κινούμενον διαιρετόν. διῃρήσθω δὴ κατὰ τὸ Τ΄. τοῦ δὴ ΓΒ μὴ κινουμένου οὐ κινηθήσεται τὸ AB: εἰ γὰρ κινήσεται, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ AT κινοῦτ᾽ ἂν τοῦ 10 BI’ ἠρεμοῦντος, ὥστε οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινηθήσεται Kal πρῶτον. ἀλλ᾽ ὑπέκειτο καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοῦ ΤῈ μὴ κινουμένου ἠρεμεῖν τὸ. ὃ δὲ ἠρεμεῖ μὴ κινουμένου τινός, ὡμολόγηται ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι. ὥστε πᾶν ἀνάγκη 15 τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι" ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ κινούμενον διαιρετόν, τοῦ δὲ μέρους μὴ κινουμένου ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἠρεμεῖν.
that, if KL is moving LM and is itself in motion, KM kK L M ae ee is not being moved by anything, merely because we cannot see which part is being moved by the other— KL by LM or LM by KL. In the second place, if a thing is in motion without being moved by anything, the fact that something else is at rest is no reason why its motion should cease: but if its motion does cease because something else has stopped moving, its own motion must have been caused by that other thing. If this principle is accepted, it can be shown that anything whatever that is in motion is being kept in motion by something. For we have taken AB to represent the thing in motion; it must then be divisible, for we have seen that every mobile is divisible. Let AB, then, be divided at C. Now if A C B ee eee A C B ee eee CB is not in motion, then the whole AB will be not in motion; for if it were, clearly AC would be in motion although CB is at rest, and thus AB would not be in motion primarily and in itself, which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus when CB is not in motion AB must be atrest. But we have agreed that if a thing is at rest because something else is not in motion, it moust have been kept in motion by that other thing. The conclusion is that anything whatever that is in motion must be kept in motion by something; for whatever is in motion must always be divisible, and if the part is not in motion the whole, likewise, must be at rest.
VOL. II P 209 a42a “Hires δὲ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος, ἐάν γέ τι κινῆται THY ἐν τόπῳ κίνησιν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινουμένου, καὶ πάλιν τὸ κινοῦν ὑπ we f o~ 3 a © ff A 20 ἄλλου κινουμένου κινῆται κἀκεῖνο ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου Kal ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι TO πρῶτον κινοῦν καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν εἰς ἄπειρον.: μὴ yap ἔστω, ἀλλὰ γενέσθω ἄπειρον. κινείσθω δὴ τὸ μὲν Α ὑπὸ τοῦ B, τὸ δὲ B ὑπὸ τοῦ T, τὸ δὲ Γ' ὑπὸ τοῦ A, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχομένου. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὑπόκειται TO κινοῦν κινούμενον κινεῖν, ἀνάγκη ὃ ἅμα γίγνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ κινουμένου καὶ τὴν τοῦ κινοῦντος κίνησιν (ἅμα yap κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν Kal 25 Κινεῖται TO κινούμενον), φανερὸν ὅτι ἅμα ἔσται τοῦ A καὶ τοῦ B καὶ τοῦ T καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν κινούντων καὶ κινουμένων ἡ κίνησις. εἰλήφθω οὖν ἡ ἑκάστου κίνησις, καὶ ἔστω τοῦ μὲν A ἐφ᾽ ἧς E, τοῦ δὲ B ep ἧς Z, τῶν δὲ Γ, A ἐφ᾽ dv H, εἰ yap ἀεὶ 80 Κινεῖται ἕκαστον ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου, ὅμως ἔσται λαβεῖν μίαν ἑκάστου κίνησιν τῷ ἀριθμῷ: πᾶσα yap κίνησις ἔκ τινος εἴς TL καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρος τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. (λέγω δὴ ἀριθμῷ μίαν κίνησιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς TO αὐτὸ TH ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἀριθμῷ γιγνομένην. ἔστι γὰρ κίνησις καὶ γένει 86 καὶ εἴδει καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἡ αὐτή--γένει μὲν ἡ τῆς 4 [Aristotle has in view the concentric celestial spheres, each influenced by those outside it and influencing those within it. There must be an outermost sphere or ‘ first mover which is also moved ’ (242 b 35) and beyond that an unmoved mover.—C. | > [i.e. each member of the series being both a mover (τὸ κινοῦν) and a moved (τὸ κινούμενον»), simultaneously imparts motion gua mover and suffers motion gua moved.—C.]
