thing in motion is moved by something else that is itself moved by something else; and it is true to say that such a series must terminate. Consequently its first member must be moved either by an agent which is not in motion at all, or by itself. Now (reserving the alternative of the first mover being itself not in motion) it is obvious enough in itself (though we have carefully established it if it were not) that if anyone had to determine whether the cause and principle of movement is to be found in that which moves itself or in that which is moved by something else, he would declare for the former, on the general principle that a cause which is causative in itself must be prior to that which derivesits causative power from some other cause which is itself also derivatively causative only.
We must, then, start afresh and examine the question: If there is any self-moving agent of motion, how does it move itself and with what kind of motion? Well then, all divisions of a mobile must themselves be divisible without limit; for it has been shown already, in our general treatment of the principles of Physics,* that whatever can, primarily and on its own account, be in motion, must be continuous. Hence it follows (1) that if a thing moves itself it cannot do so integrally in both capacities; for that would amount to saying that, being one and indivisible specifically, it was, in its integrity, both agent and patient of the same identical transference, or both the modifier and the modified in respect of the same modification, so that it might be teacher and taught simultaneously, or agent and patient of the same healing. Moreover, it must by definition be some mobile that is set in motion, and the mobile, 27b μενον, οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ: τὸ δὲ δυνάμει εἰς ἐν- τελέχειαν βαδίζει, ἔστι δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής. τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν, τὸ οἷον θερμαίνει τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ὅλως γεννᾷ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. ὥσθ᾽ dua τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ TO αὐτὸ θερμὸν ἔσται καὶ οὐ θερμόν. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσων τὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸ συνώνυμον. TO μὲν ἄρα κινεῖ TO δὲ κινεῦται τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦντος. Ore δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν᾽ οὕτως ὥσθ᾽ ἑκάτερον ὑφ᾽ ἑκατέρου κινεῖσθαι, ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν. οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐδέν, εἴ ye ἑκάτερον κινήσει ἑκάτερον" TO yap πρότερον αἰτιώτερον τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐχομένου καὶ κινήσει μᾶλλον: διχῶς γὰρ κινεῖν ἦν, τὸ μὲν τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινούμενον αὐτό, TO δ᾽ αὑτῷ: ἐγγύτερον δὲ τὸ 20 πορρώτερον τοῦ κινουμένου τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ τὸ μεταξύ. “ al A ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι εἰ μὴ ὑφ᾽ fe) A / αὑτοῦ: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς dpa ἀντικινεῖ θάτερον. ἔλαβον τοίνυν ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ κινεῖν: ἔσται ἄρα τὸ an 1 [τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν Simplic. 1237. 3 (lemma): αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν EK: αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινεῖν al.—C.]
¢ Cf. Book III. chapters i. and ii. The modéle is capable (i.) of being set in motion (transitional or first actualizing), and (ii.) of completing the movement in question and reaching the goal (complete or final actualizing).
¢ The reservation apparently is to meet such cases as the ‘favourite ‘ man is generated by man and the sun,’ in which a general cause of the conditions under which a specific cause can produce a specific effect 1s sometimes spoken of as producing that specific effect itself.
@ Which exclusion cannot falsify my conclusion. ΟἿ, as such, is potentially, not actually, in motion; and the potential is still only on its way to actuality (movement being an actualizing, though not a complete one %), whereas the mover must already be actualized; that which heats, for instance, must already be hot, and, universally, the generator must already be in possession of the characteristics.to be conferred upon the generated.? Thus the ‘ selfheating ᾿ would have to be both hot and not hot at the same time and in the same respect. And so in all other cases in which producer and produced bear the same denomination.* It follows, then, that if anything moves itself, the factor that causes the movement is distinguishable from the factor that is moved.
