equity. And, last of all, come the people, who cry with a loud voice, that they will render obedience neither to the one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles © are deprived of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent, the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the best.
Lelius.—I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point undetermined.
XXXVI. Scipio.—We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty bound to begin with Jupiter.
Lelius.—Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which resembles that poem? ~ Scipio.— Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our investigations than by invoking him, whom, with one voice, both learned and. unlearned extol: as the universal king of all gods and men.
How so? said Leelius.
Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states for the benefit of society, that there might. be believed to exist one Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many witnesses, ‘if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations have unanimously recognised, by the decrees of their chiefs, that nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the gods are governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report. ~ What men do you mean? said Leelius.
Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have arrived at the opinion that the pre universe [is anis rome - a _— Mind? yaa voRh uk) VA | ' Here four pages are Yet PMs AS td ON THE COMMONWEALTH. 8r1 _XXXVII. But if you please, my Leclius, I will bring ated evidences, which are neither too’ ancient, nor in any respect barbarous.
Those, said Leelius, are what I want.
Scipio.—You are aware, that it is now not four centuries ‘since this city of ours has been without kings. Leelius.—You are correct, it is less than four centuries.
Scipio.—Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of ‘a state or city; is ita ‘long time?
Lelius.—It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.
Scipio.— You say truly, and yet not four centuries have elapsed since there was a king in Rome.
Lelius.— And he was a proud king.
Scipio.—But who was his predecessor?
Leelius—He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the same praise on all his predecessors, as far back as Romulus, who reigned about six centuries ago, Scypio.—Even he, then, is not very ancient.: Lelius.—No, he reioned when Greece was already becoming old.
Scipio. —Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous people?
Leelius.— Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.
Then Scipio said—But with respect to the present question, we do not so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government of kings, you will confess that | am producing authorities that are neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.
XXXVIII. Then Lelius said—I see, Scipio, that you are: very sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as. with every fair judge, authorities are worth less than ar guments.
Scipio replied—Then, Leelius, you shall yourself make use of an argument derived from your own senses.
. Leelius.—What senses do you mean?
Scipio.—The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen to feel angry with any one.
_ Lelius.—That happens rather oftener than I could wish.
Scipio.—Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to triumph over your judgment?
No, by Hercules! said Leelius, I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward—é Ah! you unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am in a rage with you.’
Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a kind of sedition and rebellion of nature, which he sought to appease by reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when conscience reigns, it allows no resting place to lust, violence, or temerity.
Lelius.—You have spoken the truth.
Scipto.—Well then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your approbation?
Leelius.—More than anything upon earth.
Scipio. — Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal propensities should assume an ascendancy over us?
Lelius.— For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.
Scipio.—You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them all?
Lelius.—Certainly, that is my wish..
Scipio.—How then can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject of the commonwealth? in which, if the state is thrown into many hands, it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority: for if power be not united, it soon comes to nothing.
XXXIX. Then Lealius asked— But what difference i is there, I should like to know, between the ones and the many, if justice exists equally in many 4 And Scipio said—Since I see, my Leelius, that the authorities I have adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.
In what way, said Leelius, are you going to make me again support your argument?
Scipio.—Why thus. I recollect when we were ite; at, Formie, that you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one master only.
Leelius.—To be sure, those of my steward.
Scipio.—What do you at home? do you commit your affairs to the hands of many persons?
Leelius.—No, I trust them to myself alone.
Serpio.—Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master but yourself?
Lelius.—N ot one.
Scipio.—Then I think you must grant me that as respects the state, the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is superior to any other.
Lelius.—You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain very nearly that opinion.
XL. And Scipio said—You would still further agree with me, my Leelius, if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I should come at once to more illustrious examples, Lelius.—What examples do you mean?
_ Scipio.—Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one single Tarquin only, that made the title of ring unpopular among the Romans?
Lelius.—Yes, I acknowledge that, Scipio.—You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of liberty. Then, innocent men were driven into banishment; then the estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took S14.ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
-place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders ensued; and lastly, those proceedings which tended to ‘place all powers in the hands of the populace.