ὁ [ἴῃ extent’ or towards the extremes, but this does not exclude unlimited divisibility.—C.]
Now since anything that is in motion is, of necessity, being moved by something, suppose a thing is being moved locally by another thing that is in motion, and that again by another, and so on; then the series cannot go on without limit, but there must be a prime cause of the motion.* For suppose this is not so and the series has no limit: let A be kept in motion by B, B by C, C by D, and so on, each member of the series being kept in motion by the next. Now we are assuming that each mover, while it causes motion, is being kept in motion; and since the movements of the mover and the moved must occur simultaneously (for the one moves and the other is moved at the same time ὃ), itis obvious that the movements of A, B, C, and of every one of the moved movers willoccursimultaneously. Takethemovement ofeach member separately, and let E, F, G, H, represent respectively the motions of A, B,C, D; for although my Py Gs A JAT[B]C [TD | throughout the series each is being kept in motion by the next one, we may nevertheless assign to each a movement that is numerically one, because every movement is from ‘here’ to ‘there’ and is not unlimited in extent.° 4(By ‘a movement that is numerically one’ I mean a movement that proceeds from one and the same starting-point to one and the same goal in one and the same period of time. For a movement may be ‘the same’ generically or specifically, as well as numerically: generically, if it belongs to the ¢ [This long parenthesis recapitulates the definition of a ‘numerically single motion’ given in Book V. In a modern book it would stand as a footnote.—C.]
345 8 αὐτῆς κατηγορίας, οἷον οὐσίας ἢ ποιότητος, εἴδει δὲ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ εἴδει εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει, οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς μέλαν ἢ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς κακὸν ἀδιάφορον τῷ εἴδει, ἀριθμῷ dé ἡ ἐξ ἑνὸς τῷ 22h ἀριθμῷ eis ἕν TH ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, οἷον ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ λευκοῦ εἰς τόδε TO μέλαν 7) ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου εἰς τόνδε ἐν τῷδε TH χρόνῳ: εἰ yap ἐν 4 ἄλλῳ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀριθμῷ μία κίνησις, ἀλλ᾽ εἴδει. 8 εἰρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς πρότερον.) εἰλήφθω δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ κεκίνηται τὴν αὐτοῦ κίνησιν τὸ A, καὶ ἔστω ἐφ᾽ ᾧ K. πεπερασμένης δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ Α κινήσεως, καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἔσται πεπερα- σμένος. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἄπειρα τὰ κινοῦντα καὶ τὰ κινού- μενα, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἡ EZHO ἡ ἐξ ἁπασῶν ἄπειρος 1p ἔσται. (ἐνδέχεται μὲν yap ἴσην εἶναι τὴν τοῦ A καὶ τοῦ B καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων, ἐνδέχεται δὲ μείζους τὰς τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε εἴτε ἴσαι εἴτε μείζους, ἀμφο- τέρως ἄπειρος ἡ ὅλη: λαμβάνομεν γὰρ τὸ ἐνδεχό- μενον.) ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἅμα κινεῖται τὸ Α καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ἡ ὅλη κίνησις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔσται καὶ ἡ τοῦ A+ ἡ δὲ τοῦ A ἐν πεπερασμένῳ: ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἄπειρος ἐν πεπερασμένῳ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον. 20 Οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν δεδεῖχθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς" 1 [εἴτε ἔσαι εἴτε μείζους Simpl. 1045. 8, Oxf. Trans.: εἰ ἀεί τε μείζους, Par. 1859.—C.]
