$2 he was arrayed in the robes of Timandra his mistress?) What. relation could this have with the event which afterwards happened to him; when, being slain and cast naked into the street and abandoned by all the world, his mistress took off her mantle and covered his dead body with it? Was this then fixed as a piece of futurity, and had it natural causes, or was it mere accident that the dream was seen, and came true?
LXX. Do not the conjectures of the interpreters of dreams _ rather indicate the subtlety of their own talents, than any natural sympathy and correspondence in the nature of things?
A runner, who intended to run in the Olympic games, dreamed during the night that he was being driven in a chariot drawn by four horses. In the morning he applied to an interpreter. He replied to him, You will win: that is what is intimated by the strength and swiftness of the horses. He then applied: to Antiphon, who said to him, By your dream it appears that you must lose the race; for do you not see that four reached the goal before you?
Here is another story respecting an athlete; and the books of Chrysippus and Antipater are full of such stories, However, [ will return to the runner, He then went to a soothsayer and informed him that he had just dreamed that he was changed into an eagle. You have won your race (said the seer), for this eagle is the swiftest of all birds. He also went to Antiphon, who said to him, You will certainly be conquered; for the eagle chases and drives other birds which fly before it, and consequently is always behind the rest.
A certain matron, who was very anxious to have children, and who doubted whether she was pregnant or not, dreamed one night that her womb was sealed up; she, therefore, asked a soothsayer whether her dream signified her pregnancy? He said, No; for the sealing implied, that there could be no conception. But another whom she consulted said, that her — dream plainly proved her pregnancy; for vessels that have. nothing in them are never sealed at all. How delusive, then, is this conjectural art of those interpreters! Or do these stories that I have recited, and a host of similar ones which. - the Stoics have collected, prove anything else but the subtlety of men, who, from certain imaginary analogies of things, arrive at all sorts of opposite conclusions? | _ Physicians derive certain indications from the veins and.
breath of a sick man; and have many other symptoms by which they judge of the future. So, when pilots see the cuttlefish leaping, and the dolphins betaking themselves to the harbours, they recognise these indications as sure signs of an approaching storm. Such signs may be easily explained by reference to the laws of nature; but those which I was mentioning just now cannot possibly be accounted for in the same manner. | LXXI. But the defenders of divination reply, (and this is the last objection I shall answer,) that a long continuance of observations has-created an art. Can, then, dreams be experimented on? And if so, how? for the varieties of them are innumerable. Nothing can be imagined so preposterous, so incredible, or so monstrous, as to be beyond our power of dreaming. And by what method can this infinite variety be either fixed in memory or analysed by reason?
Astrologers have observed the motion of the planets, for a certain order and regularity in the course of these stars has been discovered which was not suspected, But tell me, what order or regularity can be discerned in dreams? How can true dreams be distinguished from false ones; since the same dreams are followed by different results to different people, and, indeed, are not always attended by the same events in the case of. the same persons?
For this reason I am extremely surprised that, though people have wit enough to give no credit to a notorious liar, even when he speaks the truth, they still, if one single dream has turned out true, do not so much distrust one single case because of the numbers of instances in which they have been found false, as think multitudes of dreams established because of the ascertained truth of this one. | If, then, dreams do not come from God, and if there are — no objects in nature with which they have a necessary sympathy and connexion, and if it is impossible by experiments and observations to arrive at a sure interpretation of them, the consequence is, that dreams are not entitled to any. credit or respect whatever.: And this I say with the greater confidence, since those very persons who experience these dreams cannot by any means understand them, and those persons who pretend to interpret them, do so by conjecture, not by demonstration, And in the infinite series of ages, chance has produced many more extraordinary results in every kind of thing than it has in dreams; nor can anything be more uncertain than that conjectural interpretation of diviners, which admits not only of several, but often of absolutely contrary senses.
7 LXXII. Let us reject; therefore, this divination of dreams, as well as all other, kinds. F or, to speak truly, that superstition has extended itself through all nations, and has oppressed the intellectual energies of almost all men, and has betrayed them into endless imbecilities: as I argued in my treatise on the Nature of the Gods, and as I have especially laboured to prove in this dialogue on Divination. Hor I thought that I shouldbe doing an immense benefit both “to myself.and to my countrymen if I could entirely eradicate all those superstitious errors.
Nor is there any fear that true religion can be endangered by the demolition. of this superstition; for it is the part of a wise man to uphold the religious institutions of our ancestors, by the maintenance of their rites and ceremonies. And the beauty of the world and the order of all celestial things compels us to confess that there is. an excellent and eternal mature which deserves'to be worshipped and admired by all mankind.