But (2) that such a case cannot be regarded as one of reciprocal action and passion between the factors concerned may be shown as follows. There would not really be any primary motor at all if each moved the other, for the primacy of causation falls to the agent that is prior to the next most primary and is therefore entitled better than it to be called the source of motion; for we have seen that ‘ causing motion’ may be assigned to an agent in two senses, to wit to the agent that is set in motion by something else or to the one set in motion by itself, and that one further back from the object ultimately moved is nearer to the principle of movement than is an intermediate between it and that object. Moreover, there is no necessity for either moving factor to be put in motion by anything but itself; so it would only be by incidental concomitance that the other moves it in return. I choose then hypothetically to exclude this contingency, and we are left with one element 8561" μὲν κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν ἀντικινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀκίνητόν Bye τι κινεῖν ἀνάγκη ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ κινούμενον, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι. ἔτι ἣν κινεῖ κίνησιν καὶ κινοῦτ᾽ ἄν, ὥστε τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαίνεται. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ πρώτως αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦντος οὔτε ἕν μόριον οὔτε πλείω κινήσει αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον εἰ κινεῦται αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ, ἴω ~ δὶ ᾽ 80 ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινος κινήσεται ἢ ὅλον ὑφ᾽ ὅλου. εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τι μόριον αὐτὸ ὑῴ αὑτοῦ, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρῶτον αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν" χωρισθὲν γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν κινήσει αὐτὸ αὑτό, τὸ δὲ ὅλον οὐκέτι. εἰ δὲ ὅλον ὑφ᾽ ὅλου κινεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς av ταῦτα Kwot αὐτὰ ἕαυτά. ὥστ᾽ εἰ 2588 μὴ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰλήφθω μὴ κινούμενα ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν. Τῆς ὅλης dpa τὸ μὲν κινήσει ἀκίνητον ὄν, TO δὲ κινηθήσεται: μόνως yap οὕτως οἷόν τέ τι avroκίνητον εἶναι. Eire εἴπερ ἡ ὅλη αὐτὴ αὑτὴν κινεῖ, TO μὲν κινήσει αὐτῆς, TO δὲ κινήσεται. ἡ ἄρα AB ὑφ᾽ ὃ αὑτῆς τε κινήσεται καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς A. ἐπεὶ δὲ κινεῖ TO μὲν κινούμενον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου τὸ δ᾽ ἀκίνητον ὄν, Kal α Cf. Chapter i. > Not receiving heat from the source and passing it on instrumentally or as a mediator to a recipient, but being itself both actually hot so as to heat its neighbour and under * shortage ’ of heat so as to be heated by it. ¢ This paragraph is a supplementary afterthought, the roof being complete and the discussion closed without it. t is an alternative form of (2) just above.
258 a κινεῖται TO μὲν κινοῦν TO δὲ οὐθὲν κινοῦν, τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἀκινήτου εἶναι κινοῦντος δέ, καὶ ETL EK κινουμένου μὴ κινοῦντος δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν. ἔστω yap τὸ A κινοῦν μὲν 10 ἀκίνητον δέ, τὸ δὲ Β κινούμενόν te ὑπὸ τοῦ A καὶ κινοῦν τὸ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ I, τοῦτο δὲ κινούμενον μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ B, μὴ κινοῦν δὲ μηδέν (εἶπερ yap Kal διὰ πλειόνων ἥξει ποτὲ εἰς τὸ Τ', ἔστω δι᾽ ἑνὸς μόνου). τὸ δὴ ἅπαν ABI’ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἀφέλω τὸ TV, τὸ μὲν AB κινήσει αὐτὸ ἑαυτό---τὸ μὲν A κινοῦν, τὸ δὲ Β κινούμενον---τὸ δὲ Τ' οὐ ιὸ Κινήσει αὐτὸ ἕαυτό, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως κινήσεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ τὸ yap Β κινεῖ τῷ κινεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου, οὐ τῷ ὑφ αὑτοῦ τινος μέρους. τὸ apa AB μόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ Kiel. ἀνάγκη apa τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἔχειν 20 τὸ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον δὲ Kal TO κινούμενον μηδὲν δὲ κινοῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἁπτόμενα ἤτοι dudw ἀλλήλων ἢ θατέρου θάτερον. εἰ μὲν οὖν συνεχές ἐστι TO ἴων “ / κινοῦν---τὸ yap κινούμενον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συνεχές --δῆλον ὅτι τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ οὐ τῷ αὐτοῦ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλον a κινεῖ αὐτὸ ἕαυτό, κινούμενόν τε καὶ κινοῦν τῷ αὐτοῦ τι εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. οὐ b} “λ -“-Ρ δ᾽ 5A A Ἰλλὰ “ A yap ὅλον κινεῖ οὐδ᾽ ὅλον κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ μὲν α [The argument is more easily followed in a concrete illustration: let A be a man’s soul, B his body, C his clothes.