> [If we take either of the cases mentioned, the conclusion, that the total movement is unlimited (2.6. an illimitable aggregate of movements through limited distances), will follow; and since these are possible cases we are entitled to deduce our conclusion from either. It is immaterial that the PHYSICS, VII. τ.
same category of existence, (say) substance or quality; specifically, if the starting-point and the goal belong to the same species, for example black and white, or good and bad, where one of these is not distinguished from the other by any further specific difference; but it is numerically one when the passage occurs in a single unbroken period of time between terms which are each numerically one, e.g.
from one particular whiteness to one particular blackness or from this particular place to that, in this particular period of time; for if the period occupied were different, the movement would have only specific, not numerical, unity. But all this has been set forth already.*) Let us now take the time in which A has completed its own movement, and represent that time by K. Since the movement of A is limited, the time will be limited. But since by hypothesis the series of movers and moved is unlimited, the movement EFGH composed of all their individual movements will likewise be unlimited (for it is possible to assume that the movements of A, B, and the rest are all equal or that the movements of the rest are greater than that of A: in either case the result will be that the whole movement is unlimited; and it is open to us to take any case that is possible’). And since the movements of A and of each of the rest are simultaneous, the total movement EFGH will occupy the same period as the movement of A: but the period occupied by A’s movement was limited; consequently we shall have an unlimited movement in a limited time, which is impossible. This might seem to establish the point we set out conclusion might not follow, if, for example, the movements formed a convergent series.—C. ] 42bod μὴν ἀποδείκνυται διὰ τὸ μηδὲν δείκνυσθαι ἀδύνατον. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ ἄπειρον εἶναι κίνησιν, μὴ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πολλῶν: ὅπερ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ἕκαστον yap κινεῦται τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κίνησιν, ἅμα δὲ πολλὰ κινεῖσθαι οὐκ ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον κατὰ τόπον BKAL σωματικὴν κίνησιν ἀνάγκη ἢ ἅπτεσθαι ἢ συνεχὲς εἶναι τῷ κινουμένῳ (καθάπερ ὁρῶμεν ἐπὶ πάντων), ἀνάγκη τὰ κινούμενα καὶ τὰ κινοῦντα συνεχῆ εἶναι ἢ ἅπτεσθαι ἀλλήλων, ὥστ᾽ εἶναί τι ἐξ ἁπάντων ἕν. τοῦτο δὲ εἴτε πεπερασμένον εἴτε ἄπειρον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ νῦν: πάντως γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἔσται ἄπειρος ἀπείρων ὄντων, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἴσας εἶναι καὶ μείζους ἀλλήλων" ὃ 80 yap ἐνδέχεται ληψόμεθα ws ὑπάρχον. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ex τῶν A, B, I, A ἄπειρόν τί ἐστιν, κινεῦται δὲ τὴν EZHO κίνησιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ K, οὗτος / δὲ πεπέρανται, συμβαίνει ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ ἄπειρον διιέναι ἢ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἢ τὸ ἄπειρον. \ ἀμφοτέρως δὲ ἀδύνατον: ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἵστασθαι Kal 1 [πρῶτον Simplic. 1046. 4 (lemma); οὐ ibid. 9 πρῶτον, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι προσεχῶς καὶ μὴ δι ἄλλου, and below 243 a 3 and 245 a 8 τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν: πρώτως al.—C.]
