will produce motion in the first instance. So that, after all, the realiiy of a pre-existent energy is recognised in these systems, as is also made to appear by a reference to the philosophy of Anaxagoras, who identifies mind and energy together, as well as to that of Empedocles in his assertion of such principles as harmony and discord.
10. How this Advancing forwards, then, on these principles, what bears on the remains to be proved in regard of these primary sub* (1) Vidi Stewart's Outlines of Moral PhUoaophy, Part II. chap. u. article I.
BOOK XI.] ANALIBIB OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS. IxXT stances as a oasis wliereon to build the truth of God's question of existence, what remains, then, is pretty obvious. These ^^'^ «»i«*- primary substances, we have seen, involve an eternal *"**' motion — a motion that is circular, and between that which receives this motion and that which imparts it we must recognise the intei> mediate existence of that which, though the source of motion, is itself immovable; and this constitutes what already has been implied in the mention of the primary substances, and that is, the eternity of OM substance whose energy constitutes its essence. And as to the energy of this first substance, that can hardly be called in question, for we must bear in mind that a perpetuity of motion presupposes an eternal cause of that motion.
Having thus established the existence of this First j^ ^^^^^ ^^^ Substance, the source of all the motion in the Universe, of actions are though at the same time itself being immovable, Aris- ^qI^^^^^ totle next examines into the sort of action to be found in this Substance — that is, of course, so far as this subject is disco- verable to the weakness of our faculties; for, after all, we can only look at the Divine Nature through the distorted medium of our own subjectivity.* And this is strongly illustrated in the views which Aristotle puts forward about the mode of operation pursued by the Deity.
As to the mode of God*s operation, Aristotle iden- 21. The mode tifies it with that of the intellect or ap j>ctite in man; of God's God, the first imparter of motion, moves that which ope^^^o"- receives the motion as a thing that may be compared to an object of human volition, or of the human understanding. A thing appears fair; it excites a corresponding desire within us, and we strive to attain it just because it is what appears fair. A truth is placed before the understanding; it evokes or calls forth a corresponding intel- lectual effort to grasp this truth, and the mind rests satisfied with the accomplishing of this end as the successful pursuit of its object. And to apply this to the matter in hand, Aristotle would thus seem to characterise the Divine energy as a manifestation of volition and of mental activity on the highest and most stupendous scale that we can form any conception of. And, certainly, there is ^^ ^^^ ^^^.^ one element which can be disengaged from this analysis of Aristotle's of God's Nature, which emphatically is one which must analysis of command the approbation of even Christian philoso- Nature?"^ phers, and therefore is the more remarkable as one to oe found in the theories of a Pagan writer. This element alluded to is the recognition by Aristotle of God as the independent source of his own operations, within and by Himself — a truth faintly though Intelligibly mirrored to us in the freedom of the will, and the creative (1) This tendency it noticed by Cicero in the first book of the De Natorft. The •tudent of Ecclesiastical History it taUj aware cf its pernicious operation oti Theology.
/2 txXYl ANALYSIS OF ARTSTOTLE's HBTAPHTBIGS. j^BOOE XL energies of the human mind; and a truth, moreover, so glorious that the Holy Scriptures of Gkjd teem with frequent avowals of it!
28. The final.-^^ ^^\^ of itself teaches us the final cause of the cause of God's Divine activity, and what it is that it proposes for itself energy. j^^ ^|jjg j|.g djgpiay of energy. It is love that draws forth the one, and a yearning after what is lovely that leads to a display of the latter. In us frail mortals, though the will, when not perverted, strains after what is good as an object of desire, yet it may or may not attain such, however it may love it; and the same holds good of the mind in its apperception of truth. In the case, how- ever, of God, the will and its object are not separate, and therefore, when we say that Qod pursues the work of creation as an object that is loved — f»yci di <as «p«»fi€voy-— we mean, in other words, that the essential quality of the Divine nature is love, or, as the Evangelist St. John has it, that " Qod is love."
