Son: onthe other hand, taking oda/a in the ‘primary’ Anistotelian sense, he has repos kar’ ovalay kal bmoKemevor. In the West (see above on Tertullian and Novatian) the Latin substantia (Cicero had in vain attempted to give currency to the less euphonious but more suitable essentia) had taken its place in the phrase wnzus substanti@ ox communio substantia, intended to denote not only the homogeneity but the Unity of Father and Son, Accordingly we find Dionysius of Rome pressing the test upon his namesake of Alexandria and the latter not declining it (below, p. 183). But a few years later we find the Origenist bishops, who with the concurrence of Dionysius of Rome deposed Paul of Samosata, expressly repudiating the term. This fact, which is as certain as any fact in Church history (see Routh Re//. iii. 564 &c., Caspari Alte u. Neue. Q., pp. 161 5qJ-), Was a powerful support to the Arians in their subsequent endeavours to unite the conservative East in reaction against the council. Scholars are fairly equally divided as to the explanation of the fact. Some hold, foliowing Athanasius i he. 42, sgg.; Newman’s Arians4, | Shedd i. 362—372 5 and the Introduction to the Tomus and ad ele ee are and eds embodied in this | A/vosin this volume pp. 482, 488. The use of oveia in Aristotle is ities especially that appended to Lpist. Euseb. p. 77; Zabn's tabulated by Bonitz in the fifth volume (index) to the Berlin Marcellus pp. 11 —27 (also p. 87), perhaps the best modern dis- | edition: its use in Plato is less srequent and less technical, but cussion 3 Harnack ii. pp. 228—230, and note 3; Loofs $§ 32—34; | see the brief account in Liddell and Scott.
xxxii PROLEGOMENA, CHAPTER IL, § 3 (2).
in A ee ee a ee and Basil, that Paul imputed the duoodcoy (in a materialising sense) to his opponents, as a consequence of the doctrine they Peace to his own, and that ‘the 80’ in repudiating the word, repudiated the ea es the divine nature could be divided by the emanation of a portion of it in the Logos. Hilary, on the other and, tells us that the word was used by Paul himself (‘male é400dc10v Paulus confessus est, sed numquid melius Arii negaverunt?’) If so, it must have been meant to deny the existence of the Logos as an otcla (i.e. Hypostasis) distinct from the Father. Unfortunately we have not the original documents to refer to. But in either case the word was repudiated at Antioch in one sense, enacted at Niczea in another. The fact however remains that the term does not exclude ambiguity. Athanasius is therefore going beyond strict accuracy when he erie (p. 164) that no one who is not an Arian can fail to be in agreement with the Synod. Marcellus and Photinus alone prove the contrary. But he is right in regarding the word as rigidly excluding the heresy of Arius.. This brings us to the question in what sense odola‘is used in the Nicene definition. We must remember t.
strong Western and anti-Origenist influence which prevailed in the council (above, p. xvii.), and the use 0 $réo7acts and ovata as convertible terms in the anathematism (see Excursus A, pp. 77, sgg. below). Now going back for a moment to the correspondence of the two Dionysii, we see that Dionysius of Rome had contended not so much against the sulordination of the Son to the Father as against their undue separation (wemepiomevan Stoordoets). In other words he had pressed the 6uoodcwv upon his namesake in the interest rather of the zzzzty than of the eyuality of the Persons in the Holy Trinity. At Nicwa, the problem was (as shewn above) to explain (at least negatively) how the Church understood the Generation of the Son. Accordingly we find Athanasius in later years explaining that the Council meant to place beyond doubt the Zssential Relation of the Divine Persons to one another (rd Ydiov rs odaias, tabrérys, see de Decr. pp. 161, 163 sg., 165, 168, 319; of course including identity of Nature, pp. 396, 413, 232), and maintaining to the end (where he expresses his own view, P. 490, &c.)
