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t'OP[m?GHT DEPOSm in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY «^ Jpm.
AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY / BY EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER THE MACMILLAN COMPANY LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd.
A/^ rights reserved Copyright, 1896, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY.
NortoooB iPrtSB J. S. Gushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith Norwood Mass. U.S.A.
PREFACE My aim in writing this book has been to present in brief outHne and simple form the methods and most important results of experimental psychology. The volume contains the substance of lectures delivered to second and third year classes in the Cornell University, and is designed primarily as a text-book for those who attend my lecture courses. I hope, however, that its sphere of usefulness may extend beyond these limits.
The plan of the work is analytic. It sets out from the consideration of the simplest factors in adult mental expe- rience, and endeavours gradually to build up the actual mind from the laws of these simple factors and their groupings. After a general introduction comes a series of four chapters, which deal with the elementary conscious functions. A second series discusses those complex men- tal processes which are easiest of analysis and lend them- selves best to individual treatment. A third series deals in part with still more complicated processes, while in part it pushes the analysis of previous chapters still further. A concluding section surveys the results of the whole enquiry, and indicates the point at which psychology gives place to metaphysics.
vi Preface vi Preface The general standpoint of the book is that of the tra- ditional English psychology. The system which is out- lined in it, however, stands also in the closest relation to that presented in the more advanced treatises of the German experimental school, Kiilpe's Outlines of Psycho- logy and Wundt's Grundzilge der physiologischen Psycho- logic. While I have tried to make the present work complete in itself, I have also written with the view of producing a book which should be preparatory to these standard psychologies. At the same time I have not attempted to * boil down ' either of the larger works. The facts recorded have been gathered from them and from many other sources, to which I here make general acknowledgment, — all that is permitted by the scope of my undertaking. But no statements in the text have been taken upon trust, and no experiment is described which I have not myself performed.
The book presupposes, as every psychology must, a certain amount of physical and physiological knowledge on the part of the reader. I have, however, reduced this amount to as small a compass as possible, and do not think that any question will arise which cannot be cleared up at once by reference to an elementary physical or physiological text-book.
The subject-matter has throughout been broken up into sections; so that if it is desired to employ the book for a shorter course than that for which it has been designed, it is only necessary to select the more important passages and ignore the rest. Thus it is possible to omit §§ 3, 5 ^nd 6 of Chapter I; §§ 8 and ii of Chapter II; § 2i and others Preface vii of Chapter III; the whole of Chapter IV, etc., as well as to curtail the remaining sections by neglecting some of the descriptions of method and other supplementary remarks. I owe a heavy debt of gratitude to Miss E. B. Talbot, a member of my graduate seminary, and to my colleagues, Drs. D. Irons and W. B. Pillsbury, for constant advice and assistance during the preparation of the work. I have further to thank President J. G. Schurman for valuable suggestions with regard to the earlier chapters, and Miss C. S. Parrish and my wife for help upon many special points. The ten figures in the text (some of which are adapted from other works) were kindly drawn for me by Professor H. D. Williams.
Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I The Meaning and Problem of Psychology PAGE § I. The Beginnings of Psychology...i § 2. The Definition of Psychology...3 § 3. Mental Process, Consciousness and Mind...9 § 4. The Problem of Psychology...12 § 6. External Aids to Psychology..«,...21 PART I CHAPTER II Sensation as a Conscious Element. The Method of Investigating Sensation § 7. The Definition of Sensation...§ 8. The Attributes of Sensation...§,9. The Method of Investigating Sensation § 10. General Rules for the Introspection of Sensation 37 42 CHAPTER III The Quality of Sensation I. Sensations of Special Sense §12. The Quality of Visual Sensations...,. 45 § 13. The Quality of Auditory Sensations..,. ♦ 5° ix X Contents PAGE §15. The Quality of Gustatory Sensations...54 §16. The Quality of Cutaneous Sensations...56 II. Organic Sensations § 17. The Quality of Muscular, Tendinous and Articular Sensations. 59 § 18. The Quality of Alimentary Sensations...62 § 19. The Quality of the Circulatory, Respiratory and Sexual Sensations 63 § 20. The Quality of the Static Sense...63 III. Common Sensation § 22. The Total Number of Elementary Sensations...66 CHAPTER IV The Intensity, Extent and Duration of Sensation § 23. Intensity, Extent and Duration as Attributes of Sensation.. 68 § 24. The Minimal Intensity, Extent and Duration of Sensation.. 70 § 25. The Maximal Intensity, Extent and Duration of Sensation.. 74 § 26. The Relation of Intensity, Extent and Duration to Quality of CHAPTER V Affection as a Conscious Element. The Methods of Investigating Affection §31. The Definition of Affection 92 §33. The Methods of Investigating Affection...loi §34. The Attributes of Affection.. -...105 Contents XI CHAPTER VI Conation and Attention § 35. Bodily Tendency and Mental Constitution.