Now this miglit appear a somewhat fanciful inter- oft^fore^ pretation of what we found in the text, but when what going analysis follows is annexed, the analysis will not seem so unjusti- foUo^s*" ^^** liable on the ground of its exaggeration; for thereby will we find Aristotle laying it down that Gbd's existence is what must be most excellent and happy, and therefore, as such, his aim must be the promotion of general felicity in all parts of Creation, and the actuating principle in his Divine perfections must be love, and Vindicated ^^^^^"S ^^^c but lovc. Perhaps, however, it will be the by a passage safest course to give the reader Aristotle's own words from the literally translated. ** The mode of Glod*s existence," Metaphysics. ^^^ Aristotle,* " must be such a one as is most excellent, and an analogy of which we have in our own short career. God exists for ever in this condition of excellence, whereas, indeed, for us this is impossible. His pleasure consists in the exercise of his essen- tial energy, and hence wakefulness and perception are what with God are most agreeable. Now essential perception is the perception of that which is most excellent, and the mind perceives itself by parti- cipation of its own object of perception; but indeed, it is a sort of contact of both, that in the Divine Mind creates a regular identity between these two,^ so that with God both are the same. And in possession of this prerogative, He subsists in the exercise of energy; and contemplation of his own perfections is what to Gbd must oe most agreeaole and best. And this condition of existence, after so excellent a manner, is what is so astonishing to us when we examine God's Nature; and the more we do so, the more wonderful that Nature appears to us. And the mode of God's existence is essential energy^ and as such is a life that is most excellent and everlasting, so (!) In chap. vii. of b#»ot XI.
(2) This is not quite a literal tianslation of Aristotle's words In the passage th«£ Ip being quoted.
BOOK XI.] ANALYSIS OF AB1ST0TLB*5 METAPUT8ICS. IxXTli that we must allow God Almighty to be possessed of such a life aa is eternal and uninterrupted."
Now, in these words, wliich are to be found towards the close of book XI. chapter vii., may be said to be tion the sum *" contained the most lucid statement of Aristotle's and substance notions of the Divine Nature of the Being and Attri- Sot^V^fGod. bates of God; and the bearing of this passage on the question of his Theology is most important, and is briefly noticed again in the remarks which follow alter the actual analysis of the Metaphysics has been brought to its close.
And here Ajistotle mentions an erroneous view preva- 27. Error in lent on this point amqjigst the Pythagoreans and Speu- Theology of the sippus, which he but just notices, and the discussion of ^ ^eorems. which, as we shall see, he resumes in the last Book of the Meta- physics. The Pythagoreans thought that what was excellent, and what was most glorious, could not be discovered in the dawn of Creation, but was a thing of subsequent growth in the way of natural development; and in opposition to this false opinion, which has reappeared on several occasions since the age of Pythagoras, and especially in modern times,^ Aristotle contends for the existence of perfection as what is original, and to be regarded as a paramount principle in Creation.
This remarkable chapter concludes with a further 23. Further delineation of the Divine Nature as that which is sketch of the devoid of parts, for magnitude cannot in any way in- 5.^" °^ volve this Divine Nature; for God imparts motion throughout infinite duration, and nothing finite— as magnitude is— can be possessed of an infinite capacity. And, likewise, is God devoid of passions, and unalterable — airaBrfs koi dvaXKoicnTov — for all such notions as are involved in passion or alteration are quite outside the sphere, so to say, of the Divine existence. Now, this representation added to that which recognises the necessary existence of (jod, which is given in the early parts of the chapter, completes the Aristotelian picture of the Divine Attributes. The ^g summ Stagyrite, theretore, beholds in God a Being whose view of Aria? essence is love, manifested in eternal energy; and the totie's notion* final canse of the exercise of his Divine perfections is ^ the happiness which He wishes to diffuse amongst all his creatures; and this happiness itself doth He participate in from all eternity. Besides, His existence excludes everything like the notion of poten- tiality, which would presuppose the possibility of non-existence; and, therefore, God's existence is a necessary existence. Further, also, He is devoid of parts, and without passions or alterations, possessed of (1) This maybe teen in those treatises which place the modem discoveries l« Geology by the side of Revelation, professedly with a friendly aim, but leally ia trder to bxing die latter into disrepute.
IxxtU analysis of Aristotle's xetaphtbics. [book xl uninterrupted and eternal life, and exercising his fnnetions tbrongh* out infinite duration.
