*64 XVERROES the power of doing it be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the act. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this problem. As we have said there (is another cause of difference of opinion about this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the contradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator of his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things which are not done according to the will of God, or His authority. So there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslim* are agreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled to do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and freedom. Again, if man is compelled to da certain deeds, then on him has been imposed a task which he cannot bear| and when he is made to bear a burden, there is no difference between his work and the work of inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has no power, neither has the man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have made capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task, such as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his Nizamiyyah, that man is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He has established it upon the impossibility of imposing a task which one cannot tear, in order to avoid the principle formerly disproved by the Mutazlites, on account of its bein^ unfit by reason. The succeeding Asharites have opposed them. Moreover if man had no power in doing a deed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil, and that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring goodness. Tn this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as agriculture etc, would become useless. So also would become useless all those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion of danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine €tc. such a condition is quite contrary to all that is intellegible to man.
^66 AVERROES ^66 AVERROES Now it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction which is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we would say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is not to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by means of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evi~ dent that God has created in us power by which we can perfom deeds which are contradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except by the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the removal of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed by the conjunction of both these things at the same time. This being so the deeds attributed to use are done by our intention, and by the fitness of the causes which are called the Predestination of God, which He has furnished for us from outside. They neithtr complete the works which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause of our intending them - one of the two things. For intention is produced in RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY #7 us by our imagination, or for the verification of a thing, which in itself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us* For instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention, and move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing which it is better to shun, we leave it without intention. Hence our intentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves. To this the following words of God, refer " Each of them hath angels, mutually succeeding each other, before him and behind him- they watch him by the command of God. " Io6 As these outside causes take this course according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never go astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them, and our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on the whole, but by their fitness, so it is necessary that actions too should also be within woll--defined limits, that is, they be found in a 106. Quran XIII, 12.
given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary because our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us; and all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes, are themselves limited, and are found in a given quantit}^ only. This relation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes, but also between them and the causes which God has created in our body, and the well-defined order existing between the inner ana outer causes. This is what is meant by Fate and predestination, which is found mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also the " Preserved Tablet. "™7 God's knowledge of these causes, and that which pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one can have a full knowledge of these things except God, and hence He is the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said, " Say, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden besides 107. Quran LXXXV, 22.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 26t, God * Io8 A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret things, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing, before it comes into being, And as the arrangement and order of causes bring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be a knowledge of the existence or non - existence of a thing at a certain time. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what things would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised be He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes. This is what is meant by the u keys of the secret," in the following words of God, " with Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth them besides Himself. " I09 All that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we can acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination and fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by those verses and Traditions 108. Quran YXVII, 67. 109. Quran VI, 59.
which are apparently contradictory. When their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The existent things from our volition are completed by two things our intention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referred to only by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a good answer, and here reason is in perfect agreement with religion, but it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there are creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the Muslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that whatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can be answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can be understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator but God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot be called creators, except speaking figuratively. Their existence also depends upon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves their existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after their actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when causes come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there been no divine protection they could not have existed for the least moment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that ; a man who makes any of the causes to be £0-existent with God is like a man who makes the pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says that the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He mtans that writing is a word which may 'be applied to both, but in reality they have no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no difference between Ihem. Such is also the case with the word Creator, when applied to God and the ■Causes. We say that in this illustration there are doubts. It should have been 272 AVERROEb 272 AVERROEb clearly shown, whether the scribe was the Creator of the essence ( Jawhar ) of pen, a preserver of it, as long as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after it is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the pen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences ( Jawahir ) of everything which come into contact with its causes, which are so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no creator but God - a reason which agrees with our feelings, reason and religion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which produce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that which God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that which surround the universe from outside. This is quite clear in the movement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the moon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it is on this arrangement and order which God has put in their movements that our existence and that of RELIGION' AND PHILOSOPHY 273 all other things depends. So even if we imagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other position, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them, »11 the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so because of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the things which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects of the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the case with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the greater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number, or all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not been those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating them that could not exist even for a single moment a'ter birth. But we say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of the animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement of the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not even for a twinkling of the eye. So praised be the " Sagacious, the Knowing. " II0 God has called our attention to this fact in His book, " And He hath subjected the night and the day to your service^ and the sun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His Command; "IXI again, " Say, what think ye, if God should cover you with perpetual nignt, until the day of Resurrection; " II2 and again, " Of His mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the one, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance, by your industry; in the other; IJ3 and, " And He obligeth whatever is in heaven or on earth to serve you. " IX* Further He says, " He likewise compelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their courses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your service. " XI5 There may be _^ ■ mrno. Quran LXVII, 14.