§ 36. The Question of a Third Conscious Element § 38. The Nature and Forms of Attention § 39. The Attributes of Attention § 40. The Degree of Attention.
§ 41. The Duration of Attention § 42. The Range of Attention PAGE PART II _ CHAPTER Vn Perception and Idea § 43. Sensation, Perception and Idea...148 I. Extensive Ideas II. Temporal Ideas '^ §48. Rate of Movement...174 III. Qualitative Ideas §51. The Function of the Idea 183 CHAPTER VIII The Association of Ideas § 52. The Nature and Forms of Association Contents § 54. Successive Association § 55. The Law of Association .^ PAGE CHAPTER IX Feeling and Emotion § 56. The Nature and Forms of Feeling § 57. The Nature of Emotion § 58. The F"orms of Emotion § 59. The Expression of the Emotions § 60. Mood, Passion and Temperament CHAPTER X Voluntary Movement. The Analysis of Action §61. The Nature of Action..
§ 62. The Beginnings of Voluntary Action.
§ 63. The Nature of Impulsive Action § 64. The Place of Impulse in Consciousness §65. The Forms of Impulse § 67. Instinctive Action...§ 68. Selective, Volitional and Automatic Action § 69. Inaction...,.
PART III CHAPTER XI Recognition, Memory and Imagination § 70. The Nature of Recognition §71. The Forms of Recognition § 72. Recognition and Cognition § 73. The Investigation of Recognition Contents Xlll § 74. Recognition and Memory.
§ 76. Retention § 77. Memory and Cognition § 78. The Investigation of Memory § 79. The Nature and Forms of Imagination § 80. Illusions of Recognition and Memory CHAPTER XII Self-Consciousness and Intellection § 81. Self-Consciousness...§ %'^. The Formation of Concepts § 85. Comparison or Discrimination, and Abstraction CHAPTER XIII.
Sentiment § 86. The Nature of Sentiment.
§ 87. The Forms of Sentiment.
§ 89. The Basis of ^Esthetic Sentiment § 90. The Intellectual Sentiments § 91. The Social or Ethical and the Religious Sentiments CHAPTER XIV The Synthesis of Action. The Reaction Experiment § 92. The Synthesis of Action...§ 93. The Simple Reaction...
§ 94. The Discrimination Reaction and the Cognition Reaction § 95. The Choice Reaction...§ 96. The Automatic Reaction...§ 97. The Function of the Reaction Experiment § 98. The Association Reaction...,,.
PAGE xiv Contents CONCLUSION CHAPTER XV The Ultimate Nature of Mind. Mind and Body.
PAGE § 99. The Mind of Psychology. 339 § loi. The Mind of Metaphysics 344 INDEX 347 AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY 3XKOO- INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I The Meaning and Problem of Psychology § I. The Beginnings of Psychology. — Knowledge is the product of leisure. The members of a very primitive society have no time to amass knowledge; their days are fully occupied with the provision of the bare neces- sities of life. But as soon as a community begins to accumulate wealth, and so becomes able to support a leisured class (priests, instructors of rich men's children), an opportunity is created for those who desire knowledge to devote their lives to its acquirement.
Out of this ' curiosity to know ' science is born. Men look out upon the world, and see that it is full of objects which call for investigation. Inanimate nature is made to reveal her secrets; laws are discovered in the fall of the stone, the ebb and flow of water, the spread of colours in the rainbow: physics, the * mother of the sciences,' has arisen. Birds and beasts and fishes have their special habits and their special structure, the observation of which is the starting-point of zoology. Physics and zoology, and indeed all the sciences, find their source in analysis. What at first seems simple, is shown by B I 2 TJie Meaning and Problem of Psychology careful observation to be compound, and is split up into more simple parts; these, in their turn, into still sim- pler; and so on, — until the science has reached its ele- ments, the simplest things or processes which belong to it, things and processes which cannot be further reduced or more minutely subdivided.
