plan of our Legiflature. One great end undoubtedly of a mixed Government like ours, compofed of Monarchy, and of controls, oa the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the Prince ihall not be able to violate the laws. This is ufeful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at firfl: view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defenfive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the difcretionary powers which are necejfarily \:ejied in the Monarchy whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magijiracy and ojice, or for con -dueling the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, fiould all be exercifed upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a Court. This, I laid, is equal in importance to the fecuring a Government according to law. The laws reach but a very little little way. Conftitute Government how you pleafe, infinitely the greater part of it muft depend upon the exercife of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightnefs of Minifters of State. Even all the ufe and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your Commonwealth is no better than a fcheme upon paper; and not a living, afting, effedtiv^e conftitution. It is poffible, that through negligence, or ignorance, or defign artfully conduced, Minifters may fuffer one part of Government to languifh, another to be perverted from its purpofes, and every valuable interefl: of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without poffibility of fixing any fingle act on which a criminal profecution can be juftly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active, part of the State, far from being foreign to the purpofes of a wife Government, ought to be among its very firft and deareft objeds. When, therefore, the abettors of the new fyftem tell us, that between them and their oppofers there is nothing but a llruggle for power, and that therefore we are no-wavs concerned in it; we muft tell thofe who have the impudence to infult us in this manner, that of all things we ought to be the moft concerned, who and what fort of men they are, that hold the truft of every thing that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what muft either render us totally defperate, or foothe us into the fccurity of idiots. We muft foften into into a credulity below the milkinefs of infancy, to think all men virtuous. VVe mufi: be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, fome good, fome evil. The elevation of the one, and the depreffion of the other, are the iirft objefts of all true policy. But that form of Government, which, neither in its direct inftitutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the moft truftworthy hands, but has left its whole executory fyftem to be difpofed of agreeably to the uncontrouled pleafure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but confequentially errOi'ieous in every part of it.
In arbitrary Governments, the conftitution of the Miniftry follows the conftitution of the Legiflature. Both the Law and the Magifirate are the creatures of Will. It muft be fo. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable confideration of this matter, than that every fort of Government ought to have its Adminijiration correfpondent to its Legijlature, If it fliould be otherwife, things muft fall into an hideous diforder. The people of a free Commonwealth, who have taken fuch care that their laws ftiould be the refult of general confent, cannot be fo fenfelefs as to fuffer their executory fyftem to be compofed of perfons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recommended recommended to thole powers, upon the ufe of which the very being of the State depends.
The popular eledion of magiftrates, and popular difpofition of revviirds and honours, is one of the firft pd vantages of a free State. Without it. or fomething equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot iciig enjoy the fubflance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good Government. The frame of our Commonwealth did not admit of fuch an adual election: but it provided as well, and (while the fpirit of the conflitution is preferved) better for all the effeds of it than by the method of fuffrage in any democratic State whatfoever. It had always, until of late, been held the firft duty of Parliament, to rcfufc to fupport Government ^ until poii-er was in the hands cf perfons who were acceptable to the people y or while JaSfions fredcmiuated in the Court in which the nation had no confidence. Thus all the good effects of popular election were fuppofcd to be fecured to us, wnthout tlie mifchiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and a diftinct canvafs for every particular office throughout tlic body of the people. This was the moft noble and refined part of our conflitution. The people, by their reprefentatives and grandees, were intruded with a deliberative power in making lav.'s j the King with the control of his negative. The King was intrufted with the deliberative choice and the eltftion to ofiice; the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refufal to fupport. Formerly this power of controul was what kept Minifters in awe awe awe of Parliaments, and Parliaments in reverence with the people. If the ufe of this power of controul on the fyftem and perfons of Adminiftration is gone, every thing is loft, Parliament and all. We may aiTure ourfelves, that if Parliament will tamely fee evil men take pofleffion of all the ftrong-holds of their country, and allow them time and means to fortify themfelves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of difcovering, whether they will not be reformed by power, and whether their meafures will not be better than their morals; fuch a Parliament will give countenance to their meafures alfo, whatever that Parliament may pretend, and whatever thofe meafures may be.
Every good political inftitution muft have a preventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from Government, and not to trufi: for the fafety of the State to fubfequent punifhment alone: puniftiment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain; and which, when power is fuffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.
Before men are put forward into the great trufts of the State, they ought by their condu(5l to have obtained fuch a degree of eftimation in their country, as may be fome fort of pledge and fecurity to the publick, that they will not abufe thofe trufts. It is no mean fecurity for a proper ufe of power, that a man has ilievvn by the general tenor of his adions, that the affedion, the the the good opinion, the confidence, of his fellow citizens have been among the principal objects of his life; and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to a fettled contempt, or occafional forfeiture of their efteeni.
That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming Into power is obliged to defert his friends, or who lofing it has no friends to f3aTipathize with him; he who has no fway among any part of the landed or commercial intereft, but whofe whole importance has begun with his office, and is fure to end with it; is a perfon who ought never to be fuffered by a controuling Parliament to continue in any of thofe fituations which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs; becaufe fuch a man has no comiexion with the intereji of the people.
