And all this Aristotle draws to one conclusion in this settles regard of the existence of anything; namely, that the the question of phenomenon as such is to be regarded as a matter of exi^tence"*^ fact. There is to be no more questioning about it than there would be of any other fact. To ask why this very Ihing is this very thing which it is, is really to ask notmnff at all. What course then should an investigator adopt if guided oy what has been already laid down? Why, assuming that the thing is what it is to our senses, he should proceed to inquire into the cause of its existence, bid n v7rapx€i. For example, take the case of thunder; the phenomenon itself it w-ruld be a contradiction of the testimony oj our senses to suppose coul be different from what it is. Our bu.si BOOK VII.] A1ALTSI8 OP ARISTOTLE's MBTAPHTSICa iHx ness with it is i) try and discover, if possible, the canse oi first principle of it.
And this will explain all that has gone before in gg. "v^iiy so reference to the logical inquiries that we have been much logical engaged in throughout the entire of this sixth book; for ^quiry in book if all philosophic speculation must ultimately conduct one to an attempt at discovery of the cause, this will involve us m an examination as to formal principles; for m the present case tne causi3 sought for is the to n ^v ^Ivm. This brings us to the close of this very miportant book, which shows how Aristotle had penetrated into the kernel of the principles that form the basis of our modem systems of philosophv; and, perhaps, if the detractors from the Btagyrite's genius and originahty would deem it theii luty to make themselves a little more familiar with his works, {xerluips, I sav, thej would find abundant refutation here of the anti-experiential spirit with which they have charged him.
BOOK VII.
BOOK VII.
At the commencement of book VII. we are favoured i. Book VII. with a sort of epitome of the results already attained contains an previous to entermg upon an application of these logical fJe \o-?^2* ^ principles to the case of that substance which falls under principles ihe notice of our senses. It is as well, however, to re- established in mind his readers, as Aristotle thinks, why it was that ^^ ^'• he conducted them through the regions of speculation which he has exposed to their view in Dook YI. But an account ^^ o ch i this matter is simply this. The to ti ^u €ivai is one i,;,ok vii." certain aspect of substance, its locical aspect. Now the principle of this is to be found in definition; hence the various inquiries about definition, and its parts, and those that followed in the way of nece«»sary consequence. Having despatched, however, this logical inquiry about substance, we come now to deal more imme- diately with substance, and our business will be to try and find out its nature, and the number of those things of which we may predicate the term.
Now in regard of the different sorts of substances, we s. Different know that there are some whose existence is acknow- sorts of sub- ledged by all such as sensibles; yet there are others ^^*"*'®*' ibout wnich there is not the same uniformity of opinion, but ih regard of which individual speculators have put forward peculiai sentiments of their own. However, as a more fitting opportunity will present itself for the discussion of these latter theories, thfyv are Cor the prer^ent omitted, but are resumed in books XI. XIL and aIU.
1 AVALTSIS OF ABISTOTLXTB METAFHTSICS. [bOOKVI^ # Th in uirv ^^^ busincss at present, however, will be with those re«pe<^ing^^ substances about which there are no diversities of Bible sub- opinion as to their existence; but which are acknow- c£p!i! *°^ ^ lodged by aL; and these are those substances that are cognisant by our senses. Now all these sensible sub- stances involve in themselves matter; and to say that a thing has matter, is to say that it has a capacity for undergoing various changes and affections. And these, of course, presuppose a some- thii^g that is the subject of them, which in the present instance constitutes a substance.
But this view of substance, as the subject of certail •iiowsthatel^oc Diaterial changes, identifies matter with capacity; and, and kvepyeta therefore, Aristotie deems it requisite to state wliat that Mme'nafure. ^ which mav be set alongside as parallel with energy; and this, unaoubtedly, is tne €ldos or fto/9^77; that is, the form; and it is the aim of the second chapter to show this. Now, no doubt when we see anything subsisting m any particular condition, e.^, water as ice, in a state of congelation, we make that condition to serve as a proof of there beiog a certain subject of it. And when we come to see what this subject is, as in the instance of ice as water, we sh^ find that it is matter. Matter, however, after all merely amounts to capacity; and if we cannot discover some productive power to develop potentiality into actuality, we look in vain for the manifestation of the phenomenon before us. The discovery, however, of energy (fvtfyvaa) as a principle of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and a momentary glance at the circumstances of the case will show its perfect identity with the tlBos or form. For instance, what is a oalmP it is evenness in the surface of the sea: here the sea is the subject; that is, the matter, in capacity, of the evenness; but the evenness itself is the energy.
