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i^^H mtm^m^ speciAL coLLecxiloNS que^N's UNiveusiiy AT kiNQsxroN kiNQSTON ONTARIO CANAt)A THOUGHTS O N THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
Hoc vero occultum, inteftinum, domefticum malum, non modo non exiftit, verum etiam opprimit, antequam perfpicere atque explorare potueris. Cic.
THE THIRD EDITION.
LONDON, Priflted fgr J, DODSLEY, in Paj^vMall, THO U GH T S O N THE CAUSE f OFTHEPRESENT DISCONTENTS- IT is an undertaking of fome degree of de-* licacy to examine into the caufe of public diforders. If a man happens not to fucceed in fuch an enquiry, he will be thought weak and vilionary j if he touches the true grievance, there is a danger that he may come near to perfons of weight and confequence, who will rather be exafperated at the difcovery of their errors, than thankful for the occafion of correding them. If he fliould be obliged to blame the favourites of the people, he will be conlidered as the tool of powers if he cenfures thofe in power, he will B be be looked on as an inflrument of fa£lion. But in all exertions of duty fomething is to be hazarded. In cafes of tumult and diforder, our law has inverted every man, in fome fort, with the authority of a magiftrate. When the affairs of the nation are diftradted, private people are, by the fpirit of that law, j unified in rtepping a little out of their ordinary fphere. They enjoy a privilege, of fomewhat more dignity and effedf, than that of idle lamentation over the calamities of their country. They may look into them narrowly; they may reafon upon them liberally; and if they Ihould be fo fortunate as to difcover the true fourceof the mifchief, and to fuggeft any probable method of removing it, though they may difpleafe the rulers for the dny, they are certainly of fervice to the caufe of Government. Government is deeply interefted in every thing which, even through the medium of fome temporary uneafinefs, may tend finally to compofe the minds of the fubjed;, and to conciliate their affeftions. I have nothing to do here with the abftrad: value of the voice of the people. But as long as reputation, the molt precious pofl'effion of every individual, and as long as opinion, the great fupport of the State, depend entirely upon that voice, it can never be confidered as a thing oi little confequence either to individuals or to Government. Nations are not primarily ruled by laws; lefs by violence. Whatever crisjinal energy may befuppofed either in force or regulation; vhe operation of both is, in truth, merely inltrumental. Nations are governed 1 HE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 3 governed by the fi^me methods, and en the fame principles, by which an individual without authority is often able to govern tiiolc who are his equals or his fuperiours; by a l:novvledge of their temper, and b\ a judiiious man?Jgement of it; I mean, — when public affairs are fteadily and quietly conduced j not when Government is nothing but a continued fcufRe between the magiftrate and the multitude; in which fometimes the one ar^d fometimes the other is uppermoftj in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a feries of contetnptii^le victories and fcandalous fubmifllons. The temper of the people amongft whom he prefixes ought therefore to be the firft ftudy of a Sn tefman. And the knowledge of this teniptr it is by no meaiiS impofllble for him to attain, if he has not an intereft in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.
To comnlain of the ^z" '^'e^ive in, to murmur at the prelent pofieilors of power, i j lament the pall, to conceive extravagant h^pes of the future, are the common difpoiitions of the greateft part of mankind; indeed the neceffary efFe(fts of the ignorance and icyity of.he xuh^ar. Such complaints and humours have exifled in all times; yet as all times have not been ali!-^e, true political fagacity manifefts itfclf, in diftinguilliing that compL-tint which only charadierizes the general infirmity of human nature, from thofe which are fy mptoms ot the particular diftemperature of our own air and feafon.
B 2 Nobody, Nobody, I believe, will confider it merely as the language of fpleen or difappointment, if I fay, that there is fomething particularly alarming in the prefent conjuncture. There is hardly a man in or out of power who holds any other language. That Government is at once dreaded and contemned; that the laws are defpoiled of all their refpedled and falutary terrors; that their inadlion is a fubjecft of ridicule, and their exertion of abhorrence; that rank, and office, and title, and all the folemn plaufibilities of the world, have loft their reverence and effecft; that our foreign politicks are as much deranged as our domeflic oeconomy; that our dependencies are flackened in their affed:ion, and loofened from their obedience 3 that we know neither how to yield nor how to inforce; that hardly any thing above or below, abroad or at home, is found and entire; but that difconnexion and confufion, in offices, in parties, in families, in Parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the diforders of any former time: thefe are fads univerfally admitted and lamented.
