10 maintain among themselves, have no other end in view than to make certain provisions * for themselves * for the winter, still, man who is above them, has an entirely different end in view when he maintains and tends them, namely, to obtain honey for himself. So also [is it with] man, in so far as he is an individual thing and looks no further than his finite character can reach; but, in so far as he is also a part and tool of the whole of Nature, this end of man cannot be the final end of Nature, because she is infinite, and must make use of him, together also with all other 20 things, as an instrument.
Thus far [we have been speaking] of the law imposed by God; it is now to be remarked also that man is aware of two kinds of law even in himself; tl I mean such a man who uses his understanding aright, and attains to the know ledge of God; and these [two kinds of law] result from his fellowship with God, and from his fellowship with the modes of Nature. Of these the one is necessary, and the other is not. For, as regards the law which results from his fellowship with God, since he can never be otherwise 30 but must always necessarily be united with him, therefore t B: beginningless.
^J B continues: i. In him who uses his understanding aright and attains to the knowledge of God; these result from his fellow ship with God. 2. Those which result from his fellowship with the modes of Nature.
ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN 141 he has, and always must have before his eyes the laws by i which he must live for and with God. But as regards the law which results from his fellowship with the modes, since he can separate himself from men, this is not so necessary.
Now, since we posit such a fellowship between God and men, it might justly be asked, how God can make himself known to men, and whether this happens, or could have happened, by means of spoken words, or directly *through himself,* without using any other thing to do it with.
We answer,! not by means of words, in any case; for 10 in that case man must have known the signification of the words before they were spoken to him. For example, if God had said to the Israelites, / am Jehovah your God, then they would have had to know first, apart from these words, that God existed, It before they could be assured * thereby * that it was he * [who was speaking to them].* For they already knew quite well then that the voice, thunder and lightning were not God, although the voice proclaimed that it was God. And the same that we say here about words, we also mean to hold good of all 20 external signs.
We consider it, therefore, impossible that God should make himself known to men by means of external signs.ttt And we consider it to be unnecessary that it should happen through any other thing than the mere essence of t B: To this we answer that such [a thing] can never happen by means of words; for, in that case, man would have had to know the signification of the words before the outward communication was made to him through them. When, for example, God said to 30 the Israelites,...tt A: dat hy God was [that he was God]; B: dat God was [that God existed].
ttt B continues: this self-revelation must therefore take place solely through the essence of God and the understanding of man; K i God and the understanding of man; for, as the Under standing is that in us which must know God, and as it stands in such immediate union with him that it can neither be, nor be understood without him, it is incontrovertibly evident from this that no thing can ever come into such close touch with the Understanding as God himself can. It is also impos sible to get to know God through something else. i. Be cause, in that case, such a thing would have to be better known to us than God himself, which is in open conflict 10 with all that we have hitherto clearly shown, namely, that God is a cause both of our knowledge and of all essence, and that without him all individual things not only cannot exist, but cannot even be understood. 2. Because we can never attain to the knowledge of God through any other thing, the nature of which is necessarily finite, even if it were far better known to us; for how is it possible that we should infer an infinite and limitless thing from a * finite and * limited thing? For even if we did observe some effects or work in Nature the cause of which was unknown 20 to us, still it would be impossible for us to conclude from this that there must be in Nature an infinite and limitless thing in order to produce this result. For how can we know whether many causes have concurred in order to produce this, or whether there was only one? Who is to tell us?
We therefore conclude, finally, that, in order to make himself known to men, God can and need use neither words, nor miracles, nor any other created thing, but only himself.
CHAPTER XXV 1 ON DEVILS WE shall now briefly say something about devils, whether they exist or do not exist, and it is this: If the Devil is a thing that is once for all opposed to God, and has absolutely nothing from God, then he is precisely iden tical with Nothing, which we have already discussed before.
If, with some, we represent him as a thinking thing that absolutely neither wills nor does any good, and so sets him self, once for all, in opposition to God, then surely he is 10 very wretched, and, if prayers could help, then one ought to pray for his conversion.
But let us just see whether such a wretched thing could even exist for a single moment. And, if we do so, we shall immediately find out that it cannot; for whatever duration a thing has results entirely from the perfection of the thing, and the more essence and godliness things possess, the more lasting are they: therefore, as the Devil has not the least perfection in him, how should he then, I think to myself, be able to exist? Add to this, that the persistence 20 or duration of a mode of the thinking thing only results from the union in which such a mode is, through love, joined to God. As the precise opposite of this union is supposed in the case of the Devils, they cannot possibly exist.!
