fallen into error and have to be excused. For it is compulsory rather than voluntary to believe a thing to be true, the proof of which has already been established; that is, we cannot believe or disbelieve it as we like, as it depends upon our will to stand or not to do so. So, if one of the conditions of verification be freedom of choice, a learned man, and he alone, should be held excused, if he makes a mistake on account of some doubt. Hence the Prophet has said that if a magistrate judges rightly he receives two rewards, and if he makes a mistake he deserves only one. But what magistrate is greater than one who judges the universe, whether it is so or not. I These are the judges — the learned men — whom God has distinguished with the knowledge of interpretation.
It is this kind of mistake of insight which learned people are quite apt to make when they look into those obscure questions the investigation of which the Law has imposed upon them. But the mistake the common ^people make in these matters is sin pure and simple, whether in theoretical or in practical things. As a magistrate, ignorant of Tradition, when he makes mistakes in judgment, cannot be held excused, so likewise a judge of the universe when not having the qualities of a judge is also not excusable, but is either a sinner or an unbeliever. If it be a condition that a magistrate si] all have capacity 01 arbitration concerning the lawful and the forbidden, that is, knowledge of the principles of Law and their application through analogy — how much more befitting it is for an arbitrator of the universe to be armed with fundamental knowledge of the mental sciences, and the way of deducing results from them.
Mistake in the interpretation of the Law is thus of two kinds — a mistake which can be excused in one fit to look into the thing in which it has been committed, just as an expert physician is excused if he commits an error in the application of bis science; or a magistrate when he misjudges, and a mistake which is inexcusable in one not fit to investigate a thing. But the error which cannpt; be excused for anybody, and which, if it happens to show itself in relation to the very principles of the Law, is infidelity, and if in universals is an innovation, is that error which is committed in those things which have been settled by all arguments and so the knowledge of them is possible for everybody, for instance, the acknowledgement of the existence of God, of Prophecy, and of the happiness or the misery of the next woild. This is so, because all these three principles are proved by those three methods, the justification of which a man cannot deny by any means, that is exhortative controversial and argumentative proofs. A denier of such things, which are the very root of the principle of the Law, is an unbeliever, a retroorade with his tongue and his heart, or through negligence, on account of his denying them in spite of proofs. For if he be a man believing in arguments, he can verify them through these or if he believes in controversy, he can verify through that; and if ho believes in religious admonitions lie can well justify them through these. And hence the Prophet has said: "I have been commanded to fight with men till "thev say: 'There is no God but Allah* and believe in me " that is, by any of these three means of attaining the Faith.
But there are things which, on account of their obscurity, cannot be understood by inference. So, God has favoured such of his creatures as cannot understand logic, either on account of their nature, habit, or lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such things and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them. Foi everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the help of dogmatic and r\ hortatory argument which are common to all men. This is why the Law has 46 AVEfcROES been divided into two kinds J exoteric and esoteric. The exoteric part consists of those examples which have been coined to express certain meanings; while the esoteric is the meanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in philosophy.
These are the very four or five kinds of methods of knowing reality mentioned by Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) in his b( ok called Al Tafriqah bain al Islam wal Zindiqa'h. If it so happens as we have said that we can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods, then we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them. Such things should be taken literally and interpretation should find no place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the principles of the Law, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an infidel. For instance, if a man believes that there is nc happiness or misery in the next world, and that the teaching is only an artifice to safe- Religion and Philosophy *t guard the life and property of the people from one another and that there is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an unbeliever.
When this has once been established it will become clear to you that interpretation is not lawful in the exoteric part of the Law. If the canon of inter? pretation be used in the principles of the Law, it is infidelity, and if used in getieral things it is an innovation. But there is also a certain exoteric law which requires an interpretation from learned men. It is not misbelief for them to take it exoterically, but it is so or is at least an innovation in religion if ignorant men try to interpret or explain it. Among these is the verse of Equalisation and the Tradition of Descent. For the Prophet said of a Neirro slave girl who told him that God was in heaven: u Emancipate her, for she is a believer.' For there are persons who cannot believe a thing except through their imagination, that is, it i.^ difficult for them to believe a thing which they cannot imagine. Among these may be classed men who cannot understand a thing except with a reference to space, and hence believe in God as though physical, notwithstanding that these are the very persons who have dealt very harshly with those mentioned above. They ought to be told that things of this character are parabolical, and that we should pause and consider the saying of God: " Yet none knoweth the interpretation thereof except God'*. Although learned men agree that these are to be interpreted, they differ in the interpretation according to their knowledge of principles of philosoph}'. There is a third part of the Law which occupies an intermediate position, on account of some doubt about it. Some say that it should be taken exoterically, and that no interpretation should be allowed in it; while there are others who say that they have some esoteric meaning, and should not be taken exoterierdlv by the learned' BEUGION AND PHILOSOPHY 49 This is on account of the obscurity of their meaning. A learned man may be excused if he makes a mistake about them.