6. Diifcrent ^^ ^ ^^^ worthy of remark, that different sorts •orts of matter of matter have different sorts of energies likewise^ enerefer*'*"^ for in some things energy amounts to a synthesis, and in others to a mixture, and in others to something else of this sort.
In chapter iiL we have a question discussed as to '* ^linia"' whether the name of a thing bears reference to its question in r«- energy — ^that is, its form; or to that which is a com- ^ard of the pound of energy and capacity — that is, of matter and thSg. * lorm. But, however important this question may be in other respects, yet it is entirely irrelevant as regards the present investigation about substance c(^nisant by the senses. But, nevortheJess, it is quitejplain that it is similar to a question already discussed in book VI., as to the inherence of the parts defined in the entire thing defined; and as capacity corresponds to matter, and energy to form, it will be found to turn on the difference ibDeady pointed out between material and formal defimtions.
poOR YII.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE's MFTAPHTSICS. U And the discussion of this question conducts Aristotle - -, j, i to a solution of the difficulties under which Anti- the paradox 0/ fithenes, and persons similarly uneducated, laboured; Anti»thene« nanielj, as to the non-definability of the r6 ri iart, or J^Son.^**" very nature of a thinff. Now, no doubt, the definition of this, which is the lo^cal or formal definition, has its difficulties, as Aristotle admits in Book YI.; but still we may define the 76 ri ioTi, by making people acquainted with some quality or other of it of a positive kmd: for example, take the case of silver; we mi^ht show not what it is, but what it is like, namely, that it resembles tin; and that this quality, moreover, resides in a substance that has its formal principles, and admits of definition, or, in other words, con stitutes the compound of capacity and energy. And the same solution is further illustrated in the case of the Fythagoric system of numbers viewed as substances.
Thus Aristotle has established the fact that substance cognisant by the senses involves matter; yet on the hks its own"^ subject of material substance we must bear in mind — cuUar matter, as IS shown in chapter iv. — that although all things Jhap"*" IV.
IV.
necessarily spring pnmarilv from some onginal matter, yet that each ps^cular thing has its own peculiar or appropriate matter. Though several systems of matter spring from the same primary matter, this is no obstacle to their being different them- selfiBS; and this may be brought about through the intervention of some efficient cause; for example, a chest and bed are both made from wood. But still, where the things themselves are different, the matter is different; as you cannot by any efficient means make a saw from wood or wooL ^ that from the same matter we may make different things; but where we know the things themselves to be different, we may assume that they have arisen Trom different kinds of matter; or, in other words, that, notwithstanding the existence of some primary universal matter, yet that each thing may be said to involve its own peculiar matter. This, however, may be ascribed either to art, or some such efficient cause; but to be certain that we assign an adequate reason for such, we should make it our business to search through the entire category of causes.
Now, this is what Aristotle wishes to lay down in lo. two sorts regard of substances such as are physical but generable; of physical yet all this does not equally apply to such as, though 8^*>stance8. being physical or natural, are yet eternal substances: for these latter do not involve matter, or, at least, such a description of matter as the former, but matter capable merely of local or topical motion, as might be illustrated from the science of astronomy.
And, whilst on this subject, Aristotle tmnks he may jj ^j^^^^ j^ j, remind his readers, that although some things do not that alone in- involve generation or corruption, yet that it is only voivesacon- those that involve both that can be said also to involve "®*^°'* lii ANALYSIS OP Aristotle's metaphysics. fBOOKYni.
matter, matter; but this is just what has been implied in the chapter r. statement towards the close of the last chapter. And, moreo7er, this holds good in the case of contraries; for they, in the two cases, are generated palpably after different modes: for mst-ance, compare the ^neration of a wmte man from a black man, with that of wiiteness from blackness. But, further, the doubt still presents itself as to how, in regard of these contraiies, the matter of each involves iJie princi]^e of contrariety; whether through potentiality, or through a corruption of a certain nabit or form usually worn by the things themselves; as might be illustrated in the case of vinegar and wine.