The first analysis is always analysis of the outward, the external. Just as the infant (whose history is the history of the human race, epitomised, condensed into half-a-dozen years) gets its earliest experiences in the form of experiences of the things or objects about it, and only after a time attains to self-experience, or comes to speak of itself as * I,' so mankind at large, at that primitive stage of their development which we are now considering, were attracted to the study of nature and of natural objects. " The understanding," says Locke, — and he might have used a word of wider significance, and said the 'mind,' — the understanding or the mind, " like the eye, while it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object."
Let us suppose, however, that this knowledge of nature has advanced a certain distance; that the physicist or zoologist has collected a large number of observations and arranged them to his satisfaction. It is not to be expected that he will henceforth cease to desire knowledge; for the more we know, the more do we wish to know, "as if increase of appetite had grown by what it fed on." He will rather seek to enlarge the boundaries of his know- ledge; to discover new facts, of a different order from those which he has hitherto studied. And at this point §§ I, 2. Beginnings and Definition of Psychology 3 the thought may very well occur to him, How is it that / can discover facts at all? The facts are one thing: he himself, who desires to know about the facts, and who is able to understand and interpret them, is another. Hence he may come to believe that it is worth his while to enquire about himself, just as he has been enquiring about things. " Art and pains," it is true, are demanded of him; but the art achieved may be judged worth the pains to be taken for its achievement. " Whatever be the diffi- culties that lie in the way of this enquiry," so Locke goes on, " sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage." Now when the enquiry has been started, when the question has been asked as to the difference between oneself and the things outside oneself, philosophy has sprung into being, — and with philosophy, psychology.
Psychology, then, is a late development of human knowledge; it does not appear until the sciences of nature have made some progress. And these sciences them- selves cannot take shape until mankind has attained a certain stage of civilisation.
§ 2. The Definition of Psychology. — Philosophy began as a body of reflective knowledge in which no sharp line of distinction was drawn between one department of thought and another. Yet it contained from the first the germs of many sciences which should later be sharply separated. To-day we hardly use the general name * philosopher *; we speak of the * logician ' or the * moral- ist ' or the * metaphysician '; and if we employ the word ' philosophy,' we think of it as comprising a number of 4 The Meaning and Problem of Psychology special sciences or disciplines; ontology, ethics, episte- mology, etc. It is with one of the special philosophical disciplines — psychology — that we are here concerned.
Every one knows in a rough way what it is that psy- chology deals with. It treats of * mind ' and ' conscious- ness,' and of the laws of mind and consciousness. My ' mind ' is that in me which thinks, understands, reasons, chooses, directs my actions. And my ' consciousness ' is my inner knowledge of my thought and action: I am ' conscious ' of the awkwardness of my movements, or of the correctness of my answer to an examination question. In these senses, the words ' mind ' and * consciousness ' are familiar to all of us.
Now it is quite true that psychology deals with mind and consciousness, and with their laws. But it often happens that the scientific use of words is different from their popular or ordinary use. Thus the word ' law ' means, in everyday language, an ordinance or regulation imposed by authority; whereas, in the language of natural science, it means simply a regularity or unbroken uni- formity of natural events. It should not be surprising, then, that the ' mind ' and ' consciousness ' of psycho- logical science differ a little in their meanings from the ' mind ' and ' consciousness ' of our daily conversation. We shall see, later on, that the current usage of the words is metaphysical as well as psychological.
It will, perhaps, be easiest for us to get rid of our pre- conceived opinions as to the meanings of these familiar terms, if we have before us, from the very outset, a scientific definition of psychology, and postpone for the present our discussion of * mind ' and * consciousness ' in their technical psychological senses. Psychology may be § 2. The Definition of Psychology 5 defined as the science of mental processes. Each of the three terms included in the definition requires a brief explanation.