As, however, there is no necessity whatever why we should posit the existence of Devils, why then should they be posited? For we need not, like others, posit Devils in order to find [in them] the cause of Hatred, Envy, Wrath, and such-like passions, since we have found this sufficiently, without such fictions. 30 t A: not exist. M3 i CHAPTER XXVI BY the assertion of what precedes £ we not only wanted to make known that there are no Devils, but also, indeed, that the causes (or, to express it better, what we call Sins) which hinder us in the attainment of our perfection are in our selves. We have also shown already, in what precedes, how and in what manner, through reason as also tt through the fourth kind of knowledge, we must attain to our blessed- 10 ness, and how the passions * which are bad and should be banished * must be done away with: not as is commonly urged, namely, that these [passions] must first be subdued before we can attain to the knowledge, and consequently to the love, of God. That would be just like insisting that some one who is ignorant must first forsake his ignorance before he can attain to knowledge. ttt But [the truth is] this, that only knowledge can cause the disappearance thereof — as is evident from all that we have said. Similarly, it may also be clearly gathered from the above that without Virtue, 20 or (to express it better) without the guidance of the Under standing, all tends to ruin, so that we can enjoy no rest, and we live, as it were, outside our element. So that even if from the power of knowledge and divine love there accrued to the understanding not an eternal rest, such as we have shown, but only a temporary one, it is our duty to t B: of the preceding chapter. JJ B omits these four words.
ttJ B continues thus: but just as knowledge alone can cause the annihilation of this (as is evident from all that we have said) so it 30 may likewise be clearly gathered from the above...seek even this, since this also is such that if once we taste i it we would exchange it for nothing else in the world.
This being so, we may, with reason, regard as a great absurdity what many, who are otherwise esteemed as great theologians, assert, namely, that if no eternal life resulted from the love of God, then t they would seek what is best for themselves: as though they could discover anything better than God! This is just as silly as if a fish (for which, of course, it is impossible to live out of the water) were to say: if no eternal life is to follow this life in the 10 water, then I will leave the water for the land; It what else, indeed, can they say to us who do not know God?
Thus we see, therefore, that in order to arrive at the truth of what we assert for sure concerning our happiness and repose, we require no other principles except only this, namely, to take to heart our own interest, which is very natural in all things. ttt And since we find that, when we pursue sensuousness, pleasures, and worldly things, we do not find our happiness in them, but, on the contrary, our ruin, we therefore choose the guidance of our understanding. 20 As, however, this can make no progress, unless it has first attained to the knowledge and love of God, therefore it was highly necessary to seek this (God); and as (after the fore going reflections and considerations) we have discovered that he is the best good of all that is good, we are compelled to stop and to rest here. For we have seen that, outside him, there is nothing that can give us any happiness. And it is a true freedom to be, and to remain, bound with the loving chains of his love.
Lastly, we see also that reasoning is not the principal 3° thing in us, but only like a staircase by which we can climb £ B continues thus: people would seek and consider pleasures of sense, merriment, and worldly enjoyments: as though...It B continues: so it is also with the foregoing; for, what else,...B omits this sentence.
i up to the desired place, or like a good genius which, with out any falsity or deception, brings us tidings of the highest good in order thereby to stimulate us to pursue it, and to become united with it; which union is our supreme happiness and bliss.
So, to bring this work to a conclusion, it remains to indicate briefly what human freedom is, and wherein it consists. For this purpose I shall make use of these following propositions, as things which are certain and 10 demonstrated.
i. The more essence a thing has, so much more has it also of activity, and so much less of passivity. For it is certain that what is active acts through what it has, and that the thing which is passive is affected through what it has not.
2. All passivity that passes from non-being to being, or from being to non-being, must result from some external agent, and not from an inner one: because no thing, con sidered by itself, contains in itself the conditions that will 20 enable it to annihilate itself when it exists, or to create itself when it does not exist.
3. Whatever is not produced by external causes can have nothing in common with them, and can, consequently, be neither changed nor transformed by them.
