Now, in reference to this case, observe that they could not speak by authority of the summoner of the president of the centuries, for he was dead; and conjecture without divination could say that. Or perhaps what they said was no better than the result of chance, which prevails to a considerable extent in all affairs of this nature. For what could the soothsayers of Etruria know as to whether the tent they observed was as it should be, and whether the regulations of the pomerium, or circumvallation, were exactly obeyed.
For myself, I agree with the sentiments of Caius ituscehiee rather than with those of Appius Claudius, who were both of them my colleagues; and I think that, although the college and law of augurs were first instituted on account of the reverence entertained for divination in ancient times, they were afterwards maintained and preserved for the sake of the state.
XXXVI. Of this, however, more elsewhere. At present, let us examine the auguries of other nations who have evinced therein more superstition than art. They make use of all kinds of birds for their auspices; we confine ourselves to few: and one set of omens are reckoned unfavourable by tie’ and a different set by us.
King Deiotarus often asked me for an account of our discipline and system of divination, and I asked him for 932: ON DIVINATION.
information avout his. Good neavens! how different were the two meinoas, In some instances, so much so as ‘to be downright contradictory to one another. And he had recourse to augurs on all occasions; but how very seldom do we apply to them unless the auspices are required by the people!
Our ancestors were unwilling to wage any war without consulting the auspices. But how many years have elapsed since this ceremony has been neglected by our proconsuls and propretors? They never take auspices; they do not pass over rivers by the encouragement of omens; nor do they wait for the intimation of the sacred chickens.
As to that divination which consists in observing the flight of birds from some elevated spot—once considered of so much consequence in military expeditions,—Marcus Marcellus, who was consul five times, as well as imperator and chief augur too, omitted it altogether. What is become, then, of divination by birds, which (as wars are carried on by people who take no care about any auspices) seems to be retained by the city magistrates, while it is renounced by our military commanders? So much did Marcellus despise auspices, that when he was proceeding on any enterprise, he was accustomed to travel in a closed litter, that he might not be liable to be hindered by them. And we augurs now-a-days act much in the same way, when, for fear of what is called a joint auspice, we order the sacrificial cattle to be separated from each other. Not that I commend conduct like this; for to make these contrivances, either that an auspice should not happen at all, or that if it happens it should not be seen,— what is it but an attempt to avoid the admonitions of Jupiter?
XXXVII. It is ridiculous enough for you to assert that this king Deiotarus did not repent of having believed the auspices which he experienced when he went in search of Pompey, because he had, by doing his duty, thus secured the fidelity and friendship of the Romans; for that praise and glory were dearer to him than his kingdom and possessions. I dare say they were; but this has nothing to do with the auspices. Surely no crow could inform him that it was a piece of magnanimity to defend the liberty of the Roman people. It was he himself who felt spontaneously what he did feel; and birds can do no more than signify bare events, be they fortunate or disastrous. -, Thus, I conceive that Deiotarus in this affair followed no other auspices than those of conscience, which taught him to prefer his duty to his interest. But if the birds showed him that the result would be prosperous, they certainly deceived him; for he fled from the battle, together with Pompey, and a grievous time it was for him. From this general he was compelled to separate—another affliction; and, to crown his troubles, he soon had Cesar quartered upon him, both as a guest and an enemy. What could be more painful than this? Lastly, Ceesar, after having deprived him of the tetrarchy of the Trogini, and bestowed it on a certain Pergamenian of his train,—after having likewise deprived him of Armenia, which had been granted him by the senate,—after having been entertained by him with most princely hospitality, left his entertainer the king wholly stripped of his possessions.
It is needless to add more. I will return to my original subject. If we seek to know events by those auspices which are sought from birds, it appears by this argument that no birds could truly have predicted prosperity to king Deiotarus. Tf we want to know our duty, that is not to be sought from augury, but from virtue.
XXXVIII. I say nothing, then, of the augural staff of Romulus, which you declare to have remained unconsumed by fire in the midst of a general conflagration; and pass over the razor of Attius Navius, which is reported to have cut through a whetstone. Such fables as these should not be admitted into philosophical discussions.
What a philosopher has to do is, first, to examine the nature of the augural science, to investigate its origin, and to pursue its history. But how pitiful is the nature of a science which pretends that the eccentric motions of birds are full of ominous import, and that all manner of things must be done, or left undone, as their flights and songs may indicate! How can their inclinations to the right or left determine the power of auspices? and how, when, and by whom were such absurd regulations as these invented?.