Leelius.—1 must confess this is all too true.
All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and tranquillity, for licence is wont to prevail when ‘there is little to fear, as in a calm voyage, or a trifling disease. But as we observe the voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director, as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming; so our nation in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as ‘Kings; for public safety is after all rather more valuable than popular licence. And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief, without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the absolute character of his power. For though he is evidently called dictator be-‘cause he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe him, ‘my Leelius, in our sacred books entitled (Magister Populi) the master of the people.
This is certainly the case, said Leelius. i Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely. * * * XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as ‘Ennius says, after the death of one of the best of mon-‘archs—, They hold his memory dear, and in the warmth _ Of their discourse, they cry—O Romulus!
O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars To be thy country’s guardian! 0 our sire!
Be our protector still, O heaven-begot. ' Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced them their country’s guardians, their fathers, and their gods. Nor indeed without cause, for they added— Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.
And truly they believed that life and honour and: glory had arisen to them from the justice of their king. ‘The same good-will would doubtless have remained in their cepwidents, 1 Two pages are missing here.
if the same virtues had been preserved on*the-throne, but, as ‘you see, by the injustice of one man the whole of that kind -of constitution fell into ruin.
I see it indeed, said Leelius, and I long to kde the bikery of these political revolutions both in. our own Commonwealth, and in every other.
XLII. And Seipio saidLWhen I shall have egphineds my opinion respecting the form: of. govertiment which I prefer, ‘I shall be able to speak to you more accurately respecting the revolutions of states, though I think that ‘such will not take place so easily in the mixed form of government which I ‘recommend. With respect, however, to absolute monarchy, ‘it presents an inherent and invincible tendency to revolution. No sooner does a king begin to be unjust, than this entire form of government is demolished, and he at once becomes -a tyrant, which is the worst of all eovernments, and one very ‘closely related to monarchy. If this state falls into the hands of the nobles, which is the usual course of events, it becomes an aristocracy, or the second of the three kinds of constitutions which I have described. For -it is, as it were, a royal, that is to say, a paternal council of the chief men of the. state consulting for the public benefit. Or if the people ‘by itself -has expelled or slain a tyrant, it is moderate in its conduct as ‘long as it has sense and wisdom, and while it rejoices in its exploit, and applies itself to maintaining the constitution. which it has established. But if ever the people has raised ‘its forces against a just king, and robbed him of his throne, or, as has frequently happened, has tasted the blood of its legitimate nobles, and subjected the whole commonwealth to its own licence, you can imagine no flood or conflagration so terrible, or any whose violence is harder to appease, than this unbridled insolence of the populace.
XLIII. Then we see realized that which Plato so vividly describes, if I can but express it in our language. It is by no means easy to do it justice in translation: however, I will try.. | - When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace - are fired with the thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on ‘by evil ministers, drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated licence; then the magistrates and chiefs, if they. are not utterly subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down under the title oi despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the passage, Yes, said Leelius, it is familiar to me.
Scipio.— Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to obey the chiefs of the state, are persecuted by the insensate populace, who call them voluntary slaves. But those who, though invested with magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private individuals, and those private individuals who labour to abolish all distinctions between their own classand the magistrates, are extolled with acclamations and overwhelmed with honours, so that it inevitably happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized, that liberalism abounds in all directions, due authority is found wanting even in private families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness it, Then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All modesty is banished; they become far too liberal for that. No difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them, The very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the same rights as their husbands; dogs, horses, and asses, are emancipated in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that they frighten the passengers from the road. At length the termination of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely without any master at all.
Then Lelius said—You have very accurately rendered the ‘Opinions which he expressed.