This (late of things is the more extraordinary, becaufc the great parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to be in a manner entirely dillblved. No great external calamity has vifited the nation; no peftilence or famine. We do not labour at prefent under any fcheme of taxation new or oppreffive in the quantity or in the mode. Nor are we engaged in unfuccefsful war; in which, our miffortunes might eafily pervert our judgement; and and our minds fore from the lofs of national glory, might feel every blow of Fortune as a crime in Government.
It is impoflible that the caufe of this ftrange diftcmper -fliould not fometimes become a fubjed: of difcourfe. It is a compliment due, and which I willingly pay, to thofe who adminifter our affairs, to take notice in the fird place of their fpeculation. Our Minifters are of opinion, that the increafe of our trade and manufactures, that our growth by colonization and by conqueft, have concurred to accumulate immenfe wealth in the hands of fome individuals; and this again being difperfed amongft the people, has rendered them univerfally proud, ferocious, and ungovernable i that the infolence of fome from their enormous wealth, and the boldnefs of others from a guilty poverty, have rendered them capable of the moft atrocious attempts j fo that they have trampled upon all fubordination, and violently born down the unarmed laws of a free Government; barriers too feeble againft the fury of a populace fo fierce and licentious as ours. They contend, that no adequate provocation has been given for fo fpreading a difcontent; our affairs having been conducted throughout with remarkable temper and confummate wifdom. The wicked indullry of fome libellers, joined to the intrigues of a few difappointed politicians, have, in their opinion, been able to produce this unnatural ferment in the nation.
Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the prefent convulfions of this country, if the B ^ abovQ above account be a true one. I confefs I fliall aflcnt to it witb great reluctance, and only oa the compulfion of the cleareft and firmeft proofs; bccaufe th'jir account refolves itfelf into this fliort, but difcouraging propofition, " That we ** have a very good Miniftry, but that we are a *' very bid pcrople;" that we fet ourfelves to bite the hana that feeds us; that with a malignant infinity we oppofe the meafiires, and un-.
gratefully vilify the perfons, of thofe, whofe folc objc6l is our own peace and profperity. If a feu; uny libellers, ading under a knot of factious p.liticians, without virtue, parts, or charadter [.\\<:h they are conRantly rcprefcnted by tlnrie ^entlcmc;-;), are fufficient to excite this dill:Lirl)..nce, very perverfe n-iuft be the difpofition of ti.at people, amongft whom fuch a difturbance can be excited Dy luch means. It is befides r.o fmail aggravation of the public misfortune, thct the difeal'e, on ihis hypothecs, appears to h<^ without remedy. If the wealth of the nation be the caufe of its turbultnce, I imagine it is nc^t propofcd to liitroduce poverty, as a conftable to keep the peace. If our dominions abroad are the roots which Ted iiU this rank luxuriance of fcditioii, it is not intended to cut them ofF in (-rdcr to faniith the fruit. If our liberty has entccbled the executive power, there is no defjgn, I hope, to call in the aid of defpotifm, to fill up the d^ficicnci. s oi law. Whatever may be intended, thefe things are not yet profefied. We feem therefore to be driven to abfolute dclpair; for we have no other materials to work work upon, but thofe out of which God has been pleafed to form the inhabitants of tliis ifland. If thefe be radically and ciTcntially vitious, all that can he faid is, that thole men re very unhappy, to whofe fortune or duty it fads to adminifter the affairs of this untoward people. I hear it ind:-f:d fometimes aiferted, that a fteady perfeverance in the prefent mealures, and a rigorous puni(hment of thofe who oppofe them, will in courfe of time infallibly put an end to thefe diforders. But this, in my opinion, is faid without much obfervation of our prefent difpofition, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation is compofed be fo very fermentable as thefe gentlemen defcribe it, leaven never will be wanting to work it up, as long as difcontent, revenge, and ambition, have exiftence in the world. Particular punifnments are the cure for accidental diftempers in the State; they inflame rather than allay thofe heats which arife from the fettled mifmanagement of the Government, or from a natural ill difpoGtion in the people. It is of the utmoft moment not to make miftakes in the ufe of ft^ong meafures; and firmnefs is then only a virtue when it accompanies the mofh perfect wifdom. In truth, inconftancy is a fort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.