The last chapter of this book opens with the mention contaij2*a^ of a doubt that has been urged in respect of de&iitions doubt as re- and numbers, why they should be one; e.^.ia the defi- nWon***^' nition of man as a two-footed animal, why are not these two qualities constitutive of plurality, instead of unity. Now, if people choose to adopt the usual modes of defining and distrnmiiahiiig^things, they will never arrive at a solution of these difficmties. The case, however, will be different if they bear in mind the distinctions that Aristotle has already established as resulting from the difference of energy from capacity, and how matter is equi- pollent with capacity, and energy with form. And this will always be found to be the case where matter is concerned, whether that matter be cognisant by sense or by mind {gla-BTfTrj § i/oi/r^ vXj;). Of course, if a thing does not involve matter, the queslion as to its unity would be absurd; for the very fact of its immateriality is ample security for its unity.
BOOK VIII.
BOOK VIII.
1. Book viii. ^^^ eighth book, whereon we now enter, may be oon- s'continuation sidered as strictly a coutinualion of book VII. and of book VII. accordingly we find it occupied with discussions about the same subjects as the preceding, namely, as to what potentialities are, and the relation subsisting between energy and potentiality. And as to how it is that Metaphysics, as a science, comes to deal with the subject of potentiality, Aristotle assigns the cause already mentioned, namely, that it depends on the multifarious predication of entity, and from one of tnese significations of it being what subsists, according to potentiality and actuality — koto cvpafitp „ _.. Now the subject of potentiality, as respects its varituiix7 in in book IV. chapter xii., and the reader is referred to book VIII. ^Ijj^ij portion of the Metaphysics as a collateral study BOOK VTII.] AXALT8IS OF ARISTOTLE'S ME7APHTSICS. Ill ^ith this. In the present snrvey of potentiality Arislotle will omit the consideration of whatsoever is styled so homonymously or equivo- cally; and this will exclude, amongst others, what is metaphorically stalled Potentiality in Geometry.
Now in any classification of the varions existing potentialities we must bear in mind that they must of*airwjJS*fS be all ranged as nnder one primary potentialit y, which under one pi- may be considered as the original principle of chan<(e Jj"y capacity, in something else, and this in another body, and ^^ 80 on through several.* And we may view potentiality either in reference to nabit, or passivity, or activity, and so forth; and to potentiality in any of these respects there corresponds an im poten- tiality which may be regarded as a want or negation of those qualities or properties which we denominate as potentialities.
But one broad line of demarcation may be drawn ^: One broad between potentialities in general; namely, so far forth Jjrion^ between as they are either rational or devoid of reason; and the capacities in former will be found resident in animated beings pos- JJJ"*^' sessed of a rational soul, whereas the latter are merely mechanical, so to say. There are to be discovered in these, however different productive energies, according as the subjects of the poten tialities are rational or irrational; for example, the former may be causative of several contraries, whereas one result merely can be traced to the latter. And again, we are to remember that excellence of condition or execution, the ro fv, is not necessarily involved ir. the notion of potentiality as such; for although one who carries out any course of action well must have acquired a certain capacity that possesses excellence, yet a man may go through a certain course of action and yet not do so either successfully or properly.
But as the relation between potentiality and energy is nnder examination, Aristotle draws our attention to regard*©? the certain prevalent erroneous notions on this subject; for relation of example, amongst the Megaric school, as to energy cJpSy"** being a requisite condition for, or rather, as what was chap, iii! identical with capacity; for example, a builder, if he does not actually build a house, cannot be said to have the capacity of building. But this view of things is quite false, and might be refuted from the instances of the arts; for, allowing a man to have acquired any art whatsoever, could we say that he had lost it because he was not actually engaged in the production of any artistic results P But the absurdities of the Megarics ' in this position 6. The absnr- may be made apparent by showing that it reduces them ditiesof the (1) It vrill be seen what use Aristotle makes of this principle in his Demonstr» tion of God's existence.