the convertibility of ovata and brdoracrs for this purpose. By the word 6 6eds or Oeds he understands ovdev Erepov } thy ovatav rod bvros (de Decr. 22). The conclusion is that in their original sense the definitions of Nica assert not merely the sfecific identity of the Son with the Father (as Peter gva man is of one odofa with Paul, or the Emperor’s statue of one form with the Emperor himself, p. 396), but the full unbroken continuation of the Being of the Father in the Son, the inseparable unity of the Son with the Father in the Oneness of the Godhead. Here the phrase is ‘balanced’ by the é« rs [brocrdoews 4] ovclas rod Marpds, not as though merely one obcia had given existence to another, but in the sense that with such origination the viaia remained the same. This isa ‘first approximation to the mysterious doctrine of the wepsxdépnous,’ coinherence, or ‘ circuminsessio,’ which is necessary to guard the doctrine of the Trinity against tritheism, but which, it must be observed, lifts it out of the reach of the categories of any system of thought in which the workings of human intelligence have ever been able to organise themselves. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity vindicated by the Nicene formula on the one hand remains, after the exclusion of others, as the one direction in which the Christian intellect can travel without frustrating and limiting the movement of faith, without bringing to a halt the instinct of faith in Christ as Saviour, implanted in the Church by the teaching of S. Paul and of S. John, of the Lord Himself: on the other hand it is not a full solution of the intellectual difficulties with which the analysis of that faith and those instincts brings us face to face.
That God is One, and that the Son is God, are truths of revelation which the category of ‘ substance’ fails to synthesise. The Nicene Definition furnishes a basis of agreement for the purpose of Christian devotion, worship, and life, but leaves two theologies face to face, with mutual recognition as the condition of the healthy life of either. The theology of Athanasius and of the West is that of the Nicene formula in its original sense. The inseparable Unity of the God of Revelation is its pivot. The conception of Zersonality in the Godhead is its difficulty. The distinctness of the Father, Son, and Spirit is felt (AAos 6 Marhp &AAos 6 vids), but cannot be formulated so as to satisfy our full idea of personality. For this Athanasius had no word; mwpécwroy meant too little (implying as it did no more than an aspect possibly worn but for a special period or purpose), imdéoracis (implying such personality as separates Peter from Paul) too much. But he recognised the admissibility of the sense in which the Nicene formula eventually, in the theology of the Cappadocian fathers, won its way to supremacy in the East. To them trdoracts was an appropriate term to express the distinction of Persons in the Godhead, while odefa expressed the divine Mature which they possessed in common (see Excursus A. p. 77 s99.).
This sense of otcla approximated to that of species, or eldos (Aristotle’s ‘secondary’ ovcta), while that of bnéorac.s gravitated toward that of personality in the empirical sense. But in neither case did the approximation amount to complete identity. The idea of trine personality was limited by the consideration of the Unity; the mepixdpnois was recognised, although in a somewhat different form, the prominent idea in Athanasius being that of covnherence or immanence, whereas the Cappadocians, while using, of course, the language of John xiv. 11, yet prefer the metaphor of successive dependence bomep e& adrtoews (Bas. Ep. 38, p. 118 D). To Athanasius, the Godhead is complete not in the Father alone, still less in the Three Persons as parts of the one ovcia, but in each Person as much as in a//. The Cappadocian Fathers go back to the Origenist view that the Godhead is complete primarily in the Father alone, but medva¢ely in the Son or Spirit, by virtue of their origination from the Father as myn or airla rhs Oedtntos. To Athanasius the distinct Personality of Son and Spirit was the difficulty; his difference from Origen was wide, from Marcellus subtle. To the Cappadocians the difficulty was the Unity of the Persons; to Marcellus they were ¢oto c@lo opposed, they are the pupils of Origen?. Accordingly when Basil makes a distinction between odofa and ixédorasis in the Nicene anathematism, he is giving not historical exegesis but his own opinion.