And from these last two [propositions] I infer the follow ing fourth proposition: 4. The effect of an immanent or inner cause (which is all one to me) cannot possibly pass away or change so long as this cause of it remains. For such an effect, just as it 30 is not produced by external causes, so also it cannot be changed [by them]; following the third proposition. And since no thing whatever can come to naught except through external causes, it is not possible that this effect should be liable to perish so long as its cause endures; following the second proposition.
5. The freest cause of all, and that which is most appro- i priate to God, is the immanent: for the effect of this cause depends on it in such a way that it can neither be, nor be understood without it, nor is it subjected to any other cause; it is, moreover, united with it in such a way that together they form one whole.
Now let us just see what we must conclude from the above propositions. In the first place, then, 1. Since the essence of God is infinite, therefore it has an infinite activity, and an infinite negation of passivity, 10 following the first proposition; and, in consequence of this, the more that, through their greater essence, things are united with God, so much the more also do they have of activity, and the less of passivity: and so much the more also *are they* free from change and corruption.
2. The true Understanding can never perish; for in itself it can have no cause to destroy itself, following the second proposition. And as it did not emanate from external causes, but from God, so it is not susceptible to any change through them, following the third proposition. And since 20 God has produced it immediately and he is only t an inner cause, it follows necessarily that it cannot perish so long as this cause of it remains, following the fourth proposition. Now this cause of it is eternal, therefore it is too.
3. All the effects of the *true* understanding, which are united with it, are the most excellent, and must be valued above all the others; for as they are inner effects, they must be the most excellent; following the fifth proposition; and, besides this, they are also necessarily eternal, because their cause is such. 30 4. All the effects which we produce outside ourselves are the more perfect, the more they are capable of becoming united with us, so as to constitute one and the same nature with us; for in this way they come nearest to inner J A: is not only.
i effects. For example, if I teach my neighbours to love pleasure, glory, avarice, then whether I myself also love these or do not love them, whatever the case may be, I deserve to be punished, this is clear. Not so, however, when the only end that I endeavour to attain is, to be able to taste of union with God, and to bring forth true ideas, and to make these things known also to my neighbours; for we can all participate equally in this happiness, as happens when it creates in them J the same desire that I have, thus causing 10 their Jt will and mine to be one and the same, constituting one and the same nature, agreeing always in all things.Jtt From all that has been said it may now be very easily conceived what is human freedom,! which I define to be this: it is, namely, a firm reality which our understanding t A: him. tt A: his.
HI Instead of the three preceding paragraphs, B has the following: 2. As (according to Proposition II.) no thing can be a cause of its own annihilation, nor, if it is not the effect of any external cause, 20 can it (according to Proposition III.) be changed by such, but (according to Proposition IV.) the effect of an inner cause can neither pass away, nor change so long as this cause thereof endures; it follows that the true understanding, since it is produced by no external cause, but immediately by God, is, through this cause, eternal and immutable, can neither perish nor change, but, with it, necessarily remains eternal and lasting.
3. Since the inner effects of an immanent cause (according to Proposition V.) are the most excellent of all, all the effects of the true understanding which are united therewith, must also be valued 3° above all others, and [must] necessarily be eternal with their cause. Whence it follows that 4. The more perfect the effects are which we produce outside us, the more capable are they of becoming united with us so as to constitute one and the same nature with us. It is thus when, f The servitude of a thing consists in being subjected to external causes, freedom, on the contrary, in not being subjected to them, but freed from them.
acquires through direct union with God, so that it can bring i forth ideas in itself, and effects outside itself, in complete harmony with its nature; without, however, its effects being subjected to any external causes, so as to be capable of being changed or transformed by them. Thus it is, at the same time, evident from what has been said, what things there are that are in our power, and are not sub jected to any external causes; we have likewise also proved here, and that in a different way from before, the eternal and lasting duration of our understanding; and, lastly, 10 which effects it is that we have to value above all others.
So,! to make an end of all this, it only remains for me still to say to my friends to whom I write this:tt Be not astonished at these novelties; for it is very well known to you that a thing does not therefore cease to be true because it is not accepted by many. And also, as the character of the age in which we live is not unknown to you, I would beg of you most earnestly to be very careful about the com munication of these things to others. I do not want to say that you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only 20 that if ever you tU begin to communicate them to anybody, through my union with God, I conceive true ideas, and make them known to my neighbours, so that they may likewise participate with me in this happiness, and so that there arises in them a desire like mine, making their will one and the same with mine, so that we thus constitute one and the same nature, agreeing in all things.