* The reservation is because if the agent is immaterial it is said to touch the patient but the patient is not said to touch it. Cf. De gen. θὲ corr. 323 a 25 ff.
(under the action of another motor) or may not be in motion at all, and since the thing moved may in its turn either be moving something else or moving nothing, the self-mover must embrace a factor that causes motion but is itself unmoved and also a factor that is in motion and that may or may not, as the case may be, convey motion to something else. Let A then be the unmoved mover, B what is moved by A and in its turn moves C, which is moved by B but itself moves nothing. (There may of course be any number of links between B and C, but, as it makes no difference, we suppose one only.) Then ABC taken as a whole group moves itself. But if I take away C out of the group, AB will still move itself, A being the mover and B the moved; but C will neither move itself nor be moved at all. And neither will BC move itself without A, for B can only move anything at all in virtue of being moved by something else, not by any factor it contains in itself. It is then only AB that really moves itself. The self-mover, then, must embrace a motor that cannot itself be a motum, and a motum that need not itself be a motor; and motor and motum must be in contact, either reciprocal or at least in the direction from motor to motum.® If then the motor is con-’ tinuous ὁ (as the motum must necessarily be), obviously the whole self-mover does not move itself in virtue of some self-moving principle that pervades it continuously, but moves itself as a whole that is both suffering and causing motion in virtue of embracing as factors of itself that which causes motion and that which suffers it; for not all of it is motor, nor all of it motum, but A is the motor and ¢ i.e. dimensional, and therefore material.
2584 τὸ A, κινεῖται δὲ τὸ B μόνον: τὸ δὲ Γ΄ ὑπὸ τοῦ A οὐκέτι: ἀδύνατον yap. ᾿Απορίαν δὲ ἔχει, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις ἢ τῆς A (εἰ συνεχὲς τὸ κινοῦν μὲν ἀκίνητον δέ) 7 τῆς Β τῆς κινουμένης" 80 7) λοιπὴ ἄ ἄρα κινήσει τῆς Ay ἢ τῆς Β κινηθήσεται; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρώτως κινουμένη. ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ AB- ἀφαιρεθείσης γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΒ, ἔτι κινήσει ἑαυτὴν ἡ λοιπὴ ΑΒ. ἢ δυνάμει μὲν ἑκάτερον 2580 οὐδὲν κωλύει ἢ θάτερον τὸ κινούμενον διαιρετὸν εἶναι, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον" ἐὰν δὲ διαιρεθῇ, μηκέτι εἶναι ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν διαιρετοῖς δυνάμει πρώτως ἐνεῖναι. Φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ πρώτως 5 κινοῦν ἀκίνητον" εἴτε γὰρ εὐθὺς ἱ ἵσταται τὸ κινού- μενον ὑπό τινος δὲ κινούμενον εἰς ἀκίνητον 70 πρῶτον, εἴτε εἰς κινούμενον μὲν αὐτὸ δ᾽ αὑτὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἷστάν, ἀμφοτέρως συμβαίνει τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν εἶναι τοῖς κινουμένοις ἀκίνητον. 256 b 18 * (Kat εὐλόγως δὲ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. τρία 15 yap ἀνάγκη εἶναι,, τό τε κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ. τὸ μὲν οὖμ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη [ 1 [τὸ dé...ἀδύνατον γάρ is omitted ἴῃ ἘΣ. It was unknown to Alexander and absent in most copies known to Simplicius (1245. 2).—C.]