XLIV. Scipio.—Now to return to the argument of my discourse, It appears that this extreme licence, which is the only liberty in the eyes of the vulgar, is, according to Plato, such that from it as a sort of root tyrants naturally arise and spring up. For as the excessive power of an aristocracy occasions the destruction of the nobles, so this excessive liberalism of democracies brings after it the slavery of the people. Thus we find in the weather, the soil, and the animal constitution, the most favourable conditions are sometimes suddenly converted by their excess into the contrary, and this fact is especially observable in political governments; and this excessive liberty soon brings the people collectively and individually to au excessive servitude. For, as I said, this extreme liberty easily introduces the reign of tyranny, the severest of all unjust slaveries. In fact, from the midst of this unbridled aud capricious populace, they elect some one as a leader in opposition to their afflicted and expelled nobles: some new chief, forsooth, audacious and impure, often insolently persecuting those who have deserved well of the state, and ready to oratify the populace at his neighbour’s expense as well as his own. ‘Then since the private condition is naturally exposed to fears and alarms, the people invest him with many powers, and these are continued in his hands. Such men, like Pisistratus of Athens, will soon find an excuse for surrounding themselves with body-guards, and they will conclude by becoming tyrants over the very persons who raised them to dignity. If such despots perish by the vengeance of the better citizens, as is generally the case, the constitution is re-established. But if they fall by the hands of bold insurgents, then the same faction succeeds them, which is only another species of tyranny. And the same revolution arises from the fair system of aristocracy, when any corruption has betrayed the nobles from the path of rectitude. Thus the power is like the ball, which is flung from hand to hand: it passes from kings to tyrants, from tyrants to the aristocracy, from them to democracy, and from these back again to tyrants and to factions; and thus the same kind of government is seldom long maintained.
XLV. Since these are the facts of experience, royalty is, In my opinion, very far preferable to the three other kinds of political constitutions. But it is itself inferior to that which is composed of an equal mixture of the three best forms of government, united and modified by one another, I wish to establish in a commonwealth a royal and preeminent chief. Another portion of power should be deposited in the hands of the aristocracy, and certain things should be reserved to the judgment and wish of the multitude. This constitution, in the first place, possesses that great equality, without which men cannot long maintain their freedom;—secondly, it offers a great stability, while the particular separate and isolated forms easily fall into their contraries; so that a king is succeeded by a despot,—an aristocracy by a faction,—a democracy by a mob and confusion; aud all these forms are frequently sacrificed to new revolutions. In this united and mixed constitution, however, similar disasters cannot happen without the greatest. vices in public men. For there can be little to occasion revolution in a state, in which every person is firmly established in his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into which we can fall.
XLVI. But I fear, Lelius, and you, my amiable and learned friends, that if I were to dwell any longer on this argument, my words would seem rather like the lessons of a master, and not like the free conversation of one who is uniting with you in the consideration of truth. I shall therefore pass on to those things which are familiar to all, and which I have long studied. And in these matters I believe, I feel, and I affirm, that of all governments, there is none which, either in its entire constitution, or the distribution of its parts; or in the discipline of its manners, is comparable to that which our fathers received from our earliest ancestors, and which they have handed down to us. And since you wish to hear from me a development of this constitution, with which you are all acquainted, I shall endeavour to explain its true character and excellence. Thus keeping my eye fixed on the model of our Roman Commonwealth, I shall endeavour to accommodate to it all that I have to say on the best form of government, And by treating the subject in this way, I think I shall be able to accomplish most satisfactorily the task which Leelius has imposed on me.
XLVI. Lelius,—It is a task most properly and peculiarly your own, my Scipio; for who can speak so well as you either on the subject of the institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from most illustrious ancestors, or on that of the best form of a constitution which, if we possess, (though at this moment we do not, still,) when we do possess such a thing, who will be more flourishing in it than you? or on that of providing counsels for the future, as you, who by dispelling two mighty perils from our city, have provided for its safety for ever? | |!
ON THE COMMONWEALTH. 319.