ai) ee eicane iN in ae eee the Unity of the Godhead in Three Persons, against e Rpt an oe on saat: ather. How then did it escape the danger of lending countenance Re aaa hanasius teels t See without solving it, for the distinction given by him, p. 84, Bere a ss ae hout real meaning (ze say with Tertullian ‘of one substance’). On the eee a ma ie _ at the iE < Son was sufficient to secure the Trinity of Persons. ‘By the name council in its revision netic Ge oe d shift eee Snort (P-434 Cra et) wenn ist ie oe etl Peer eet eesarean creed shifted vids to the principal position where it took the place of Adyos. y eed imposed no additional test in that direction (the é« ts ovolas is important but not 2 Gregory Thaumaturgus was the great Origenist influence 9, edited by Draseke in Z¢schr. fier K.G. viii. 85sgg.- Apollinarius in northern Asia Minor: the Cappadocian fathers wer r Minc appac 2 ere also | was of S iani igen: influenced in the direction of the 6foov¥cvoy by Apollinarius: see | also p. Fist: SE ee a ene eee ee the correspondence between Basil and the latter, Bas. EAA. 8 » THE HOMOUSION: ITS JUSTIFICATION. XXxili decisive in this respect). This was felt as an objection to the Creed, and the objection was pointed by the influence of Marcellus at the council. The historical position of Marcellus is in fact, as we shall see, the principal key to the ‘conservative’ reaction which followed. The insertion into the conservative creeds of a clause asserting the endlessness of Christ’s Kingdom, which eventually received ecumenical authority, was an expression of this feeling. But a final explanation between the Nicene doctrine and Monarchianism could not come about until the idea of Personality had been tested in the light of the appearance of the Son in the Flesh. The solution, or rather definition, of the problem is to be sought in the history of the Christological questions which began with Apollinarius of Laodicea, The above account of the anti-Arian test formulated at Niczea will suffice to explain the motives for its adoption, the difficulties which made that adoption reluctant, and the fact of the reaction which followed. One thing is clear, namely that given the actual conditions, nothing short of the test adopted would have availed to exclude the Arian doctrine. It is also I think clear, that not only was the current theology of the Eastern Church unable to cope with Arianism, but that it was itself a danger to the Church and in need of the corrective check of the Nicene definition. Hellenic as was the system of Origen, it was in its spirit Christian, and saturated with the influence of Scripture. It could never have taken its place as the expression of the whole mind of the Church; but it remains as the noblest monument of a Christian intellect resolutely in love with truth for its own sake, and bent upon claiming for Christ the whole range of the legitimate activity of the human spirit. But the age had inherited only the wreck of Origenism, and its partial victory in the Church had brought confusion in its train, the leaders of the Church were characterised by secular knowledge rather than grasp of first principles, by dogmatic intellectualism rather than central apprehension of God in Christ. Eusebius of Czsarea is their typical representative. The Nicene definition and the work of Athanasius which followed were a summons back to the simple first principles of the Gospel and the Rule of Faith. What then is their value to ourselves? Above all, this, that they have preserved to us what Arianism would have destroyed, that assurance of Knowledge of, and Reconciliation to, God in Christ of which the divinity of the Saviour is the indispensable condition; if we are now Christians in the scnse of S. Paul we owe it under God to the work of the great synod. Not that the synod explained all; or did more than effectually ‘block off false forms of thought or avenues of unbalanced inference’ which ‘challenged the acceptance of Christian people.’ The decisions of councils are ‘primarily not the Church saying ““yes”’ to fresh truths or developments or forms of consciousness; but rather saying ‘“‘no” to untrue and misleading modes of shaping and stating her truth,’ (Lax Mundi, ed.i. p. 240, cf. p. 334). It is objected that the Nicene Formula, especially as understood by Athanasius, is itself a ‘false form of thought,’ a flat contradiction in terms.
That the latter is true we do not dispute (see Newman’s notes infra, p. 336, note 1, &c.). But before pronouncing the form of thought for that reason a false one, we must consider what the ‘terms’ are, and to what they are applied. To myself it appears that a religion which brought the divine existence into the compass of the categories of any philosophy would by that very fact forfeit its claim to the character of revelation. The categories of human thought are the outcome of organised experience of a sensible world, and beyond the limits of that world they fail us. This is true quite apart from revelation. The ideas of essence and substance, personality and will, separateness and continuity, cause and effect, unity and plurality, are all in different degrees helps which the mind uses in order to arrange its knowledge, and valid within the range of experience, but which become a danger when invested with absolute validity as things in themselves. Even the mathematician reaches real results by operating with terms which contain a perfect contradiction (e.g. /—1, and to some extent the ‘calculus of operations’). The idea of Will in man, of Personality in God, present difficulties which reason cannot reconcile.