I am not one of thofe who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been lb, frequently and outrageoufly, both in other countries and in this. But I do fay, that in all B 4 difputes B 4 difputes 8 THOUGHTS ON IM^E CAUSE OF difputes between them and their rulers, the preilimption is at leaft upon a par in favour of the people. Experience may perhaps juftify me in going further. Where popular difcontents have been very prevalent; it may well be affirmed and fupported, that there has been generally fomething found amils in the conftitution, or in the conducl: of Government. The people have no interell: in dilorder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the State, it is far otherwife. They certainly may aft ill by dcfign, as well as by miftake. '^ Les revolutions " gui a7'rivent dans Ics grands etats ne font point <' un effe5t du hazard^ 711 du caprice des peuples, •' Rien ne revolte les grands d'un royaiime ^* comme un Gouvernement foible et derange, ** Four la populace, ce nejl jamais par envie *' d'aitiiquer qiiellefe Jlideije, viais par impatience ^' de fouffrir'^." Thefe are the words of a great man; of a Minifler of ftate; and a zealous alTertor of Monarchy. They are applied to the jyfteui of Fa'-coiiritifm which was adopted by Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful confequences it produced. What he fays of revolutions, is equally true of all great difturbances. If this prefumption in favour of the fubjeds againft the trultees of power be not the more probable, 1 am fure it is the more comfortable fpeculation j becaufe it is more eafy to change an adminiftration than to reform a people.
t Mem. de Sully, vol. I. p. 133.
jjpop Upon a fuppofitlon, therefore, that in the opening of the caufe the prefumptions ftand equally balanced between the parties, there feems fufficient ground to entitle any perfon to a fair hearing, who attempts fome other fcheme befide that eafy one which is fafliionablc in fome fafliionable companies, to account for the prefent difcontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no grievance, becaufe our grievances are not of the fame fort with tbofe under which we laboured formerly j not precifely tbofe which we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stuarts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the filent lapfe of events as material alterations have been infenfibly brought about in the policy and charadter of governments and nations, as tbofe which have been marked by the tumult of public revolutions.
It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning public mifcondud:; as rare to be right in their fpeculation upon the caufe of it. I have conftantly obfervcd, that the generality of people are fifty years, at leaft, behind-hand in their politicks. There are but very few, who are capable of comparing and digelling w]:iat pafies before their eyes at different times and occafions, fo as to form the whole into a dillind fyftem. But in books every thing is fettled for theni, v/ithout the exertion of any confiderable diligence or fagacity. For which reafon men are wife with bjjt little reflexion, and good with little felfdenial.
loTHOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF denial, in the bufinefs of all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlightened judges of the tran factions of paft ages J where no paflions deceive, and where the whole train of circumftances, from the trifling caufe to the tragical event, is fet in an orderly feries before us. Few are the partizans of departed tyranny j and to be a Whig on the bufinefs of an hundred years ago, is very conliftent with every advantage of prefent fervility. This retrofpedtive wifdom, and hiftorical patriotifm, are things of wonderful convenience; and ferve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between fpeculation and pra6lice. Many a ftern republican, after gorging himfelf with a full feafl of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true Saxon conftitution, and difcharging all the fplendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, fits down perfectly fatisfied to the coarfeft work and homelieil job of ti:ie day he lives in. I believe there was no profefled admirer of Henry the Eighth among the inftruments of the laft King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eig th, was there, I dare fay, to be found afingle advocate for the favourites of Richard the Second.
Nocomplaifance to our Court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be fo changed, but that public liberty will be among us, as among our anceftors, obnoxious to fome perfon or other; and that opportunities will be furniflicd, for attempting at leaft, fome alteration to the prejudice of our conlliitution. The*^ attepl^^* THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS, ir attempts will naturally vary in their mode according to times and circumflances. For ambition, though it has ever the fame general viev^rs, has not at all times the fame means, nor the fame particular objedls. A great deal of the furniture of ancient tyranny is worn to rags; the reft is entirely out of fafliion. Be(ides, there are few Statefmen fo very clumfy and awkward in their bufmefs, as to fall into the identical fnare which has proved fatal to tlieir predeceflors. When an arbitrary impofition is attempted upon the fubjedt, undoubtedly it will not bear on its fore-head the name of Shipmoney. There is no danger that an extenfion of the Foreji laws fhould be the chofen mode of opprefiion in this age. And when we hear any inflance of minifterial rapacity, to the prejudice of the rights of private life, it will certainly not be the exacflion of two hundred pullets, from a woman of fadiion, for leave to lye with her own hufband *.
Every age has its own manners, and its politicks dependent upon them i and the fame attempts will not be made againft a conftitution fully formed and matured, that were ufed to deftroy it in the cradle, or to relift its growth during its infancy.
Againft the being of Parliament, I am fatisfied, no defigns have ever b^en entertained Iince the * " Uxor Hufronis de Nevill dat Domino Re2;t ducentas '* Gallinas, eo quod poflit jacere una nocle cum Domino <* fuo Hugone de Neviii." Maddox, Hift. Exch. c. xii!.