α [* Physical,’ as contrasted with the action of a psychological ‘ motive.’—C. ] ¢ What is meant by ilimitable motion in Bk. VI. ch. vii. is traversing illimitable distance; and the demonstration there is intended to show that this cannot be accomplished in a limited time by either a limited or a limitless mobile. In the present passage there is no question of an illimitable distance being traversed either by the illimitable aggregate or by any limited member of it: what is meant by illimitable to prove: that there must be a prime cause of motion. But there is as yet no reductio ad absurdum, for in a finite time there may be infinite movement, if it is movement not of one thing but of many; and this is so in the present case: each thing accomplishes its own movement, and there is no impossibility in many things being in motion simultaneously. But since the immediate and direct cause of a physical α movement in space must (as we see in all cases) be either in contact or continuous with the thing it moves, our series of movers and moved must be either continuous or in contact with one another so as to form one thing composed of them all. For our present purpose it makes no difference whether this one thing is limited or unlimited; for in any case, since they are unlimited in number, the whole movement will be unlimited, if we assume as actual what is theoretically possible, namely, that each movement is either equal to or greater than the one prior to it. If then, A, B, Ὁ, D, εἴς. make up an unlimited magnitude which accomplishes its motion EFGH in the limited time K, this involves the conclusion that an unlimited movement is gone through in a finite time by something which is either limited or unlimited; and, whichever it is, the conclusion is an impossibility. The series must therefore come to movement here, is a motion of an illimitable magnitude which brings a different limited stretch of it over against a definite object. So far from this being shown to be impossible, it is taken for granted that it can happen, in the former passage (see pp. 165 sq.). So that the present contention is not only unsupported but implicitly denied by the former argument. It was unfortunately accepted by mediaeval writers, including Aquinas, who refers it to Aristotle; but this passage (unauthentic in the opinion of the translator) seems to be the only place in which it is to be found.
243 a εἶναί τι πρῶτον κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ συμβαίνειν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τὸ ἀδύνατον. ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις εἴληπται ἐνδεχομένη, τοῦ δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένου τεθέντος οὐδὲν προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον.
[The cause of movement or change must be in derect touch with the thing moved or changed by it, 1.6. there must be nothing between them. This principle applies to all kinds of change: of place, or quality, or quantity (243 a 3-11).
(1) Adi locomotion caused by an eaternal agent can be reduced to either pushing or pulling (a 11-244 a 4). And since in pushing or pulling there must be direct contact with the load, this is true of all local movement (a 4—b 2).
(2) Modification of quality means change in those sensible characteristics which distinguish one body from another, effected by sensible characteristics of the same kind. In animate beings such change may be accompanied by sensation and perception. In ali such cases there is direct contact 243a3 To δὲ πρῶτον κινοῦν---μὴ ὡς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως--ἅμα τῷ κινουμένῳ ὅ ἐστί' λέγω δὲ τὸ ἅμα, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν μεταξύ. τοῦτο γὰρ κοινὸν ἐπὶ παντὸς κινουμένου καὶ κινοῦντός ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ κινήσεις-- ἥ τε κατὰ τόπον καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ a κατὰ 10 TO ποσόν---ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ κινοῦντα τρία εἶναι, τό τε φέρον καὶ τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ τὸ αὖξον 1 7 φθέίνον. Uparov οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῆς φορᾶς" πρώτη γὰρ αὕτη τῶν κινήσεων. ἅπαν δὴ τὸ φερόμενον PHYSICS, VII. 1-1.
an end, and there must be a first moved mover.@ This impossibility, it is true, depends on an assumption®; but that does not matter, because the assumption is theoretically possible and from such an assumption no impossibility ought to result.
* [And, of course, beyond this first moved mover, an unmoved mover to move 1t.—C.]
ὃ [Viz. that each movement is either equal to or greater than the preceding one.—C. ] ARGUMENT (continued) between the object, the medium (if any) such as air, and the (3) Change of quantity, increase or decrease, is effected by direct contact (a 11-16).