The revelation of Christ is addressed primarily to the will not to the intellect, its appeal is to Faith not to Theology. Theology is the endeavour of the Christian intellect to frame for itself conceptions of matters belonging to the immediate consequences of our faith, matters about which we must believe something, but as to which the Lord and His Apostles have delivered nothing formally explicit. Theology has no doubt its certainties beyond the express teaching of our Lord and the New Testament writers; but its work is subject to more than the usual limitations of human thought: we deal with things outside the range of experience, with celestial things; but ‘we have no celestial Janguage.’ To abandon all theology would be to acquiesce in a dumb faith: we are to teach, to explain, to defend; the Adyos coglas and Adyos yyécews have from the first been gifts of the Spirit for the building up of the Body. But we know in part and prophesy in part, and our terms begin to fail us just in the region where the problem of guarding the faith of the simple ends and the inevitable metaphysic, into which all pure reflexion merges, begins. Eire obv pidocopytéov elite ui piAocopntéoy, pirocopntéov, ‘man is metaphysical nolens volens y only let us recollect that when we find ourselves in the region of antinomies we are crossing the frontier line between revelation and speculation, between the domain of theology and that of ontology. That this line is approached in the definition of the great council no one will deny. But it was reached by the council and by the subsequent consent of tne Church reluctantly and under compulsion. The bold assumption that we can argue from the revelation of God in Christ to mysteries beyond our experience was made by the Gnostics, by Arius: the Church met them by a denial of what struck at the root of her belief, not by the claim to erect formulze applied merely for the lack of better into a revealed ontology. In the terms Person, Hypostasis, Will, Essence, Nature, Generation, Procession, we have the embodiment of ideas extracted from experience, and, as applied to God, representing merely the best attempt we can make to explain what we mean when we speak of God as Father and of Christ as His Son. Even these last sacred names convey their full meaning to us only in view of the historical person of Christ and of our relation to God through Him. That this meaning is based upon an absolute relation of Christ to the Father is the rock of our faith, That relation is mirrored in the name Son of God: but what it is in itself, when the empirical connotations of Sonship are stripped away, we cannot possibly know. ‘Opootiotos Te Tarpt, 2 zfs ovcias tod Marpdés* these words assert at once our faith that such relation exists and our ignorance of its nature. To the simplicity of faith it is enough to know (and this knowledge is what our formula secures) that in Christ we have not only the perfect Example of Human Love to God, but the direct expression and assurance of the Father’s Love to us. (c) Materials for Reaction. ‘The victory of Niczea was rather a surprise than a solid conquest. As it was not the VOL, IV. ¢ XXXiV PROLEGOMENA, CHAPTER IL, § 3 (2).
spontaneous and deliberate purpose of the bishops present, but a revolution which a minority had forced through by sheer strength of clearer Christian thought, a reaction was inevitable as soon as the half-convinced conservatives returned home’ (Gwatkin). The reaction, however, was not for a long time overtly doctrinal. The defeat, the moral humiliation of Arianism at the council was too signal, the prestige of the council itself too overpowering, the Emperor too resolute in supporting its definition, to permit of this. Not till after the death of Constantine in 337 does the policy become manifest of raising alternative symbols to a coordinate rank with that of Niczea; not till six years after the establishment of Constantius as sole Emperor,—1.e. not till 357,—did Arianism once again set its mouth to the trumpet. | During the reign of Constantine the reaction, though doctrinal in its motive, was personal in its ostensible grounds. The leaders of the victorious minority at Nicaea are one by one attacked on this or that pretence and removed from their Sees, till at the time of Constantine’s death the East is in the hands of their opponents. What were the forces at work which made this possible?
(1) Persecuted Arians. Foremost of all, the harsh measures adopted by Constantine with at least the tacit approval of the Nicene leaders furnished material for reaction, Arius and his principal friends were sent into exile, and as we have seen they went in bitterness of spirit. Arius himself was banished to Illyricum, and would seem to have remained there five or six years. (The chronology of his recall is obscure, but see 1D)3@. Baar. 364, and Gwatkin, p. 86, note 2). It would be antecedently very unlikely that a religious exile would spare exertions to gain sympathy for himself and converts to his opinions. As a matter of fact, Arianism had no more active supporters during the next half-century than two bishops of the neighbouring province of Pannonia, VALENS of Mursa (Mitrowitz), and Ursactus? of Singidunum (Belgrade). Valens and Ursacius are described as pupils of Arius, and there is every reason to trace their personal relations with the heresiarch to his Illyrian exile. The seeds sown in Illyria at this time were still bearing fruit nearly 50 years later (pp. 489, 494, note). Secundus nursed his bitterness fully thirty years (p. 2943; cf. 456). Theognis grasped at revenge at Tyre in 335 (pp. 104, 114).