If the Law is divided into these three parts, it may be asked: to which of these does the description ot the state of the Day of Judgment Belong? We would reply that it is quite clear, on the very face of the question, that it belongs to that part in which there is some difference of opinion. For one group of men, who class themselves among philosophers, say that these things should be taken literallv. For, according to them, there is not a single argument which makes their literal sense absurd and unreasonable. This is the method of the Asharites. But another group of philosophers interpret them; but they differ very widely in the interpretation itself. Amongst these may be mentioned Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) and a large number of Sufis. There are some who Would amalgamate the two interpreta* 50 AVERRORS 50 AVERRORS tions, as Abu Hamid has done in some of his books. These questions are among those in which, if the learned men err they are to be excused; otherwise, they are to be thanked and rewarded. For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day of Judgment, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the fundamentals of the Law, and it can be easily verified by any of the three methods of argument common to all men. But one who is not learned should take it exoterically, an interpretation in his case is unbelief, for it leads to infidelity. We are thus of opinion that such people should accept the literal sense, for interpretation will certainly lead them to infidelity. A learned man who discloses the discussions of these things to the common people helps them towards unbelief and one who abets another in that direction is himself no KEUGION AND PHILOSOPHY 81 better than an unbeliever. It is therefore unsuitable that these interpretations should be published in any other than learned books, for in this way they will reach none but the learned. But it is a mistake both in religion and philosophy if they are put in other books, with dogmatic and exhortative arguments, as Abu Hamid has done. Although the author's intention was good, the idea, thus to increase the number of learned men, he caused a good deal of mischief through it. For, on account of this method some people began to find fault with philosophy, and others to blame religion, and still others began to think of reconciling the two. It seems that this was the very aim which Abu Hamid had in view in writing these books. He has tried to awaken the nature of men, for he never attached himself to any particular way of thinking in his books. He was an Asharite with the Asharites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher with the philosophers, po much so that f2 AVERROES he was, as has been said: " I am a Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if I meet a Ma'adi I am one of Banu Adnan."
Hence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except the learned, from reading his books; as it is incumbent upon them to hinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these books is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot understand philosophical books, only those endowed with superior natures. People are on the whole destitute of learning and are aimless in their reading which they do without a teacher. Nevertheless they succeed in leading others away from religion. It is an injustice to the best kind of men and the best kind of creation;; for in their case justice consists in the knowledge of the best things by the best people, fit tq know it* It should be remembered RKLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY" 53 that the greater the thing is the higher will be the injustice done to it on account of ignorance. Hence God says: " Polytheism is a great injustice.'* 15 These things we have thought proper to mention here, that is, in a discussion of the relation between philosophy and religion and the canons of interpretation in Law. If these matters had not become commonly known among men, we would not have said anything about them and would not have entered in a plea on behalf of the interpreters. For these things are suitable only for mention in philosophical books.
You ought to be aware that the real purpose of the Law is to impart the knowledge of truth and of right action. The knowledge of truth consists in the cogniscance of God and the whole universe with its inner significance, especially that of religion, and the knowledge of happiness or misery of the next world. Right action consists in followo 15. Quran xxxi, 12.
U AVERR0ES ing those actions which are useful tor happiness and avoiding those which lead to misery. The knowledge of these actions has been called practical knowledge. This is divided into two kinds: external actions, the knowledge of which is called Fiqh, that is, Theology; and actions pertaining to feelings, such as gratitude, patience, and other points of character to which the Law has urged us or from which it has prohibited us. This is called the knowledge of continence and of the next world. Abu Hamid in his book The Revivification of the Sciences of Religion seems to be inclined to this kind, and as the people have always turned away from the former kind of knowledge and have turned themselves to the second which leads them easily to piety, the book attained its name. But we have wandered from our own purpose and will now return to it.