in. Quran LXVII, 14. 112, Quran XVI, if, 113. Quran XXVIH, 71. 114. Quran XVIII. 73.
115. Quran XLV, 12. 116. Quran XIV, 37 quoted many other verses on the subject. Had there been any wisdom in their existence by which God has favoured us, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to be grateful to Him.
The second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things produced out of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; and movements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences and substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect the accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For instance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real creator of the child, and the life in it- Such is also the case with agriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed scattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So there is no creator but God, while created things are but essences, To this refer the words of God. " O men, a parable is propounded unto you, therefore, hearken unto it. Verily 'the idols which ye invoke, besides God, can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for the purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn the same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned." ll7 This is wher« the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said, "I give life and kill. * II8 When Abraham saw that he could understand it, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, " Verily, God bringeth the sun from the east; do thou bring it from the west."
On the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be understood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in Tradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not apply to the created things by any near or far-fetched metaphor, for the meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God has said, "God created you, and that which ye know."118 It should be known 117. Quran, XXII, 72.
118. " Hast thou notr considered him who disputed with Abraham concerning his Lord, because God had given him that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of them, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is the knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the knowledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing which is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must alsays be understood by a reference to the seen. So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for every action there is in actor. It being so, the agreement of the Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect, if we understand by' it the denial of the existence of an agent in the visible world. For from the existence of the the Kingdom? When Abraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and kill. Abra-• harn said, verily God bringeth the sun from the east do thou bring it from the wett; whereupon the infidel was confounded; for God directeth not the ungodly ^people.' Quran,.II:26o agent in ii, we have brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world, it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His command and will, It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds, and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the middle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling and che movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling of hand and voluntary movement, which thay would call acquired. So their is no difference between them, except in there n-raes, which never effect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.
Fourth Problem:-Divine Justice and Injusitce. The Ashariteshave expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and religion; about this problem They have explained it in a way in which religion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions, so when a man's action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been imposed asa divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in *&o AVERROES *&o AVERROES itself be called good or bad is simply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad. So according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied injustice to himself. He says "God hath borne witness that there is no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom profess the same, who executeth righteousness; and "Thy God is not unjust towards His servants; " and again, "Verily God will not deal unjustly with men in any respect; b«rt men deal unjustly with their own souls " It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many a verse of the Quran, "That He leads as well as misleads the people!" He says, "God causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom He pleaseth;" and, "If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction." We would say that these verses cannot be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently contradict them-the verseo in which God denies injustice to himself. For instance, He says, "Heliketh not ingratitude (Kufr) in His servant." So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity, that God has not misled the people and has nob caused them to err will be clear to you from the following verses: *' Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy face towards true religion, the Quran, III, 16 Quran, XLI, 46 Quran, X, 45 Quran, XIV, 4 Quran, XXXII, U Quran, XXXIX, 9 institution of God, to which He hath created man kindly disposed; " and, " when thy Lord drew forth their posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam. " A Tradition of the Prophet says, " Every child is born according to the divine constitution. " These being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile them so that they may agree with reason. The verse, " Verily (jrod will cause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth. " refers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have been endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go astray by their very nature, and led to it by inner ^nd outer causes. The meaning of the verse, H If we had pleased, we have given unto every soul its direction/ is that He thought of not creating people ready to err, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have done so. But as the dispositions of men are different Quran, XXX, 29. Quaan, VII, 171 Quran, XXXV, 9 the words may mislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which speak of misleading the people. For instance, "He will thereby mislead many, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby except the transgressors''; and, "We have appointed the vision which we showed thee, and also the tree cursed in the Quran, and the verses about the number of angels of hell. "Thus doth God cause to err whom He pleaseth and He dirtcteth whom He pleaseth.,r It means that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the sick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for they who believe will know it to be true from their Lord; but the unbelievers will say, what meaneth by this parable? He will thereby mislead etc. Quran, II, 24) Quran, XVII; 6a.By the vision may be meant tht Prophet's night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his vision about the Omayyeds.