The Etrurian soothsayers hold as the author of their discipline a child whom a ploughshare suddenly dug up from a clod of the earth. Whom do we Romans look upon as the author of ours? Is it Attius Navius? But Romulus and Remus lived several years before him, and they were both augurs, as_ we are informed. Shail we call our system the invention of the Pisidians, the Cilicians, or the Phrygians? Shall we, by. speaking thus, call men devoid of all civilization the authors of divination?
XXXIX. “But,” you say, “all kings, people, and nations use auspices;” as if there was anything in the world so very — common as error is, or as if you yourself, in judging, were. guided by the opinion of the multitude. ) How few, for instance, are there who deny that pleasure is a good: most people even think it the chief good. But is the Stoic frightened from his creed by their numbers? or does the multitude follow their authority in many things? What wonder is there, then, if in respect. of auspices, and all kinds of divinations, weak spirits are affected by those popular superstitions, though they cannot overturn the truth!: And what uniformity or settled agreement exists between augurs? The poet Ennius, referring to our Roman augurs, says— | ‘ When on the left it thunders, all goes well. In Homer, on the contrary, Ajax,’ making some complaint or other to Achilles about the ferocity of the Trojans, speaks in. this manner— |: For them the father of the Gods declares, His omens on the right, his thunder theirs. So that omens on the left appear fortunate to us, while the _ Greeks and barbarians prefer those on the right. Although I am not unaware that our Romans call prosperous signs. sinistra, even if they are in fact dextra. But certainly our countrymen used the term sinistra, and foreigners the word dextra, because that usually appeared the best. How great, however, is this contrariety! Why need I stop to mention that they use different birds and different signs from our-: selves? they take their observations in a different way, and give answers in a different way; and it is superfluous to admit that some of these modes are adopted through error, some through superstition, and that they often mislead.
XL. To this catalogue of superstitions you have not hesi- 1 This is another piece of forgetfulness on the part of Cicero.—See Tliad, ix. 236, a ‘tb PEM Ve > ON DIVINATION, 235.
tated to add a number of omens and presages. For instance, you have quoted the words which A‘milia addressed to Paulus, that Perses had perished; which Paulus received as an omen of success. You quote likewise the speech that Cecilia made to her sister’s daughter—“ I yield my place to you.” Nor is. this all: you cite the phrase, favete linguis (keep silence) 5 and you extol the prerogative presage derived from the name of the person who takes precedence in the elections of the comitia. I call this being ingenious and eloquent against — yourself; for how, if you attend to things like these, can your mind be free and calm enough to follow, not superstition, but reason, as your guide in action? Is itnotso? If any one, while speaking on his own affairs, in the course of his common conversation, drops a word that may seem to you: to bear on anything which you are thinking or doing, shall that circumstance inspire you with either fear or energy?
When Marcus Crassus was embarking his army at Brundusium, a certain itinerant vender of figs from Caunus cried out in the harbour, “ Will you buy any cawneas!/” Let us say, if you please, that this was an omen against Crassus’s expedition; for that it was as much as to say, Cave ne eas (Beware how you go), and that if Crassus had obeyed the omen he would not have perished. But if we regard such omens as these, we shall have to take notice of sneezes, the breaking of a shoe-tie, or the tripping over a pebble in walking.. | It now remains for us to speak of the lots, and the Chaldean astrologers, vaticinations, and dreams. And first let us: speak of lots. | XLI. What, now, isa lot? Much the same as the game of mora, or dice,! and other games of chance, in which luck andfortune are all in all, and reason and skill avail nothing. These games are full of trick and deceit, invented for the object of gain, superstition, or error.
But let us examine the imputed origin of the lots, as we did that of the system of the soothsayers. | We read in the records of the Preenestines, that Numerius. Suffucius, a man of high reputation and rank, had often been: commanded by dreams (which at last became very threaten- 1 The Latin has quod talos jacere, quod tesseras,—tali being dice with _ four flat and two round sides, and tesser@ dice with six flat sides.
ing) to cut a flint-stone in two, at a particular spot. Being extremely alarmed at the vision, he began to act in obedience to it, in spite of the derision of his fellow-citizens; and he had mo sooner divided the stone, than he found therein certain lots, engraved in ancient characters on oak. The spot in which this discovery took place is now religiously guarded, being consecrated to the infant Jupiter, who is represented with Juno as sitting in the lap of Fortune, and sucking her breasts, and is most chastely worshipped by all mothers.
