a The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. De Ciu. Dei, xi. 6, xii. 1C; but Boethius's use of sempiternitas, as well as his word-building, seem to be peculiar to himself. Claudianus Mamertus, speaking of applying the categories to God, uses sempiternitas as Boethius uses aeternitas. Cf. De Stain Animae i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms inter changeably, e.g. Asclep. 29-31. On Boethius's distinction thereby perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity."
It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "God rules, possessing all things." Here again nothing substantial is asserted of either subject; in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "God" refer to the substance in virtue of which the subject is — man or God. The term "just" refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz. just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which He is something, viz. great. No other cate gory save substance, quality, and quantity refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place, which is not a category of the sub stance, like "just" in virtue of justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make reference to activity or time — if indeed God's "ever" can be described as time — but not to a category of substance, like "great " in virtue of greatness.
Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and passivity in God, for they simply are not to be found in Him.
Have I now made clear the difference between the categoi'ies? Some denote the reality of a thing; others its accidental circumstances; the former declare that a thing is something; the latter say between time and eternity see Cons. v. pr. 6, and Rand, / er dfm B. zugeschr. Trakt. de fide, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in Theol. Littzff., 1902, p. 147.
non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Ilia igitur, quae aliquid esse designant, 105 secunduni rem praedicationes uocentur. Quae cum de rebus subiectis dicuntur, uocantur accidentia secundum rem; cum uero de deo qui subiectus non est, secunduni substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur.
V.
Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu 5 constare perspiciuntur. Age enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris et dominum; at non etiani si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album, sed 10 interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata peril nimirum album. At in domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato 15 deperit seruo, constat non earn per se domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.
Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod a Dominus and seruus are similarly used as illustration, In Cat. (Migne, P.L. Ixiv. 217).
6 i.e. which is external to the master.
c i.e. which is external to the whitened thing.
nothing about its being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something external. Those cate gories which describe a thing in terms of its substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to God, who is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of substance.
V.
V.
Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing remarks have been prelimin ary; for qualities which obviously arise from the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and slave a are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are predicates of sub stance. If you suppress the term slave,6 you simul taneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,0 though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the substance of master, but is an adventitious augmenta tion arising from the possession of slaves.
It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases, decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it is applied. The B2 25 20 est esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere, nee semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod 25 ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me est minime uero ex sese.
30 Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque aliud ut dictum est difte- 35 runt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest, quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, persona- 40 rum. Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis quidem ei est productio filii, 45 relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritual sanctum; hos, quoniam incategory of relation, then, has nothing to do with the essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condi tion of relativity, and that not necessarily to something else,, but sometimes to the subject itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again, if 1 come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me, and not in the least on the essence of his being.
Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way. Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have said, have no other difference but that of rela tion, and if relation is not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject, but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very sub stance; however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be spatially different, since corporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero 50 pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.
Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et 55 in rebus numerabilibus repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem. Trium igitur idonee constituta est unitas.
VI.
Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, 5 seruata uero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel omnino eius quae se cundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola singillatim profei-untur atque 10 separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem pater qui filius non est nee idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tameii deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane scien- 15 dum est non semper talem esse relatiuam praedicationem, ut semper ad difFerens praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; difFerunt enira. Nam omne aequale aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem idem est; et similis 20 est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id DE TR1NITATE They are incorporeal. But since the Father is God, the Son is God., and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the Three is suitably established.
VI.
VI.
But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a predication referring to one substance is a predication without relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same God, the same in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be predicated of sub stance. One must riot forget that predicates of relativity do not always involve relation to some thing other than the subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different. For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is a relation of identicals.
quod est idem. Quod si id in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed 25 simplici intellectu erigi et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.
Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime, 30 uestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde uenit effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas 35 nequiuit ascendere, quantum inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.
a Cf. Cons. v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the passage " quare in illius summae intelleg-entiae acumen si possumus erigamur."
A relation of this kind is not to be found in created things, but that is because of the difference which we know attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of God let imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be known. n I have now finished the investigation which I pro posed. The exactness of my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will pro nounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, God helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits, Avhatever is lost through rny infirmity must be made good by my intention.
ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHI1 V.C. ET INT.. EXCONS. OBD. PATRICII VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS ET SPIRITVS SANCTVS DE DIVINITATE SVBSTAN- TIALITKR PRAEDICENTVR QVAERO an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est 5 ab ipsis catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo dubitauerit. Sed cum rursus 10 colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur sub stantia trium nee separari ullo modo aut disiungi ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS EX-CONSUI.S, PATHICIAX TO JOHN THE DEACON WHETHER FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT MAY HE SUBSTANTIALLY PREDICATED OF THE DIVINITY THK question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be predicated of the Divinity sub stantially or otherwise. And I think that the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is ad mittedly the surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made potest nee uelut partibus in unum coniuncta est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaecumque igitur de diuina 15 substantia praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse communia; idque signi erit quae sint quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc rnodo dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur. Hoc modo si dicimus: " Pater 20 deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus deus est/' pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter praedicari.
Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus 25 sanctus ueritas est; pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iustitia de omnipotentia ac de ceteris 30 omnibus quae tarn de singulis quam de omnibus singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substan tialiter dici. Vnde apparet ea quae cum in singulis separatirn dici conuenit nee tarnen in omnibus dici queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; 35 qui uero iste sit, posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmittit ad filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantial e nomen hoc inditum; nam si substantiate esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iustitia ut ipsa quoque substantia, 40 de ceteris diceretur.
Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo, sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non est VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS up of various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything, therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right be predicated substantially of the Divinity.
Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is truth, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth. If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice, Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons singly and collectively are plainly substantial predi cates. Hence it appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all Three is not a sub stantial predicate, but of another kind — of what kind I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it would be affirmed of the other Persons.
Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the other predicates which I have already mentioned. The idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus 45 patrem ac filium ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substaritialiter dici sed alio quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est; nam et pater alicuius 50 pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trmitas quidem substantia liter de deo praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac spiritus sanctus non est) nee trinitas filius nee trinitas spiritus sanctus 55 secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum plural itate consistit, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.
Quod si personae diuisae sunt, substantia uero indiuisa sit, necesse est quod uocabulum ex personis 60 originem capit id ad substaiitiam non pertinere; at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit, trinitas igitur non pertinet ad substantiam. Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est 65 ad aliquid. Deus uero ueritas iustitia bonitas omnipotentia substantia inmutabilitas uirtus sapieiitia et quicquid hniusmodi excogitari potest substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur. Haec si se recte et ex fide habent, ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte 70 diuersus es, diligentius intuere quae dicta sunt et fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge.
" i.e. personaliter (loh. Scottus ad loc.).
* i.e. sed personaliter (loh. Scottus ad loc.}.
"Vide supra, Introduction, p. xii.
VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS Spirit too is not the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial manner, but otherwise.* For if each term were predi cated substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially b predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity — since He who is Father is not Son and Holy Spirit — nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.
Now if the Persons are separate, while the Sub stance is undivided, it must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially pre dicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth, Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable substantially to divinity.
If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm me. But if you are in any point of 'another opinion, examine carefully what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.0 ITEM EIVSDEM AD EVNDEM QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE IN EO QVOD SINT BONAE SINT CVM NON SINT SVBSTANTIALIA BONA POSTVLAS, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque 5 eo dicis esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus no turn itev buiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo quam cuiquam 10 participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque patitur esse seiuiictum.1 Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia turn id habent commodi, quod 1 seiunct. Rand; coniunct. codd. opt.; disiunct. vulg. Vallinus.
a Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six Enneades or groups of nine.
6 Cf. discussion on the nature of good in Cons. iii. m. 10 and pr. 11 (infra, pp. 274 if.).
FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING ABSOLUTE GOODS You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure question in my Hebdomads a conceniing the manner in which substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute goods.6 You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness with what eager ness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess I like to expound my Hebdomads to myself, and would rather bury my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks cum his soils qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur 15 in mathematica fieri solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.
