But since the eye of the mind cannot look at all things together, in one glance, which the memory retains, these trinities of thought alternate in a series of withdrawals and successions, and so that trinity becomes most innumerably numerous; and yet not infinite, if it pass not beyond the number of things stored up in the memory. "For, although we begin to reckon from the earliest perception which any one has of material things through any bodily sense, and even take in also those things which he has forgotten, yet the number would undoubtedly be certain and determined, although innumerable. For we not only call infinite things innumerable, but also those, which, although finite, exceed any one's power of reckoning.
13. But we can hence perceive a little more clearly that what the memory stores up and retains is a different thing from that which is thence copied in the thought of the man who remembers, although, when both are combined together, they appear to be one and the same; because we can only remember just as many species of bodies as we have actually perceived, and so great, and such as we have actually perceived; for the mind imbibes them into the memory from the bodily sense; whereas the things seen in thought, although drawn from those things which are in the memory, yet are multiplied and varied innumerably, and altogether without end. For I remember, no doubt, but one sun, because, according to the fact, I have seen but one; but if I please, I think of two, or three, or as many as I will; but the sight of my mind, when I think of many, is formed from the same memory by whicli I remember one. And I remember it just as large as I saw it. For if I remember it as larger or smaller than I saw it, tben I no longer remember what I saw, and so I do not remember it. But because I remember it, I remember it as large as I saw it; yet I think of it as greater or as less according to my will. And I remember it as I saw it; but I think of it as running its course as I will, and as standing still where I will, and as coming whence I will, and whither I will. For it is in my power to think of it as square, although I remember it as round; and again, of what colour I please, although I have never seen, and therefore do not remember, a green sun; and as the sun, so all other things. But owing to the corporeal and sensible nature of these forms of things, the mind falls into error when it imagines them to exist without, in the same mode in which it thinks them within, either when they have already ceased to exist without, but are still retained in the memory, or when in any other way also, that which we remember is formed in the mind, not by faithful recollection, but after the variations of thought.
14. Although it very often happens that we believe also a true narrative, told us by others, of things which the narrators have themselves perceived by their senses. And in this case, when we think the things narrated to us, as we hear them, the eye of the mind does not seem to be turned back to the memory, in order to bring up visions in our thoughts; for we do not think these things from our own recollection, but upon the narration of another; and that trinity does not here seem to come to its completion, which is made when the species lying hid in the memory, and the vision of the man that remembers, are combined by will as a third. For I do not think that which lay hid in my memory, but that which I hear, when anything is narrated to me. I am not speaking of the words themselves of the speaker, lest any one should think that I have gone off to that other trinity, which is transacted without, in sensible things, or in the senses; but I am thinking of those species of material things, which the narrator signifies to me by words and sounds; which species certainly I think of not by remembering, but by hearing. But if we consider the matter more carefully, even in this case, the limit CHAP. VIII.] HOW WE EEMEMBER WHAT WE ARE TOLD. 279 of the memory is not overstepped. For I could not even understand the narrator, if I did not remember generically the individual things of which he speaks, even although I then hear them for the first time as connected together in one tale.
For he who^, for instance, describes to me some mountain stripped of timber, and clothed with olive trees, describes it to me who remember the species both of mountains, and of timber, and of olive trees; and if I had forgotten these, I should not know at all of what he was speaking, and therefore could not think that description. And so it comes to pass, that every one who thinks things corporeal, whether he himself imagine anything, or hear, or read, either a narrative of things past, or a foretelling of things future, has recourse to his memory, and finds there the limit and measure of all the forms at which he gazes in his thought. For no one can think at all, either a colour or a form of body, which he never saw, or a sound which he never heard, or a flavour which he never y tasted, or a scent which he never smelt, or any touch of a corporeal thing which he never felt. But if no one thinks anything corporeal except what he has perceived, because no one remembers anything corporeal except what he has perceived, then, as is the limit of perceiving in bodies, so is the limit of thinking in the memory. For the sense receives the species from that body which we perceive, and the memory from the sense; but the eye of the mind of the thinker, from the memory.
15. Further, as the will applies the sense to the body, so it applies the memory to the sense, and the eye of the mind of the thinker to the memory. But that which harmonizes those things and unites them, itself also disjoins and separates them, that is, the will. But it separates the bodily senses from the bodies that are to be perceived, by movement of the body, either to hinder our perceiving the thing, or that we may cease to perceive it: as when we avert our eyes from that which we are unwilling to see, or shut them; so, again, the ears from sounds, or the nostrils from smells. So also we turn away from tastes, either by shutting the mouth, or by casting the thing out of the mouth. In touch, also, we either remove the bodily thing, that we may not touch what we do not wish, or 280 ON THE TlilNITY. [BOOK XI.