Thus in every kind of change the extremities of agent and patient must be together, with nothing between (a 16-b 2).— Taxing the initiator of movement to mean not that for the sake of which the movement takes place, but that which sets it going, we may say that the initiator must be in direct touch with the thing it immediately moves; and by this I mean that there can be nothing between them. This is true of every mover and the moved it directly acts upon. And since there are three kinds of motion, (1) local, (2) qualitive, and (3) quantitive, there must be three kinds of mover respectively causing local transference, change of attribute, and growth or shrinkage. So let us begin with (1) local movement, for it takes natural precedence of the others. Everything A δι > x 8488 ἢ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ κινεῖται ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου. ὅσα μὲν οὖν αὐτὰ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν κινεῖται, φανερὸν ἐν τούτοις ὅτι ἅμα τὸ κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἐστιν" ἐνυπάρχει ιὸ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀναμεταξύ. ὅσα δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινεῦται, τετραχῶς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι: τέτταρα yap εἴδη τῆς ὑπ ἄλλου φορᾶς---ἔλξις, ὦσις, ὄχησις, δίνησις. “Ἄπασαι yap at κατὰ τόπον κινήσεις ἀνάγονται εἰς ταύτας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔπωσις ὥὦσίς τίς ἐστιν, ὅταν τὸ ad αὑτοῦ" κινοῦν ἐπακολουθοῦν ὠθῇ, ἡ 0 δ᾽ ἄπωσις, ὅταν μὴ ἐπακολουθῇ κινῆσαν, ἡ δὲ 248} ῥῖψις, ὅταν σφοδροτέραν ποιήσῃ τὴν ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ" κίνησιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν φορᾶς καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου “A φ φέρηται ἕως ἂν κρατῇ ἡ κίνησις. πάλιν ἡ δίωσις καὶ σύνωσις ἄπωσις καὶ ἕλξις εἰσίν: ἡ μὲν γὰρ δίωσις ἄπωσις (ἢ γὰρ ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου 5 ἐστὶν ἡ ἄπωσις), ἡ δὲ σύνωσις ἕλξις (Kal yap πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ἡ ἕλξις)" ὥστε Kal ὅσα τούτων εἴδη, οἷον σπάθησις καὶ κέρκισις: ἡ μὲν γὰρ σύνωσις, ἢ δὲ δίωσις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ at ἄλλαι συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις (ἅπασαι yap ἔσονται διώσεις ἢ συνώσεις), πλὴν ὅσαι ἐν γενέσει καὶ α Note that the natural movement of the elements is not included.
> e.g. down a slope, over an edge, or just falling where it stands.
σι a A φθορᾷ εἰσιν. ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἄλλο Te γένος κινήσεως ἢ σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις" ἅπασαι γὰρ διανέμονται εἴς τινας τῶν εἰρημένων. ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν εἰσπνοὴ ἕλξις, ἡ δ᾽ ἐκπνοὴ ὦσις: ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ἡ πτύσις καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι διὰ τοῦ Ἵ Ἵ A σώματος ἢ ἐκκριτικαὶ ἢ ληπτικαὶ κινήσεις" αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕλξεις εἰσίν, αἱ δ᾽ ἀπώσεις. Δεῖ δὲ Kal τὰς ἄλλας τὰς κατὰ τόπον ἀνάγειν" ἢ ἅπασαι γὰρ πίπτουσιν εἰς τέσσαρας ταύτας, τούτων δὲ πάλιν ἡ ὄχησις Kal ἡ δίνησις εἰς EAEW καὶ ὦσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὄχησις κατὰ τούτων τινὰ τῶν τριῶν τρόπων ἐστίν' TO μὲν yap ὀχούμενον κινεῖται ἽἼ \ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι ἐν κινουμένῳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπὶ κινουμένου τινός, TO δ᾽ ὀχοῦν ὀχεῖ ἢ ἑλκόμενον ἢ ὠθούμενον ἢ δινούμενον, ὥστε κοινή ἐστιν ἁπασῶν τῶν τριῶν ἡ ὄχησις. ἡ δὲ δίνησις σύγκειται ἐξ ld - ἕλξεώς TE καὶ ὥσεως" ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ δινοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕλκειν τὸ δ᾽ ὠθεῖν: τὸ μὲν yap ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἄγει. or εἰ TO ὠθοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕλκον ἅμα TH ὠθου- μένῳ καὶ τῷ ἕλκομένῳ, φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ τόπον κινουμένου καὶ κινοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξύ. ἀλλὰ * If you are speaking absolutely, genesis cannot be ἃ ‘bringing ’ together (as some have maintained it is), for it would be a bringing something to something indeed, not however ‘away from something else’ but ‘away from nothingness.” And analogously with perishing. [When two or more of the four elements are brought together to form a (homoeomerous) substance, such as flesh, something new comes into being, which was not there before. So the coming-into-being (or perishing) of flesh, though it involves a bringing together (or separation) of pre-existing elements, is not completely accounted for by that process of local movement.—C, | PHYSICS, VII. x.