Revolution, S2 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF Revolution. Every one muH: perceive, thit it is ftrongly theintercft of the Court, to have Ibme fecond caufe interpofed between the Miniflers and the people. The r,entlemen of the Houfe of ComiTiOns have an interert: equally flrong, in fuilaining the part of that intermediate caufe. However they may hire out the ufufruB of their voices, they never will part with the fee and inheritance. Accordingly thofe who have been of the mofl known devotion to the will and pleafure of a Court, have at the fame time been moft forward in ad'erting an high authority in the Houfe of Commons.' When they knew who were to ufe that authority, and how it was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. It mufl be always the vvifh of an unconftitutlonal Statefman, that an Houfe of Commons who are entirely dependent upon him, {l:;ould have every right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleafure. It was foon difcovered, that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible.
The power of the Crown, almofl dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more strength, and iar lefs odium, under the name of Influence. An influence, which operated without noife and without violence; an influence which converted the very antagonifl, into the inftrument, of power; which contained in itfelf a perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and which the diflreffes and the profperity of the country equally tended to augment.
ment, was an admirable fubftitute for a Prerogative, that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had moulded in its original ftamina irrefiftible principles of decay and difiblution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary fyftem; the intereft of adive men in the State is a foundation perpetual and infallible. However, fome circumftances, arifmg, it muft be confelTed, in a great degree from accident, prevented the effedts of this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting any ferious apprehenfions. Although Government was ftrong and flourifhed exceedingly, the Court had drawn far lefs advantage than one would imagine from this great fource of power.
At the Revolution, the Crown, deprived, for the ends of the Revolution itfelf, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to flruggle againll all the difficulties which prelled fo new and unlettled a Government. The Court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers to men of luch intereft as could fupport, and of fuch fidelity as would adhere to, its eftablilhment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common defence. This connexion, necelTary at firft, continued long after convenient; and properly conduced might indeed, in all fituations, be an ufeful inftrument of Government. At the fame time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and charafter, th;; people, poircifed a fccuricy ior their juft portion of importance portance in the State. But as the title to the Crown grew ftronger by long polTefiion, and by the conllant increafe of its influence, thefe helps have of late feemed to certain perfons no better than incumbrances. The powerful managers tor Government were not fufficiently fubmilllve to the pleafure of the poffelTors of immediate and perfonal favour, fometimes from a confidence in their own ftrength natural and acquired; fometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country, which gave them a confideration independent of the Court. Men aded as if the Court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of Government, thus divided in appearance between the Court and the leaders of parties, became in many cafes an acceflion rather to the popular t!:an to the royal fcale; and fomc part of that influence which would otherwife have been poffeffed as in a fort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it arofe, and circulated among the people. This method therefore of governing, by m.fn of great natural inteiefl or great acquired confideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers ofabfolute monarchy. It is the nature of defpotifm to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary plealure; and to annihilate all intermediate fituations between boundlefs ftrength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.
Tq Tq To set rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and to fecure to the Ccurt the unlimited and uncontrouled life of its own vaji infiiience, under the foie dircBion of its own private favoiify has for fome years paft been the great objed: of policy. If this were compailed, the influence of the Crown muft of courle produce all the efted;s which the moft fanguinc partizans of the Court could polTibly defire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower forts. A new proje<ft was therefore devifed, by a certain fet of intriguing men, totally different from the fyftem of Adminiftration which had prevailed fince the acceffion of the Houfe of Brunfwick. This projedt, I have heard, was firffc conceived by fome perfons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.
The earlieft attempt in the execution of this deiign was to fet up for Minifter, a perfon, in rank, indeed refpetftable, and very ample in fortune 3 but who, to the moment of this vaft and fudden elevation, was little known or coniidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit fubmiffion. But whether it was for want of firmnefs to bear up againff the firft oppoiition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the moft eligible; that idea was foon abandoned. The inflrumental part of the project Wus a little altered, 6 to i6 THOUGHTS ONTHECAUSE OF to aecommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more furely to the one great end propofed.
The firft part of the reformed plan was t» draw a line 'which fiould Jeparatc the Court from the Minijlry. Hitherto thefc names had been looked upon as fynonymous; but for the future. Court and Adminiilration were to be confidered as things totally diftinft. By this operation, two fyl]:ems of Adminidration were to be formed; one which fliould be in the real fecret and confidence; the other merely oftenfible, to perform the official and executory duties of Government. The latter were alone to be refponfible; whilft the real advifers, who enjoyed all the power, were eife6lual]y removed from all the danger.
Secondly, A party under thefe leaders was to be formed in favour of the Court againjl the Minijlry: this party was to have a large Ihare in the emoluments of Government, and to hold it totally feparate from, and independent of, offenfible Adminillration.