2 {I have followed Themistius (222. 23) in placing this peas here. No further rearrangement of the text, such as Alexander Sea 1224. 26) said some critics desired, is necessary. The conclusion (τοῦτο) which this paragraph describes as having been reached and commends as reasonable—that the first mover must be wemoved—has not even been mentioned at the earlier place, and there is nothing in the preceding context there for τοῦτο to refer to. The paragraph is an afterthought which was somehow inserted in the wrong place, where it interrupts the course of the argument.—C. | only B is the motum; for there will be no C in the whole (if it be rightly ‘self-moving’) of which A is the motor: there cannot be.
But supposing A, the unmoved motor, to be continuous, it may be asked: “If we subtract something from A or from the motum B, will the remainder of A continue to act as motor or the remainder of B tobe moved? For if so, AB will not be the primary self-mover, since if you subtract something from it the remainder will still move itself.’’ The answer is that either motor and motum alike or motum only may well be divisible potentially (qua dimensional) so long as they are indivisible in their actuality (qua entities); for it may be that if divided they would lose the capacities on which the self-moving relation is based. So there is no reason why the primary self-moving characteristic should not inhere in potentially divisible entities.
It is evident, then, from all that we have said that the primary motor is not itself a movable; for the thing in motion under some agent other than itself can always trace back its motion either to a primary unmoved mover or to an agent that is indeed moving but can itself initiate its movement or arrest it,? and either way alike the primary motor of anything that is in motion is found to be unmoved.
Now this conclusion is only what we should have expected; for in the three links of mover, instrument of motion, object moved, the last must experience @ [Simplicius (1245. 5) thinks that, if this last remark is genuine, it means that AB constitutes a complete self-moving system. The addition of a C would be superfluous, for B may or may not have a C to move (238 a 8).—C.]
VOL. II Z 337 μὲν κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἀνάγκη" TO δ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι (συμμεταβάλλει γὰρ τοῦτο ~,ἷ Ca ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ TH κινουμένῳ ὄν" δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπον κινούντων, ἅπτεσθαι “γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη μέχρι τινός), τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οὕτως ὥστ᾽ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκίνητον. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἔσχατον, ὃ κινεῖσθαι μὲν δύναται, κινήσεως δὲ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὃ κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπ ἄλλου δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ, εὔλογον---ἶνα μὴ avay- Kalov εἴπωμεν---καὶ TO τρίτον εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ov. διὸ καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν Νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων Kat ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν ποιεῖ εἶναι: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὧν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγὴς wv.)
α 'This ἔσχατον is to be taken simply as ‘ the last of a connected series "in this case the series of divine and immaterial motors, animate self-moving organisms, inanimate mobilia.
» [Anaxagoras, frag. 12, so describes Nous, except that he does‘not say that it is incapable of motion.—C. ] INTRODUCTORY NOTE The primal cause of all motion is itself motionless. The primal motion (directly caused by it) is rotation; all other motions are derivative and vary in complexity according to their mode of derivation. Thus there is: 1. Uniform motion caused by an agent (A) which is itself motionless.
2. Regular, but not uniform, motion caused by an agent (B) which is itself moving with a uniform motion.
3. More complex motion caused by an agent (C) which is itself moving with a regular, but not uniform, motion.
PHYSICS, VIII. v.—vz.
motion but need not cause it; the middle term must be in motion itself as well as causing motion in something else (for it accompanies the changes of the thing it moves and keeps pace with it—patently so in the case of local movement where the instrument and the load must remain in (partial) contact somewhere); and so if the first term (which by hypothesis causes motion) is to be distinguished from an instrument, it cannot also be itself in motion. And since we find as the last term of the series? entities (inanimate objects, to wit) capable of being moved but not of initiating motion, and other entities (lhving organisms, to wit) including in themselves a factor capable of initiating motion and also one capable of being moved, does not analogy suggest—not to say insist—that there is a third order of entities capable of initiating motion but incapable of being moved? So Anaxagoras® did well to say that ‘Intelligence’ was unaffected (by the material universe) and free from admixture, since he regarded it as the principle of movement, and it could only be so if itself motionless, and could only control it if itself unmingled with it.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE (continued) 4, Still more complex motion caused by various combinations of the above (for the same subject can move with more than one motion. See 259 b 80).
