least in the dialogue Of the Soul Cf. ii. 65 with note. he disparages him by saying that he was not present at the death of Socrates, though he was no farther off than Aegina.
Again, they say that he showed a certain jealousy of Aeschines, because of his reputation with Dionysius, and that, when he arrived at the court, he was despised by Plato because of his poverty, but supported by Aristippus. And Idomeneus asserts that the arguments used by Crito, when in the prison he urges Socrates to escape, are really due to Aeschines, and that Plato transferred them to Crito because of his enmity to Aeschines.
Nowhere in his writings does Plato mention himself by name, except in the dialogue On the Soul Phaedo, 59 b. and the Apology. 34 a. Aristotle remarks that the style of the dialogues is half-way between poetry and prose.
And according to Favorinus, when Plato read the dialogue On the Soul, Aristotle alone stayed to the end; the rest of the audience got up and went away. Some say that Philippus of Opus copied out the Laws, which were left upon waxen tablets, and it is said that he was the author of the Epinomis.
Euphorion and Panaetius relate that the beginning of the Republic was found several times revised and rewritten, and the Republic itself Aristoxenus declares to have been nearly all of it included in the Controversies of Protagoras.
There is a story that the Phaedrus was his first dialogue. For the subject has about it something of the freshness of youth.
Dicaearchus, however, censures its whole style as vulgar.
A story is told that Plato once saw some one playing at dice and rebuked him. And, upon his protesting that he played for a trifle only, "But the habit," rejoined Plato, "is not a trifle." Being asked whether there would be any memoirs of him as of his predecessors, he replied, "A man must first make a name, and he will have no lack of memoirs."
One day, when Xenocrates had come in, Plato asked him to chastise his slave, since he was unable to do it himself because he was in a passion.
Further, it is alleged that he said to one of his slaves, "I would have given you a flogging, had I not been in a passion." Being mounted on horseback, he quickly got down again, declaring that he was afraid he would be infected with horse-pride. He advised those who got drunk to view themselves in a mirror; for they would then abandon the habit which so disfigured them. To drink to excess was nowhere becoming, he used to say, save at the feasts of the god who was the giver of wine. He also disapproved of over - sleeping. At any rate in the Laws 808 b. he declares that "no one when asleep is good for anything." He also said that the truth is the pleasantest of sounds. Another version of this saying is that the pleasantest of all things is to speak the truth. Again, of truth he speaks thus in the Laws 663 e.: "Truth, O stranger, is a fair and durable thing. But it is a thing of which it is hard to persuade men." His wish always was to leave a memorial of himself behind, either in the hearts of his friends or in his books.
He was himself fond of seclusion according to some authorities.
His death, the circumstances of which have already been related, took place in the thirteenth year of the reign of King Philip, as stated by Favorinus in the third book of his Memorabilia, and according to Theopompus The awkwardness of this last clause can be explained, but not excused, if we suppose that Diogenes Laertius got his citation of Theopompus from Favorinus. honours were paid to him at his death by Philip. Cf. Hdt. vi. 39 Myronianus in his Parallels says that Philo mentions some proverbs that were in circulation about Plato's lice, implying that this was the mode of his death.
He was buried in the Academy, where he spent the greatest part of his life in philosophical study. And hence the school which he founded was called the Academic school.
And all the students there joined in the funeral procession. The terms of his will were as follows: "These things have been left and devised by Plato: the estate in Iphistiadae, bounded on the north by the road from the temple at Cephisia, on the south by the temple of Heracles in Iphistiadae, on the east by the property of Archestratus of Phrearrhi, on the west by that of Philippus of Chollidae: this it shall be unlawful for anyone to sell or alienate, but it shall be the property of the boy Adeimantus to all intents and purposes: the estate in Eiresidae which I bought of Callimachus, bounded on the north by the property of Eurymedon of Myrrhinus, on the south by the property of Demostratus of Xypete, on the east by that of Eurymedon of Myrrhinus, and on the west by the Cephisus; three minae of silver; a silver vessel weighing 165 drachmas; a cup weighing 45 drachmas; a gold signet-ring and earring together weighing four drachmas and three obols. Euclides the lapidary owes me three minae. I enfranchise Artemis. I leave four household servants, Tychon, Bictas, Apollonides and Dionysius.