separation as involved in genesis and perishing.* And now that we see that union and separation are synonymous with bringing together and setting apart, we see that all motions can be reduced to these antithetical terms.’ Further, inhaling is a drawing in, and breathing out an expulsion; and so with spitting and all the excretive and assimilating movements, since they are indrawings and outthrustings respectively.
Moreover, we must reduce the remaining forms of local movement to these two. For all of them come under one of the enumerated four, and of these again carrying and turning can be reduced to pulling and pushing. For being carried is distributed amongst all the other three forms, since the load moves incidentally to the motion of the carrier in or on which it is placed, and the carrier moves because it is either pulled or pushed or turned, so that carrying may be referred to any of the three. And turning can be resolved into pulling and pushing, for the agent that turns the subject does so by pulling one part towards itself and pushing another part away from itself.¢ It is clear, then, that in all cases of local movement there will be nothing between the mover and the moved, if it can be shown that the pushing or pulling agent must be in direct contact with the load. But » I follow a suggestion made by Simplicius in interpreting this difficult passage. [It must be remembered that κίνησις here means locomotion only. Cf. the second text here, καὶ πᾶσα δὴ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισίς éorwv.—C. | ¢ Obviously, as Simplicius notes, this assertion is made on the strength of the action of the mill-girl, or whoever it may be, as pulls and puishes the mill-stone by the handle as she grinds.
8448 μὴν τοῦτο δῆλον Kal éx τῶν ὁρισμῶν: ὦ ὲ μὴν 7 δῆλον ν ὁρισμῶν: ὦσις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο κίνησις, ἔλξις δὲ ἡ am ἄλλου πρὸς αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς 3.
10 ἄλλο, 6tav* θάττων ἡ κίνησις ἦ τοῦ ἕλκοντος τῆς χωριζούσης am ἀλλήλων τὰ συνεχῆ: οὕτω yap συνεφέλκεται θάτερον. (τάχα δὲ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναί τις ἕλξις καὶ ἄλλως- τὸ γὰρ ξύλον ἕλκει τὸ πῦρ οὐχ οὕτως. τὸ δ᾽ οὐθὲν διαφέρει κινουμένου τοῦ ἕλκοντος ἢ μένοντος ἕλκειν: ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἕλκει οὗ 15 ἔστιν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὗ ἦν.) ἀδύνατον δὲ ἢ ad αὑτοῦ 544 πρὸς ἄλλο ἢ am ἄλλου πρὸς αὐτὸ κινεῖν μὴ ἁπτόμενον. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ τόπον κινουμένου καὶ κινοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξύ.
᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς" ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἅμα εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον ἀλλοιοῦν 1 [ὅταν...συνεχῆ. The reading of Simplicius 1054. 7 and 27, adopted by the Oxf. Trans.—C.]