The heavens consist of a nest of concentric spheres whose several axes are inclined at various angles to the Prime axis (that of the outermost); they and their motions are all eternal. The proper motion of each, viz. uniform INTRODUCTORY NOTE (continued) rotation about its own axis, belongs to class 1, and this is the only motion of the outermost sphere; that of each of the others is compounded of motions belonging to 1, and 2 or 3: the two latter being derived from one (or more) of the spheres above it. The sun, moon, and the various planets (each of which is fixed on the equator of its proper sphere) move therefore with various degrees of [We have seen that the primary agent of motion must be unmoved. The next point ἐδ that, if there is to be eternal and constant motion, there must be at least one eternal primary unmoved mover. That is all we need to establish, whether or not there is a plurality of such agents (258 b10-16).
It might be alleged that the souls of animals are unmoved sources of motion and that they exist at one time and not at another and so are not eternal. But even so there must be some eternal agent to account for the perpetual process of coming into being and perishing and for the fact that souls exist at some times and not at others (b 16-259 a 6).
Is there only one such eternal agent, or more than one? The view that there is only one is to be preferred on grounds of the economy of nature, and because a single constant motion requires a single agent (a 6-20).
This conclusion can be supported by a review of the results already reached with regard to the principles of motion and 258b10 ᾿Επεὶ δὲ δεῖ κίνησιν ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, ἀνάγκη elvai τι ἀίδιον ὃ πρῶτον κινεῖ, εἴτε ἕν εἴτε πλείω, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀΐδιον εἶναι τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινούντων δέ, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν νῦν λόγον" ὅτι δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί α The allusion is to the belief, attributed to the Platonists, PHYSICS, VIII. vz.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE (continued) complexity. Thus it is easy to see that variable, contrary, and intermittent changes, including genesis and extinction in terrestrial things, may be caused by the influence of the ‘ stars.’
Cf. De caelo ii. 6, 8, 10, and 12, and Sir Th. Heath’s Avistarchus of Samos, pp. 193 sqq.
ARGUMENT (continued) a closer analysis of the self-motion ascribed to the souls of animals. The only kind of ἡ self-motion’ animals can be supposed to have is local movement, and strictly this is originated by external causes and therefore cannot be unceasingly maintained. Also the animal’s soul moves itself only in the incidental sense that the body carries it from place to place. To cause continuous motion we need an agent that cannot be moved even incidentally (a 20-b 31).
It follows further that what is primarily and directly moved by such an agent—namely the heaven—must be eternal and possess a constant motion, whereas the heavenly bodies, which impart motion to earthly things, have compound and therefore variable motions (Ὁ 31-260 a 10).
We can now see why there is constant motion of that which is directly moved by the first unmoved agent, and also intermittent motion derived from variable agents We have shown that motion must be eternal and can never cease; so there must be some prime mover, whether singular or plural, that is eternal and not itself movable. The contention that all unmoved movers are eternal? is not to our present purpose, but the following considerations will show that there that every ‘ soul,’ 7.¢. the vital principle of every living thing, is immortal, [Plato, Phaedrus 245 c.—C.]