(2) The chief of the Megarics was Euclid: their school has been claated airongfl the cnperfect offshoots from Socratioism.
liv ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLlfIS METAFHTSICS. [bOOKVIO, Megarics akin ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ (^^^ po8ition with the followers of Prota- to those of Pro- goras, who maintained the exclusive subjectivity of our ^MiSon*^^* sensatious, to the denial of their objectivity. Now really such theories, if persisted iu, will lead to the annihilatioii of anythinff like generation or motion. But the fact is, that these per- sons would never fall into this error if they bore steadily in mind that such an assumption as theirs was the confusion of things that are per- fectly different, and this would have been avoided by carefulness as to the distinction subsisting between energy and capacity.
of Se Vwd ^^^^ distinction has been abundantly illustrated already, ^vepYcca should and may be further discerned from the origin of the especially. Moreover, we may ask ourselves what is the relation between capacity and actuality P May not a thing, that is endued with a capacity of being, nevertheless not exist at all? and, on the other hand, may not a thing be endued with the capacity of not being, and yet exist after all? Surely this may be tlie case, but there must ensue between being and non-being, or between non- being and being, some such principle as energy or tlie motion which is included in trie idea of energy, in order to account for the transi- tion or change of either into otner. p „ ^,, In chapter v.,* which is the next following, we have capacities ex- somc important prmciples established as to rational wiained into in potentiahties, compared with those that are devoid of ^ **** ^' reason. Aristotle shows, in regard of those capacities that are rational and resident in the rational soul, that their aevelop- ment depends upon habit,^ and that habit, of course, presupposes various exercises of antecedent activity; still all these capacities are worked in subservience to some one dominant principle, call it pro- pension or free-will, whichever you please, for appetite and volition in their very nature involve the capacity of successnilly accomplishing their seversi ends or objects of pursuit. And this in general may be stated as the mode in which capacity passes into actuality: it is through the medium of such principles as propension or free-will, and that, too, on the grounds already mentioned, of *"te energy or motion, involved in the condition of actual existence beiiig the result of capacity; but propension and free-will, we know, possess in them- selves the principle of originating motion in other things.
So that one advantage that we may recKon on attain- view^s'aSout ^S V ^^ examination into the nature of energy, may energy lead to be said to consist in the definite views which we thereby capadS^* in**^* attain of what capacity really is. And therefore Aris- ehap. vi.' totle shows US the nature of energy, not merely positively, but also negatively; not merely what energy is, (1) In chapter iv. there is an illustration of the nature of possibility and impossi* Mity, by means of unmeaning symbols.
(2) This chapter may be read along with chapter v. part I. of ••' The Analogy" 9 Bishop Butler ^OOE Vin.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLll'S METAPHYSICS. hf but what it is not. We cannot, however, affirm the subsistence of all thuLgs in a state of energy, save either only analo^cally or rela- tively. But, above all things, we should bear in mind that however energy in its nature is connected with motion, it would be most erroneous to confound it with motion. The difference between motion and energy is this, that the former is merely the act of transition towards a certain end, which end, when it is attained, entitles us to assert the existence of energy. This point is elucidated by Aristotle m chapter vi., in the portion of that chapter which (though the greater part of it) has been called in question on the grouna of its spuriousness.
The next question in regard of potentiality which Aristotle discusses, is, as to where we are to recog- JJajI'^^l^y Bise the existence of potentiality, and where a thing there is capa- cannot be said to involve capacity at all; for example, ^^^y* *"^ ^^®'« is earth a man in capacity, or not P Now, once for all it chap.**vii! may be stated on tnis subject, that where there is no hindrance in the nature of the thing itself, and where we can lay oui finger on some extrinsic efficient principle, we may reasonably infer the existence of potentiality. But we can never say determmately that potentialit;i^ exists objectively, save whei'e we can pronounce that a chsmge has been accomplished thereby in something else. And this may be illustrated in the case of compound things: for example, we will not say that earth is a chest in capacity; but when the earth has been instrumental in working a change, — ^for instance, in contributing to the growth of a tree, — then we say that the wood is a chest in capacity, and we call the chest not earth or earthy, but wooden or made of wood. So that where we can resolve a composite nature into its elementary parts, and through them into its ultimate matter, carrying out the nile just given, we shall be enabled to discover where the capacity exists, or if it exists at all.
Another question which the relation of capacity to n. ispoten- energy suggests is as to which is prior; and as we shall t»aiity prior to see in book XI., where Aristotle makes an application of cSapfviii. the settlement of this question to determine what the Divine Nature is, we shall see, T say, how important a use is made there of what he now demonstrates, namely, that energy is prior to capacity. Its priority Aristotle now establishes, not merely in defi- nition and in siibstance, but also in time, though not invariably in the last. The very nature of energy would show us that its order of development must be anterior to that of capacity, that is, as far as substance is concerned; for the first capacity is a capacity of ener- gising. This, however, may be different in time; for the matter of which a man is composed is prior to the man; and yet this statement after all does not really clash with the principle of the priority ol energy to capacity, for the capacity of the matter to become a rian wouM lie dormant, if "^here did not supervene son e productivr*, po^er M ANALYSIS OF lilISTOTLE*S METAPHTSIOS. [bOOKYIH und tliis is the same thing as to say, that not merely is energy prior to capacity, t>ut that, in the present case, if we do not admit this, a man will not exist at all.