_ Wherefore, as this religion which is united with the knowledge of nature is to ‘be propagated, so also are all the roots of superstition to be destroyed. For it presses upon, and pur-‘sues, and persecutes you wherever you turn yourself,—whether you consult a diviner, or have heard an omen, or have immolated a victim, or beheld a flight.of birds; whether you have seen a Chaldean or a soothsayer; if it lightens or thunders, or if anything is struck by lightning; if any kind of prodigy occurs; some of which events must be frequently coming to pass; so that you can never rest with a tranquil mind.
_ Sleep seems to be the universal refuge from all labours and anxieties. And yet even from this many cares and perturba-‘tions spring forth which, indeed, would of themselves have no influence, and would rather be despised, if certain philosophers ‘had not taken dreams under their special patronage; and those, too, not philosophers of the lowest order, but men of — vast learning, and remarkable penetration into the conse-‘quences and inconsistencies of things, men who are looked pon as absolute and perfect masters of all science. Nay, if Carneades had not resisted their extravagances, I hardly know whether they would not by this time have been reckoned the only philosophers worthy of the name. And it is with those men that nearly all our controversy and dispute respecting divination is mainly waged; not because we think meanly of their wisdom, but because they appear to defend _ their theories with the greatest acuteness and cautiousness. But, as it is the peculiar property of the Academy to interpose no personal judgment of its own, but to admit those opinions which appear most probable, to compare arguments, and to set forth all that may be reasonably stated in favour of each proposition; and so, without putting forth any authority of its own, to leave the judgment of the hearers free and unprejudiced; we will retain this custom, which has been handed down from Socrates; and this method, dear brother Quintus, if you please, we will adopt as often as possible in all our dialogues together. Indeed, said he, nothing can be more agreeable to me. Having held these conversations we went away..
PREFACE BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
Or all the treatises on Fate which have come down to us from antiquity, this essay of Cicero’s is the most valuable. Cicero regards Fate or Destiny as the decree of God, the dictum of Providence. But he supposes that it is essentially conditional, and it goes hand in hand with free-will, since free-will is one condition of Fate itself. He therefore agrees with the fathers of the first three centuries in their doctrine of free-will, so admirably explained by Erasmus and Leibnitz, While on one side he defends the decrees of Deity, on the other he defends the liberty of man in a qualified sense, and rescues his readers at once from impiety and fatalism. In this brief treatise will be found the germs of most of the arguments that have been so elaborately extended by more recent writers, who, while they have done much to elucidate the subject, have done yet more to obscure it.
[Zhe commencement of this treatise is lost. | I. * %* * Hat branch of philosophy which, because it relates to manners, the Greeks usually term ethies,! the Latins have hitherto called the philosophy of manners. But it may be well for one who designs to enrich the Latin language, to call it moral science. And here we have to explain the nature and force of certain propositions which the Greeks term axioms (agupara). When these propositions relate to -the future, and speak of possibilities and impossibilities, it is difficnlt to determine their precise force. Such propositions necessarily refer to the amount of possibility, and are only resolvable by logic, which I call the art of reasoning. But T cannot avail myself in this essay on Fate of the method I employed in that other style of mine in which I discussed the Nature of the Gods, or in the book which I published on the doctrine of Divination: in which treatises the sentiments of each philosophic school are explained in a continuous discourse; in order that each reader might the more easily adopt that opinion which appeared to him the more probable. In the present work I am compelled to adopt another mode of argumentation, for the following reason.— For when [ was spending some time at Puteoli, Hirtius 1 From 760s.
\ 1 From 760s.
\ Pansa, the consul elect, and a most intimate friend of my own, who was greatly devoted to these studies, which have been my delight from childhood upwards, was there too, and we were a great deal together, and the principal topic of our * conferences was the best method of establishing peace and concord among our fellow-citizens. For after Czsar’s death certain individuals sought every pretext to excite new disturbances, and we were extremely anxious to prevent and frustrate their machinations, and nearly all our conversations were devoted to those deliberations; and one day when [ was more at leisure than usual, and less interrupted by visits, Hirtius called to see me, and our discourse turned on the daily, and I may almost say legitimate subject of peace and tranquillity. 7; II. And after some time, he said,—Since you have not, as I hope, abandoned your oratorical studies, my; Cicero, and though you have no doubt preferred philosophy to them, I should like to hear you now illustrate some leading philosophical problem. You may, replied I, either hear me discuss such, or argue it yourself; for you are quite right in supposing that I have not abandoned my oratorical studies, for which I have also been the means of exciting your own inclination; although I partially found you originally very much attached to it; nor, in fact, do the philosophical studies in which I am now most interested, impair that faculty, but I may rather say that they increase it. For the orator has a great affinity to this system of philosophy which we follow; for he borrows subtlety from the Academy, and in return he imparts to it a certain richness of expression, and copiousness of ornament. Therefore, continued I, since we are equally possessed of oratory and philosophy, your choice shall determine the subject of our conversation.