4 The wood draws the fire to itself, whereas ihe natural movement of fire is upwards. So much is clear. But what underlies this curious interpolation (known to Simplicius, but not the mediaeval Latin translation) 1s something much more than this. To Simplicius and to Aquinas the more obvious case of the magnet known to Aristotle (and even to Thales) but strangely neglected by him, seemed to present the strange (to them as to most modern minds) phenomenon of the actio in distans which contradicted the very thesis which our present author is endeavouring to prove, viz. that an agent cannot act upon any subject with which it is not in physical contact. Perhaps no metaphysical prejudice has ever entangled the mind of man more mischievously than this. Albertus and Aquinas escaped it by attributing to the heavenly bodies the power of actio in distans and allowing this follows directly from our definitions, for pushing moves things away (either from the agent or from something else) to some other place, and pulling moves things from some other place either to the agent or to something else, the motion of the pulling agent itself being faster than the motion which tends to separate the two continuous things from one another; for in that case the second is towed along by the first. ([t may well seem, however, that there is some other kind of ‘drawing’ than that which we have dealt with; for wood draws fire to itself without itself moving at all. But it does not really make any difference whether the pulling agent is in motion itself (in the direction of the motion it imparts) or not; for if stationary it draws the mobile to where it is, if in motion, to where it was.) 4 But in any case the agent cannot move anything from itself to somewhere else or from somewhere else to itself, unless it is in contact with it. So it is obvious that there is no intermediary between the mover and the moved in the case of local movement.
(2) No more can there be anything between the agent and patient in qualitive modifications. This can be shown by going through the possible cases, for in all of them we shall find that the extremes of the active and passive correlatives are in contact.
the magnet to share in this celestial power and so help to maintain a continuity in the whole scheme of nature. Ancient thinkers found no such escape and modern thinkers are only now, if now, emancipating themselves from it. Here our interpolator having raised the question and being unable to answer it, contents himself with the dogmatic reassertion that no such action as appears to manifest itself here is really possible. [For the analysis of the magnet’s action see A A ~ ϑ44ν»δ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀλλοιούμενον. (ὑπόκειται γὰρ cm A A ἡμῖν τὸ τὰ ἀλλοιούμενα κατὰ τὰς παθητικὰς λεγομένας ποιότητας πάσχοντα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. τὸ yap ποιὸν ἀλλοιοῦται τῷ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν οἷς διαφέρουσι τὰ σώματα ἀλλήλων (ἅπαν Ν an / a “ γὰρ σῶμα σώματος διαφέρει τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἢ πλείοσιν ἢ ἐλάττοσιν ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοῖς αὐτοῖς). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ ἀλλοιού- μενον)" ὑπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων: ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι πάθη τῆς ὑποκειμένης ποιότητος. ἢ γὰρ θερμαινόμενον ἢ γλυκαινόμενον ἢ πυκνούμενον ἢ ξηραινόμενον Δ “A ἢ λευκαινόμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαί φαμεν, ὁμοίως τὸ ἄψυχον καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον λέγοντες, Kal πάλιν τῶν 10 ἐμψύχων τά τε μὴ αἰσθητικὰ τῶν μερῶν καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ἀλλοιοῦνται γάρ πως καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις. ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν κίνησίς ἐστι διὰ σώματος, πασχούσης τι τῆς αἰσθήσεως. καθ᾽ ὅσα μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄψυχον ἀλλοιοῦ- ται, καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον" καθ᾽ ὅσα δὲ τὸ ἔμψυχον, οὐ ιὸ κατὰ πάντα TO ἄψυχον: od yap ἀλλοιοῦται κατὰ 548 4 τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τὸ μὲν λανθάνει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ λαν- θάνει πάσχον (οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον λανθάνειν ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις γίγνηται ἡ ἀλλοίωσις). εἴπερ οὖν ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ ἀλλοιού- 1 [The clauses in brackets were supplied by Prantl from Sia 1057. 24 and the second text in six of Bekker’s mss.—C. | α (Categories, ch. viii. distinguishes four classes of Qualities: (1) habits and dispositions (some of which are discussed here in the next chapter); (2) inborn capacities and incapacities; (3) shape and form (see 245 Ὁ 10 ff.); (4) affective qualities, PHYSICS, VII. u.
