' Luke xvi. 23.
Rom. iv. 3.
Those books, again, from a comparison with which the productions of questionable origin were rejected, are with certainty attributed to Hippocrates; and any one who denies their authorship is answered only by ridicule, simply because there is a succession of testimonies to the books from the time of Hij)-pocrates to the present day, which makes it unreasonable either now or hereafter to have any doubt on the subject. How do we know the authorship of the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Varro, and other similar writers, but by the unbroken chain of evidence? So also with the numerous commentaries on the ecclesiastical books, which have no canonical authority, and yet show a desire of usefulness and a spirit of inquiry. How is the authorship ascertained in each case, except by the author's having brought his work into public notice as much as possible in his own lifetime, and, by the transmission of the information from one to another in continuous order, the belief becoming more certain as it becomes more general, up to our own day; so that, when we are questioned as to the authorship of any book, we have no difficulty in answering? But why speak of old books? Take the books now before us: should any one, after some years, deny that this boek was written by me, or that Faustus' was written by him, where is evidence for the fact to be found but in the information possessed by some at the present time, and transmitted by them through successive generations even to distant times? From all this it follows, that no one who has not yielded to the malicious and deceitful suggestions of lying devils, can be so blinded by passion as to deny the ability of the Church of the apostles — a community of brethren as numerous as they were faithful— to transmit their writings unaltered to posterity, as the original seats of the apostles have been occupied by a continuous succession of bishops to the present day, especially when we are accustomed to see this happen in the case of ordinary writings both in the Church and out of it.
7. But Faustus finds contradictions in the Gospels. Say, rather, that Faustus reads the Gospels in a wrong spirit, that he is too foolish to understand, and too blind to see. If you were animated with piety instead of being misled by party spirit, you might easily, by examining these passages, discover a wonderful and most instructive harmony among the writers. Who, in reading two narratives of the same event, would think of charging one or both of the authors with error or falsehood, because one omits what the other mentions, or one tells concisely, but with sub- [Book XXXIIL stantial agreement, what the other relates in detail, so as to indicate not only what was done, but also how it was done? This is what Faustus does in his attempt to impeach the truth of the Gospels; as if Luke's omitting some saying of Christ recorded in Matthew implied a denial on the part of Luke of Matthew's statement. There is no real difficult}'^ in the case; and to make a difficulty shows want of thought, or of the ability to think. There is, indeed, a point in the narrative of the centurion which is discussed among believers, and on which objections are raised by unbelievers of no great learning, who prove their quarrelsomeness, when, after being instructed, they do not give up their errors. The point is, that Matthew says that the centurion came to Jesus "beseeching Him, and saying; " while Luke says that he sent to Jesus the elders of the Jews with this same request, that He would heal his servant who was sick; and that when He came near the house he sent others, through whom he said that he was not worthy that Jesus should come into his house, and that he was not worthy to come himself to Jesus. How, then, do we read in Matthew, " He came to Him, beseeching Him, and saying, My servant lieth at home sick of the palsy, and grievously tormented?" ' The explanation is, that Matthew's narrative is correct, but brief, mentioning the centurion's coming to Jesus, without saying whether he came himself or by others, or whether the words about his servant were spoken by himself or through others. But is it not common to speak of a person as coming near to a thing, although he may not reach it? And even the word reach, which is the strongest form of expression, is frequently used in cases where the person spoken of acts through others, as when we say he took his case to court, he reached the presence of the judge; or, again, he reached the presence of some man in power, although it may probably have been through his friends, and the person may not have seen him whose presence he is said to have reached. And from the word for to reach we give the name of Perventors to those who by ambitious arts gain access, either personally or through friends, to the, so to speak, inaccessible minds of the great. Are we, then, in reading to forget the common usage of speech?
Or must the sacred Scripture have a language of its own? The cavils of forward critics are thus met by a reference to the usual forms of speech.