Quran, LXXIV, 34 may object and ask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that divine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in its being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His very creation, are such that they require some men, though very few, to be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the outer causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which requires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the divine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not been created things in which there is little evil and much good, for'the good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or there had -been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is well known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones, is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little evil.
Thig very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels when God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a vicegerent, that is, a man, "When God said to the angels, I am going to place a substitute on earth, th?y said, wilt thou place there one who will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise, and sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know not." He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that when there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers the evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction of the other. So from all these it is clear* how misleading can be attributed to Him, in-spite of His justice, and injustice disproved. The causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the causes of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes of direction to good jn which there is found nothing which may lead to erring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good have those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this applies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictary verses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations, which you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this problem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this method. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the Creator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations have done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the creator of evil. So now they know that He is the Crertor of both. As misleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary that it should be attributd to Him, like the creation of evil. But this should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created good for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good -on account of their connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil Quran, II, 28 Quran, II, 28 would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its necessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not have < xisted at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But if you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare it to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its existence is better than non-existence, that is,-good. Now the verse ot the Quran "No account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do; but an account shall be demanded of them/' means that He does nothing because it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need doing a thing. If it be to, God needs that thing for His own existence, because of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being-and God is free from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection requires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be evident, that He is nob just in the same* way as man is just. But it is not right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions are neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For it cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time falsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For if we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that there are things which are just and good in themselves and others which are evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same way as man is, it becomes} necessary to admit there is some defect in him. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for which he is just, and so he is dependent upon another.
It should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to be told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told it who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the common people is confronted RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 2«> fey these contradictions in the universal verses, and Tradition. Such people musb believe in the exoteric meanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common people cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to God is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is impossible (Mustahil) and they think that God has power over it, and then told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some defect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is weak. A.s the existence of things free from evil was possible according to the masses, God has "said, " If we had pleased, we had certainly given every 3011I its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me must necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell with genii and men, altogether."^1 This verse means one thing to the common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to mean that it is nob 131 Quran, XXA", 14.
incumbent upon him that He should create a class of men to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought we could create men with whom evil could •not be attached, but would have been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his guidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with the fifth question.
Problem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:— The Day of Judgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the learned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about the conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ about its condition, but aboufe the visible things by which they should explain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are some religions which have made it only spiritual, that* is, meant only for the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony of divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned men, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present world, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon principles, admitted by all to be true. One ot them is that when it is clear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but for some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of their life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category. God himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the created things. He says in the Quran, "We have created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion of the unbelievers."^2 Again, He says, describing and praising the learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of this existence, "Who remember God standing, and sitting, and lying on their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee therefore, deliver us from £he torment of 132 Quran, XXXVIII; 26.
hell fire."^ The ultimate purpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in other things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran,!He says, "Did ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye should not be brought again before us,"J34 and, " Doth man think, that he shall be left at full liberty, without controP'I^S'and further on He says, "I have not created genii and men for any other end, but that they should serve me."n6 that is the genius out of all creation which could' know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance of knowing God, "What reason have I that I should not worship him who hath created me? for unto him shall ye return, y>iw Now it being clear that man has been created tor a certain work, it is evident that the work should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has been created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none other; that 133 Quran. Ill, 188 136 Quran, LI 156 134 Quran, XXIII: 117 137 Quran, XXXVI; 2£ 135 Quran, LXXV, 36 is, it is specialised in it. This being eo, it is necessary that the real purpose of man's creation be those deeds which are found in him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational powers As there are two portions of the rational powers,-practical and theoretical- it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded of hfcn. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be found in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection in those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard it are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by divine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also appears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught them the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people, both in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught them the theoratical knowledge of things, which all the people should