30. Chap. Tiii. -^'^^ ^^^™ ^^^^ Aristotle passes on, in chapter yiil. The unity or to the Subject, as to whether we are to recognise the pr?n?ary^8ub- ""^^7 o^ Plurality of such primary substances; and, in stance proved determining for their plurality, he does not infringe experiment- upon the doctrine already established in the last chapter * ^* of the existence of one First Cause of all. For, although in this' chapter he puts forward these many primary substances, yet they are endued with motion — albeit, eternal;* and this motion they have received, in the first instance, from that which, though the source of all motion in the Universe, is itself, notwithstanding, un- moved; but this, with Aristotle, is God Himself. And here, too, we see another example of Aristotle's eclectic spirit in his reference to the works of others, and his custom of extracting therefrom what- ever may be real and serviceable to truth. As to the Ideal hypothesb, however, or the Pythagorean system of numbers, he leaves them out of the way; for, after aU, they have no bearing on the present dubject; but rather, in the theories of astronomers, does Aristotle expect to discover the object of his pursuit.
31. Reference ^^> accordingly, searches into the works of astro- to the writings nomers; such as Eudoxus and Calippus, in order to Uii8*8ubje°t ascertain the generally received notions of scientific men, as to the number of the orbital motions of the heavenly bodies; and for this reason, because corresponding to these several motions, there are so many substances belonging to the stars — first, second, and so on, according to the arrangement adopted by astronomers. For Aristotle's idea was, that the nature of the stars constituted a certain eternal substance; and, though he thus re- cognises a number of eternal substances, yet he places one above them all, from whence, as from a fountain, the others derive their motion.
This sketch, which is given us in this eighth 82. Value of chapter, of the systems of Eudoxus and Calippus is interesting, so far as it illustrates the condition of astronomical science about the time of Aristotle; and what we have here is likely to be an extract from the Stagy rite's own work on astronomy, in which he undertakes to amplify and improve the labours of Eudoxus; and the loss of which must be regarded with serious regret by all those interested in the learning of tne ancients. Having ascertained the number of the motions of the heavenly bodies, and, therefore, of the bodies themselves, to amount to fifty and five, or, exclusive of those of the sun and moon, forty-seven, he somewhat too dogmatically pronounces about the completeness of this enume* ration, and concludes with an assertion of what he had already proved in the De Coelo; namely, the existence of one heaven- CD EeveUtion has taught us of the eternal generation of the S in frcm the Fathtt BOOK XI.] ANALTSI8 OF ABI&TOTL£*S METAPHTSIC& IxiLl th ovpavos. The connexion between tin's assertion and Ariiotle'a theological system will be briefly considered in the remarks to be found at the end of this Analysis; to which, therefore, the reader is referred.
In thus investing the heaven and the stars with the 33 conflnne attribute of Divinity, Aristotle conceives himself called his assertions upon to furnish some confirmation of his opinions on {JaSti"^^*"* this point; and he appeals to the authority of antiquity, and to tradition, to bear him out in supporting his theory. Perhaps, after all, this was merely a piece of flattery to the popular supersti- tion; for Aristotle, more than any other of the Greek philosopliers, viewed with contempt tliose long-cherished mythological norioua which had been bequeathed to his countrymen, from an age too dark and remote for the lamp of history to shoot its ravs into. The passage, however, is a most remarkable one, in whicfi the Stagyrite seeks to disencumber his opinions of any ^jj- Repel? the novelty that they might at first sight appear to assume; JaSra, anSTthe and runs somewhat as follows: — " It has been tradi- passage quoted tionally reported, as from the very earliest ages, and d° ne**°** *^" " has been left to posterity in the form of a myth, both that these celestial substances are gods, and that Divinity embraces the entire system of Nature. Th©r« have been made, however, to these, certain fabulous additions, for the purpose of winning the belief of the multitude, and thus securing their obedience to the laws, and their co-operation towards advancing the general welfare of the state. These additions have been to the effect that these ^ods were of the same form as men, and even that some of them were m appear- ance similar to certain others amongst the rest of the animal creation. The wise course, however, would be for the philosopher to disengage from these traditions the false element and to embrace that which is true; and the truth lies in that portion of this ancient doctrine which recognises the existence of these primary celestial substances, and regards them as gods."