Eusebius of Nicomedia, recalled from exile with his friend and neighbour Theognis, not long after the election of Athanasius in 328, was ready to move heaven and earth to efface the results of the council. The harsh measures against the Arians then, if insufficient to account for the reaction, at any rate furnished it with the energy of personal bitterness and sense of wrong.
(2) The Eusebians and the Court. Until the council of Sardica (i.e. a short time after the death of Eusebius of Nicomedia), the motive power of the reaction proceeded from the environment of Eusebius, of wep) Evo€Biov. It should be observed once for all that the term ‘ EUSEBIANS’ is the later and inexact equivalent of the last named Greek phrase, which (excepting perhaps p. 436) has reference to Eusebius of Nicomedia only, and not to his namesake of Cesarea. The latter, no doubt, lent his support to the action of the party, but ought not to suffer in our estimation from the misfortune of his name. Again, the ‘ Eusebians’ are not a heresy, nor a theological party or school; they are the ‘ring,’ or personal entourage, of one man, a master of intrigue, who succeeded in combining a very large number of men of very different opinions in more or less close association for common ecclesiastical action. The ‘ Eusebians’ sezsa Jatiori are the majority of Asiatic bishops who were in reaction against the council and its leaders; in the stricter sense the term denotes the pure Arians like Eusebius, Theognis, and the rest, and those ‘ political Arians’ who without settled adherence to Arian principles, were, for all practical purposes, hand in glove with Eusebius and his fellows.
To the former class emphatically belong Valens and Ursacius, whose recantation in 347 is the solitary and insufficient foundation for the sweeping generalisation of Socrates (ii. 37), that they ‘always inclined to the party in power,’ and George, the presbyter of Alexandria, afterwards bishop of the Syrian Laodicea, who, although he went through a phase of ‘conservatism,’ 357—359, began and ended (Gwatkin, pp. 181—183) as an Arian, pure and simple. Among ‘ political Arians’ of this period Eusebius of Czesarea is the chief. He was not, as we have said above, an Arian theologically, yet whatever allowances may be made for his conduct during this period (D.C.B., ii. 315, 316) it tended all in one direction. But on the whole, political Arianism is more abundantly exemplified in the Homeeans of the next generation, whose activity begins about the time of the death of Constans.
The Eusebians proper were political indeed «2 tues kat &Aot, but their essential Arianism is the one element of principle about them. Above all, the employment of the term ‘SEMI-ARIANS’ as a synonym for Eusebians, or indeed as a designation of any party at this period, is to be strongly deprecated. It is the (possibly somewhat misleading, but reasonable and accepted) term for the younger generation of convinced ‘ conservatives,’ whom we find in the sixth decade of the century becoming conscious of their essential difference in principle from the Arians, whether political or pure, and feeling their way toward fusion with the Nicenes. These are a definite party, with a definite theological position, to which nothing in the earlier period exactly corresponds. The Eusebians proper were not semz-, but vea/ Arians. Eusebius of Cesarea and the Asiatic conservatives are the predecessors of the semi-Arians, but their position is not quite the same. Reserving them fora moment, we must complete our account of the Eusebians proper. Their nucleus consisted of the able and influential circle of ‘ Lucianists;’ it has been remarked by an unprejudiced observer that, so far as we know, not one of them was eminent as a religious character (Harnack, i. 185); their strength was in fixity of policy and in ecclesiastical intrigue; and their battery was the imperial court. Within three years of the Council, Constantine had begun to waver, not in his resolution to maintain the Nicene Creed, that he never relaxed, but in his sternness toward its known opponents. His policy was dictated by the desire for unity: he was made to feel the lurking dissatisfaction of the bishops of Asia, perhaps as his anger was softened by time he missed the ability and ready counsel of the extruded bishop of his residential city. An Arian presbyter (‘ Eustathius’ or ‘ Eutokius’?), who was a kind of chaplain to Constantia, sister of Constantine and widow of Licinius, is said to have kept the subject before the Emperor’s mind after her death (in 328 BeeNS OG 1.25). _ At last, as we have seen, first Eusebius and Theognis were recalled, then Arius himself was pardoned upon his general assurance of agreement with the faith of the Synod.