Household furniture, as set down in the inventory of which Demetrius has the duplicate. I owe no one anything.
My executors are Leosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus and Thrasippus."
Such were the terms of his will. The following epitaphs were inscribed upon his tomb Anth.
Pal. vii. 60.: Here lies the god-like man Aristocles, eminent among men for temperance and the justice of his character. And he, if ever anyone, had the fullest meed of praise for wisdom, and was too great for envy.
Next Anth. Pal. vii. 61.: Earth in her bosom here hides Plato's body, but his soul hath its immortal station with the blest, Ariston's son, whom every good man, even if he dwell afar off, honours because he discerned the divine life.
And a third of later date Anth. Pal.
vii. 62.: a. Eagle, why fly you o'er this tomb? Say, is your gaze fixed upon the starry house of one of the immortals?
b. I am the image of the soul of Plato, which has soared to Olympus, while his earth-born body rests in Attic soil.
There is also an epitaph of my own which runs thus Anth. Pal. vii. 108.: If Phoebus did not cause Plato to be born in Greece, how came it that he healed the minds of men by letters?
As the god's son Asclepius is a healer of the body, so is Plato of the immortal soul.
And another on the manner of his death Anth. Pal. vii. 109.: Phoebus gave to mortals Asclepius and Plato, the one to save their souls, the other to save their bodies. From a wedding banquet he has passed to that city which he had founded for himself and planted in the sky.
Such then are his epitaphs.
His disciples were Speusippus of Athens, Xenocrates of Chalcedon, Aristotle of Stagira, Philippus of Opus, Hestiaeus of Perinthus, Dion of Syracuse, Amyclus of Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus of Scepsus, Timolaus of Cyzicus, Euaeon of Lampsacus, Python and Heraclides of Aenus, Hippothales and Callippus of Athens, Demetrius of Amphipolis, Heraclides of Pontus, and many others, among them two women, Lastheneia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phlius, who is reported by Dicaearchus to have worn men's clothes. Some say that Theophrastus too attended his lectures. Chamaeleon adds Hyperides the orator and Lycurgus, and in this Polemo agrees. Sabinus makes Demosthenes his pupil, quoting, in the fourth book of his Materials for Criticism, Mnesistratus of Thasos as his authority.
And it is not improbable. Here begins the first of three appendices, being an introduction to the study of the Platonic writings (47-66).
Freudenthal, in Hell. Stud. iii., has shown that the extant fragment of the *pro/logos of Albinus is similar and probably derived from the same source. Albinus lived in the second century a.d., for in 151-2 Galen was his pupil in Smyrna.
The reader will note the careful style of the preface with its avoidance of hiatus. In x. 29 is a similar personal appeal to the reader.
Now, as you are an enthusiastic Platonist, and rightly so, and as you eagerly seek out that philosopher's doctrines in preference to all others, I have thought it necessary to give some account of the true nature of his discourses, the arrangement of the dialogues, and the method of his inductive procedure, as far as possible in an elementary manner and in main outline, in order that the facts I have collected respecting his life may not suffer by the omission of his doctrines. For, in the words of the proverb, it would be taking owls to Athens, were I to give you of all people the full particulars.
They say that Zeno the Eleatic was the first to write dialogues. But, according to Favorinus in his Memorabilia, Aristotle in the first book of his dialogue On Poets asserts that it was Alexamenus of Styra or Teos. In my opinion Plato, who brought this form of writing to perfection, ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its embellishment.
A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced and the choice of diction. Dialectic is the art of discourse by which we either refute or establish some proposition by means of question and answer on the part of the interlocutors.