I In the margin of this paragraph A has the following note: the author's entreaty to those for whom, at their request, he had dictated this treatise, and therewith the conclusion of all.
It B continues: that they should not be astonished at the 30 novelties (which they might find here); since a thing does not therefore cease to be true when it is not accepted by many.
ttt B continues: wish to communicate them to others, then you shall have no other object in view except only the Happiness of your neighbour; being at the same time clearly assured that the reward of your labour will not disappoint you therein.
1 then let no other aim prompt you except only the happiness of your neighbour, being at the same time clearly assured by him that the reward will not disappoint your labour. Lastly, if, on reading this through, you should meet with some difficulty about what I state as certain, I beseech you that you should not therefore hasten at once to refute it, before you have pondered it long enough and thoughtfully enough, and if you do this I feel sure that you will attain to the}: enjoyment of the fruits of this tree which you promise 10 yourselves.
J B concludes: desired END.
TEAOS [THE END] APPENDICES [APPENDIX I] i *ON GOD* AXIOMS 1. Substance is, by its nature, prior to ail its modifications.
2. Things which are different are distinguished either realiter or modaliter.
3. Things which are distinguished realiter either have different attributes, such as Thought and Extension, or are referred to different attributes, as in the case of Under standing and Motion; one of which belongs to Thought, 10 and the other to Extension.
4. Things which have different attributes, as also the things which belong to different attributes, do not have anything the one of the other.
5. That which has not in itself something of another thing, can also not be a cause of the existence of such another thing.
6. It is impossible that that which is a cause of itself should have limited itself.
7. That by which the things are sustained is by its nature prior to t such things. 20 PROPOSITION I To no substance that exists can one and the same attri bute be ascribed that is ascribed to another substance; or (which is the same) in Nature there cannot be two sub stances, unless they are distinguished realiter.tl I A: the first (prior) in; B: prior to.
Jt B:...in Nature there cannot be posited two substances of one and the same nature.
If there are two substances, then they are distinct; and consequently (Axiom 2) £ they are distinguished either realiter or modaliter; not modaliter, for in that case the modes would by their nature be prior to the substance, which is contrary to the first axiom; therefore, realiter; and consequently, what is predicated of the one cannot be predicated of the other, which is what we intended to prove.
10 PROPOSITION II One substance cannot be the cause of the existence of another substance.
Such a cause;annot contain in itself anything of such an effect (Prop, i); because the difference between them is real, and therefore it cannot (Axiom 5) produce it.JJ PROPOSITION III Every attribute or substance ttt is by nature infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind.
No substance is produced by another (Prop. 2) and conse quently, if it exists, it is either an attribute of God, or it has been its own cause outside God. If the first, then it is necessarily infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind, such t A gives the references to Axioms and Propositions in the margin; B, in the text.
JJ A adds: (existence); B:...and therefore the one cannot produce the other.
HI A: all attributes or substance; B: all substance or its attri-3o butes.
APPENDIX I 155 as are all other attributes of God. If the second, then it is also necessarily such because (Axiom 6) it could not have limited itself.
PROPOSITION IV To such an extent does existence pertain by nature to the essence of every substance,! that it is impossible to posit in an infinite understanding the Idea of the essence of a substance that does not exist in Nature.
The true essence of an object Jt is something which is 10 realiter different from the Idea of the same object; and this something exists (Axiom 3) either realiter, or is contained in some other thing which exists realiter; from which other thing this essence cannot be distinguished realiter, but only modaliter; such are all the essences of the things ttt which we see, which before they yet existed were already contained in extension, motion, and rest, and when they do exist are not distinguished from extension realiter } but only modaliter. Moreover, it would involve self-contradiction to suppose that the essence of a substance tttt is contained thus 20 in some other thing; because in that case it could not be distinguished from this realiter, contrary to the first proposi tion; also, it could in that case be produced by the subject which contains it, contrary to the second proposition; and lastly, it could not by its nature be infinite and supremely perfect in its kind, contrary to the third proposition.
t A: to every essence of substance; B: to the essence of a substance.
t J B:...of the object of an idea.
B: essences or things. 30 A: that an essence of the substance; B: that an essence of substance.