What you say, replied Hirtius, is very pleasing to me, and like everything that you utter, for your inclinations are never at variance with my desires. But as I have been already largely instructed in oratory, and have heard you often, and am likely again to hear you enlarge on the rhetorical art, and as I see by your Tusculan Disputations that you have adopted the Academic method of investigation, by arguing against all propositions; I will therefore now, -if you have no objection, propose a subject on which I am 266 ON FATE, eager to ‘have your opinion. Can I, I replied, find any.objection to anything which will give you pleasure? Do not, however, forget that Iam ‘a Roman,:and as such naturally timid when approaching this kind of argument, and recurring to such studies only after a long interval, and discussing metaphysical:topics. I will listen to you, repilied he, while you speak on this intricate topic, with the same friendly disposition ri which I read your writing; so begin.! 4 ILI. Let us consider here Ris Breol sc Gms of which, as in the case of Antipater the poet, or of those who are born on the day of the winter solstice, or of two brothers whoare illat the same time, or as in the urime, or the nails, and other things of the same kind, the influence of nature prevails, which IT am far from denying;; I only say that there is here no appearance of fate, In other cases, some things may be purely fortuitous; as in that case.of shipwreck in the adventures of Icadius and Daphitas. Some of these stories indeed (if T may thus speak without offence to my master) appear to be the invention of Posidonius, and some are downright absurd.
For what shall I say ’—ifit was the fate of Daphitas to fall from a horse and to lose his life by the fall, still can he have been predestined to fall from this:particular horse, which was no horse at all, but only a rock which was called “The Horse?” And when the oracle warned Philip to beware of a four-horsed chariot, did it signify that miniature chariot carved on the handle:of the sword which slew him? Why should we be surprised. that a.certain nameless person after having escaped shipwreck was drowned ina river? When the oracle forewarned him.that he should perish by water, did it indicate the particular stream which proved fatal to him? And in the adventure of the robbed Icadius, I see no trace of what you call destiny, for no special prediction was fulfilled in his death. {1.is nothing very wonderful that a piece of rock from the cavern should haye fallen on his legs; for I suppose that, this rock would still have fallen if Icadius had not been in the cavern just.atthat time. For-either there is nothing whatever fortuitous, or else such an accident as this may have been such,. J ask ’ then—and this principle is capable of extensive apeiieshion—sf there were absolutely no such name, no such nature, and no ‘such influence asthat of. 2 A good deal: of the. original is lostuhere, ©...|: ON FATE, QT ee Fate, and if, as a general rule, the majority of events, or every event, happened at random and by chance, would they happen otherwise than they do? Why then should we always resort to Fate, when without any such principle the cause.of every event may be fairly referred to nature, or to fortune?
IV. Let us, however, as we fairly may, dismiss Pos! donius, without any offence to him, and turn our attention to the sophisms of Chrysippus. And first let us answer those difficulties which he finds in the sympathy of things; and his other objections we will take afterwards. In the climates of different countries we observe a great variety; some are healthy, others unwholesome. In some, the animal constitution becomes phlegmatic,.and as it were exuberant; in others, dry and arid. And there area.great many other very considerable differences between place and place. At Athens the air is delicate, which is supposed to render the Athenians clever. In Thebes it ‘is gross and heavy, and the Beotians are proverbially sturdy and stupid. Yet the subtle air of Attica cannot be the cause why some:pupils follow Zeno, others Arcesilas, others Theophrastus. And the density of the Theban atmosphere can never cause a Theban athlete to aim at victory in the Nemean games rather than in the Isthmian. And tocome nearer home,—what influence cap.
the nature of our climate have to make me prefer a walk in the portico of Pompey, rather than in the field of Mars? and in your society, rather than that of another? or at the period of the ides, rather than ‘the calends? As, then, the nature of the situations has some effect upon some things, ‘and none upon others, so also the influence of ‘the stars may, if you please, account for some phenomena, but certainly not for all. But, Chrysippus would reply, since there are dissimilarities in the natures of men, so that some persons like sweet things, others prefer what is bitter; some are libidinous, others irascible, or cruel, or proud, while others recoil from such faults; since, then, he would say, one constitution is so different from another, what is the wonder if these diversities result from different causes?