XLVIII. As our country is the source of the greatest’ benefits, and is a parent dearer than those who have given us life, we owe her still warmer gratitude than belongs to Gur human relations. * Nor would Carthage have continued to flowish ann pee centuries without wisdom and good institutions. * * In truth, says Cicero, although the reasonings of pert men may contain most abundant fountains of science and virtue; still, if we compare them with the achievements and complete actions of statesmen, they will seem not to have been of so much service in the actual business of men as of amusement for their leisure.
BOOK Il. INTRODUCTION BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR, In this second Book of his Commonwealth, Cicero gives us a spirited and eloquent review of the history and successive developments of the Roman constitution. He bestows the warmest praises on its ‘early kings—points out the great advantages which had resulted from its primitive monarchical system, and explains how that system had been graduaily broken up. In order to prove the importance of reviving it, he gives a glowing picture of the evils and disasters that had befallen the Roman state in consequence of that overcharge of democratic folly and violence, which had gradually gained an alarming preponderance, and describes, with a kind of prophetic sagacity, _ the fruit of his political experience, the subsequent revolutions of the Roman state, which such a state of things would necessarily bring about.
I, [Wuen therefore he observed all his friends kindled with the de]sire of hearing him, Scipio thus opened the discussion. I will commence, said Scipio, with a sentiment of old Cato, whom, as you know, I singularly loved and exceedingly admired, and to whom, in compliance with the judgment of 320 ON THE COMMONWEALTH.»
both my parents, and also by my own desire, I was entirely devoted during my youth; of whose discourse, indeed, I could never have enough; so much experience did he possess as a statesman respecting the republic which he had so long governed, both in peace and war, with so much success. There was also an admirable propriety in his style of conversation, in which wit was tempered with gravity; a wonderful apti-. tude for acquiring, and at the same time communicating information,—and_ his life was in perfect correspondence and unison with his language. He used to say that the government of Rome was superior to that of other states; for this reason, because in nearly all of them there had been single individuals, each of whom had regulated their commonwealth according to their own laws and their own ordinances.. So Minos had done in Crete, and Lycurgus in Sparta; and in Athens, which experienced so many revolutions, first: Theseus, then Draco, then Solon, then Clisthenes, afterwards many others; and lastly, when it was almost lifeless and quite prostrate, that great and wise man, Demetrius Phalereus, supported it. But our Roman constitution, on the contrary, did not spring from the genius of one individual, but from that of many; and it was established, not in the lifetime of one man, but in the course of several ages and centuries. For, added he, there never yet existed any genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing at any time to escape its attention, and all the geniuses in the world united in @ single mind, could never, within the limits of a single life, exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize all, without the aid of experience and practice.
Thus, according to Cato’s usual habit, I now ascend in my discourse to the “ Origin of the People,” for I like to adopt the expression of Cato. I shall also more easily execute my proposed task, if I thus exhibit to you our political constitution in its infancy, progress, and maturity, now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary republic.
II. When all had signified their approbation, Scipio resumed:—What commencement of a political constitution can we conceive more brilliant, or more universally known, than the foundation of Rome by the hand of Romulus? and he was the son of Mars: for we may grant this much to the common report existing among men, especially as it is not merely ancient, but one also which has been wisely maintained by our ancestors, in order that those who have done great service to communities, may enjoy the reputation of having received from the gods, not only their genius, but their very birth.
It is related, then, that soon after the birth of Romulus and his brother Remus, Amulius, king of Alba, fearing that they might one day undermine his authority, ordered that they should be exposed on the banks of the Tiber; and that in this situation, the infant Romulus was suckled by a wild beast; that he was afterwards educated by the shepherds, and brought up in the rough way of living and labours of the countrymen; and that he acquired, when he grew up, such superiority over the rest by the vigour of his body and the courage of his soul, that all the people who at that time inhabited the plains in the midst of which Rome now stands, tranquilly and willingly submitted to his government. And when he had made himself the chief of those bands, to come from fables to facts, he took Alba Longa, a powerful and strong city at that time, and slew its king, Amulius.