At the same time and place in which the Temple of Fortune is now situated, they report that honey flowed out of an olive. Upon this the augurs declared that the lots there mstituted would be held in the highest honour; and, at their command, a chest was forthwith made out of this same olivetree, and therein those lots are kept by which the oracles of Fortune are still delivered. But how can there be the least degree of sure and certain information in lots like these, which, under Fortune’s direction, are shuffled and drawn by the hands of a child? How were the lots conveyed to this particular spot, and who cut and carved the oak of which they are composed?
“ Oh,” say they, “there is nothing which God cannot do.” 1 wish that he had made these Stoical sages a little less inclined to believe every idle tale, out of a superstitious and miserable solicitude.
The common sense of men in real life has happily succeeded in exploding this kind of divination. It is only the antiquity and beauty of the Temple of Fortune that any longer preserves the- Preenestine lots from contempt even among the vulgar. For what magistrate, or man of any reputation, ever resorts to them now? And in all other places they are wholly disregarded; so that Clitomachus informs us, that with reference to this, Carneades was wont to say that he had never been so fortunate as when he saw Fortune at Preeneste. So we will say no more on this topic.
XLII. Let us now consider the prodigies of the Chaldeans. Eudoxus, who was a disciple of Plato, and, in the judgment — of the greatest men, the first astronomer of his time, formed the opinion, and committed it to writing, that no credence should be given. to the predictions of the Chaldeans in their calculation of a man’s life from the day of his nativity.
ON DIVENATION. 237 ON DIVENATION. 237 Panetius, who is almost the only Stoic who rejects astrological prophecies, says that Archelaus and Cassander, the two principal astronomers of the age in which he himself lived, set no value on judicial astrology, though they were very celebrated for their learning in other parts of astronomy. Scylax of Halicarnassus, a great friend of Paneetius, and a first-rate astronomer, and chief magistrate of his own city, likewise rejected all the predictions of the Chaldeans.
But to proceed merely on reason, omitting for the present the testimony of these witnesses.: | Those who put faith in the Chaldeans, and their calculations of nativities, and their various predictions, argue in this manner: they affirm that in that circle of constellations which the Greeks term the Zodiac there resides a certain energy, of such a character that each portion of its circumference influences and modifies the surrounding heavens according to what stars are in those and the neighbouring parts at each season; and that this energy is variously affected by those wandering stars which we call planets. But when they come into that portion of the circle in which is situated the rise of that star which appears anew, or into that which has anything in conjunction or harmony with it, they term it the true or quadrate aspect.
And moreover, as there happen at every season of the year several astronomical revolutions, owing to approximations and retirements of the stars which we see, which are affected by the power of the sun,—they think it not merely probable, but true, that according to the temperature of the atmosphere at the time must be the animation and formation of children from their mother’s womb; and that their genius, disposition, temper, constitution, behaviour, fortune, and destiny through life depend upon that.
XLII. Whatan incredible insanity is this! for every error does not deserve the mere name of folly. The Stoic Diogenes grants, that the Chaldeans possess the power of foreseeing certain events; to the limit, that is, of predicting what a child’s disposition and his particular talent and ability are likely to be. But he denies that the other things which they profess can possibly be known. For instance; two twins may resemble each other in appearance, and yet their lives and fortunes may be entirely dissimilar, (238 ON DIVINATION.
Procles and Eurysthenes, kings of the Lacedeemonians, were twin-brethren. But they did not live the same number of years; for Procles died a year before his brother, and much excelled him in the glory of his actions. _ But I question whether even that portion of prophetic power which the worthy Diogenes concedes to the Chaldeans, by a sort of prevarication in ‘argument, ean be fairly ascribed to them. For, as according to them the birth of infants is regulated by the moon, and as the Chaldeans observe and take notice of the natal stars with which the moon happens to be in conjunction at the moment of a nativity, they-are founding their judgment on the most fallacious evidence of their eyes, as to matters which they ought to behold by reason and intellect. For the science of Mathematics, with which they ought to be acquainted, should teach them the comparative proximity of the moon to the earth, and its re-Jative remoteness from the planets Venus and Mercury, and especially from the sun, whose light it is supposed to borrow. And the other three intervals, those, namely, which separate the sun from Mars and from Jupiter and from Saturn, and the distance also between that and the heaven, which is the bound and limit of our universe, are infinite and immense. What influence, then, can such distant orbs transmit to the moon, or rather to the earth? | XLIV. Moreover, when these astrologers maintain, as they are bound to maintain, that all children that are born on the earth under the same planet and constellation, having the same signs of nativity, must experience the same destinies, they make an assertion which evinces the greatest ignorance of astronomy. For those circles which divide the heaven into hemispheres—cireles which the Greeks call horizons, and the Latins jinientes—perpetually vary according to the spot from which they are drawn; and, therefore, the risings and settings of the stars appear to take place at different seasons to different races of men.