2580 τί TO ἀκίνητον μὲν αὐτὸ πάσης ἐκτὸς μεταβολῆς Kal ἁπλῶς καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινητικὸν δ᾽ ἑτέρου, δῆλον ὧδε σκοποῦσιν. Ἔστω δ᾽, εἴ τις βούλεται, ἐπί τινων ἐνδεχόμενον wor elval ποτε καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνευ γενέσεως Kal φθορᾶς (τάχα yap ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι ἀμερὲς ὁτὲ μὲν ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν 40 ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ εἶναι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον). καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινητικῶν δ᾽ > ἢ id Ἁ A cy e δὲ \ κυ > ὃ ᾽ὔ 4 ἐνίας ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνδεχέσθω Kal τοῦτο. ἀλλ᾽ ov τι πάσας ye δυνατόν: δῆλον yap ws αἴτιόν TL τοῖς αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσίν ἐστι TOD ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι, ὁτὲ δὲ μή. TO μὲν yap αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ a5 Κινοῦν ἅπαν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη μέγεθος, εἰ μηδὲν κινεῖται ἀμερές" TO δὲ κινοῦν οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τοῦ δὴ τὰ μὲν γίγνεσθαι τὰ δὲ φθείρεσθαι, Kat τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι συνεχῶς, οὐδὲν αἴτιον τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν μὴ ἀεὶ δ᾽ ὄντων, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τῶν ἀεὶ μὲν ταδὶ κινούντων, TOV" δ᾽ ἕτερα. τοῦ yap 80 ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχοῦς οὔτε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον οὔτε ͵7ὔ A πάντα" TO μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἐξ avay- 1 [τῶν Simplic. 1252. 26, Oxf. Trans.: τούτων codd.—C.]
« [Aristotle has in view the objection that the souls of animals are unmoved causes of motion, but exist only for a time (though thev may not undergo any process of coming into being or perishing) and consequently are not eternal. That may beso; but none the less there must be some eternal unmoved mover.—C. } > [Because, as shown in Book VI. chapter iv., anything that undergoes a process of change must be divisible into parts.—C. ] PHYSICS, VIII. vz.
must be something that is not itself susceptible of any movement in the way of external change, either primarily or incidentally, while it is capable of causing movement in something else.
Let us grant (if anyone chooses to urge it) that there may conceivably be things which sometimes are and sometimes are not, without any process of becoming or perishing® (indeed if anything that has no parts exists at one time and not at another, it may be a necessary conclusion that it does so without undergoing any process of change ὃ). Further, let us grant the possibility that some of the principles that cause motion but are not themselves susceptible of movement belong to this class of things that now are and now are not. But in no case can this be true of all such principles; for it is evident that the coming and going of these intermittently present and not present self-movers must have some cause. For anything which moves itself must have magnitude gua mobile (for nothing that cannot be divided can be made to move), but nothing that we have said shows that a cause of motion as such must have magnitude. Accordingly the (prime) cause of the continual genesis and dissolution of the things that come into being and pass out of it cannot be found in any of the unmoved movers whose own existence is not eternal, nor in any group of causes some of which produce motion in certain things and others in certain other things. Neither (as is obvious) can any one of such be the cause of the everlasting and uninterrupted process, nor can the whole sum of them; for that the process should be everlasting and uninterrupted is an eternal necessity, whereas the whole sum runs back without limit (so that we never 2598 Κηῆς, τὰ δὲ πάντα ἄπειρα, καὶ οὐχ ἅμα πάντα ὄντα. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἔνιαι ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινουσῶν δέ, Kat πολλὰ τῶν αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινούντων φθείρεται τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιiverat, Kal τόδε μὲν ἀκίνητον ὃν τόδε κινεῖ, ἕτερον δὲ τοδί, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔστι τι ὃ περιέχει, καὶ τοῦτο παρ᾽ ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ Kal τῆς συνεχοῦς μεταβολῆς" Kat τοῦτο μὲν τούτοις, ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτια κινήσεως. Hizep οὖν ἀΐδιος ἡ κίνησις, ἀΐδιον Kal τὸ κινοῦν ἔσται πρῶτον, εἶ ἕν" εἰ δὲ πλείω, πλείω τὰ ἀΐδια. ἕν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλὰ καὶ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα 10 δεῖ νομίζειν. τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ συμβαινόντων, ἀεὶ on A a a τὰ πεπερασμένα μᾶλλον ληπτέον: ἐν yap τοῖς φύσει δεῖ TO πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ ἕν, ὃ πρῶτον τῶν ἀκινήτων ἀΐδιον ὃν ἔσται ἀρχὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις κινήσεως. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ἕν καὶ ἀΐδιον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν. δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἀεί, ἀνάγκη συνεχῆ εἶναι" Kal yap TO ἀεὶ συνεχές, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφεξῆς οὐ συνεχές. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε συνεχής, * If (were such a thing possible) they were individually eternal, and formed a group without limit in number, it might be another matter. But, on the hypothesis we are examining, they form an unlimited succession, each rising out of its predecessor.