_ III. Having acquired this glory, he conceived the design (as they tell us) of founding a new city and establishing a new state. As respected the site of his new city, a point which requires the greatest foresight in him who would lay the foundation of a durable commonwealth, he chose the most convenient possible position. For he did not advance too near the sea, which he might easily have done with the forces under his command, either by entering the territory of the Rutuli and Aborigines; or by founding his citadel at the mouth of the Tiber, where many years after Ancus Martius established a colony. But Romulus, with admirable genius and foresight, observed and perceived that sites very near the sea are not the most favourable positions for cities which would attain a durable prosperity and dominion. And this, first, because maritime cities are always exposed, not only to many attacks, but to perils they cannot provide against. For the continued land gives notice, by many indications, not only of any regular approaches, but also of any sudden surprises of an enemy, and announces them beforehand by the mere DE NAT. ETC. b sound. There is no adversary who, on an inland territory, ‘can arrive so swiftly as to prevent our knowing not only his existence, but his character too, and where he comes from. But a maritime and naval enemy can fall upon a town on the sea coast before any one suspects that he is about to come; and when he does come, nothing exterior indicates who he is, or whence he comes, or what he wishes; nor can it even be determined and distinguished on all occasions whether he is a friend or a foe.
IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed to corrupt influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that nothing can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. ‘Those who inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And even when they do not desert their country in person, still their minds are always expatiating and voyaging round the world.
“Neo or, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and dispersion of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and their attention to military pursuits.
The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their position nourishes many expensive and “deceitful gratifications of the passions. And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the Peloponnesus itself is almost wholly on the sea coast; nor, beside the Phliasians, are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond the Peloponnesus, the Ainianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes, are the only inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which, girded by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the institutions and manners of their cities? | And these things, I have before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which fi fi of all those colonies, which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia, Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. For among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people, if. we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the calamities and revolutions of Greece, because she became infected with the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that there is a ereat facility for new inhabitants flocking to them. And again, that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers them a market for their goods. | V. By what divine wisdom then could Romulus embrace all the benefits that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the dangers to which they are exposed, except, as he did, by building his city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant commodities by the same channel? and, in the same river, a communication 1s found by which it not only receives from the sea all the productions necessary to the conveniences and elegances of life, but those also which are brought from the inland districts. So that Romulus seems to me to have divined and anticipated that this city would one day become the centre and abode of | a powerful and opulent empire. For there is no other part of Italy in which a city could be situated so as to be able to maintain so wide a dominion with so much ease.
VI. As to the natural fortifications of Rome, who is so negligent and unobservant as not to have them depicted and deeply stamped on his memory? Such is the plan and direction of the walls, which, by the prudence of Romulus and his royal successors, are bounded on all sides by steep and rugged hills. And the only aperture between the Esquiline and Quirinal mountains is enclosed by a formidable rampart, and surrounded by an immense fosse. And as for our fortified ¥2 ¥2 citadel, it is so secured by a precipitous barrier and énclosure of rocks, that, even in that horrible attack and invasion of the Gauls, it remained impregnable and inviolable. Moreover, the site which he selected had also an abundance of fountains, and was healthy, though it was in the midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills which at once create a current of fresh air, and fling an agreeable shade over the valleys.
VII. These things he effected with wonderful rapidity, and thus established the city, which, from his own name Romulus, he determined to call Rome. And in order to strengthen his new city, he conceived a design, singular enough, and even a little rude, yet worthy of a great man, and of a genius which discerned far away in futurity the means of strengthening his power and his people. The young Sabine females of honourable birth, who had come to Rome, attracted by the public games and spectacles which Romulus then, for the first time, established as annual games in the circus, were suddenly carried off at the feast of Consus' by his orders, and were given in marriage to the men of the noblest families in Rome. And when, on this account, the Sabines had declared war against Rome, the issue of the battle being doubtful and undecided, Romulus made an alliance with Tatius, king of the Sabines, at the intercession of the matrons themselves who had been carried off. By this compact, he admitted the Sabines into the city, gave them a participation in the religious ceremonies, and divided his power with their king.