Therefore, as its essence is not contained in any other thing, it must be a thing that exists through itself.
COROLLARY Nature is known through itself, and not through any other thing. It consists of infinite attributes every one of them infinite and perfect in its kind; to its essence pertains existence, so that outside it there is no other essence or existence, and it thus coincides exactly with the essence of God who alone is glorious and blessed.
[APPENDIX II] * ON THE HUMAN SOUL * As man is a created finite thing, &c., it necessarily follows that what he has of Thought, and what we call the Soul, is a mode £ of the attribute which we call Thought, and that nothing else except this mode belongs to his essence: so much so that when this mode comes to naught, the soul perishes also, although the above attribute remains un changed. Similarly as regards Jt what he has of Extension; what we call Body is nothing else than a mode of the other 10 attribute which we call Extension; when this is destroyed, the human body also ceases to be, although the attribute Extension remains unchanged.
Now in order to understand what this mode is, which we call Soul, and how it derives its origin from the body, and also how its change (only) depends on the body (which to me constitutes the union of soul and body), it must be observed: I. That the most immediate mode of the attribute which we call thought contains objective the formal essence of all things; so much so, that if one could posit a real thing 20 whose essence was not objective in the above-named attri bute, then this would not be infinite, nor supremely perfect in its kind; contrary to what has already been proved in the third proposition. And since, as a matter of fact, Nature or God is one being of which infinite attributes are predi cated, and which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily follows that of all this there is produced tl B omits " as regards," and inserts " and " after " Extension."
158 GOD; MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING in Thought an infinite Idea, t which comprehends objective the whole of Nature just as it is realiter.
2. It is to be observed that all the remaining modes, such as Love, Desire, Joy, *&c.,* derive their origin from this first immediate mode; and that, too, in such wise, that if it did not precede, then there could be no love, desire, * nor joy,* &c. Whence it clearly follows that the natural love which prompts everything to preserve its body (I mean the mode) It cannot have any other origin than in the Idea 10 or the " objective " essence of such body which is in the thinking attribute. Further, since for the real existence of an Idea (or " objective " essence) no other thing is required than the thinking attribute and the object (or " formal" essence), it is certain, as we have said, that the Idea, or the "objective" essence, is the most immediate t mode of the * thinking * attribute. And, consequently, there can be in the thinking attribute no other mode, that should belong to the essence of the soul of every ttt thing, except only the Idea, which must be in the thinking attribute when its 20 object exists: for such an idea brings with it the remaining modes of Love, Desire, * joy,* &c. Now as the Idea comes from the existence of the object, therefore according as the object changes or perishes, so its Idea must change or perish, and such being the case, it is that which is united with the object. tttt t I call that mode the most immediate mode, which, in order to exist, requires no other mode in the same attribute.
J A: it necessarily follows that of all that which is produced in Thought there is an infinite Idea...; B:...that there is 30 produced in thought an infinite idea thereof...It B omits the words in brackets.
til A: gelijken [like]; B: iegelijk'n [every].
Hit B:...so this idea of it must change or perish in the same degree or measure of change or annihilation, because it is thusunited with the object.
APPENDIX II 159 Lastly, if we should want to proceed and ascribe to the i essence of the soul that through which it can be real, we shall be able to find nothing else than the attribute [Thought] and the object of which we have just been speaking; and neither of these can belong to the essence of the Soul, as the object has nothing of Thought, and is realiter different from the Soul.! And with regard to the attribute, we have also proved already that it cannot pertain to the above-mentioned essence, as appears even more clearly from what we said subsequently; II for the attribute as attribute IK is not 10 united with the object, since it neither changes nor perishes, although the object changes or perishes.
Therefore the essence of the soul consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or " objective " essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, 6-c., without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension. And in order 20 that this definition may be somewhat more fully understood, it should be borne in mind what I have already said when speaking about the attributes, which, I said, are not different as regards their existence,tltt for they are themselves the " subjects " of their essences; also that the essence of every one of the modes is contained in the above-named attributes, * and, lastly, that all the attributes are attributes * of One infinite Being. Wherefore also, in the ninth chapter of the First Part, I called this Idea a creation created immediately by God; since it contains objective the " formal " essence of all 30 B: as the object of Thought has nothing thereof, but is realiter different from it.