This principle, however, Aristotle makes anothef Important UM iniportani use of, in estabUshinff the fact, that in order of this principle to acquire particular habits, there must, in the first of encrSy^'^'^ instance, be an exercise of previous enet^,* and we eh»p. viul know from other parts of the Stagyrite's works, that it is by repeated acts of such an energy, that practical principles are formed, and the foundation laid, as Butler also shows, for there being erected thereupon a superstructure of virtue and personal religion. For example, one who wishes to learn music must actualh play certain pieces of music, whether vocal or instru- mental. And all this shivers into atoms the quibbles of the Sophists, who would fain make out that a man who is not in possession of scientific knowledge, will yet accomplish some of the objects of the science, or master some of its difficulties. We might as well say that a man is fit for a life of persevering virtue, who has never gone tlirough any course of discipline, or possessed himself of virtuous principles of action throu^ uie exercise of habit. \% wi ♦t-.*.-. But we may regard the subject in another point of Anal cause of View; what IS the tinal cause, we may ask, of poten- pofentjauty, tiality P Certainly, actuality. Animals do not actually ^ ^*'*' ^ * exercise the power of vision for the ulterior purpose of their being furnished with a capacity of seeing; but they have this capacity in order that they may actually use it. Now, does not this likewisa lend its testimony to the truth of the principle of energy being prior to capacity? Besides this, however, do we ever recognise *he existence of capacity — would we ever be brought to allow its existence — except there could be previously pointed out to us some iorm that the capacity had arrived at P But what is form but energy under another name P And certainly the end proposed is prior to the means through which it should be accomplished, and yet the end and the energy are the same; and this we see in the case of teachers, who, if they can succeed in realizing to their pupils what the energy is in a particular case, conceive that they have made them acquainted with the end. Aristotle might have iLustrated this by the case of a drill-master or a dancing-master.
But after all, we must admit the priority of energy of'etorna^rt^'e ^0 Capacity in the strictest sense of the word, if we best proof of choose to examine into the nature of what is eternal; e ierCT°"'^^' for what is eternal does not, nor cannot, subsist in capacity, but yet its very essence consists in what con- stitutes energy. The notion of potentiality is excluded from the Divine nature, for that would destroy the necessity of God's exist- ence, for it would recognise the possibility of His non-existence.
<il) This previous energy seems parallel with what Coasin tenns Spontaneity, BookvulJ analysis of abisvotlb's metaphysics. lYli And all this may be illustrated in the motion of the 15. Hustrated heavenly bodies, which, as those bodies are Divine, the fi^m astro- motion of them is eternal. Most certainly, the motion of °®™y- them has nothing to do with capacity, for then men would be justified in the apprehension they have rrom time to time been shaken by, of a suspension of the laws which rule the celestial phenomena. But this IS quite groundless; the sun, or moon, or stars, will never halt in their heavenly courses; their periodic journeys will uninterruptedly be renewed, because these bodies, like God Himself, have energy for their essence, and, therefore, we may rest certain and contented that their operations will never be suspended on account of the wearisome- ness engendered, or the system being impaired. Nay, even why need we go beyond our own world in search of this truth, when the phenomena of fire and of earth might have taught us the same truth m the perpetuity of their energy P This, Aristotle remarks, is an instance of mutual imi- 10. The prin- tation between thin^ heavenly and earthly, but makes cipie of no further observation thereon, for he did not know *y°*^o^is°*- what ice know by revelation from Christ, how that all things external are mere types of something inward and unseen, as all our Lord's miracles show us, and were intended by our Redeemer to show us. Now, what I mean is ttiis, that Nature herself is one mighty symbol of what is spiritual, and that the whole creation groaneth and tra- vaileth together to have this life, struggling within her womb, brought to the birth, and her mystic meaning, that is buried within her, borne forth and carried home to the bosoms of the human race, to be nursed and cherished there!