If the purpose of the Law is to impart the knowledge of truth and of right action, this cannot be attained except by one of the two methods: viz, by conception or verification such as Mutakallimuii have maintained in their books. There are three methods of verification open to people: philosophy, dogmatics and exhortation. There are two methods of conception: either by the thing itself, or by its like. As all people cannot by their nature understand and accept philosophical and dogmatic arguments, together with the difficulty of learning the use of inferences and the long time it takes to learn them, and the purpose of the Law being to be quite common among men, it is necessary that it should contain all kinds of verifications and conceptions. Among the methods of verification th<ere arc some which are meant for the common people: that is, exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative being more common than the other. There is one method which is meant solely for the learned, and that is the method of rational inference. Now, it is M AVEBKOES the primary aim of the Law to improve the condition of the many without neglecting the few, and hence the method of conception and verification adopted are common to the majority.
These methods are of four kinds: the first is that which, while in particulars the same in both, that is, both exhorfcatively and dialectically, is still true b; conception and verification. These ar syllogisms of which the minor and th< major premise are certain, besides bein^ easily imagined and well known. Thes< are set before the deductions which an drawn from them, and not from t theii likes. To this kind of religious injunctioi there is no interpretation, and one win denies them or puts an interpretation upon them is an infidel. The second' kind is that the premises of which although well known or easily imagined are also positively established. Their conclusions are drawn by analogy. Upon these, that is, their conclusions, an interpretation may be, put. The third ULL1GI0N AND PHILOSOPHY o7 kind is just the reverse of the second, that is, the conclusions are themselves intended and their premises are well known or easily imagined without being positively established. Upon these alsothat is, upon the conclusions, no interpretation can be put, but the premises may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth kind is that the premises of which are well-known or conjectural without being positively established. Their deductions are by analogy when that is intended. It is the duty of the learned men to interpret them and of the common people to take them exoterically.
In short, all that should be interpreted can be grasped by philosophy alone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of the common people to take it literally, both in conception and in veriiication. The reason for the latter is th<*t they cannot understand more. A student:i6f law sometimes rinds interpretations which have;i preference over others, in;i general way by verification; 58 AVERROEb 58 AVERROEb that is, the argument is more convincing with the interpretations than with the literal meanings. These interpretations are common and it is possible for them to be admitted by any whose speculative faculties have been developed in controversy. Some of the interpretations of the Asharites and the Mutazilites are of this type, though the arguments of the Mutazilites are generally the more weighty. But it is the duty of the common people who are not capable of understanding: more than exhortation to take them exoterically. Indeed, it is not proper for them to know the interpretations at all.
Thus there are three groups into which men have been divided: Those who are not included amongst those who should know the interpretations. These are common people who are guided by exhortation alone. They form a vast majority: for there is not a smgWmtional being who cannot accept a;rc*sult by this method. The second are dogmatic interpreters. These are so, either by their nature only, or both by nature and habit. The third are those who can be definitely called interpreters. These are the philosophers, both by nature and by philosophical training. This kind of interpretation should not be discussed with the dogmatists, not to speak of the common people. If any of these interpretations are disclosed to those not fit to receive them-cspecially philosophical interpretations-these being far higher than common knowledge, they may be led to infidelity. For he wishes to nullify the exoteric meaning and to prove his interpretation. But if the exoteric meaning is shown to be false without the interpretation being established, he falls into infidelity, if this concerns the principles of the Law. So, the interpretations should not be disclosed to the common people, and ought not to be put into exhortative or doctrinal books-that is, books written with an expository purpose in view -as Abu Hamid has done.
60 AVEHROKS 60 AVEHROKS Hence, it is necessarry that the common people should be told that those things which are exoteric, and yet cannot be understood easily, the interpretations of which it is impossible for them to understand, are parabolical, and that no one knows the interpretation thereof except God, We should stop at the following words of God " None knoweth the interpretation thereof except God ",16 This is also the answer to the question about some of those abstruse problems which the common people cannot understand: " They will ask thee concerning the spirit: answer: The spirit was created at the command of my Lord, but ye have no knowledge given to you, except a little.''17 Again, one who interpretes these to persons not fit to receive them is an infidel, because he leads others to infidelity, which is quite in opposition to the purpose of the Law. This is especially the case when corrupt interpretations are put on the principles of the Law, as 16. Quran iii. 6. 17. Quran xyii. 87.
some men of our own times do. We have known many people who think they are philosophers and hence claim to find out strange things through philosophy, which are in every way contrary to religion, and they do not admit of any other interpretation. QBkey think they must disclose these things to the common people. But by the disclosure of wrong notions they lead them to eternal destruction.