V. While he argues: in this way, he shows that he dans not understand the true question, nor its principal difficulties. For, allowing that ‘different men. haye different inclinations, owing to anterior natural causes, yet it does not follow on that account that the causes of our wills and desires are also natural and anterior, for if that were the case nothing whatever would be in our own power. At present we confess that it does not depend upon ourselves to be clever or stupid, robust or weak; but he who thinks that it therefore follows that it does not depend upon our own will whether we shall sit or walk, is plainly ignorant of what consequences flow from what premises. For although it may be owing to antecedent causes that men are born clever or stupid, powerful or weak, still it does not follow that it is defined and settled by prin-_ cipal causes, whether they are to sit, or walk, or do any particular thing.
Stilpo, a philosopher of Megara, a particularly shrewd man, and famous enough in his day, was, according to.the account of his friends, vehemently addicted to wine and women. Nor do they mention this to diminish his credit, but to illustrate his virtue; for they assert that his philosophy so tamed and subdued his vicious nature that no one ever saw in him the slightest trace of drunkenness or debauchery. Need I say more? Have we not all heard what judgment Zopyrus, the physiognomist, who had pretended to ascertain the dispositions and habits of men by the inspection of their bodies, countenances, foreheads, and eyes, pronounced upon Socrates, affirming that he was stupid and dull, because his throat was protuberant, saying that these parts were obstructed and blocked up? He added that Socrates was decidedly lascivious respecting women; at which Alcibiades is reported to have laughed heartily. But such vicious inclinations may arise from natural causes, and yet for them to be so extirpated and entirely eradicated, that a person who was originally inclined to them may have wholly repressed their influence, would not depend so much on natural causes as on energy of will, study and discipline; all which things are discarded if the power and nature of fate is to be confirmed on principles of divination.
VI. If you insist on the reality of divination, I once more ask, from what perceptions of art does it proceed 3 I call those things perceptions, which the Greeks call theorems (Gewphpara). “For I do not suppose that any other workmen employ no perceptions in their work, or that those who use a divination can really predict futurity. The axioms of the astrologers, then, are something of this sort; “If any one,” say they, ‘is born at the period when the dog-star rises, he will never be drowned in the sea.” Take care, Chrysippus, and defend your cause as well as you can, for Diodorus, a powerful logician, will have a great contest with you on this subject. For if the argument thus connectedly stated be true—If any one is born at the rising of the dog-star, he shall not perish in the sea; then it is true—If Fabius was born at the rising of the dog-star, Fabius could not perish in the sea. There is, therefore, a contradiction between these two clauses, that Fabius was born at the rising of the dogstar, and that Fabius will die in the sea. This conjunction, then, consists of repugnant clauses,—Fabius does exist, and Fabius will die in the sea; which, in the way in which it was stated, is impossible: therefore, this statement, that Fabius will die in the sea, is of that kind which is impossible. Every proposition, then, relative to the future, which is false, in fact must be regarded as impossible.?
VII. This consequence, however, is by no means agreeable to you, O Chrysippus, and this very point is your main dispute with Diodorus: for this philosopher only admits that to be possible which is either true or will be true; and whatever will be true, that he says is unavoidable; and whatever will not be true, that he says is impossible. You both regard as possible that which will never happen, as, for instance, that this precious stone may be broken, though it never will be; and you deny that it was inevitable that Cypselus should reign at Corinth, although Apollo’s oracle had predicted such a fact a thousand years before. But if you approve of these divine predictions, then you will also look upon what are falsely predicted as future events, as things which itisimpossibleshould — come to pass—as, for instance, if it were said that Scipio Africanus shall conquer Africa, and if this statement is realized, — then you must assert that it was unavoidable; and this agrees with the opinion of Diodorus which is opposed to yours. But if that conditional proposition is true, If you are born at the rising of the dog-star, you can never be drowned in the sea; and if the first clause of this proposition is necessary (for in past propositions all statements which are true are necessary, according to Chrysippus, who disagrees with his master ue Cleanthes, because they are immutable, and because what is past cannot be changed from true to false)—if the first member of the conditional proposition be necessary, the consequent is also necessary: although Chrysippus denies the universal applicability of this principle. Still, however, if there is any natural cause why Fabius will not die in the sea, then Fabius cannot die in the sea.