This brings to a close the proposed examination into 35, jhe sequel the existence and nature of tne First Cause; and inas- to his theory of much as, in the unfolding of his theory on this point, q ®<j"**^"" ®^ Aristotle has ascended up to the Absolute and Etem^ Mind, through the su^ectivity of the human mind, and also had demonstrated that the Divine Nature is what in itself must be essen- tially ^ood, two questions apparently remain for discussion; the first involving certain subjects of doubt as regai^ds the Mind itself, which are investigated in chapter ix., and the second as to whether the Univcise involves in its entire system this very excellence — ^this rS ayaB6py which we found to be inherent in the Divinity.
The question discussed in regard of mind is as to gg Questions what the essence of mind consists in, whether we must relating to the ■Anune its essence as being manifested in the capacity mind; chap. i« IXXX ANALYSIS OF iiBI&TOTLE*S MZTAPHTSTCS. [bOOK XL of perceiving, or in the actual perception itself — t6 vottp or rj tforja-is. Now, it is unportant to decide this question — for the settlement ol which the student is referred to chapter ix.; for the dignity of mind Aristotle conceives depends very much upon correct views as to its nature: the great danger to be avoided is the exaltation of the objects of perception above the ^eat percipient faculty itself. Such will only tend to drag down mmd from the eminence tbat it ought always to occupy in our estimation.
37. The nature ^^^ ^^^^ q^ucstion is, as to the nature of the Good oftheToiYu- in its CDnnexjLun with the system of the Universe 06v; chap. x. — ^ subjcct that is also discussed in chapters iv. and V. book XIII. The inquiry which is mentioned in this tenth chapter is, as to whether tiie nature of the entire of Creation consti- tutes what is good and excellent. How are we to account for the existence of what is good? — how are we to give a solution of the orderly system of the Universe? Is not the point in question best illustrated by the case of an army, where the discipline and order that prevail there, and give rise to its excellent condition, are the result of the vigilance and strict command exercised by the general: the general, certainlj, does not preside over the army on account of the subordination that is found there; but, oice versd. The application of this to the matter in hand is obvious; and by it we see Aristotle recognising what is good as a paramount principle in Creation.
And this, too, exposes the absurdities of any system wCTe^ed t?^" that would ignore the existence of what is good; and it deny the exist- is easy to scc why it was that they were led to adopt ence of good, such an hypothesis. They were for generating all things from contraries; and would thus assume the active influence at work therein of a principle of what is bad (rot) <l>avKov); whereas had they thought as Aristotk did, and admitted the existence of matter (vAi;), they would have recognis4;d that as the prime source Df evil. It was quite absurd for them to msist on such principles as these, because it was in reality a denial of what was matter of fa^t, of what was plainly in existence before their very eyes, and that was the operation of a certain power, which aimed at the promotion of what IS good as such, and succeeded likewise in the attainment of this very purpose.