I. Commuuis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam. Harum duplex modus est.
20 Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum, ueluti si hanc proponas: " Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est doctorum tantum, quae tanien ex talibus communis animi 25 conceptionibus uenit, ut est: " Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse/' et cetera; quae non uulgus sed docti comprobant.
II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero quod est accepta essendi 30 forma est atque consistit.
III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid, cum esse susceperit.
35 IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic enim accidens hie 40 substantia significatur.
a On this mathematical method of exposition cf. Cons. ill pr. 10 (infra, p. 270).
6 Esse = Aristotle's rb ri tan; id quod est = r<55e rl. e Consistere = inroarrivai.
a language understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore followed the example of the mathematical a and cognate sciences and laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that follows.
I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible; as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the re mainders are equal." Nobody who grasps that pro position will deny it. The other kind is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same class of common conceptions; as " Incorporeals cannot occupy space/' and the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
II. Being and a concrete thing6 are different. Simple Being awaits manifestation, but a thing is and exists c as soon as it has received the form which gives it Being.
III. A concrete thing can participate in some thing else; but absolute Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has acquired Being.
IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different; the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
VI. Omne quod est1 participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.
45 VII. Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.
VIII. Omni composite aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.
IX. Omnis diuevsitas discors, similitude uero 50 appetenda est; et quod appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc ipsum quod appetit.
Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus; a prudeate uero rationis interprete suis unumquodque aptabitur 55 argumentis.
Quaestio uero huiusmodi est. Ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt 60 bona ipsa sunt. Sed quemadmodum bona sint, inquirendum est, utrumne participatione an substantia? Si participatione, per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est album non est. Et de ceteris qualitatibus 65 eodem modo. Si igitur participatione sunt bona, ipsa per se nullo modo bona sunt: non igitur ad bonum tendunt. Sed concessum est. Non igitur participatione sunt bona sed substantia. Quorum 1 est codd. infer lores; om. codd. opt.
a Id quod est esse = rb ri ty elvai.
VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being a through the fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate in something else.
VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its particular Being.
VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one and the same.
IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it seeks.
These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to eacli point.
Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must, however, inquire how they are good — by participation or by substance. If by participation, they are in no wise good in them selves; for a thing which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are good not by participation but by substance.
uero substantia bona est, id quod sunt bona sunt; 70 id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse. Esse igitur ipsorum bonum est; omnium igitur rerum ipsum esse bonum est. Sed si esse bonum est, ea quae sunt in eo quod sunt bona sunt idemque illis est esse quod boni esse; substantialia igitur bona 75 sunt, quoniam non participant bonitatem. Quod si ipsum esse in eis bonum est, non est dubium quin substantialia cum sint bona, primo sint bono similia ac per hoc hoc ipsum bonum eruiit; nihil enim illi praeter se ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit ut oirmia 80 quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est. Non sunt igitur substantialia bona ac per hoc non in his est esse bonum; non sunt igitur in eo quod sunt bona. Sed nee participant bonitatem; nullo enim modo ad bonum tenderent. Nullo modo igitur sunt 85 bona.
Huic quaestioni talis poterit adhiberi solutio. Multa sunt quae cum separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur; ut cum triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu 90 separat, mente tamen segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius praeter materiam speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni praesentiam paulisper ex animo, quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorurnque sententia barbararumque 95 gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper amoto ponamus omnia esse quae sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum bona esse a Cf. the similar reductio ad absurdum in Tr. 5 (infra, p. 98) and in Cons. v. pr. 3 (infra, p. 374). b Vide supra, p. 6, n. 6.
But those things whose substance is good are sub stantially good. But they owe their actual Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good; therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness. But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself. Hence all things that are, are God — an impious assertion. Wherefore things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good."
This problem admits of the following solution.'' There are many things which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive possent, si a primo bono minime defluxissent. Hinc intueor aliud in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod 100 sunt. Ponatur enini uiia eademque substantia bona esse alba, grauis, rotunda. Tune aliud esset ipsa ilia substantia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas; nam si haec singula idem essent quod ipsa substantia, idem esset grauitas quod color, quod 105 bonum et bonum quod grauitas — quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud igitur tune in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse, ac tune bona quidern essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent, non a bono ac bona essent ac non idem