Of the Platonic dialogues there are two most general types, the one adapted for instruction and the other for inquiry. And the former is further divided into two types, the theoretical and the practical. And of these the theoretical is divided into the physical and logical, and the practical into the ethical and political. The dialogue of inquiry also has two main divisions, the one of which aims at training the mind and the other at victory in controversy. Again, the part which aims at training the mind has two subdivisions, the one akin to the midwife's art, the other merely tentative. And that suited to controversy is also subdivided into one part which raises critical objections, and another which is subversive of the main position.
I am not unaware that there are other ways in which certain writers classify the dialogues. For some dialogues they call dramatic, others narrative, and others again a mixture of the two. But the terms they employ in their classification of the dialogues are better suited to the stage than to philosophy. Physics is represented by the Timaeus, logic by the Statesman, Cratylus, Parmenides and Sophist, ethics by the Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Symposium, as well as by the Menexenus, Clitophon, the Epistles, Philebus, Hipparchus and the Rivals, and lastly politics by the Republic, the Laws, Minos, Epinomis, and the dialogue concerning Atlantis. i.e. Critias.
To the class of mental obstetrics belong the two Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis and Laches, while the Euthyphro, Meno, Io, Charmides and Theaetetus illustrate the tentative method. In the Protagoras is seen the method of critical objections; in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, and the two dialogues entitled Hippias that of subversive argument. So much then for dialogue, its definition and varieties.
Again, as there is great division of opinion between those who affirm and those who deny that Plato was a dogmatist, let me proceed to deal with this further question. To be a dogmatist in philosophy is to lay down positive dogmas, just as to be a legislator is to lay down laws. Further, under dogma two things are included, the thing opined and the opinion itself.
Of these the former is a proposition, the latter a conception. Now where he has a firm grasp Plato expounds his own view and refutes the false one, but, if the subject is obscure, he suspends judgement.
His own views are expounded by four persons, Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, In the Laws. the Eleatic Stranger. In the Sophist and the Statesman. These strangers are not, as some hold, Plato and Parmenides, but imaginary characters without names, That the Eleatic Stranger is not Parmenides is decisively proved by Soph. 241 e. for, even when Socrates and Timaeus are the speakers, it is Plato's doctrines that are laid down. To illustrate the refutation of false opinions, he introduces Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, Protagoras, or again Hippias, Euthydemus and the like.
In constructing his proofs he makes most use of induction, not always in the same way, but under two forms. For induction is an argument which by means of certain true premisses properly infers a truth resembling them. And there are two kinds of induction, the one proceeding by way of contradiction, the other from agreement. In the kind which proceeds by contradiction the answer given to every question will necessarily be the contrary of the respondent's position, e.g. "My father is either other than or the same as your father. If then your father is other than my father, by being other than a father he will not be a father. But if he is the same as my father, then by being the same as my father he will be my father."
And again: "If man is not an animal, he will be either a stick or a stone. But he is not a stick or a stone; for he is animate and self-moved. Therefore he is an animal.
But if he is an animal, and if a dog or an ox is also an animal, then man by being an animal will be a dog and an ox as well." This is the kind of induction which proceeds by contradiction and dispute, and Plato used it, not for laying down positive doctrines but for refutation. The other kind of induction by agreement appears in two forms, the one proving the particular conclusion under discussion from a particular, the other proceeding by way of the universal [by means of particular facts]. The former is suited to rhetoric, the latter to dialectic. For instance, under the first form the question is raised, "Did so-and-so commit a murder?" The proof is that he was found at the time with stains of blood on him.
This is the rhetorical form of induction, since rhetoric also is concerned with particular facts and not with universals. It does not inquire about justice in the abstract, but about particular cases of justice. The other kind, where the general proposition is first established by means of particular facts, is the induction of dialectic. For instance, the question put is whether the soul is immortal, and whether the living come back from the dead. And this is proved in the dialogue On the Soul by means of a certain general proposition, that opposites proceed from opposites. And the general proposition itself is established by means of certain propositions which are particular, as that sleep comes from waking and vice versa, the greater from the less and vice versa. This is the form which he used to establish his own views.