1 They were probably not yet bishops at this time, as they | (unlike the obscure Secundus and Theonas, and the later generwere young bishops at Tyre in 335; evidently they are ‘the fairest | ation of Eunomians) are open to the i of God’s youthiul flock’ (!) alluded to in Eus. V.C, iv. a2. a pinch, ) P charge of subserviency at 2 At the same tim? Arius himself and all his fellow acianiets VAC ee UsomOh ANG Y WA XXXV The atmosphere of a court is seldom favourable to a high standard of moral or religious principle; and the place-hunters and hangers-on of the imperial courts of these days were an exceptionally worthless crew (see Gwatkin, p. 60, 110, 234). It is a tribute to the Nicene cause that their influence was steadily on the other side, and to the character of Constantine that he was able throughout the greater part of the period to resist it, at any rate as far as Athanasius was concerned. But on the whole the court was the centre whence the webs of Eusebian intrigue extended to Egypt, Antioch, and many other obscurer centres of attack.
The influences outside the Church were less directly operative in the campaign, but such as they were they served the Eusebian plans. The expulsion of a powerful bishop from the midst of a loyal flock was greatly assisted by the co-operation of a friendly mob; and Jews (pp. 94, 296), and heathen alike were willing to aid the Arian cause. The army, the civil service, education, the life of society were still largely heathen; the inevitable influx of heathen into the Church, now that the empire had become Christian, brought with it multitudes to whom Arianism was a more intelligible creed than that of Nicsea; the influence of the philosophers was a serious factor, they might well welcome Arianism as a ‘ Selbstersetzung des Christentums.’ ‘This is not inconsistent with the instances of persecution of heathenism by Arian bishops, and of savage heathen reprisals, associated with the names of George of Alexandria, Patrophilus, Mark of Arethusa, and others. (For a fuller discussion, with references, see Gwatkin, pp. 53—59.)
(3.) Zhe Lcclesiastical Conservatives. Something has already been said in more than one connection to explain how it came to pass that the very provinces whose bishops made up the large numerical majority at Niczea, also furnished the numbers which swelled the ranks of the Eusebians at Tyre, Antioch, and Philippopolis. The actual men were, of course, in many cases 3 changed in the course of years, but the sees were the same, and there is ample evidence that the staunch Nicene party were ina hopeless minority in Asia Minor 4 and but little stronger in Syria. The indefiniteness of this mass of episcopal opinion justifies the title ‘Conservative.’
In adopting it freely, we must not forget, what the whole foregoing account has gone to shew, that their conservatism was of the empirical or short-sighted kind, prone to acquiesce in things as they are, hard to arouse to a sense of a great crisis, reluctant to step out of its groove. If by conservatism we mean action which really tends to preserve the vital strength of an institution, then Athanasius and the leaders of Niceea were the only conservatives. But it is not an unknown thing for vulgar conservatism to take alarm at the clear grasp of principles and facts which alone can carry the State over a great crisis, and by wrapping itself up in its prejudices to play into the hands of anarchy. Common men do not easily rise to the level of mighty issues. Where Demosthenes saw the crisis of his nation’s destiny, Alschines saw materials for a personal impeachment of his rival. In the anti-Nicene reaction the want of clearness of thought coincided with the fatal readiness to magnify personal issues. Here was the opportunity of the Arian leaders: a confused succession of personal skirmishes, in which the mass of men saw no religious principle, nor any combined purpose (Soc. i. 13, vverowayias te ov8ey dmeixe Ta ywipeva), was conducted from headquarters with a fixed steady aim. But their machinations would have been fruitless had the mass of the bishops been really in sympathy with the council to which they were still by their own action committed. ‘ Arian hatred of the council would have been powerless if it had not rested on a formidable mass of conservative discontent: while the conservative discontent might have died away if the court had not supplied it with the means of action’ (Gwatkin, p. 61. He explains the policy of the court by the religious sympathies of Asia Minor $ and its political importance, pp. 90-91.) But the authority of the council remained unchallenged during the lifetime of Constantine. and no Arian raised his voice against it. One doctrinal controversy there was, of subordinate importance, but of _akind to rivet the conservatives to their attitude of sullen reaction.