A process is any object of scientific knowledge which is not a * thing.' A 'thing' is permanent, relatively un- changing, definitely marked off from other things. A process is, by etymology, a 'moving forward.' It is a be- coining something, — a continuous operation, a progressive change, which the scientific observer can trace throughout its course. It melts into and blends with operations and changes which follow and precede it. Thus the chemist speaks of the 'process of decomposition.' The changes which constitute decomposition are the ' process '; the final products of decomposition are * things.' The wear- ing away of a cliff by the action of water is a process; the rock itself is a thing. The thing ' is,' here or there; the process 'takes place.' — Psychology deals always with processes, and never with things.
A mental process is any process, falling within the range of our experience, in the origination and continu- ance of which we are ourselves necessarily concerned. Heat is a process. But heat, regarded simply as a ' mode of motion,' is independent of us; the movement continues, whether or not we are present to sense the heat. When, however, heat falls within our sensible ex- perience, we, the experiencing individuals, have something to say to it; it is what it is, in part at any rate, because of ns. The (physical) movement is translated by us into the (psychological) sensation of heat. More than that: if we are cold, to start with, the same physical heat will seem hotter to us than it would have done, had we been warm. This heat process, theUj, is a mental process. Qr 6 The Meaning and Problem of Psychology again: the space of geometry is independent of us. It has its laws, which hold good whether we know them or not. But space may be a matter of our experience, and may be modified by our experience. '' I had such pleas- ant thoughts," we may say, **that the road seemed much shorter than usual." TJiis space is a mental process.
— Psychology deals with none but mental processes.
A science is a sum of knowledge which has been classi- fied and arranged under certain general rules and com- prehensive laws; it is coherent and unified knowledge. We may know, from our boyish discoveries, that the eggs of some gulls and some plovers are speckled with green and brown; but this knowledge is not scientific. It becomes scientific when we include it in the know- ledge that the speckling is characteristic of the eggs of the Laridae and Charadriidae; and when we use it to link these two groups together, in making out the inter-re- lations and lines of descent of the different bird forms.
— Psychology is not a string of unconnected observations, but a science.
(i) Objection may be taken to the statement that the subject- matter of psychology consists exclusively of processes. All the text-books of psychology, it may be said, treat of ideas. But ideas are stable, permanent * things.' I remember now the large chestnut tree that overshadowed my home; I have an idea of the tree. The idea is clear-cut, separate from other ideas which it may call up, — the ideas of the house, of my room in the house, etc. Does not its permanence, and its independence of other ideas, make it a * thing '?
A close examination of the idea or mental picture of the tree shows us that the objection is not well founded. The idea of the tree is complex, containing a number of colours, a number of lights and shades, a number of forms. These constituents receive § 2. TJie Definition of PsycJioIogy 7 varying emphasis during the time of our attention to the idea. Now the form of the tree is uppermost in our mind, now its shadow, now the stickiness of its buds, now some incident con- nected with it, — the crashing down of a snow-laden branch, or what not. The idea changes. Again: the idea of the tree differs according to the different backgrounds of thought upon which it appears. It may be suggested to us by the pain of a bruise, by a patch of colours in a strange landscape, by the sough of the wind on a stormy night, etc. It is not the same in these different cases: it melts to some extent into its mental background, and is continually shifting and moving upon the background. Yet again: the idea of the tree need not always be a mental picture, a visual idea. It may contain the ideas of words, spoken or heard; certain scents, of spring or autumn; certain remem- brances of movement or pressure or resistance. All these factors come and go, change places and vary in importance, as the idea passes through the mind. The idea is not a thing: it does not stand, like the rock; it takes place or goes on, like the action of the waves upon the rock. It is a process.
Still, it is always the idea of a tree. Yes: just as the process of decomposition can always be called ' decomposition.' The name is permanent and unchanging; but the name is only one factor out of the whole number which make up the actual mental experience.
(2) It is impossible to give at the outset a complete list even of the typical forms of mental processes. Every item of our ' inner ' experience — every idea, desire, resolve, emotion, impulse, train of thought, action — is a mental process or a complex of mental processes.