8. Those who examine this matter not in a J Matt. viii. 5-13; Luke vii. 2-10.
disputatious but in a calm believing spirit are invited to come to Jesus, not outwardly but in heart, not in bodily presence but in the power of faith, as the centurion did, and then they will better understand Matthew's narrative. To such it is said in the Psalm " Come unto Him, and be enlightened; and your faces shall not be ashamed." = Hence we learn that the centurion, whose faith was so highly spoken of, came to Christ more truly than the people who carried his message. We find an analogous case in the woman with the issue of blood, who was healed by touching the hem of Christ's garment, when Christ said, "Some one hath touched me." The disciples wondered what Christ meant by saying, "Who hath touched me?" *'Some one hath touched me,'' when the crowd was thronging Him. In fact, they made this reply: " The crowd throngeth Thee, and sayest Thou, Who hath touched me? " ^ Now, as the people thronged Christ while the woman touched Him, so the messengers were sent to Christ, but the centurion really came to Him. In Matthew we have a not infrequent form of expression, and at the same time a symbolical import; while in Luke there is a simple narrative of the whole event, such as to draw our attention to the manner in which Matthew has recorded it. I wish one of those people who found their silly objections to the Gospels on such trifling difficulties would himself tell a story twice over, honestly giving a true account of what happened, and that his words were written down and read over to him. We should then see whether he would not say more or less at one time than at another; and whether the order would not be changed, not only of words, but of things; and whether he would not put some opinion of his own into the mouth of another, because, though he never heard him say it, he knew it perfectly well to be in his mind; and whether he would not sometimes put in a few words what he had before related at length. In these and other ways, which might perhaps be reduced to rule, the narratives of the same thing by two persons, or two narratives by the same person, might differ in many things without being opposed, might be unlike without being contradictory. Thus are undone all the bandages with which poor Manichaeans stifle themselves to keep in the spirit of error, and to keep out all that might lead to their salvation.
9. Now that all Faustus' calumnies have been refuted, those at least on the subjects here treated of at large and explained fully = Ps. XX Book XXXIII.]
as the Lord has enabled me, I close with a word of counsel to you who are implicated in those shocking and damnable errors, that, if vou acknowledge the supreme authority of Scripture, you should recognise that authority which from the time of Christ Himself, through the ministry of His apostles, and through a regular succession of bishops in the seats of the apostles, has been preserved to our own day throughout the whole world, with a reputation known to all. There the Old Testament too has its difficulties solved, and its predictions fulfilled. If you ask for demonstration, consider first what you are, how unfit for comprehending the nature of your own soul, not to speak of God; I mean an intelligent comprehension, such as you profess to desire, or to have once desired, and I not the notions of a credulous fancy. Ad-I mitting this incompetency, which must con-I tinue while you remain as you are, you may at least be referred to the natural conviction of every human mind, unless it is corrupted by error, of the perfect unchangeableness and incorruptibility of the nature and substance of God. Admit this, or believe it, and you will no longer be ^Nlanichsans, so that in, course of time you may become Catholics.
CONCERNING THE NATURE OF GOOD, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
[DE NATURA BONI CONTRA MANICH.-EOS.]
CIRCA A.D. 495.
PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION, IN TORONTO BAPTIST (theological) COLLEGE, TORONTO, CANADA.
CONTENTS ON CONCERNING THE NATURE OF GOOD.