if we were already touching it, we fling or push it away. So the will acts by movement of the body, lest the bodily sense should be joined to the sensible things. And it does this according to its power; for when it endures hardship in so doing, on account of the condition of slavish mortality, then torment is the result, in such wise that nothing remains to the will save endurance. But the will averts the memory from the sense; when, through its being intent on something else, it does not suffer things present to cleave to it. As any one may see, when often we do not seem to ourselves to have heard some one who was speaking to us, because we were thinking of something else. But this is a mistake; for we did hear, but we do not remember, because the words of the speaker presently slipped out of the perception of our ears, through the bidding of the will being diverted elsewhere, by which they are usually fixed in the memory. Therefore, we should say more accurately in such a case, we do not remember, than, we did not hear; for it happens even in reading, and to myself very frequently, that ^/ when I have read through a page or an epistle, I do not know what I have read, and I begin it again. For the purpose of the will being fixed on something else, the memory was not so applied to the bodily sense, as the sense itself was applied to the letters. So, too, any one who walks with the will intent on something else, does not know where he has got to; for if he had not seen, he would not have walked thither, or would have felt his way in walking with greater attention, especially if he was passing through a place he did not know; yet, because he walked easily, certainly he saw; but because the memory was not applied to the sense itself in the same way as the sense of the eyes was applied to the places through which he was passing, he could not remember at all even the last thing he saw. Now, to will to turn away the eye of the mind from that which is in the memory, is nothing else but not to think thereupon.
Chap. ix. — Species is produced hy species in succession. 16. In this arrangement, then, while we begin from the bodily species and arrive finally at the species which comes to be in the gaze of the thinker, we find four species born, as CHAP. X.] POWER OF THE IMAGINATION. 281 it were, step by step one from the other, the second from the first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third: since from the species of the body which is perceived, there arises that which comes to be in the sense of the perceiver; and from this, that which comes to be in the memory; and from this, that which comes to be in the eye of the mind of the thinker.
And the will, therefore, thrice combines as it were parent with offspring: first the species of the body with that to which it gives birth in the sense of the body; and that again itself with that which from it comes to be in the memory; and this also, thirdly, with that which is born from it in the gaze of the thinker's mind. But the intermediate combination which is the second, although it is nearer to it, is yet not so like the first as the third is. For there are two kinds of vision, the one of perception, the other of thinking. But in order that the vision of the thinker may come to be, there is wrought for the purpose in the memory from the vision of perception something like it, to which the eye of the mind may so turn itself in thinking, as the sight of the eyes turns itself in perceiving to the bodily object. I have, therefore, chosen to put forward two trinities in this kind: one when the vision of perception is formed from the bodily object, the other when the vision of a thinker is formed from the memory. But I have refrained from commending an intermediate one; because we do not commonly call it vision, when the form which comes to be in the sense of him who perceives, is entrusted to the memory. Yet in all cases the will does not appear, unless as the combiner as it were of parent and offspring; and so, proceed from whence it may, it can be called neither parent nor offspring.
Chap. x. — Tlie hnagincUlon also adds even to things we have not seen, those things ivhich we have seen elsewhere.
17. But if we do not remember except what we have per^ ceived, nor think except what we remember; why do we commonly think things that are false, when certainly we do not remember falsely those things which we have perceived; unless it be because that will, which I have already taken pains to show as much as I can to be the imiter and the separater of things of this kind, leads the sight of the thinker, that is to be formed, after its own Avill and pleasure, through the hidden y stores of the memory; and, in order to think those things which we do not remember, impels it to take one thing from hence, and another from thence, from those which we do remember; and these things combining into one vision make something, which is therefore called false, because it either does not exist without in the nature of corporeal things, or does not seem copied from the memory, in that we do not remember that we ever perceived such a thing. For who ever saw a black swan? And therefore no one remembers a black swan; yet who is there that cannot think it? For it is easy to apply to that shape which we have come to know by seeing it, a black colour, which we have not the less seen in other bodies; and because we have perceived both, we remember both. Neither do I remember a bird with four feet, because I never saw one; but I contemplate such a phantasy very easily, by adding to some winged shape such as I have seen, two other feet, such as I have likewise seen.^ And therefore, in thinking conjointly, what we remember to have perceived singly, we seem not to think that which we remember; while we really do this under the rule of the memory, whence we take everything which we Join together after our own pleasure in manifold and diverse ways. For we do not think even the very magnitudes of bodies, which magnitudes we never saw, without help of the memory; for the measure of space to which our gaze commonly reaches through the magnitude of the world, is the measure also to which we enlarge the bulk of bodies, whatever they may be, when we think them as great as we can. And reason, indeed, proceeds still beyond, but phantasy does not follow her; as when reason announces the infinity of number also, which no vision of him who thinks according to corporeal things, can apprehend. The same reason also teaches that the most minute atoms are infinitely divisible; yet when we have come to those slight and minute particles which we remember to have seen, then we can no longer behold phantasms more slender and more minute, although reason does not cease to continue to divide them. So we think no corporeal things, except either those we remember, or from those things which we remember.