The difference between their aim and that of the jurists can bo made clear by the following example. Since it is not possible to make every one an expert physician a certain physician laid down some principles for the preservation of health and the prevention of diseases, and he allowed the use of some things but prohibited others. Now a man comes and tells the people that the principles laid down by that physician are not correct and declares them to be false, and they become discredited in the eyes of the people; or says that thov are capable of interpretations which they cannot understand and cannot verify by practice. Do you think that people in these circumstances will ever act upon those things which are useful for their health and for the prevention of diseases or that the man himself will ever be capable of acting on them? No, he will be quite incapable of doing so and thus will lead them all to destruction.
This is the case when those interpretations which they cannot understand are correct, to say nothing of those that are wrong. For they will not believe in health to be preserved, nor disease to be prevented, to say nothing of the things which preserve health or prevent disease. This is the condition of that man who discloses interpretations of the Law to the common people and those not fit to receive them. And hence he is an unbeliever.
The simile which we have described above is a real parallel, and not merely RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 6* [fanciful (as some may think) as ib is jjcorrect in every respect. For the relation of the medicine to the body is the same as that of the Law to the soul. 0A phvsician is one who seeks to pre- J serve the health when he finds it good ( and tries to restore it when it is missed. In the same way a religious law- giver is one who takes care of the health of souls, which is called piety. The Quran also makes clear its purpose, through religious action, by many verses. For instance: " O true believers, a fast is ordained unto you as it was ordained those before you, that ye may fear God" 18 and " Their flesh is not accepted of God neither their blood; but your piety is accepted by Him "19 and: " For prayer preserveth a man from filthy crimes and from that which is blameable."20 There are many other verses of the same nature in the Quran. Thus, we see, a religious law-giver seeks to establish this kind of health by religious kncw- 18. Quran ii, 79, 19, Quran x*ii as. ao. Quran xux H.
64 AVBRROES ledge and practice. This is the hea upon which depends happiness and I the case of its absence the misery of the next world.
This should have made it clear to you not merely that one should not speak of the wrong interpretation. But also that it is not proper to put even tiue ones in the books of the common people. These correct interpretations are of the faith which man has and of which the whole creation was afraid to bear the burden. By this we refer to the following verse of the Qnran: " We proposed the faith unto the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains, and they refused to undertake the same, and were afraid thereof, but man undertook it: verily he is unjust to himself and foolish.''' il These interpretations and the idea that their discussion is necessary in the Lawhave given rise to many sects in Islam, so much so that they have denounced one another with infidelity and innova-21 tyurcm xxxiii, 07, •IRLIGJONAtfD PHILOSOPHY ffi tions. This is especially the effect of wrong interpretations. The Mutazilites interpreted a large number of verses and Traditions and disclosed them to the people. So also did the Asharites, though their interpretations were less in number. They only succeeded in creating hatred and wars among men, destroying the Law, and disuniting the people complete!)'. To add to this, the method which they have adopted in proving these interpretations is adapted neither to the common people nor to the learned. For if you look closely into it, you will find that it is not correct according to the norms of logic — this anyone who has had any training may see for himself without the least effort. In fact, many of the principles upon which the Asharites build their conclusions are sophistical in their nature. The}'' deny many fundamentals, like, the proof of accidence, the influence of one thing upon another, the necessity of cause and effects, abstract figures and the processes leading 66 AVERR0E8 to them. Indeed, Asharite Mutakalliniun have been in this respects unjust to Mohammadans, for one of their sects has denounced as infidels all those who do not recognise the existence of God by methods which they have devised for the knowledge of Him: but in truth they themselves are in the wrong and are unbelievers.
It is upon this point that the difference of opinion arises. Some say that the first principle is of reason, while others allege that it is of faith. That is to say they have thought that faith, even before knowing the methods common to all and to which the Law has made a call on all, is the onlv method of arriving at truth. Thus they have mistaken the real purpose of the Law-giver, and being themselves in the wrong they have led others astray.