But, just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was the only actor, and afterwards, in order to give the chorus breathing space, Thespis devised a single actor, Aeschylus a second, Sophocles a third, and thus tragedy was completed, so too with philosophy: in early times it discoursed on one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and Plato the third, dialectics, and so brought philosophy to perfection. Thrasylus says that he published his dialogues in tetralogies, like those of the tragic poets. Thus they contended with four plays at the Dionysia, the Lenaea, the Panathenaea and the festival of Chytri. Pots. Of the four plays the last was a satiric drama; and the four together were called a tetralogy.
Now, says Thrasylus, the genuine dialogues are fifty-six in all, if the Republic be divided into ten and the Laws into twelve. Favorinus, however, in the second book of his Miscellaneous History declares that nearly the whole of the Republic is to be found in a work of Protagoras entitled Controversies. From iii. 37 we infer that Favorinus drew upon Aristoxenus for this wildly improbable assertion. This gives nine tetralogies, if the Republic takes the place of one single work and the Laws of another. His first tetralogy has a common plan underlying it, for he wishes to describe what the life of the philosopher will be. To each of the works Thrasylus affixes a double title, the one taken from the name of the interlocutor, the other from the subject.
This tetralogy, then, which is the first, begins with the Euthyphro or On Holiness, a tentative dialogue; the Apology of Socrates, an ethical dialogue, comes second; the third is Crito or On what is to be done, ethical; the fourth Phaedo or On the Soul, also ethical.
The second tetralogy begins with Cratylus or On Correctness of Names, a logical dialogue, which is followed by Theaetetus or On Knowledge, tentative, the Sophist or On Being, a logical dialogue, the Statesman or On Monarchy, also logical. The third tetralogy includes, first, Parmenides or On Ideas, which is logical, next Philebus or On Pleasure, an ethical dialogue, the Banquet or On the Good, ethical, Phaedrus or On Love, also ethical.
The fourth tetralogy starts with Alcibiades or On the Nature of Man, an obstetric dialogue; this is followed by the second Alcibiades or On Prayer, also obstetric; then comes Hipparchus or The Lover of Gain, which is ethical, and The Rivals or On Philosophy, also ethical. The fifth tetralogy includes, first, Theages or On Philosophy, an obstetric dialogue, then Charmides or On Temperance, which is tentative, Laches or On Courage, obstetric, and Lysis or On Friendship, also obstetric. The sixth tetralogy starts with Euthydemus or The Eristic, a refutative dialogue, which is followed by Protagoras or Sophists, critical, Gorgias or On Rhetoric, refutative, and Meno or On Virtue, which is tentative.
The seventh tetralogy contains, first, two dialogues entitled Hippias, the former On Beauty, the latter On Falsehood, both refutative; next Ion or On the Iliad, which is tentative, and Menexenus or The Funeral Oration, which is ethical. The eighth tetralogy starts with Clitophon or Introduction, which is ethical, and is followed by the Republic or On Justice, political, Timaeus or On Nature, a physical treatise, and Critias or Story of Atlantis, which is ethical. The ninth tetralogy starts with Minos or On Law, a political dialogue, which is followed by the Laws or On Legislation, also political, Epinomis or Nocturnal Council, or Philosopher, political, and lastly the Epistles, thirteen in number, which are ethical. In these epistles his heading was "Welfare," as that of Epicurus was "A Good Life," and that of Cleon "All Joy." They comprise: one to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to Hermias, Erastus and Coriscus, one each to Leodamas, Dion and Perdiccas, and two to Dion's friends. This is the division adopted by Thrasylus and some others.
Some, including Aristophanes the grammarian, arrange the dialogues arbitrarily in trilogies.
In the first trilogy they place the Republic, Timaeus and Critias; in the second the Sophist, the Statesman and Cratylus; in the third the Laws, Minos and Epinomis; in the fourth Theaetetus, Euthyphro and the Apology; in the fifth Crito, Phaedo and the Epistles. The rest follow as separate compositions in no regular order.
