is a common laeaning for Xcfirw: e. g. we are told in the Iliad, II. 106, that Atreus, on his deathbed, left (IXfirci/) his sceptre to Thyestes.
^ Anstotle's remarks in this chapter may be compared with what he Bayi in the De Anim^ book I. chap, iii., and book III chaps, vi &qq« CH. IX.] C2KTAIN rSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. 341 But, further, whether understanding consti-, «n. *..u tute its substance, or wbetner perception does, essence of what, may I ask, does it understand 1 for either JJ^^V " *' ^ it is itself that it understands, or something else. And supposing that it understands something else, either it will invariably be the same, or something different; whether, then, is there any difference, or no difference at all, between its understanding what is &ir, and understanding what is casual; or, also, would it be an absurd idea to imagine that it exercises the faculty of cogitation in regard of certain things) It is evident, therefore, that that which under- stands is most divine, and most entitled to reverence, and that it undergoes no change; for change would presuppose a transition into something that is worse: and a thing of this sort would, in the present instance, amount to a certain motion. In the first place, then, of course, sup- or u it ^ v6n- posing that the mind^ were not perception or '**' intelligence, but capacity, it is reasonable to infer that con- tinuity of perception would be a laborious operation for the mind; and, in the next place, it is evident that there would be in existence something else that is more entitled to reverence tlian Mind,2 — namely, that which is an object of perception to the mind: for both the ^ulty of understanding and actual perception will be present to the mind even in its under- standing that which is most inferior.
So that we must avoid this consequence; for s. The dignity also would it be better not to see some things than?li51"* ^t.
to see them: hence, perception would not consti- true view of its \ute that which is most excellent. Accordingly, "*'**'*• may we assume that Mind is cognisant of its own operations, if it really is that which is most superior, and if perception amounts to the perception of a perception.
Now, scientific knowledge invariably appears, ^.
as well as perception by sense and opinion and the nature of the faculty of thought, to be conversant about ^^^^^^""^ something different from itself and to be * The difficultifs even of approxunating towards anything like a moderate acquaiiitanoe with our mental constitution is well pointed out ly Brown in Lis Philosophy of the Human Mind.
^ Aristotle thus refutes his adversai-y, £8 he would think, most triumphantly, by a glaring ''reductio ad abiurdum." The ai^^oienl he uses is worthy of attention.
342 THE HETAFHTSIOS OV ABTSTOTLE. [BOOK XL conversant about itself only in a secondary or subordi- nate sense. Further, if we suppose that understanding ia different from being an object of perception to the under- standing, according to which of these will subsistence in an excellent way be inherent in Mind? for neither is it the same thing the being inherent in an act of perception by the un- derstanding, and in an object of perception to the understand- ing: or, shall we say that in the case of some things the science constitutes itself that which is the object of the science? 5. Aristotle'! In the casc, I admit, of the productive sciences, r^P'y- the substance and the essence do not involve a connexion with matter; whereas in the case of the spe- culative sciences the definition or formal principle is the object of the science, as well as is the perception exer- cised by the mind. Inasmuch, then, as the object of the understanding is not a different thing from the understand- ing itself, in the case of as many things as do not involve a connexion with matter they will be the same thing; and the act of perception by the mind will be identical with the object of perception.^ *,,. ^,. Moreover, therefore, a doubt remains whether of perception a au object of perception IS a composite nature or ture— ai*iftfe"w ^^^> ^^^y if this be the case, the object of percep- tion, as a compound, would imdergo a change* in the parts of the entire; or, shall we say that everything is indivisible which does not involve a connexion with matter, — as the human mind? Or, are we to take for granted that the perception of compound objects involves a connexion with matter during a certain portion of duration? for an ex- cellent condition of subsistence does not always reside in this particular thing or in that; but that which is most ex- cellent subsists in a thing, viewed as a certair entirety, being something different from itself. And, therefore, the first and actual perception by mind of Mind itself dotl subsist in this way throughout all eternity.
' The writings of modem MetaphysiciaDS are full of discussions of this sort; e,g. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Stewart, Brown. Incomparably the best work on the subject^ notwithstanding Brown's ill-judged attack, is Dr. Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers.
' I have supplied a portion of this sentence to make it the moce iBtelligible.
OH. X.1 THE GOOD IN THE UNIVERSB. 345 CHAPTER X.»