CHAP. XL] NUMBEE, WEIGHT, AND MEASURE. 283 Chap, xi, — Number, weight, measure.
18. But because those things which are impressed on the memory singly, can be thought according to number, measure seems to belong to the memory, but number to the vision; because, although the multiplicity of such visions is innumerable, yet a limit not to be transgressed is prescribed for each in the memory. Therefore, measure appears in the memory, number in the vision of things: as there is some measure in visible bodies themselves, to which measure the sense of those who see is most numerously adjusted, and from one visible object is formed the sight of many beholders, so that even a single person sees commonly a single thing under a double appearance, on account of the number of his two eyes, as we have laid down above. Therefore there is some measure in those things whence visions are copied, but in the visions themselves there is number. But the will which unites and regulates these things, and combines them into a certain unity, and does not quietly rest its desire of perceiving or of thinking, except in those things from whence the visions are formed, resembles weight. And therefore I would just notice by way of foretaste these three things, measure, number, weight, which are to be perceived in all other things also. In the meantime, I have now shown as much as I can, and to whom I can, that the will is the uniter of the visible thing and of the vision, as it were, of parent and of offspring, whether in perceiving or in thinking, and that it cannot be called either parent or offspring. Wherefore time admonishes us to seek for this same trinity in the inner man, and to strive to pass inwards from that animal and carnal and (as he is called) outward man, of whom I have so long spoken. And here we hope to be able to find an image of God according to the Trinity, He Himself helping our efforts, who as things themselves show, and as Holy Scripture also witnesses, has regulated all things in measure, and number, and weight.-^ 284 ON THE TRINITY. [eOOK XII.
BOOK TWELFTH.
COMMENCING WITH A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE, POINTS OUT A KIND OF TRINITY, OF A PECULIAR SORT, IN THAT WHICH IS PROPERLY CALLED KNOWLEDGE, AND WHICH IS THE LOWER OF THE TWO; AND THIS TRINITY, ALTHOUGH IT CERTAINLY PERTAINS TO THE INNER MAN, IS STILL ' NOT YET TO BE CALLED OR THOUGHT AN IMAGE OP GOD.
Chap. i. — Of what hind are the outer and tJie inner man.
1. Come now, and let iis see where lies, as it were, the boundary line between the outer and inner man. For what- ( ever we have in the mind common with the beasts, thus much ■ is rightly said to belong to tire outer man. For the outer, man is not to be considered to be the body only, but with the • addition also of a certain peculiar life of the body, whence the structure of the body derives its vigour, and all the senses with which he is equipped for the perception of outward tilings; and when the images of these outward things already perceived, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection, it is still a matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things we do not differ from the beasts, except that in shape of body we are not prone, but upright. And we are admonished through this, by Him who made us, not to be like the beasts in that which is our better part — that is, the mind — while we differ from them by the uprightness of the body. Not that we are to throw our mind intp those bodily things which are exalted; for to seek rest for the will, even in such things, is to prostrate the mind. But as the body is naturally raised upright to those bodily things which are the most elevated, that is, to things celestial; so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised upright to those things which are most elevated in spiritual things, not by the ^ elation of pride, but by the dutifulness of righteousness.
Chap. ii. — 3fan alone of animate creatures perceives the eternal reasons of things pertaining to the body.
2. And the beasts, too, are able both to perceive things CHAR III.] OF THE HIGHEE, AND PEACTICAL, EEASON. 285 corporeal from without, through, the senses of the body, and to fix them in the memory, and remember them, and in them to seek after things suitable, and shun things inconvenient. But to note these things, and to retain them not only as caught up naturally but also as deliberately committed to memory, and to imprint them again by recollection and thought when now just slipping away into forgetfulness; in order that as thought is formed from that which the memory contains, so also the contents themselves of the memory may be fixed firmly by thought: to combine again imaginary objects of sight, by taking this or that of what the memory remembers, and, as it were, tacking them to one another: to examine after what manner it is that in this kind things like the true are to be discerned from the true, and this not in things spiritual, but in corporeal things themselves; — these and the like, although transacted in things sensible, and conversant with them, and with those which the mind has drawn thence through the senses of the body, yet, as they are not devoid of reason, so are not common to men and beasts. But it is the part of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons; which, unless they w^ere above the human mind, would certainly not be unchangeable; and yet, unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be able to employ them as our measures by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge of corporeal things from the rule of dimensions and figures, wliicli the mind knows to remain unchangeably.
Chap. hi. — The higher reason which helongs to contemplation, and the lower lohich helongs to action, are in one mind.