Some critics, as has already been stated, put the Republic first, while others start with the greater Alcibiades, and others again with the Theages; some begin with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon; some with the Timaeus, others with the Phaedrus; others again with the Theaetetus, while many begin with the Apology. The following dialogues are acknowledged to be spurious: the Midon or Horsebreeder, the Eryxias or Erasistratus, the Alcyon, the Acephali or Sisyphus, the Axiochus, the Phaeacians, the Demodocus, the Chelidon, the Seventh Day, the Epimenides. Of these the Alcyon Cf. Athenaeus xi. 506 c. The same statement about the authorship of the Alcyon is attributed to Nicias of Nicaea. is thought to be the work of a certain Leon, according to Favorinus in the fifth book of his Memorabilia.
Plato has employed a variety of terms in order to make his system less intelligible to the ignorant.
But in a special sense he considers wisdom to be the science of those things which are objects of thought and really existent, the science which, he says, is concerned with God and the soul as separate from the body. And especially by wisdom he means philosophy, which is a yearning for divine wisdom.
And in a general sense all experience is also termed by him wisdom, e.g. when he calls a craftsman wise.
And he applies the same terms with very different meanings. For instance, the word fau=los (slight, plain) is employed by him As e.g.
Theaet. 147 c Cf. Rep.
527 d ou) pa/nu fau=lon a)lla\ xalepo\n pisteu=sai. in the sense of a(plou=s (simple, honest), just as it is applied to Heracles in the Licymnius of Euripides in the following passage Nauck, staunch to do great deeds, unversed in talk, with all his store of wisdom curtailed to action.
But sometimes Plato uses this same word ( fau=los ） to mean what is bad, and at other times for what is small or petty. Again, he often uses different terms to express the same thing. For instance, he calls the ( a)rxh/ ) and cause ( ai)/tion ). He also uses contrary expressions for the same thing. Thus he calls the sensible thing both existent and nonexistent, existent inasmuch as it comes into being, non-existent because it is continually changing. And he says the Idea is neither in motion nor at rest; that it is uniformly the same and yet both one and many. And it is his habit to do this in many more instances.
The right interpretation of his dialogues includes three things: first, the meaning of every statement must be explained; next, its purpose, whether it is made for a primary reason or by way of illustration, and whether to establish his own doctrines or to refute his interlocutor; in the third place it remains to examine its truth.
And since certain critical marks are affixed to his works let us now say a word about these. The cross X is taken to indicate peculiar expressions and figures of speech, and generally any idiom of Platonic usage; the used in early papyri to denote a fresh paragraph. (>) calls attention to doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato; the dotted cross (?) denotes select passages and beauties of style; the dotted diple (?) editors' corrections of the text; the dotted obelus (÷) passages suspected without reason; the dotted antisigma (?) repetitions and proposals for transpositions; the ceraunium the philosophical school; the asterisk (?) an agreement of doctrine; the obelus (-) a spurious passage. So much for the critical marks and his writings in general. As Antigonus of Carystus says in his Life of Zeno, when the writings were first edited with critical marks, their possessors charged a certain fee to anyone who wished to consult them.
Here begins the second appendix observed that there is absolutely no trace of Neo-Platonist tendencies.
Cf. Plato, The doctrines he approved are these. He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts on many bodies, Cf. Plato, Tim. 42 b sqq., 90 e. and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is geometrical Cf. Plato, Tim. 54 a sqq.; and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. He held that it is self-moved and tripartite, the rational part of it having its seat in the head, the passionate part about the heart, while the appetitive is placed in the region of the navel and the liver. Cf. Plato, Tim. 69 c sqq., 89 e..
And from the centre outwards it encloses the body on all sides in a circle, and is compounded of elements, and, being divided at harmonic intervals, it forms two circles which touch one another twice; and the interior circle, being slit six times over, makes seven circles in all. And this interior circle moves by way of the diagonal to the left, and the other by way of the side to the right. Hence also the one is supreme, being a single circle, for the other interior circle was divided; the former is the circle of the Same, the latter that of the Other, whereby he means that the motion of the soul is the motion of the universe together with the revolutions of the planets. Cf. Plato, Tim. 36 d-37 c..