The third point, and that on which the fuccefs of the whole fcheme ultimately depended, was to bring Parliament to an acquicfcence in this projcci. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the perlons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and chara(5ler, of the Minifters of the Crown. By means of a difcipline, on which 1 iLall fay more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the mofl oppofite in terefls, and the moft difcordarit politicks.
politicks.
politicks. All connexions and dependencies among fubjects were to be entirely diflolved. As hitherto hufinefs had gone through the hands of leadei*s of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no fort of consideration or credit in the country* This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an infenfibility to pride as well as to duty. Thofc high and haughty fentiments, which are the great fupport of independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in Parliamentr.ry decorum, than in a Turkifh army. It was to be avowed as a conilitutional maxim, that the King might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for Minifter; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, ss well followed as the nrft name for rank or wifdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on, as if perfedly unconcerned; while a cabal of the clofcr and back-ftairs was fubflituted in the place of a national Adminiftration.
With fuch a degree of acquiefcence, any meafure of any Court mi^ht well be deemed thoroughly fecure. The capital objecls, and by much the mofc flattering charadlerifticks of arbitrary power, would be obtained. Every thing would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the perfonal favour and inclination of the C Prince.
i8 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF Prince. This favour would be the fole introdudion to power, and the only tenure by which it was to b^ held: io that no peribn looking towards another, and all looking towards the Court, it was impofilble hut that the motive which folely influenced every man's hopes muft come in time to govern every man's conducft; till at lall the fervility became univerfal, in fpite of the dead letter of any laws or inAitutions whatfoever.
How it {hould happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon fuch a projeft of Government, may at firft view appear furprizing. But the fadt is, that opportunities vary inviting to fuch an attempt have offered; and the fcheme itfelfwas not deflitiite of fome arguments not wholly unplaufible to recommend it. Thefe opportunities and thefe arguments, the ufe that has been made of botli, the plan for carrying this new fcheme of government into execution, and the effeds which it has produced, are in my opinion worthy of our ferious conlideration.
His Majefty came to the throne of thefe kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predeceffors fince the Revolution. Fourth in defcent, and third in fucceflion of his Royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, faw fomething to flatter their favourite prejudices; and tojuflify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The perfon and caufe of the Pretender were become contemptible; his title difowned throughcut Europe, his party difbanded in England. ^ His His Majefty came indeed to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, vid:orious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negociate, but to didlate. No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil eftabHfhment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite fum, was ampie> without being invidious. His influence, by additions from conqueft, by an augmentation of debt, by an increafe of military and naval eftablifhment, much ftrengthened and extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigour of youth, as from affection there was a iirong difiike, fo from dread there feemedto be a general averfenefs, from giving any thing like offence to a Monarch, againft whofe refentment oppofition could not look for a refuge in any fort of reverfionary hope.
Thefe fingular advantages infpired his Majefly only with a more ardent define to preferve unimpaired the fpirit of that national freedom, to which he owed a fituation fo full of glory. But to others it fuggefced fentiments of a very different nature. They thought they now beheld an opportunity (by a certain fort of Statefmeg never long undifcovcred or unemployed) of drawing to thenifelves, by the aggrandifement of a Court Faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or trom honourable fervice; and wiiich it was impoffible they could hold with the leafl: fccurity, vvhilil the fyftem of Adminillration C 2 reftcd refted upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution of their delign, it was neceflary to make many alterations in political arrangement, and a fignal change in the opinions, habits, and connexions of the greateft part of thofe who at that time adted in publick.
In the firlt place, they proceeded gradually, but not (lowly, to deftroy every thing of ftrength which did not derive it:^ principal nourifliment from the immediate pleafure of the Court. The greatell weight of popular opinion and party connexion were then with the Dukeof Newcaftle and Mr. Pitt, Neither of thefc held their importance by the neiu tenure of the Court; they ivere not therefore thought to be fo proper as others for the fervices which were required by that tenure. It happened very favourably for the new fyftem, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable alienation and difguft between the parties which compofed the Adminiftration. Mr. Pitt was firrt attacked. Not fatisfied with removing him from power, they endeavoured by various artifices to ruin his charader. The other party feemed rather pleafed to get rid of fo oppreffive a liipportj not perceiving, that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reafons prevented them from daring to look their true fituation in the face. To the great Whig families it was extremely difagreeable, and feemed almoll unnatural, to oppofe the Adminiftration of a Prince of the Houfe of Brunt'wick. Day alter day they hefitated, and doubted, and lingered, cxpeding