VIII. On this topic Chrysippus exerts all his ingenuity. He pretends that the Chahdeans are deceived as much as other diviners; and that they cannot avail themselves of conditional propositions like the foregoing—“If any one is born under the dog-star he cannot be drowned in the sea.” He would rather have them announce the prognostic in. this fashion,—‘ It is not the case that if any one is born under the dog-star he will be drowned in the sea.” What an excellent joke! Rather than agree with the rational Diodorus, he sets about instructing the Chaldeans how they should frame their responses. I ask, then, if the Chaldeans should. allow themselves to change affirmative indefinites into negative indefinite conjunctives, why may not the professors of medicine and mathematics, and other sciences, do the same?
Above all men the physician will no longer propose what he is certain of in his.art in this fashion, “If any man’s veins are agitated in this manner, he has a fever;” but thus, “This man’s veins are not agitated in this way, and therefore, he has not a fever.” Again, the mathematician will no longer say, “In the sphere, when we describe great circles, they divide themselves into equal parts in the centre;” but rather, “It is not the case that when we do describe great circles in the sphere, they do not divide themselves into equal parts in the centre.” What proposition is there which, by _ the employment of such means, cannot be changed from a — conditional. affirmative into a negative conjunctive? And, indeed, we might bring out the same results in other’ manners, I said just now—* In the sphere great circles’ divide themselves equally in the centre:” I might say, “Inthe sphere great circles will be formed;” or I might say, “ Because in the sphere great circles will be formed.” There are many ways of enunciating a proposition, but there is no more — distorted one than that which Chrysippus wishes the Chaldeans to put up with in order to please. But there is no Pe | ON FATE. a7 danger of their adopting it; for it would be harder to understand these contortions of phraseology, than to learn with precision the rising and setting of every star in the heavens. gaia IX. But let us return to the question concerning possibility, so warmly contested by Diodorus, in which the question is examined, What is the signification of the term possible? Diodorus asserts that nothing is possible, except what either is true or is going to be so. This statement comes to this, that nothing happens which is not unavoidable; and that every thing which is possible either exists now, or will exist; and that things future, being certain, can no more be changed from true to false than things past; but that in things already past, the impossibility of change is very apparent; but that in things future, as they do not yet appear, we cannot equally discern that immutability. For instance, we may say with truth, of a person attacked by a mortal disease— ‘This person will die of this malady; and if this same thing were to: be said with equal truth of another person in whom the same violence of disease is not apparent, it will certainly happen as well as it will in the case of the other. Hence, we affirm that even in the case of future things, for instance, there cannot possibly be any change from true to false. This proposition, “Scipio will die,” has such force, that although we announce a future event, it is still such an one that it cannot be converted into a falseone, for it is said of a man, and all men are sure to die. | ‘But if it were said, “Scipio will die in his bed during the night by the hand of his enemy,” it might still be said with truth, as it might be about to happen; but it can only be known — to have been about to happen from the fact that it has happened. Norwas it more true to say, Scipio will die, than to -say, Scipio will die in such and such a manner; and his death itself was not less inevitable than the circumstances which attended it. Nor was it more possible to alter from true to false, the statement of, “Scipio has been slain,” than this, “Scipio will be slain.” Nor, since this is the case, do I see any reason why Epicurus has such a horror of Fate or Destiny, and why he flies for assistance to his atoms, and leads them out of the way, and why he endeavours to establish two inexplicable principles at the same time: first, that anything is 272 ON FATE, produced. without cause, from which it will follow that nothing can produce something; an opinion adopted neither by Epicurus himself nor by any other natural philosopher: secondly, that when two atoms move in empty space, one proceeds in a right line, and the other in an oblique, For Kpicurus, granting as he does that every proposition is either true or false, ought not to have hesitated to admit that everything eventually takes places in consequence of Fate. For there are no natural causes flowing from the necessity of things which determine the truth of this proposition. Carneades came down into the Academy. This fact was.not without its causes; but we must distinguish between those antecedent causes which depend on chance, and those efficient causes which contain a physical energy and influence. Thus this proposition was always true and certain, “ Epicurus will die at the age of seventy-two, in the Archonship of Pitharatus.” And yet there were no fatal causes which determined this event: but since it took place we may be sure that it necessarily happened in the way it did. And those who affirm that things future are immutable, and that things true and certain cannot become false and uncertain, ought not to be regarded as the partisans of strict fatalism, since they are only explaining the meaning of words. But those philosophers who introduce a chain of eternal causes of absolute necessity, despoil the human soul of its free-will, and bind it hand and foot in the necessity of fate.
X. This is all that we need say concerning possibility. Let us pass on to other matters.