(3) That psychology is a science can best be shown by an illus- tration. Suppose that you are requested to draw upon a piece of paper a circle of the apparent size of the full moon. The words ' draw the circle ' arouse a number of ideas in your mind: you think of various occasions when you have seen the moon, you look to see whether the pencil is properly sharpened, etc. When ideas are connected together in this way, each growing out of some one that has preceded it, we speak of a successive association of ideas. But there is another set of mental processes involved: those 8 The Meaning and Problem of Psychology aroused by the gripping of the pencil and its movement over the surface of the paper. When an association of ideas ends with the idea of bodily movement, and this is followed by the sensa- tions which accompany movement, we speak of the total experi- ence as an action. The request to draw the circle, then, may be looked upon as a problem in the psychology of action.
When we set to work to analyse this particular action, we find that the circle which we draw is the final result of a very large number of tendencies within us and conditions outside of us. Simple as the request is, each one of us understands it in his own way; and easy as it is to draw a circle, the reasons which lead to this drawing are different from those which lead to all the others. Thus one of us may draw ' from memory,' while another has to * imagine ' how the moon looks. And drawing from memory may be of two kinds: the memory may be visual memory, a remem- brance of the moon as she appears in the sky, or verbal memory, a remembrance of a statement, somewhere heard or seen, that the moon ' looks as large as a penny,' or '■ as large as a dinner plate.' Again: individuals differ in the amount of practice which they have had in ' drawing from memory,' — i.e., in the translation of an idea (the remembered moon) into the movements of hand and arm necessary to reproduce this idea upon paper. Again: the attention may vary, and vary in two ways, during the drawing. It may vary in steadiness, in ' concentration ': the agent may be very attentive to the action, alternately attentive and inattentive, or quite inattentive. It may also vary in direction, while the agent wonders whether the size of the circle is the important thing, and neatness may be neglected, or whether the figure drawn must be an exact geometrical circle; or speculates as to ' what will be done with * the drawings after they are made.
Memory, practice and attention are only some of the subjec- tive factors in the action, factors which may differ in different cases because of differences of internal tendency. We have said nothing at all of a long list of objective factors, due to conditions outside of us. But our analysis, imperfect as it is, is sufficiently complete to indicate two points: that the drawing is, as was stated just now, the final result of a large number of influences; and § 3- Mental Process, Conscioitsness and Mind 9 that these influences — whether they are those of mner tendency or of external condition — can be classified and arranged, can be separately investigated by the psychologist, and can have their due weight assigned them in particular instances. The possibility of analysis and classification shows that psychology may justly lay claim to rank as a science.
§ 3. Mental Process, Consciousness and Mind. — Psychol- ogy is sometimes defined, technically as well as popularly, as the ' science of mind.' The psychologist can accept this definition, side by side with that just given, if ' mind ' is understood to mean simply the sum total of mental pro- cesses experienced by the individual during his lifetime. Ideas, feelings, impulses, etc., are mental processes; the whole number of ideas, feelings, impulses, etc., experi- enced by me during my life constitutes my * mind.' Mind, as used in everyday conversation, means much more than this: it means something ' immaterial ' or ' spiritual,' which shows itself in ideas and feelings, but is really more than those ideas and feelings, — it means a some- thing which ' lies behind ' the particular manifestations of our mental life, just as the thing (table, e.g.^ seems to lie behind the attributes of the thing (the roundness or squareness, size, height, etc., of the particular table). Looked at in this way, however, the term * mind ' takes on metaphysical implications, and therefore has no place in psychology. The question: Is there anything behind the mental process, any permanent mind.'* and if there is, what is its nature.'' — is a question which has often been asked, and which it is well worth while to try to answer. But it is not a question which can be raised by psychology. Psychology sees in mind nothing more than the whole sum of mental processes experienced in a single lifetime.
10 The Meaning and Problem of Psychology There is, however, a great difference between the men- tal processes of childhood, vigorous manhood and old age. When we speak of ' psychology,' without any qualifying adjective, we are usually thinking of the psychology of the average human being who has passed beyond child- hood, but has not yet become enfeebled by age. Mind, then, as ordinarily regarded by the psychologist, is the sum total of mental processes experienced during this middle |^ stage of life. No definite statement can be made as to the age at which the mind of the child passes over into Fig, I. — Mind, represented as the sum total of mental processes experienced by the individual. (For the form of the Fig., cf. § 35; for processes anterior to that of the adult, or that at which the adult mind becomes senile. -