Chap. I. — God the highest and unchangeable good, from whom are all other good things, spiritual and corporeal 351 Chap. II. — How this may suffice for correcting the Manichceans 351 Chap. III. — Measure, form and order, generic goods in things made by God 352 Chap. IV. — Evil is corruption of measure, form or order 352 Chap. V. — The corrupted nature of a more excellent order sometimes better than an inferior nature even uncorrupted. 352 Chap. VI. — Nature which cannot be corrupted is the highest good; that which can, is some good.. 352 Chap. VII. — The corruption of rational spirits is on the one hand voluntary, on the other penal...352 Chap. VIII. — From the corruption and destruction of inferior things is the beauty of the universe.. 352 Chap. IX. — Punishment is constituted for the sinning nature that it may be rightly ordered...353 Chap. X. — Natures corruptible, because made of nothing 353 Chap. XI. — God cannot suffer harm, nor can any other nature, except by his permission 353 Chap. XII. — All good things are from God alone 353 Ch.\p. XIII. — Individual good things, whether small or great, are from God 353 Ch.\p. XIV. — Small good things in comparison with greater are called by contrary names 353 Chap. XV. — In the body of the ape the good of beauty is present, though in a less degree...354 Chap. XVI. — Privations in things are fittingly ordered by God 354 Chap. XVII. — Nature, in as far as it is nature, no evil 354 Chap. XVfll. — Hyle, which was called by the ancients the formless material of things, is not an evil. 354 Ch.ap. XIX. — To have true existence is an exclusive prerogative of God 354 Chap. XX. — Pain only in good natures 355 Chap. XXI. — From measure things are said to be moderate-sized 355 Chap. XXII. — Measure in some things is suitable to God himself 355 Chap. XXIII. — Whence a bad measure, a bad form, a bad order may sometimes be spoken of...355 Chap. XXIV. — It is proved by the testimonies of Scripture that God is unchangeable. The Son of God begotten, not made 356 Chap. XXV. — This last expression misunderstood by some.., 356 Chap. XXVI. — That creatures are made of nothing 356 Chap. XXVII. — "From Him" and "of Him " do not mean the same thing 357 Chap. XXVIII. — Sin not from God, but from the will of those sinning 357 Chap. XXIX. — That God is not defiled by our sins 357 Chap. XXX. — That good things, even the least, and those that are earthly, are by God 357 Chap. XXXI. — To punish and to forgive sins belong equally to God 357 Chap. XXXII. — From God also is the very power to be hurtful 358 Chap. XXXIII. — That evil angels have been made evil, not by God, but by sinning 358 350 CONTENTS ON CONCERNING THE NATURE OF GOOD.
Chap. XXXIV. — That sin is not the striving for an evil nature, but the desertion of a better...35S Chap. XXXV. — The tree was forbidden to Adam not because it was evil, but because it was good for man to be subject to God 35S Chap. XXXVI. — No creature of God is evil, but to abuse a creature of God is evil 359 Chap. XXXVII. — God makes good use of the evil deeds of sinners 35g Chap. XXXVIII. — Eternal fire torturing the wicked, not evil 35g Chap. XXXIX. — Fire is called eternal, not as God is, but because without end 359 Chap. XL. — Neither can God suffer hurt, nor any other, save by the just ordination of God...359 Chap. XLI. — How great good things the Manichseans put in the nature of evil, and how great evil things in the nature of good 359 Chap. XLII. — Manichsean blasphemies concerning the nature of God 360 Chap. XLIII. — Many evils before his commingling with evil are attributed to the nature of God by the Manichseans 361 Chap. XLIV. — Incredible turpitudes in God imagined by Manichgeus 362 Chap. XLV. — Certain unspeakable turpitudes believed, not without reason, concerning the Manichseans themselves 363 Chap. XLVI. — The unspeakable doctrine of the fundamental epistle 363 Chap. XLVII. — He compels to the perpetration of horrible turpitudes 364 Chap. XLVIII. — Augustin prays that the Manichseans may be restored to their senses 364 CONCERNING THE NATURE OF GOOD, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
[DE NATURA BONI CONTRA MANICH^EOS.] c. A.D. 405.
IN ONE BOOK, Written after the year 404. It is put in the Retractations immediately after the De Actis cum Felice Manich'xo, which was written about the end of the year 404. It is one of the most argfumentative of the Anti-Manichaean treatises, and so one of the most abstruse and difficult. The lines of argument here pursued have already been employed in part in tiie earlier treatises. The most interesting portions of the contents of the treatise, and the most damaging to the Manichaeans, are the long extracts from Mani's Thesaurus, and \\\% Fundamental Epistle. — A. H. N.