If, then, the condition of the atmosphere is affected by the energy and virtue of the stars, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another, how can those children who are born at the same time in different climates be subject to the same starry influences in various quarters of the globe? For instance, in the country which we Romans inhabit, the dogstar rises some days after the summer solstice, while among the Troglodyte, a people of Africa, it is said to rise before it. So that if I were to grant that the heavenly influences have an effect upon all the children who are born upon the earth, it would follow, that all who are born at the same time in different regions of the earth, must be born not with the same but with different inclinations according to the different conditions of climate; which, however, they by no means admit. For they persist in maintaining that all children who are born at the same period, have at their nativity the same astrological destinies allotted to them, whatever their native country may be.
XLY. But what folly is it to imagine, that while attending to the swift motions and revolutions of heaven, we should take no notice of the changes of the atmosphere immediately around us,—its weather, its winds, and rains—when weather differs so much even in places which are nearest to one another, that there is often one weather at Tusculum and another at Rome; as is especially remarked by sailors, who, after having doubled a cape, often find the greatest possible change in the wind. 7 | When the calmness or disturbed state of the weather is so variable, is it the part of a man in his senses to say that these circumstances have no effeet on the births of children happening at that moment, (as, indeed, they have not,) and yet to affirm, that that subtle and indefinable thing, which cannot be felt. at all, and can scarcely be comprehended,—namely, the conjuncture which arises from the moon and other stars, does ‘affect the birth of children?—What? is it a slight error, not to understand that by this system that energy of seminal principles which is of so much influence in begetting and procreating the child is utterly put out of sight?—for who can help observing that the parents impress on their children, to a great extent, their own forms, manners, features, and gestures. Now this could hardly happen if it were not the power and nature of the parents which was the efficient cause, but the condition of the moon and the temperature of the heavens. | Why need I press the argument that those who are born at one and the same moment, are dissimilar in their nature, their lives, and their circumstances?
XLVI. Besides, is there any doubt that many persons, though they were born with great bodily defects, are nevertheless afterwards cured of them, and set right by the selfcorrective power of their nature, or by the attention of their nurses, or the skill of their physicians? or that many children have been born so tongue-tied that they could not speak, and yet have been cured by the application of the knife? Many likewise by meditation or exercise have removed their natural infirmities. ‘Thus Phalereus records that Demosthenes when young could not pronounce the letter R; but afterwards by constant practice he learnt to articulate it perfectly. Now, if such defects had been occasioned by the influence of the stars, nothing could have altered them.
Need I say more? Does not difference of situation make races of men different? It is easy enough to give a list of such instances; and to point out what differences exist between the Indians and Persians, the Aithiopians and Syrians, in respect both of their persons and characters, so as to present an incredible variety and dissimilarity. And this fact proves, that the climate influences the nativities of men far more than the aspect of the moon and stars. For though some pretend that the Chaldean astrologers have verified the nativities of children by calculations and experiments in the cases of all the children who have been born for 470,000 years, this is a mistake. For had they been in the habit of doing so, they would never have given up the practice. But, as it is, no author remains who knows of such a thing being done now, or ever having been done.
XLVII. You see that I am not using the arguments of Carneades, but those rather of Paneetius, the chief of the Stoics. But answer me now this question. Were all those persons who were slain in the battle of Cannz born under the same constellation, as they met with one and the same end? Again, have those men who are singular in their genius and courage, a separate, some peculiar star of their own too? - For what moment is there in which a multitude of persons are not born? and yet no one has ever been like Homer.