Thofe knots or cabals of men who have got together, avowedly without any public principle, in order to fell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore univerfally odious, ought never to be fuffered to domineer in the State; becaufe they have 7io connexion with the fentiments and opinions of the people, Thefe are confiderations which in my opinion enforce the neceffity of having fome better reafon, in a free country, and a free Parliament, for fupporting the Minifters of the Crown, than that (hort one, That the King has thought proper to appoint them. There is fomething very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant with all forts forts THE PRESENT D IS C O NTENTS. 47 forts of mifchlef, in a conftitution like ours, to turn the views of adive men from the country to the Court. Whatever be the road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no ufe as a means of power or confideration, the qualities which ufually procure that opinion will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a State fo popular in its conftitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, and to truft all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of Kings and Minifters, and public men, muft be fubmitted to the judgement and good fenfe of the people of England.
Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without direftly controverting the principle, to raife objedions from the difficulty under which the Sovereign labours, to diftinguifh the genuine voice and fentiments of his people, from the clamour of a faftion, by which it is fo eafily counterfeited. The nation, they fay, is generally divided into parties, with views and paffions utterly irreconcileable. If the King fhould put his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is fure to difguft the reft; if he feled particular men from among them all, it is an hazard that he difgufts them all. Thofe who are left out, however divided before, will foon run into a body of oppofition; which, being a coUedlion of many difcontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent enough. Fadion will make its cries refound through the nation, as if the whole were in an uproar, when when by far the majority, and much the better part, will fcem for a while as it were annihilated by the quiet in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy the bleffings of Government. Befides that the opinion of the meer vulgar is a mikrable rule even with regard to themlelves, on account of their violence and inftabihty. So that if you were to gratify them in their humour to-day, that verv gratification would be a ground of their dilTatisfadion on the next. Now as all thefe rules of public opinion are to be collected with great difficulty, and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the eftecft, what better can a King of England do, than to employ fuch men as he finds to have views and inclinations moft conformable to his own; who are leaft infefted with pride and felf-will, and who are leafl: moved by fuch popular humours as are perpetually traverfing his dcfigns, and difturbing his fervice j trufting that, when he means no ill to his people, he will be fupported in his appointments, whether he choofes to keep or to change, as his private iudgement or his pleafure leads him? He will find a fure relburce in the real weight and influence of the Crown, when it is not fuffered to become an inftrument in the hands of a fadion.
I will not pretend to fay that there is nothing at all in this mode of reafoning; becaufe 1 will not afiert, that there is no difficulty in the art of Government. Undoubtedly the very beft Adminillration muft encounter a great deal of oppofition; and the very worfc will find more fupport THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. ^9 fupport than it deferves. Sufficient appearances will never be wanting to thofe who have a mind to deceive themfelves. It Is a fallacy in conftant ufe with thofe v/ho would level all things, and confound right with wrong, to infift upon the inconveniencics which are attached to every choice, without taking into coniidcration the different weight and confequence of thofe inconveniencieSi The queftion is not concerning ahfohite difcontent or perfeB fatisfad:ion in Government J neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any fyflem. The controverfy is about that degree of good humour in the people, which may poffibly be attained, and ouglit certainly to be looked fof.-While fome politicians may be v/aitlng to know whether the fenfe of every individual be againd: them, accurately diftinguidiing the vulgar from the better fort, drawing lines between the enterprizes of a faction and the effcrts of a people, they may chance to fee the Govcn-nment, which they are fo nicely weighing, and dividing, and diiunguiihing, tumble to the ground in the midft of their wile deliberation. Prudent men, when fo great an object as the fecurity of Government, or even its peace, is at fcake^ will not run the rifque of a deciiion which may be fatal to it. They who can read the political fky will fee an hurricane in a cloud no bigger than an hand at the very edge of the horizon, and Vv'ill run into the firll harbour. No lines can be laid down for civil or political u'ifiom. They are a matter incaoable of exad: definition.
'E But But, ^though no man can draw a ft roke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darknefs are upon the whole tolerably diftinguifhable. Nor will it be impoflible for a Prince to find out luch a mode of Government, and fuch perfons to adminifter it, as will give a great degree of content to his people; without any curious and anxious refearch for that abftrad-, univerfal, perfeft harmony, which while he is feeking, he abandons thofe means of ordinary tranquillity which are in his power without any refearch at all.
It i= not more the duty than it is the intereft of a Prince, to aim at giving tranquillity to his Government. But thofe who advife him may have an intereft in diforder and confufion. If the opinion of the people is againft them, they will naturally wiQi that it fhould have no prevalence. Here it is that the people muft on their part (hew themfelves fenfible of their own value. Their whole importance, in the firft inftance, and aftervv^ards their whole freedom, is at ftake. Their freedom cannot long furvive their iniportance. Here it is that the natural ftrength of the kingdom, the great peers, the leading landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants and manufadurers, the fubftantial yeomanry muft interpofe, to refcue their Prince, themfelves, and their pofterity.
We are at prefent at ilfue upon this point. We are in the great crifisof this contention; and the part which men take one way or other, will ferve to difcriminate their characters ana their prin-' cipleSc I I jfcilT rr^^^^^^yrsfit^^ ^»W.R TTT; >x-i«r>i': v^^ai ^M*/l M-^A^