But we must also consider in what manner the j ^^^ ^^ ^^ nature of the entire creation inyolves what is good to account for and what is most excdlent; whether there exists of gSS- ^^ something that has been separated in point of ▼« uYa<^ov— in feet, and which actually subsists essentially, or whether we are to assume the existence of order, or maka both of these assumptions together, just as we might illus- trate our meaning by the case of an army.
For the good or excellent condition of an army 2. This ques- depends upon the order that is enforced; and hy^^fot the commander who aims to promote this sub- an amy, ordination, even this person in a more eminent degree may be r^arded as a cause of such an excellent condition: for this officer is not set over the army on account of the order that is found to prevail there, but that order is found to exist on account of the command exercised by this officer. All things, however, are co-ordinated after a certain ^nd of animals mode, but not after a similar mode,— take the classification, for example, of aquatic and winged animals, and of plants. And they are not disposed after such a way as that there should not subsist anything in common to either in relation to the other, although in respect of some point do they involve some resemblance. For, indeed, in regard of one characteristic are all things ranked and of a house, under 00-ordinate series; but as in a house it is ^*'^^* allowable, least of all, for the free to do anything whatsoever they please, but all things, or most things, have been reduced into a state of orderly arrangement, so to slaves, likewise, and wild beasts, only in a small degree belongs a desire to do what may contribute to the general advantage; but for the most part their operations are confined to whatsoever chances to fell in their way, for the nature of each of them consti- tutes to them a first principle of this description. But I say^ in this instance, that it is requisite for all to attain unto a condition where distinctions wUl be drawn; and other things ' The reasoning contained in thii chapter is most lenarkabU indeed.
344 THE METAPHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOK XL Bubsist in this way, of which all participate, for the constitu- tion or preservation of the entire.
But whatever impossibilities or absurdities lies about the ensue to thoso who miake assertions in a different what^rgood ^^y* ^^^ ^^*^ ^^ ^^ theories those put forward on the subject who express themselves in a more elegant or accomplished manner, and in the case of which of these there prevail the least number of doubts, we must not allow such inquiries to escape our observation. For all philosophers are for producing all things from contraries; neither, however, is the expression " all things," nor the ex- pression "from contraries," correctly employed by these speculators; nor do they declare, as r^ards those things in which the contraries are inherent, in what manner they will consist of contraries, for contraries are mutually impassive. 4. How Aris- ^^* by us is this controversy decided ratio- totie settles the nally by the introduction of a certain third quest on. nature.^ Some, however, constitute some one <»^ the contraries as matter, just as those do who make the odd subject for the even, or plurality for unity.^ And this, like- wise, is decided in the same manner; for the matter which is one is not what is contrary to anything. Further, all things except unity will participate in what is worthless; for the evil itself constitutes one or other of the elements.
The other speculators assert, however, that mode is' '^the neither what is good and what is evil are first good "a first principles at all, notwithstanding that what is good IS m a most eminent degree a first prin- ciple^ in all things. And some, I admit, correctly make this assertion of what is good— I mean, that we must consider it a first principle; after what mode, however, it is that what is good constitutes a first principle they do not state: whether 1 Aristotle's solution of the existence of Evil consists in tracing it to matter as its prime source; thus coinciding with what was the funda- mental principle of the Gnostic philosophy in after ages.
* Vide book I. chap. iv.
* The plain prevalence of Qood in our system is. in a speculative point of view, as difficult to account for as that of Evil. The bearing of this fact on the controversy " De Origine Mali" is well explained by the Archbishop of Dublin in his Lectures on Political Economy. ^ Vide Lect. IV., as well as his Grace's notes and appendix to Archbishof King's Discourse on the same s* 'l^'ect OH. 1C.J FALSE SOLUTIONS OF THIS PHENOMEKOIT. 340 it is to be regarded as an end, or as a moving cause, or as • formal principle.