CHAP. I. GOD THE HIGHEST AND UNCHANGE- ABLE GOOD, FROM W'HOM ARE ALL OTHER GOOD THINGS, SPIRITUAL AND CORPOREAL.
The highest good, than which there is no higher, is God, and consequently He is unchangeable good, hence truly eternal and truly immortal. All other good things are only from Him, not of Him. For what is of Him, is Himself. And consequently if He alone is unchangeable, all things that He has made, because He has made them out of nothing, are changeable. For He is so omnipotent, that even out of nothing, that is out of what is absolutely non-existent, He is able to make good things both great and small, both celestial and terrestrial, both spiritual and corporeal. But because He is also just, He has not put those things that He has made out of nothing on an equality with that which He begat out of Himself. Because, therefore, no good things whether great or small, through whatever gradations of things, can exist except from God; but since every nature, so far as it is nature, is good, it follows that no nature can exist save frym the most high and true God; because all things even not in the highest degree good, but related to the highest good, and again, because all good things, even those of most recent origin, which are far from the highest good, can have their existence only from the highest good. Therefore every spirit, though subject to change, and every corporeal entity, is from God, and all this, having been made, is nature. For every nature is either spirit or body. Unchangeable spirit is God, changeable spirit, having been made, is nature, but is better than body; but body is not spirit, unless when the wind, because it is invisible to us and yet its power is felt as something not inconsiderable, is in a certain sense called spirit.
CHAP. 2. — HOW THIS MAY SUFFICE FOR COR- RECTING THE MANICH.EANS.
But for the sake of those who, not being able to understand that all nature, that is, every spirit and every body, is naturally good, are moved by the iniquity of spirit and the mortality of body, and on this account endeavor to bring in another nature of wicked spirit and mortal body, which God did not make, we determine thus to bring to their 33- [Chap. VIII.
understanding what we say can be brought. For they acknowledge that no good thing can exist save from the highest and true God, which also is true and suffices for correcting them, if they are willing to give heed.
CHAP. 3. — MEASURE, FORM, AND ORDER, GENE- RIC GOODS IN THINGS MADE BY GOD.
For we Catholic Christians worship God, from whom are all good things whether great or small; from whom is all measure great or small; from whom is all form great or small; from whom is all order great or small. For all things in proportion as they are better measured, formed, and ordered, are assuredly good in a higher degree; but in proportion as they are measured, formed, and ordered in an inferior degree, are they the less good. These three things, therefore, measure, form, and order, — not to speak of innumerable other things that are shown to pertain to these three, — these three things, therefore, m.easure, form, order, are as it were generic goods in things made by God, whether in spirit or in body. God is, therefore, above every measure of the creature, above every form, above every order, nor is He above by local spaces, but by ineffable and singular potency, from whom is every measure, every form, every order. These three things, where they are great, are great goods, where they are small, are small goods; where they are absent, there is no good. And again where these things are great, there are great natures, where they are small, there are small natures, where they are absent, there is no nature. Therefore all nature is good.
CHAP. 4. — EVIL IS CORRUPTION OF MEASURE, FORM, OR ORDER.
When accordingly it is inquired, whence is evil, it must first be inquired, what is evil, which is nothing else than corruption, either of the measure, or the form, or the order, that belong to nature. Nature therefore which has been corrupted, is called evil, for assuredly when incorrupt it is good; but even when corrupt, so far as it is nature it is good, so far as it is corrupted it is evil.
CHAP. 5. — THE CORRUPTED NATURE OF A MORE EXCELLENT ORDER SOMETIMES BETTER THAN AN INFERIOR NATURE EVEN UNCORRUPTED.