» (That the limited is (objectively) etter than the unlimited was a Pythagorean doctrine, and indeed a characteristically Greek conviction. Simplicius (1254. 20) refers to 188 a 18, where Empedocles’ assumption of a small number of limited elements was praised as ‘ better’ than the Atomists’ and come to a prime cause at all) and is not coexistent but successive.? Itis clear, then, that though certain unmoved principles of motion may come and go any number of times, and many self-moving things may perish to be succeeded by others, one unmoving principle moving this mobile and another that, nevertheless there must be something which embraces them all and is distinct from any one of them, and is the cause of the others coming and going and of the continual change. This something, then, is what causes the movement of the first set of moving things, and they pass it on to the others.
So, inasmuch as motion is eternal, it follows that the prime mover, if it be single, or the prime movers, if plural, must likewise be eternal. And by preference we should regard it as one principle rather than many or as a limited rather than an unlimited plurality; for if the consequences are the same it ‘is always better to assume the more limited antecedent, since in the things of nature the limited, as being better, is sure to be found, wherever possible, rather than the unlimited. And a single principle is adequate, which as the first of the unmoved entities and eternal will suffice as the principle of motion for all the rest. Another proof that there must be some single and eternal first mover is the following. We have shown that eternal movement exists of necessity. And for such movement to be eternal it must be continuous, for what constantly exists at all times is as such continuous, whereas the successive is discontinuous (and therefore not eternal). But for movement to be continuous it must be unified; and Anaxagoras’s doctrine of an unlimited number of material particles. ΟἽ also 260 Ὁ 22.—C.]
29a μία" μία δ᾽ ἡ ὑφ᾽ ἕνός τε τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ ἑνὸς lon 7 3 \ yy \ Ψ a b 20 τοῦ κινουμένου" εἰ yap ἄλλο Kat ἄλλο κινήσει, οὐ συνεχὴς ἡ ὅλη κίνησις ἀλλ᾽ ἐφεξῆς. A "Ex τε δὴ τούτων πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις εἶναί τι πρῶτον ἀκίνητον, καὶ πάλιν ἐπιβλέψας ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν κινούντων. τὸ μὲν δὴ εἶναι ἄττα τῶν id a “~ ὄντων ἃ OTe μὲν Kuvetrar ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἠρεμεῖ, φανερόν. Kat διὰ τούτου γέγονε δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πάντα 95 Κινεῖται οὔτε πάντα ἠρεμεῖ οὔτε TA μὲν ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖ τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ κινεῖται: τὰ γὰρ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα καὶ δύναμιν ἔχοντα τοῦ ὁτὲ μὲν κινεῖσθαι ὁτὲ δὲ ἠρεμεῖν δείκνυσι περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα δῆλα πᾶσι, βουλόμεθα δὲ δεῖξαι καὶ τοῖν δυοῖν ἑκατέραν τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι ἔστι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ 8) ἀκίνητα τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ κινούμενα, προιόντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦτο καὶ θέντες ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι, Kat τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι ἣ ἀκίνητον ἢ κινούμενον, καὶ κινούμενον ἢ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἀεΐ, προ- λθομεν ἐπὶ τὸ λαβεῖν ὅτι τῶν κινουμένων ἐστὶν AO α “ΤΡ movement is of necessity eternal, it must be continuous. If of necessity eternal and continuous, it must be single. If of necessity eternal and contiuous and single, it must be the movement of one eternal mobile caused by one eternal mover. Thus if there must be eternal movement there must be a single eternal first mover. But the antecedent has been demonstrated. Therefore the consequent is true. And that eternal movement must be continuous he proves by showing that its continuity is involved in its eternity; for if it were intermittent it would not be eternal.’ Simplicius, 1254. 34 ff. ὃ {In chap. iii—C.]