Now, Empedocles also forms his opinions absurdly upon this point, for he makes Harmony fitton'on^t^ to constitute what is good; and this Harmony, J^cj^^ *°* in his system, subsists even as a first principle that imparts motion, for it has the power of congregating entities; and it subsists as matter, for it is a portion of the mixture. Now, even on the supposition that to Harmony has it happened in this same system that it should subsist as matter and a first principle, and as a power that imparts motion, yet the essence of this is not the same with the essence of these; according to whioli of them, therefore, will Harmony subsist? And that Discord should be a thing that is incorruptible would be absurd likewise; and yet this very thing constitutes the nature of what is eviL But Anaxagoras regarded what is good as a » „ first pnnciple, so far as it is a power that imparts goras made motion, for Mind, in his system, imparts motion; p,!SJjJ,'^f ^"* it imparts motion, however, for the sake of some- thing else. Wherefore, that is different from that for the sake of which it subsists, except it subsists as we say it actually does; for the medicinal art in a manner constitutes health. But it was also an absurdity contained in the Anaxagorean philosophy, the not having produced a contrary to what is good as well as to Mind. But all who assert contraries to be first principles do not employ contraries as such, unless one is disposed to handle the subject in a careless vein.
And why it is that some things* are corruptible, g ^^y system and some things incorruptible, no one declares; that ignores for they produce all entities from the same first clpie»'^"u8?1)e principles. Further, some of these speculators '**■«•• produce entities from what is nonentity;^ but some, that they may not be forced to this, make all thiugs to be one.^ Further, no one lays down a reason why generation will always exist; and what the cause of generation is nobody declares. And for those who create two first principles wiU * Vide book II. chap. iv. ' For instance, the Hesiodic sohooL ' That is, Parmenidea, whose qystem has been already examined, la book I. chap. TiiL S46 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK XL it be necessary to have a diflFerent first principle which would be more dominant, as well as for those Philosophers who introduce forms, because there really exists another principle more dominant than these; for why has matter participated, or why does it participate, in these ideas t 9. Aristotle's ^^^ ^^^ others it is necessary that there should ontology free be Something that is contrary to Wisdom, and to lulSit^!' *^ that which is the science most entitled to rever- ence; but to us this is not necessary, for there is nothing contrary to what is primary. For all the con- traries involve matter, and these subsist in capacity: but contrary ignorance is opposed to what is contrary, yet nothing is contrary to what is primary.
10 Ev n th Further, on the supposition that there do not logy and phy- czist Other things beside those that are cc^nisant sicsare free jj^ ^jj^ scuscs, there wiU not subsist a first prin- ciple, and order, and generation;^ and the celestial bodies will have no existence: but there is always a first principle of the principle, just as we find in the systems of Theologians and all Natural Philosophers. ii.where,then Now, admitting that there will be forms or are we to look ' numbers, they will not constitute a cause of any- principie in the thing;^ and, if they are not a cause of anything, thesi?^^^ neither will they be a cause of motion at any rate. Further, how, let me ask, will mag- nitude and continuity arise from things that are devoid^ of magnitude? for number will not produce a continuous quan- tity, either as that which imparts motion or as form. But, certainly, there will not be anything, at least, belonging to the contraries which is both productive and motive, for it would admit of non-existence; but, surely, the energy or producing cause is subsequent to the capacity, and in such a case etem^ entities do not exist — ^but yet they do exist Accordingly, some one of these hypotheses must be rejected; and this has been declared in the above statement that capacity antecedes energy^ — as to how it must be accomplished. Further, in * This pomt is lucidly explained by Cudworth in the Intellectual System.
' As he has demonstrated in his ezanunation of Platonism, in book L ' Vide book XIL chaps, iv. and r.
* I have added these words for the sake of the sense. This mani- festly is the absurdity to which ho would reduce the Platonists. TIm CH. I.J YALUB OP AFJSTOTLBTS ACCOUNT OP IT. 847 what way numbers may be one, or soul and body, and, in general, form, and the thing itself, no one says anything on this point; nor is it possible that one should declare his sen- timents thereupon, unless he express himself as we do — namely, to the effect that it is the cause which imparts motion that is the agent of production.
But they who say that mathematical number is jg ^ j^ ^ ^^ the first, and in this way continually suppose the be'found in the existence of Another substance adhering thereto in JfeoryT^^*" succession, and of different first principles belong- ing unto each, these make the substance of the Universe to be adventitious;^ for in no wise does one substance contribute anything towards another, as to whether it exists or does not exist — and besides this they introduce many first principles.
The entities, however, do not choose to submit is. illustration to injudicious government. " The government of ft^* ^HomelSJ* many is not a good thing — let there be one ruler." iu«d, ii. 204.