But it may happen, that a certain nature which has been ranked as more excellent by reason of natural measure and form, though corrupt, is even yet better than another incorrupt which has been ranked lower by reason of an inferior natural measure and form; as in the estimation of men, according to the quality which presents itself to view, corrupt gold is assuredly better than incorrupt silver, and corrupt silver than incorrupt lead; so also in more powerful spiritual natures a rational spirit even corrupted through an evil will is better than an irrational though incorrupt, and better is any spirit whatever even corrupt than any body whatever though incorrupt. For better is a nature which, when it is present in a body, furnishes it with life, than that to which life is furnished. But however corrupt may be the spirit of life that has been made, it can furnish life to a body, and hence, though corrupt, it is better than the body though incorrupt.
CHAP. 6. — NATURE WHICH CANNOT BE COR- RUPTED IS THE HIGHEST GOOD; THAT WHICH CAN, IS SOME GOOD.
But if corruption take away all measure, al! form, all order from corruptible things, no nature will remain. And consequently every nature which cannot be corrupted is the highest good, as is God. But every nature thai can be corrupted is also itself some good; for corruption cannot injure it, except by taking, away from or diminishing that which is good.
CHAP. 7. — THE CORRUPTION OF RATIONAL SPIRITS IS ON THE ONE HAND VOLUNTARY, ON THE OTHER PENAL.
But to the most excellent creatures, that is, to rational spirits, God has oft'ered this, that if they will not they cannot be corrupted; that is, if they should maintain obedience under the Lord their God, so should they adhere to his incorruptible beauty; but if they do not will to maintain obedience, since willingly they are corrupted in sins, unwillingly they shall be corrupted in punishment, since God is such a good that it is well for no one who deserts Him, and among the things made by God the rational nature is so great a good, that there is no good by which it may be blessed except God. Sinners, therefore, are ordained to punishment; which ordination is punishment for the reason that it is not conformable to their nature, but it is justice because it is conformable to their fault.
CHAP. 8. FROM THE CORRUPTION AND DE- STRUCTION OF INFERIOR THINGS IS THE BEAUTY OF THE UNIVERSE.
But the rest of things that are made of nothing, which are assuredly inferior to the rational soul, can be neither blessed nor miserable. But because in proportion to their fashion and appearance are things themselves Chap. XIV.] NATURE OF GOOD, AGAINST THE MANICH.ilANS.
oO J good, nor could there be good things in a less or the least degree except from God, they are so ordered that the more infirm yield to the firmer, the weaker to the stronger, the more impotent to the more powerful; and so earthly things harmonize with celestial, as being subject to the things that are pre-eminent. But to things falling away, and succeeding, a certain temporal beauty in its kind belongs, so that neither those things that die, or cease to be what they were, degrade or disturb the fashion and appearance and order of the universal creation; as a speech well composed is assuredly beautiful, although in it syllables and all sounds rush past as it were in being born and in dying.
CHAP. 9. — PUNISHMENT IS CONSTITUTED FOR THE SINNING NATURE THAT IT MAY BE RIGHTLY ORDERED.
What sort of punishment, and how great, is due to each fault, belongs to Divine judgment, not to human; which punishment assuredly when it is remitted in the case of the converted, there is great goodness on the part of God, and when it is deservedly inflicted, there is I no injustice on the part of God; because na-' ture is better ordered by justly smarting under I punishment, than by rejoicing with impunity I in sin; which nature nevertheless, even thus having some measure, form, and order, in; whatever extremity there is as 3^et some good, which things, if they were absolutely taken j away, and utterly consumed, there will be accordingly no good, because no nature will remain.
HAP. 10. — NATURES CORRUPTIBLE, BECAUSE MADE OF NOTHING.