And the division from the centre to the circumference which is adjusted in harmony with the soul being thus determined, the soul knows that which is, and adjusts it proportionately because she has the elements proportionately disposed in herself. And when the circle of the Other revolves aright, the result is opinion; but from the regular motion of the circle of the Same comes knowledge. He set forth two universal principles, God and matter, and he calls God mind and cause; he held that matter is devoid of form and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it Cf. Plato, Tim. 50 d. e; 51 a.; and that it was once in disorderly motion but, inasmuch as God preferred order to disorder, was by him brought together in one place. Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 a, 69 b.
This substance, he says, is converted into the four elements, fire, water, air, earth, of which the world itself and all that therein is are formed.
Earth alone of these elements is not subject to change, the assumed cause being the peculiarity of its constituent triangles. For he thinks that in all the other elements the figures employed are homogeneous, the scalene triangle out of which they are all put together being one and the same, whereas for earth a triangle of peculiar shape is employed; the element of fire is a pyramid, of air an octahedron, of water an icosahedron, of earth a cube. Hence earth is not transmuted into the other three elements, nor these three into earth.
But the elements are not separated each into its own region of the universe, because the revolution unites their minute particles, compressing and forcing them together into the centre, at the same time as it separates the larger masses. Hence as they change their shapes, so also do they change the regions which they occupy. Cf. Plato, Tim. 58 a-c.
And there is one created universe, Cf. Plato, is perceptible to sense, which has been made by God.
And it is animate because that which is animate is better than that which is inanimate. Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 b. And this piece of workmanship is assumed to come from a cause supremely good. Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 a, b; 55 c, d. It was made one and not unlimited because the pattern from which he made it was one. And it is spherical because such is the shape of its maker.
For that maker contains the other living things, and this universe the shapes of them all. A perversion of Tim. 33 b.
To that which is to comprehend all animals in itself that shape seems proper which comprehends in itself all shapes. Diogenes Laertius opposes, not universe and its shape, but maker and universe. It is smooth and has no organ all round because it has no need of organs. Moreover, the universe remains imperishable because it is not dissolved into the Deity. Cf. Plato, as a whole is caused by God, because it is the nature of the good to be beneficent, Cf. Plato, creation of the universe has the highest good for its cause. For the most beautiful of created things is due to the best of intelligible causes Cf. Plato, Tim. 29 e-30 a; 42 e.; so that, as God is of this nature, and the universe resembles the best in its perfect beauty, it will not be in the likeness of anything created, but only of God.
The universe is composed of fire, water, air and earth; of fire in order to be visible; of earth in order to be solid; of water and air in order to be proportional. Cf. Tim. 31 b-33 a. It would be more correct to say "in order that the bonds, the inserted terms (air and water), which unite fire to earth, may be proportional." "For the best of bonds is that which makes itself and the things which it binds as complete a unity as possible; and the nature of proportion is to accomplish this most perfectly" ( Tim. 31 c). For the powers represented by solids are connected by two mean proportionals in a way to secure the complete unity of the whole. And the universe was made of all the elements in order to be complete and indestructible.
Time was created as an image of eternity. And while the latter remains for ever at rest, time consists in the motion of the universe. For night and day and month and the like are all parts of time; for which reason, apart from the nature of the universe, time has no existence. But so soon as the universe is fashioned time exists. Cf.
And the sun and moon and planets were created as means to the creation of time. And God kindled the light of the sun in order that the number of the seasons might be definite and in order that animals might possess number. The moon is in the circle immediately above the earth, and the sun in that which is next beyond that, and in the circles above come the planets. Further, the universe is an animate being, for it is bound fast in animate movement. Cf. Plato, Tim. 38 c-39 d. And in order that the universe which had been created in the likeness of the intelligible living creature might be rendered complete, the nature of all other animals was created. Since then its pattern possesses them, the universe also ought to have them. And thus it contains gods for the most part of a fiery nature; of the rest there are three kinds, winged, aquatic and terrestrial. Cf. Plato, a; 41 b, c.