And if the aspect of the stars and the state of the firmament influenced the birth of every being, it should, by parity of reasoning, influence inanimate substances; yet what can be more absurd than such an idea?: ‘ ON DIVINATION, 241 I grant, indeed, that Lucius Tarutius of Firma, my own personal friend, and a man particularly well acquainted with the Chaldean astrology, traced back the nativity of our own city, Rome, to those equinoctial days of the feast. of Pales in which Romulus is reported to have begun its foundations, and asserted that the moon was at that period in Libra, and on this discovery, he hesitated not to pronounce the destinies of Rome. | Oh, the mighty power of delusion! Is even the birth-day of a city subject to the influence of the stars and moon? Granting even that the condition of the heavens, when he draws his first breath, may influence the life of a child, does it follow that it can have any effect on brick or cement, of which a city is composed?
Why need I say more? Such ideas as these are refuted every day. How many of these Chaldean prophecies do I remember being repeated to Pompey, Crassus, and to Cesar himself! according to which, not one of these heroes was to die except in old age, in domestic felicity, and perfect renown; so that I wonder that any living man can yet believe in these impostors, whose predictions they see falsified daily by facts and results.
XLVIII. It only remains for us now to examine those two sorts of divination which you term natural, as distinguished from artificial—namely, vaticinations and dreams. With your permission, brother Quintus, we will now treat of these.
I shall be very well pleased to hear you, (answered Quintus,) for I entirely agree with all you have hitherto advanced, and, to tell you the truth, although I have had my feelings on the subject strengthened by your arguments, yet of my own accord I looked upon the opinion of the Stoics respecting divination as rather too superstitious, and was more inclined to favour the arguments which have been adduced by the Peripatetics, and the ancient Diczarchus, and Cratippus, who now flourishes, who all maintain that there exists in the minds of men a certain oracular and prophetic power of presentiment, whereby they anticipate future events, whether they are inspired with a divine ecstasy, or are as it were disengaged from the body, and act freely and easily during sleep. I wish therefore to know what is your opinion DE NAT. ETC. R 243 ON DIVINATION. e respecting these vaticinations and dreams, and by what ingenious devices you mean to invalidate them.
When Quintus had thus spoken, I proceeded again to speak, starting afresh, as it were, from a new beginning.
1 am very well aware, brother Quintus, I replied, that you have always entertained doubts respecting the other kinds of divination; but that you are very favourable to the two natural kinds—namely, ecstasy and dreams, which appear to proceed from the mind when at liberty.
XLIX. J will therefore tell you my idea very candidly respecting these two species of divination, after I have examined a little the sentiment of the Stoics, and especially of our friend Cratippus, on this subject. For you said that Cratippus, Diogenes, and Antipater summed up the question in this manner:—“If there are Gods, and they do not inform men beforehand respecting future events, either they do not love men, or do not know what is going to happen; or they think that the knowledge of the future would be of no service to mankind; or they believe it inconsistent with the majesty of Gods to reveal to men the things that must come to pass; or, lastly, we must believe that even the Gods themselves are incapable of declaring them. But we cannot say that the Gods do not love man, for they are essentially benevolent and philanthropic. And they cannot be ignorant of those things, which they themselves have appointed and designed: neither can it be uninteresting or unimportant to us to know what must happen to us, for we should be more prudent if we did know. Nor can the Gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to advertise men of: future events, for nothing can be more sublime than doing good. Nor are they unable to perceive the future beforehand. If, therefore, there are no Gods, they do not declare the future to us; but there are Gods, therefore they do declare. And if the Gods declare future events to us, they must have furnished us with means whereby we may apprehend them, otherwise they would declare them in vain; and if they have given us the means of apprehending divination, then there is a divination for us to apprehend—therefore there is a divination.”.
O acutest of men, in what concise terms do they think that they have settled the question for ever! They assume premises to draw their conclusion from, not one of which is granted to them. But the only conclusion of an argument which can be approved, is one in which the point doubted of is established by facts which are not doubtful.
L. Do you not see how Epicurus, whom the Stoics forsooth term a blunderer, reasons in order to prove that the universe is infinite in the very nature of things? That which is finite, says he, has an end. Every one will concede this.. Whatever has an end, may be seen externally from something else. This also may be granted him. Now that which includes all, cannot be discerned externally from anything else. This proposition likewise appears undeniable. Therefore that which includes all, having no end, is necessarily infinite. Thus by the proposition which we are compelled to admit, he clearly proves the point in question.