All corruptible natures therefore are natures j at all only so far as they are from God, nor I would they be corruptible if they were of I Him; because they would be what He himself is. Therefore of whatever measure, of whatever form, of whatever order, they are, ' they are so because it is God by whom they were made; but they are not immutable, be-' I use it is nothing of which they were made. I or it is sacrilegious audacity to make nothing Mid God equal, as when we wish to make what as been born of God such as what has been lade by Him out of nothing.
I I HAP. II. GOD CANNOT SUFFER HARM, NOR CAN ANY OTHER NATURE EXCEPT BY HIS PERMISSION.
Wherefore neither can God's nature suffer arm, nor can any nature under God suffer n.'irm unjustlv: for when by sinning unjustly ','3 some do harm, an unjust will is imputed to them; but the power by which they are permitted to do harm is from God alone, who knows, while they themselves are ignorant, what they ought to suffer, whom He permits them to harm.
CHAP. 12. — ALL GOOD THINGS ARE FROM GOD ALONE.
All these things are so perspicuous, so assured, that if they who introduce another nature which God did not make, were willing to give attention, they would not be filled with so great blasphemies, as that they should place so great good things in supreme evil, and so great evil things in God. For what the truth compels them to acknowledge, namely, that all good things are from God alone, suffices for their correction, if they were willing to give heed, as I said above. Not, thei^fore, are great good things from one, and small good things from another; but good things great and small are from the supremely good alone, which is God.
CHAP. 13. INDIVIDUAL GOOD THINGS, WHETH- ER S:^IALL OR GREAT, ARE FROM GOD.
Let us, therefore, bring before our minds good things however great, which it is fitting that we attribute to God as their author, and these having been eliminated let us see whether any nature will remain. All life both great and small, all power great and small, all safety great and small, all memory great and small, all virtue great and small, all intellect great and small, all tranquillity great and small, all plenty great and small, all sensation great and small, all light great and small, all suavity' great and small, all measure great and small, all beauty great and small, all peace great and small, and whatever other like things may occur, especially such as are found throughout all things, whether spiritual or corporeal, every measure, every form, Cv'ery order both great and small, are from the Lord God. All which good things whoever should wish to abuse, pays the penalty by divine judgment; but where none of these things shall have been present at all, no nature will remain.
CHAP. 14, — SMALL GOOD THINGS IN COMPARI- SON WITH GREATER ARE CALLED BY CONTRA- RY NAiMES.
But in all these things, whatever are small are called by contrary names in comparison with greater things; as in the form of a man ' Or sanity, accordin; to another rcjdinj. — A. H. N.
[Chap. XIX.
because the beauty is greater, the beauty of the ape in comparison with it is called deformity. And the imprudent are deceived, as if the former is good, and the latter evil, nor do they regard in the body of the ape its own fashion, the equality of members on both sides, the agreement of parts, the protection of safety, and other things which it would be tedious to enumerate.
CHAP. 15. — IN THE BODY OF THE APE THE GOOD OF BEAUTY IS PRESENT, THOUGH IN A LESS DEGREE.
But that what we have said may be understood, and may satisfy those too slow of comprehension, or that even the pertinacious and those repugnant to the most manifest truth may be compelled to confess what is true, let them be asked, whether corruption can harm the body of an ape? But if it can, so that it may become more hideous, what ^jminishes but the good of beauty? Whence as long as the nature of the body subsists, so long something will remain. If, accordingly, good having been consumed, nature is consumed, the nature is therefore good. So also we say that slow is contrary to swift, but yet he who does not move at all cannot even be called slow. So we say that a heavy voice is contrary to a sharp voice, or a harsh to a musical; but if you completely remove any kind of voice, there is silence where there is no voice, which silence, nevertheless, for the simple reason that there is no voice, is usually opposed to voice as something contrary thereto. So also lucid and obscure are called as it were two contrary things, yet even obscure things have something of light, which being absolutely wanting, darkness is the absence of light in the same way in which silence is the absence of voice.
CHAP. 16. — PRIVATIONS IN THINGS ARE FIT- TINGLY ORDERED BY GOD.