For we are assuming that things undergo qualitive modification in virtue of some action which affects what are called their ‘ affective qualities.’* That which is of a certain quality is modified in so far as it is perceptible to some sense, sensible characteristics being those which distinguish one body from another according as any body possesses more or fewer such characteristics or the same characteristics in a greater or less degree. And it is these sensible characteristics that produce the qualitive modifica~ tion; for they are affections of the ‘affective quality ’ we have assumed above. Thus we say that a thing is being modified when it is becoming warm or sweet or dense or dry or white. Moreover, we speak of all these processes taking place both in animate and inanimate beings, and in animate beings as occurring not only in parts that have no sense but in the senses themselves. For the process of sensation involves a kind of qualitive modification, actual sensation being a motion transmitted through the body when the sense-organ is affectedin acertain way. Accordingly, all the modifications that the inanimate patient can experience are common to the animate, but the animate subject experiences modifications which are not shared by the inanimate. For the inanimate does not experience modifications of sensation, nor is it aware of its modifications, as the animate is— though the animate too, for that matter, may be unconscious of such modifications as do not affect the senses. Since, then, qualitive modification is viz. those which are the objects of the five senses as constituting the contrarieties of touch, taste, smell, hearing, vision. They are called ‘ affective’ as having the power to modify contrary qualities in other things, and as producing ‘ affections’ (πάθη) of our senses.—C. | VOL. II Q 995 245.a μενον ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐν ἅπασί ye τούτοις sdavepov ὅτι dua ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀλλοιοῦν Kal TO πρῶτον ἀλλοιούμενον. TH μὲν yap συνεχὴς 6 ἀήρ, τῷ δ᾽ ἀέρι τὸ σῶμα. πάλιν δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα γῷ φωτί, τὸ δὲ φῶς τῇ ὄψει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις, τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον κινοῦν 4 δι πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον ὁ ἀήρ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως 10 ὁμοίως" ἅμα yap TH γεύσει ὁ χυμός. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ TOV ἀψύχων καὶ ἀναισθήτων: ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔσται μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος. Οὐδὲ μὴν τοῦ αὐξανομένου τε καὶ αὔξοντος. αὐξά- νει γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον αὖξον προσγιγνόμενον, ὥστε ἕν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ὅλον: Kal πάλιν φθίνει τὸ φθίνον 16 ἀπογιγνομένου τινὸς τῶν τοῦ φθίνοντος. ἀνάγκη οὖν συνεχὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὖξον Kat τὸ φθίνον, τῶν A ἴω δὲ συνεχῶν οὐδὲν μεταξύ. 245, Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τοῦ κινουμένου Kal τοῦ κινοῦντος πρώτου Kal ἐσχάτου πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον.
* | Literally, ‘for the cause of movement that is proximate with reference to the thing moved is the air (in contact with the sense-organ).’—C. ] > [The process of growth is exhaustively analysed in De gen. et corr. i, 5.—C.]
PHYSICS, VII. τι.
effected by sensible characteristics, it is clear that in all cases of modification one extreme of the modifier is in contact with the other extreme of the modified. For in touch, air is in contact with the source of warmth, and the body in contact with the air. And again, colour is in contact with the light, and the light with the organ of vision. And so too with hearing and smelling, for the air is in contact both with the object that provokes the sensation and the organ that feels the stimulus.* And with taste too, the savour is in contact with the organ of taste. And the principle holds equally with inanimate things that have no senses. The conclusion is that in no case is there anything between the modifier and the modified.
(3) Further, it is true of that which causes and that which experiences growth. For that from which the growth is ultimately derived is so assimilated to the growing body that the whole becomes one. And that which causes shrinkage, again, causes it by some portion of that which shrinks coming away from it. Necessarily, then, that which causes growth or shrinkage must be continuous with that upon which it acts; and if things are continuous there is nothing between them.?