And of all the gods in heaven the earth is the oldest. And it was fashioned to make night and day. And being at the centre it moves round the centre. Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 b, c.
And since there are two causes, it must be affirmed, he says, that some things are due to reason and others have a necessary cause, Cf. Plato, being air, fire, earth and water, which are not exactly elements but rather recipients of form. Cf. Plato, Tim. 49 a b. They are composed of triangles, and are resolved into triangles. The scalene triangle and the isosceles triangle are their constituent elements. Cf. Plato, Tim. 53 c-55 c.
The principles, then, and causes assumed are the two above mentioned, of which God and matter are the exemplar. Matter is of necessity formless like the other recipients of form. Of all these there is a necessary cause. For it somehow or other receives the ideas and so generates substances, and it moves because its power is not uniform, and, being in motion, it in turn sets in motion those things which are generated from it. And these were at first in irrational and irregular motion, but after they began to frame the universe, under the conditions possible they were made by God symmetrical and regular.
For the two causes existed even before the world was made, as well as becoming in the third place, but they were not distinct, merely traces of them being found, and in disorder. When the world was made, they too acquired order. Cf. Plato, the bodies there are the universe was fashioned. He holds God, like the soul, to be incorporeal. For only thus is he exempt from change and decay. As already stated, he assumes the Ideas to be causes and principles whereby the world of natural objects is what it is.
On good and evil he would discourse to this effect.
He maintained that the end to aim at is assimilation to God, that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness, but that it needs in addition, as instruments for use, first, bodily advantages like health and strength, sound senses and the like, and, secondly, external advantages such as wealth, good birth and reputation. But the wise man will be no less happy even if he be without these things. Again, he will take part in public affairs, will marry, and will refrain from breaking the laws which have been made. And as far as circumstances allow he will legislate for his own country, unless in the extreme corruption of the people he sees that the state of affairs completely justifies his abstention.
He thinks that the gods take note of human life Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 b; 44 c. and that there are superhuman beings. Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 d. He was the first to define the notion of good as that which is bound up with whatever is praiseworthy and rational and useful and proper and becoming. And all these are bound up with that which is consistent and in accord with nature.
He also discoursed on the propriety of names, and indeed he was the first to frame a science for rightly asking and answering questions, having employed it himself to excess. And in the dialogues he conceived righteousness to be the law of God because it is stronger to incite men to do righteous acts, that malefactors may not be punished after death also.
Hence to some he appeared too fond of myths.
These narratives he intermingles with his works in order to deter men from wickedness, by reminding them how little they know of what awaits them Cf. Plato, Tim. 42 b. after death. Such, then, are the doctrines he approved.
He used also to divide things, according to Aristotle, in the following manner. The third appendix begins here, containing the diaire/seis which are also attributed to Aristotle; see Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 679 sqq., who gives a Christian recension. The original, the common source of Diogenes Laertius and the Christian writer, he refers vaguely to the Hellenistio age. Goods are in the mind or in the body, or external. For example, justice, prudence, courage, temperance and such like are in the mind; beauty, a good constitution, health and strength in the body; while friends, the welfare of one's country and riches are amongst external things.
Thus there are three kinds of goods: goods of the mind, goods of the body and external goods. There are three species of friendship: one species is natural, another social, and another hospitable. By natural friendship we mean the affection which parents have for their offspring and kinsmen for each other. And other animals besides man have inherited this form.
By the social form of friendship we mean that which arises from intimacy and has nothing to do with kinship; for instance, that of Pylades for Orestes.
The friendship of hospitality is that which is extended to strangers owing to an introduction or letters of recommendation. Thus friendship is either natural or social or hospitable. Some add a fourth species, that of love.
There are five forms of civil government: one form