Now this is just what you dialecticians have not yet done in favour of divination; and you notonly bring forward no proposition as your premises, so self-evident as to be universally admitted; but you assume such premises as, even if they be granted, your desired conclusion would be as far as ever from following. For instance, your first proposition is this: If there are Gods they must needs be benevolent. Who will grant you this? Will Epicurus, who asserts that the Gods do not care about any business of their own or of others? or will our own countryman Ennius, who was applauded. by all the Romans, when he said—.
I’ve always argued that the Gods exist, But that they care for mortals I deny; and then gives reasons for his opinion; but it is not necessary to quote him further. I have said enough to show that your friends assume as certain, propositions which are matters of doubt and controversy.
LI. The next proposition is this, That the Gods must needs know all things, because they have made all things.. But how great a dispute is there as to this fact among the most learned men, several of whom deny that all things were created by the immortal Gods!
Again, they assert, that it is the interest of man to know those things which are about to come to pass. But Dicearchus has written a great book to prove that ignorance of futurity is better than knowledge of futurity.
~~ They deny that it is inconsistent with the majesty of the Gods to look into every man’s house, forsooth, so as to see what is expedient for each individual. Nor is it possible, say they, for them to be ignorant of the future. This is denied by those who will not allow that what is future can be certain. Do not you see, therefore, that they have assumed as certain and admitted axioms, things which are doubtful?
After which, they twist the argument about and sum it up thus: “ Therefore, there are no Gods; and they do not grant men intimations of the future.” And, having settled the question thus, to their own satisfaction, they add, “ But there are Gods;” a fact which is not admitted by all men; “therefore, they do grant intimations.” Even that consequence { cannot see; for they may grant no intimations of the future and yet exist as Gods.
Again, it is asserted; If the Gods grant intimations to men respecting future events, they must grant some means of explaining these intimations. But surely the contrary may be the case; for the Gods may keep to themselves the meaning of the signs which they impart to men; for else, why should they teach it to the Etrurians rather than to the Romans?: Again, they argue, that if the Gods have given men the means of understanding the signs they impart, then the existence of divination is manifest. But grant that the Gods do give such means, what does it avail, if we happen to be incapable of receiving them?
Last of all, their conclusion is; Therefore, there certainly is such a thing as divination. It may be their conclusion, but it is not proved; for, as they themselves have taught us, “ false premises cannot produce a true result.” Therefore, the whole conclusion falls to the ground.
- LIT. Let us now consider the arguments of that most excellent man, our friend Cratippus. As, says he, the use and function of sight cannot exist without the eyes—and yet the eyes do not always perform their office,—and, as he who has once enjoyed correct sight, so as to see what truly exists, is conscious of the reality of vision;—so, if the practice of divination cannot exist without the power of divination—-and though in the exercise of this power of divination some errors may occur, and the diviner may be misled so as not to foresee.
the truth; yet the existence of divination is sufficiently attested by the fact that some true divinations have been made, containing such exact predictions of all the particulars of future events, that they can never have been made by chance, —of which numerous instances might be cited. The existence of divination must therefore be admitted.
The argument is neatly and concisely stated. But Cratippus twice assumes what he wishes to prove; and even if we were willing to grant him very large concessions, we could not possibly agree with his conclusions.
His argument is this: Though the eyes should sometimes possess very imperfect sight, yet, provided they sometimes see clearly, it is evident that the power of vision is in them. On the same principle, if any one has ever once uttered a true divination, he must always be considered as Sopciewon the faculty of divining, even when he blunders.
LIII. Now I entreat you, my dear Cratippus, to consider how little is the resemblance between these two cases. To me there is none at all. The eyes which see clearly exert no more than their natural faculty of sight. But minds, if they have sometimes truly foreseen future events, either in ecstasies or dreams, have done so by fortune and accident; unless, indeed, you imagine those who believe that dreams are but dreams, will grant you that when they happen to dream anything that is true, it is no longer the effect of chance.
_ But we may concede for the present these two assumptions of Cratippus, which the Greek dialecticians would call lemmata. But we prefer speaking in Latin; still the presump~ tion, which they term prolepsis, cannot be granted.
Cratippus goes on assuming premises in this manner: There are, says he, presentiments innumerable which are not.
fortuitous. Now this we absolutely deny. See how great is..