¢ [If ἐπεί has any apodosis, it must apparently begin at 259 Ὁ 3 ταῦτα δή (where E omits 64).—C.]
4 [ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἀεί, The force of det is: ‘and that again by something else, and soon.’ Cf. Oxf. Trans. note.—C.]
for it to be unified it must be produced by a single motor in a single mobile, for if the movement were to be produced now by one thing now by another, the whole movement would not be continuous but successional.4 So from these considerations one would be led to believe that there is a prime mover, itself unmoved; and the conviction is strengthened by a consideration of the initiating principles of the (more familiar) agents of motion. For that there are certain things that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest is a patent fact. And indeed it was this that compelled us ὃ to reject all the three hypotheses: (i.) that everything is in motion, (ii.) that everything is at rest, and (iii.) that some things are always in motion and the remainder always at rest; for all these hypotheses are refuted by the existence of things that are susceptible of either condition and are now in motion and now at rest. And since ὁ these things that both move and rest are plainly to be seen of all, it lay upon us to demonstrate the actual existence of the two other kinds, namely those that are (not only sometimes but) always without motion, and those in like manner that are always in motion. Advancing to which position and laying it down that everything which is in motion must be moved by something, that something being itself either unmoving or in motion, and if in motion either moved by itself or by something else,* we arrived at this conclusion as to the initiating principle of the motion of moving things: in the cases in which such principle is itself (incidentally) involved in the motion it causes, it lies (proximately) in a self-moving being; 269 ἀρχὴ κινουμένων fev? ὃ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ πάντων é τὸ ἀκίνητον, ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ φανερῶς ὄντα τοιαῦτα ἃ κινεῖ αὐτὰ ἑαυτά, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ τὸ τῶν ζῴων γένος,--ταῦτα δὴ καὶ δόξαν παρεῖχε μή ποτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι 5 μὴ οὖσαν ὅλως, διὰ TO ἐν τούτοις ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς τοῦτο συμβαῖνον" ἀκίνητα yap ποτε ὄντα κινεῖται πάλιν, ws δοκεῖ. τοῦτο δὴ δεῖ λαβεῖν, ὅτι μίαν κίνησιν αὑτὰ κινεῖ, καὶ ὅτι ταύτην οὐ κυρίως. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ αἴτιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνεισιν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φυσικαὶ τοῖς ζῴοις, ἃς οὐ κινοῦνται δι᾿ αὑτῶν, 10 οἷον αὔξησις φθίσις ἀναπνοή, ἃς κινεῖται τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον ἠρεμοῦν καὶ οὐ κινούμενον τὴν ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ κίνησιν: τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον τὸ περιέχον καὶ πολλὰ τῶν εἰσιόντων, οἷον ἐνίων τροφή: πεπτομένης γὰρ καθεύδουσι, διακρινομένης δὲ ἐγείρονται καὶ oo A ~ i κινοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἔξωθεν οὔσης. 15 διὸ οὐκ ἀεὶ κινοῦνται συνεχῶς Uh αὑτῶν: ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν αὐτὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον 1 [κινουμένων μὲν: κινουμένων Ei: κινούμενον μὲν K. Whether κινουμένων or κινούμενον be read, it must be explained as by Dr. Wicksteed: ‘(the motion of) things moved has as its source (κινουμένων μέν) among principles that are themselves moved (or κινούμενον μέν, aS a principle that is itself moved) that which moves itself, but (as the ultimate principle of the motion) of all things that which is unmoved.’—C.] 2 [αὑτὰ Oxf, Trans. coll. Simplic. 1258. 13: αὐτὰ codd.—C.]