B: as will be seen trom what we shall say later.
! B omits "as attribute."
!! B omits the nine words that follow.
1 things, I without omission or addition. And this is neces sarily but one, considering that all the essences of the attributes, and the essences of the modes comprehended in these attributes, are the essence of one only infinite being, II But it has still to be remarked that these modes, now under consideration, [even when] none of them exists, are nevertheless equally comprehended in their attributes; and as there is no inequality whatever in the attributes, nor yet in the essences of the modes, there can be no particu- 10 larity in the idea when there is none in Nature. But as soon as ever some of these modes take on their particular existence, and thereby become in some way different from their attributes (because then their particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is the "sub ject" of their essence), then there shows itself a particu larity in the essences of the modes, and consequently in the " objective " essences of these which are necessarily comprehended in the Idea, HI And this is the reason why we said, in the definition, that the Idea llll arises from 20 an object, Hill which really exists in Nature. And with this we think we have sufficiently explained what kind of a thing the soul is in general, understanding by this expres sion not only the Ideas which arise from *the existence of* corporeal modes, but also those which arise from the existence of every mode of the remaining attributes.
I B:...I called the thinking attribute, or the understand ing in the thinking thing, a son, product, or creation created immediately by God, since it contains the " objective " essence of all things...30 H B omits this sentence, and continues: For it has to be remarked...HI B: in the Thinking Attribute.
Hll B: the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises...lllll B: from the essence of an object...APPENDIX II 161 But, since we have no such knowledge of the remaining i attributes as we have of extension, let us just see whether, having regard to the modes of extension, we can discover a more special definition, and one that shall be more appro priate to express the essence of our souls, for this is the real task before us. Now we shall presuppose here, as something already demonstrated, that extension contains no other modes than motion and rest, and that every particular material thing is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest, so much so indeed that, even if extension 10 contained nothing else except motion only or rest only, then no particular thing could be shown or exist in the whole of extension; the human body, therefore, is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest. Now the " ob jective essence " of this actual ratio * of motion and rest * which is in the thinking attribute, this (we say) is the soul of the body; so that whenever one of these two modes changes into more or less (motion or rest) I the Idea * or the soul * also changes accordingly. For example, when the [amount of] rest happens to increase, while the [quantity 20 of] motion is diminished, then there is produced thereby that pain or sorrow which we call cold; but if, on the contrary, this [increase] takes place in the [amount of] motion, then there is produced thereby that pain which we call heat. It And so when it happens that the degrees of motion and rest are not equal in all the parts of our body, but that some have more motion and rest than others, there I B: whenever one 01 these two modes, be it motion or rest, changes into more or less...II B continues as follows: But if the proportion of motion and 30 rest is not the same in all the parts of our body, but some of them are provided with more motion or rest than the others, there arises thence a difference of feeling: such as we experience when we are struck with a cane in the eyes or on the hands. Moreover, when the external causes happen to be different, and have not all the i arises therefrom a t difference of feeling (and thence arises the different kind of pain which we feel when we are struck in the eyes or on the hands with a cane), It And when it happens that the external causes, which bring about these changes, are different from one another, and have not all the same effect, then there results from this a difference of feeling in one and the same part (and from this results the difference of feeling according as one and the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron), tt And, again, 10 if the change which occurs in a part restores it to its first proportion *of motion and rest,* there arises from this that joy which we call repose, pleasurable activity, and cheerful ness. Lastly, now that we have explained what feeling is, we can easily see how this gives rise to an Idea reflexiva, or the knowledge of oneself, Experience and Reasoning. And from all this (as also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of the infinite Idea, arising immediately from God) there can also be clearly seen the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of the soul. But, for the 20 present, what we have said must be enough.
same effect, there results therefrom a difference ot feeling in one and the same part: such as \ve experience when the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron. But when the change which occurs in some part restores it to its previous proportion of motion and rest, there arises...It A gives the words in brackets immediately after "happens.''
Several of the conceptions which are either tacitly taken up or expressly defined by Spinoza are no longer familiar to us, and have to be learned like the vocabulary of a foreign tongue; with the additional disadvantage that our common English supplies no corresponding terms, the very moulds having been broken and cast away in which the thoughts were shaped." — MARTI NEAU.
[The numbers in large type refer to the pages of the translation those in smaller type to the lines.']