If it be alleged that the method that the Asharites and other Mutakallimun have devised are not those general methods in the purpose of the Law-giver for the instruction of the common people, and that it is not possible without some method being adopted, then the question arises: What are those methods which are given in the Law \ We maintain that these methods are to be found in the Quran alone. For, if we look closely we shall find that in the Quran all the three kinds of methods are laid down, for the whole of mankind, both for the majority and for the learned few. If we reflect we shall come to see that no better methods can be discovered for the instruction of the common people than those mentioned in the Quran. Anyone who changes them by interpretations which are neither clear in themselves nor clearer than others to the common people, makes null and void their philosophy and their effect, the goal of which is the happiness of mankind. This is quite evident from tbe early and the later condition of Islam, for in the early days Muslims sought perfect excellence and piety by acting on those principles with" 68 AVERBOES out putting any interpretation upon them. And those among them who knew any interpretation did not disclose it. In the later days interpretations were used, and piety decreased, the love for others was lost, and they became divided into schisms and parties.
Hence one who cares to remove this innovation from the Law, should turn to the Book, and should pick up from it the existing arguments for things whose belief is inculcated upon us. Further he should deeply think over the esoteric meanings, as far as possible, without putting interpretations upon them, except when they are not quite clear to nil. The assertions of the Book for the instructions of the people, when thought over are things, with whose help we can reach a stage from which none but the learned in logic can differ about the -esoteric meaning of that which is not clear. This peculiarity cannot be found in any other assertions but that of the Book. There are three peculiar!- RKLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 69 ties in the assertions, which have been explained in the Quran, for the common people. First., that nothing can be found more convincing and true than these. Secondly, that they can be accepted by every nature; and they.ire such that none can know their interpretations, if there be any, except the learned in logic. Thirdly, that they possess a call to the righteous, for correct interpretations. This is neither to be found in the school of the Asharites nor in that of the Mutazalites i. e. their interpretations are neither generally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor are they right in themselves. It is for this reason that innovation has increased, and it is our desire to write about it, as far as it is possible for us, provide id that we get leisure for it, have power to do it, and God gives us tt respite in life. It is just possible that this may be a (beginning for the coming generation: because the breach of Law, due to evil passions, and changed beliefs is simply 70 AVEUROtiS 70 AVEUROtiS aggrieving and saddening. This is still enhanced by those, who ascribe themselves to philosophy, because an injury from a friend is worse than the injury from an enemy. Philosophy is a companion and a foster-sister to the Law, Hence an injury from this source is the worst kind of injury, even if we neglect the enmity, hatred, and -animosity which is created between the two, although they are companions by nature and friends in reality. It has also been injured by many ignorant friends who ascribe themselves to it. These are the schisms which exist in Islam. May God set all aright, help all to His love, and bring together their hearts for piety, and erase enmity and hatred by his favour and ^race.
Indeed God has removed much of evil, ignorance and the misleading ways through this strong government, and has led the many to good, especially the people who have walked in the path of scholasticism, and have a liking for the knowledge of the Truth. Because it has called the people to the knowledge of God by mediate paths, which are higher than the depressions of the blind followers: and lower than that of the highsounding Mutakallimum; and has called the learned to their duty of considering fully the principles of Law.
la.
APPENDIX.
ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE.
May God perpetuate your honour and bless you, and screen you always from the eyes of misfortune. Through your excellent intelligence and good understanding you have learned a great part of all these sciences, till your insight informed you of the doubt which arises concerning the eternal knowledge of God, with its being at the same time concerned with created things. Thus, in the interests of truth, it is now incumbent upon us to remove the doubt from your mind, after we have stated it clearly. For one who does not know the problem adequately cannot very well solve the doubt.
The question may be stated thus: If all this universe was in the knowledge of God before its creation, then, was it in His knowledge after its creation as it was before it "came into existence; or was it in His knowledge before its creation quite different from that aft&r its coming into being? If we say that the knowledge of God about it after its creation is quite different from that which it was before its creation, it becomes necessary for us to admit that the eternal knowledge is changeable; or that when the universe came into existence out of non-existence, then there is an addition to the eternal knowledge; which is impossible. Again, if we say that the knowledge of it was the same in both the conditions, then it wowld be said: Was the created universe the same betore its -coming into existence ras it was after its creation? To this objection it will have to be answered that it was not the same before its creation as it was alter it, otliersvi^u ilio existent mid 74 AVkKRokb