39 Aristotie'a ^^^y then, constitutes Aristotle's solution of the account of the Origin of cvil, and is put forward by its author as the ^•jjrigin of ][jgst rcfntation of such theories as those of Empedocles, for example, and his school, in their recognition of the prncdples of harmony and discord. The inconsistency of this system —its utter insufficiency to account for the actual difficulty it proposes to solve — has been already exposed by the Stacynte in ms Review of the Greek Philosophy, and again in book II. chapter iv. 40. Funda- Against such systems as these, which would ascribe mental error of ^g phenomenon of generation to contrariety, the funda^ BOOK XII.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS. Ixxxi mental difficulty still remains as to how we can discover ascriWnK gene- >ny principle of efficiency in the Universe. Contraries ration to con- are mutually impassive, and whatever may be the results ^"^^ ^* of the conflfict of two of them, such, certainly, cannot be equivalent with motion. Motion must be communicated horn some ir dependent 3«)urce. Grant the phenomenon of generation; but what is the cause of generation? And such is the mrce of thw difficulty, that it pre- sented itself to the minds of the ancient philosophers, as we have already seen; and they were thus compelled, by actual reason, to recognise some gradation in their first principles, and the existence of one as more dominant than the other. In general, 41^ ThegencnJ however, they fell into the absurdity of advancing the objection existence of a something contrary to what was primary; J^Jj"^ *^*' and this inconsistency is avoided by Aristotle, who has ^* * fust proved ^e^eparate subs^tfiace^ot' a^TJotainTirst Caugej^ara-i mount tcTevery ollltiP pOweror principle in theDmverse^ Livaf then, are we to look for this, even in the systems of the Snpi naturalists: where, for example, will we discover the principle causality in the Ideal hypothesis of Plato, or in the numbers Pythagoras? Such is not to be found there; and this, too, amid all their needless multiplication of first principles. And, further. Nature herself seeks to break loose from the bondage 42. Nature pro- fixed upon her by such speculations; and things them- tests against a selves cry out against the increase of their rulers: and J'^ifcatioiTof " thus we find, not merely in the system of human primary government, but also in the wide kingdoms of Creation, entities. the one principle loudly proclaimed, of there being one sovereign influence that presides over all, and that the dominion of many is not what is advantageous either in the physical or social arrangements of the world; and this truth is conveyed to us in the weU-known line from the Iliad: " The government of many is not a good thing; let OS have one chief ruler amongst us."
BOOK XII.
We now enter upon an analysis of book XII., which, Th^^i-. however, does not contain speculations of equal interest book xu. and importance with what has gone before. The chief point of interest, however, in it relates to a refutation of the Ideal nypothesis — more elaborate and more enlarged than that found in book I. The first chapter of this book opens with a statement that the nature of the substance of those objects that fall under the notice of our senses has been declared, but that the inquiry proposed in the Metaphysics is, as to whether, beside these sensible objects, Vhere Ls in existence a certain Immovable and Eternal Substance or Ixxxii ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLB'S MBTAPHTSIOS. [bOOK ZU not. This point has been under inyestisation in the closing chap« ters of book XI., and the existence of such having been estab* lished as a matter of fact, he now proceeds to examine into the statements put forward by other speculators in relation to tliis Immovable Substance.
Now there are two leading opinions, Aristotle con- opinions re- ceives, as regards this Substance; for the existence of specting two sorts of substauces are put forward, namely, mathes'ubsumce? matical entities, such as numbers, and lines and ideas; and the difference is, that some identify both of these together, whereas others constitute them as two distinct genera — namely, ideas and mathematical numbers. The first point of in- quiry will be respecting these mathematical entities; as to whether they exist at all or not; and if they do, as to the mode of their subsistence. Next, the inquiry will extend itself to the subject of ideas, and as to whether numbers constitute substauces and first principles.
Now the inquiry in regard of mathematical entities po8ed*inquiry ^^ as to whether they subsist in objects that are cogni- as regards sant by the senses, or are in a state of actual separation SiUUea^*^*^*' from sensibles; or, supposing that they are found in neither way, qnerCi do they exist at all; or if they do, they must subsist after some different mode from either of these.
Now as to the non-inherence of mathematical entities inherence of ^^ objects that fall under the notice of our senses, mathematical Aristotle considers this to be proved from the nou- sens^ybies" divisibility of body and its non-separability from sen- sibles. It would, moreover, presuppose separable sur- faces, and so forth; and this multiplication of surfaces, &c., may be regarded as an obstruction towards a settlement of the question. The same reasoning may be applied to numbers as well as to mathematical entities. But a practical refutation of this entire theory may be found in astronomy, optics, and harmonics; at least, in doubts that might be raised m connexion with these sciences; for we might as well, in the case of these, speak of the existence of other sensible objects, and other powers of sensation, independent of those about which these systems respectively are conversant. And besides all this, even supposing this theory about the separate sub- sistence of mathematical entities to be true, the very contrary to what is usually supposed to take place will in reality happen; for it would be requisite that they should be prior to sensibles, when in point of fact tliey are subsequent to them. And again, there is the difficulty as to the mode in which these mathematical magnitudes would be one, and if they do not happen to be one, there will ensue dissolution in the case of many of them. To be sure, in a certain sense they may be prior; for instance, in definition; but it does not follow that things prior in definition should be also prior in substance.