Respecting, indeed, therefore, the substance ^ ^^ ^^^ of things that are cognisant by the senses, it enceismadet« has been declared what it is, in the mode of in- SJen Kg'iSd quirv adopted bv Natural Philosophers^ in their of supra-sen- theories concerning matter, and subsequently antecedence of capacity to energy is a false principle, and its absurdity is exposed in book YIII. chap. riii.
^ iirturoSu&Zri — " adyentitious." This is the rendering of Themistius; the word itself is a most felicitous one for Aristotie's purpose at present. It literally is applied to poetry; e.g. the Catalogue of the shipfl in the second book of the Iliad would be called iicfi<r69ios, * In book XII.— according to others, book XIII. — we have a dis- cussion respecting number, mathematical natures, and ideas. The refutation of the Ideal Hypothesis in.this book is more complete than that found in book I.
^ Taylor translates these, words "the mode of inquiry adopted is •ur Physics."
S48 THE METAPHYSICS OF AftlSTC PLE. [bOOE Xlt in our own Treatise iii regard of matter in a condition of energy or activity.^ Since, however, our present investigation has for its object to ascertain whether beside sensible sub- stances there is in existence a certain Substance that is Im- movable and Eternal, or there is not; and on the supposition of the existence of any such, what it is: in the first place we must take a glance at the assertions made by other speculators, in order that if they happen to make any asser- tion ^ not after a correct manner, we may not become entangled in the same errors, and that if there subsists any dogma in common between ourselves and them, we may not be indignant with it, as a thing peculiarly in opposition to our present design; for it is a thing that we should remain content with, if one should make some statements with more pro- priety, but others in a way no wise inferior to ourselves. 2 The order of Now, there are two opinions res[)ecting these inquiry deter- subjccts; for Certain Philosophers affirm that ing"to uSr^ mathematical entities ^ are substances: such, for the opinions example, as numbers, and lines, and those things ' that are kindred to these: and, again, that ideas* are existences of this description. Since, however, some speculators constitute these as two distinct genera — I mean, both the ideas aud the mathematical numbers — and others maintain, in opposition, that there is oue nature of both, and certain other Philosophers say that mathematical entities first, respecting ^^® alone substances, in the first place we must mathemaiicai institute an investigation respecting mathe- en I les; matical ^ entities, without annexing to them any other nature — ^as, for instance, might or might not be the case, according to whether' they happen to be ideas or not? and whether these arc first principles and substances of entities or noti but, as regards mathematical entities, attend- ing to this point merely, whether they possess a subsistence or do not, and if they do, after what mode they subsist? In next, respect- the ucxt place, after these inquiries, we shall, tag the ideas, apart by itself, institvte an investigation con- * Vide book VIII. chap. vi.
' Compare a note in book XL, at the bet^nning of chap, viii., 01 Ari* lot]e*B cuetom of examining into the literary labours of others.
* That is, the Pythagoreans.
* The Platonists.
* This he does in chaps, ii. and iii. of this book.
CH. II.] IXQUIBIES PURSUED IIT BOJE XII. S43 ceming tbo ideas themselves/ simply considered, and as much for the sake of usage as anything else; for most of the tenets of what relates to these mquiries have been divulged even by exoteric discourses ^ respecting them. Further, also, in regard «i}f that particular form of investigation, it is necessary that we encounter a more enlarged philosophic discussion, when we come to be engaged in our inquiries as to whether the substances and first principles of entities are numbers and ideas? for after the investigation relating to ideas this one remains as a third subject for inquiry.
But it is requisite, on the supposition of the s. What is the existence of mathematical entities, that these?3ry'ta regard should reside either in objects that fall under ofmathom»ti. the notice of the senses, as certain afi&rm, or that ^^ e^^^ities* they should involve a subsistence separable from sensibles; and some make a statement in this way: or, if they are not inherent in either one or the other, they either have no existence at all, or exist in some different manner. Where- fore, the question with us will not be concerning the exist- ence of mathematical entities, but concerning their mode ox existence.
CHAPTER II.3 That, indeed, therefore, it is impossible that j j^f.j^^ these mathematical entities should reside in ticai entities do objects that ai*e cognisant by the senses, and that Jgns^iSes! *" at the same time the reason assigned for this position is a fictitious one, has been declared also in the doubts, where we have proved that it is impossible that there should be two solids in the same place at the same time. And, further, also, it depends on the same course of reasoning, both that other potentialities and natures should ' This inquiry is pursued in chaps, iv. and v.