3. But that of our own which thus has to do with the handling of corporeal and temporal things, is indeed rational, in that it is not common to us with the beasts; but it is drawn, as it were, out of that rational substance of our mind, by which we depend upon and cleave to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and is deputed to handle and direct the inferior things. For as among all the beasts there was not found for the man a help like unto him, unless one were taken from himself, and formed to be his consort: so for that mind, by which we consult the supernal and inward truth.
there is no like help for such employment as man's nature requires among things corporeal out of those parts of the soul which we have in common with the beasts. And so a certain part of our reason, not separated so as to sever unity, but, as it were, diverted so as to be a help to fellowship, is parted off for the performing of its proper work. And as the twain is one flesh in the case of male and female, so in the mind one nature embraces our intellect and action, or our counsel and performance, or our reason and rational appetite, or whatever other more significant terms there may be by which to express them; so that, as it was said of the former, " And they two shall be in one flesh," ^ it may be said of these, they two are in one mind.
Chap. iv. — The trinity and the image of God is in that 2>G,vt of the mind alone which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things.
4. When, therefore, we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss a single subject, and do not double it into those two which I have mentioned, except in respect to its functions. Therefore, when we seek the trinity in the mind, we seek it in the whole mind, without separating the action of the reason in things temporal from the contemplation of things eternal, so as to have further to seek some third thing, by which a trinity may be completed. But this trinity must needs be so discovered in the whole nature of the mind, as that even if action upon temporal things were to be withdrawn, for which work that help is necessary, with a view to which some part of the mind is diverted in order to deal with these inferior things, yet a trinity would still be found in the one mind that is no where parted off; and that when this distribution has been already made, not only a trinity may be found, but also an image of God, in that alone which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things; while in that other which is diverted from it in the dealing with temporal things, although there may be a trinity, yet there cannot be found an image of God.
Chap. v. — The opinion which devises an image of the Trinity in the marriage of male and female, and in Oieir offspring.
5. Accordingly they do not seem to me to advance a pro- CHAP, v.] HUMAN MAREIAGE AND OFFSPRING. 287 bable opinion, who lay it down that a trinity of the image of God in three persons, so far as regards human nature, can so be discovered as to be completed in the marriage of male and female and in their offspring; in that the man himself, as it were, indicates the person of the Father, but that which has so proceeded from him as to be born, that of the Son; and so the third person as of the Spirit, is, they say, the woman, who has so proceeded from the man as not herself to be either son or daughter,^ although it was by her conception that the offspring was born. For the Lord hath said of the Holy Spirit that He proceedeth from the Father,^ and yet He is not a son. In this erroneous opinion, then, the only point probably alleged, and indeed sufficiently shown according to the faith of Holy Scripture, is this, — in the account of the original creation of the woman, — that what so comes into existence from some person as to make another person, cannot in every case be called a son; since the person of the woman came into existence from the person of the man, and yet she is not called his daughter. All the rest of this opinion is in truth so absurd, nay indeed so false, that it is most easy to refute it. For I pass over such a thing, as to think the Holy Spirit to be the mother of the Son of God, and the wife of the Father; since perhaps it may be answered that these things offend us in carnal things, because we think of bodily conceptions and births. Although these very things themselves are most chastely thought of by the pure, to whom all things are pure; but to the defiled and unbelieving, of whom both the mind and conscience are polluted, nothing is pure;^ so that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, is a stumblingblock to some of them. But yet in the case of those supreme spiritual things, after the likeness of which those kinds of the inferior creature also are made although most remotely, and where there is nothing that can be injured and nothing corruptible, nothing born in time, nothing formed from that which is formless, or whatever like expressions there may be; yet they ought not to disturb the sober prudence of any one, lest in avoiding empty disgust he run into pernicious error. Let him accustom himself so to find in corporeal things the traces of 288 ON THE TEINITY. [BOOK XII.
things spiritual, that when he begins to ascend upwards from thence, under the guidance of reason, in order to attain to the unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, he may not draw with himself to things above what he despises in things below. For no one ever blushed to choose for himself wisdom as a wife, because the name of wife puts into a man's thoughts the corruptible connection which consists in begetting children; or because in truth wisdom itself is a woman in, sex, since it is expressed in both Greek and Latin tongues by a word of the feminine gender.
Chap. vi. — Why this opinion is to he rejected.
6. We do not therefore reject this opinion, because we fear to think of that holy and inviolable and unchangeable charity, as the spouse of God the Father, existing as it does from Him, but not as an offspring in order to beget the Word by which all things are made; but because divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false. For God said, " Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;" and a little after it is said, " So God created man in the image of God."^ Certainly, in that it is of the plural number, the word " our " would not be rightly used if man were made in the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made in the image of the Trinity, on that account it is said, "After our image." But again, lest we should think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, whereas the same Trinity is one God, " So God created man," he says, *' in the image of God," as though instead of saying, " In His own image."