library of Ipbilcaopb^ EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A.
APPEARANCE AND REALITY SOME OPINIONS OF THE PRESS "One of the most important books that have been published during the last twenty-five years."— J. H. Muirhead in Literary Guide.
" This is a truly great book. It is one of supreme interest and importance to the student of Ethics, as well as to the student of Metaphysics. Every particular thing in it is delightful. The style, though often paradoxical, is singularly bright and attractive. It is hardly too much to say that the book is altogether the most important independent work on Metaphysics that has ever been written in English." — International Journal of Ethics.
"This book must be studied and reckoned with by all students of Metaphysics."— Guardian.
APPEARANCE AND REALITY 1 H metaphysical lEssa?
BY Fellow of Merton College, Oxford SIXTH IMPRESSION (CORRECTED) LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.
First Edition, June, 1893; Second Edition (with an Appendix), February, 1897 Third Impression, June, 1899; Fourth Impression, February, 1906; Fifth Impression (corrected), November, 1908; Sixth Impression (corrected), June, 1916.
TO MY FRIEND E R THIS UNWORTHY VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.
PREFACE.
I have described the following work as an essay in metaphysics. Neither in form nor extent does it carry out the idea of a system. Its subject indeed is central enough to justify the exhaustive treatment of every problem. But what I have done is incomplete, and what has been left undone has often been omitted arbitrarily. The book is a more or less desultory handling of perhaps the chief questions in metaphysics.
There were several reasons why I did not attempt a more systematic treatise, and to carry out even what I proposed has proved enough for my powers. I began this book in the autumn of 1887, and, after writing the first two fifths of it in twelve months, then took three years with the remainder. My work has been suspended several times through long intervals of compulsory idleness, and I have been glad to finish it when and how I could. I do not say this to obviate criticism on a book now deliberately published. But, if I had attempted more, I should probably have completed nothing.
And in the main I have accomplished all that lay within my compass. This volume is meant to be a critical discussion of first principles, and its object is to stimulate enquiry and doubt. To originality in any other sense it makes no claim. If the xii PREFACE.
reader finds that on any points he has been led once more to reflect, I shall not have failed, so far as I can, to be original. But I should add that my book is not intended for the beginner. Its language in general I hope is not over-technical, but I have sometimes used terms intelligible only to the student. The index supplied is not an index but a mere collection of certain references.
My book does not design to be permanent, and will be satisfied to be negative, so long as that word implies an attitude of active questioning. The chief need of English philosophy is, I think, a sceptical study of first principles, and I do not know of any work which seems to meet this need sufficiently. By scepticism is not meant doubt about or disbelief in some tenet or tenets. I understand by it an attempt to become aware of and to doubt all preconceptions. Such scepticism is the result only of labour and education, but it is a training which cannot with impunity be neglected. And I know no reason why the English mind, if it would but subject itself to this discipline, should not in our day produce a rational system of first principles. If I have helped to forward this result, then, whatever form it may take, my ambition will be satisfied.
The reason why I have so much abstained from historical criticism and direct polemics may be briefly stated. I have written for English readers, and it would not help them much to learn my relation to German writers. Besides, to tell the truth, I do not know precisely that relation myself. And, though I have a high opinion of the metaphysical powers of the English mind, I have not seen any PREFACE. Xlll PREFACE. Xlll serious attempt in English to deal systematically with first principles. But things among us are not | as they were some few years back. There is no | established reputation which now does much harm: to philosophy. And one is not led to feel in writing that one is face to face with the same dense body of stupid tradition and ancestral prejudice. Dogmatic Individualism is far from having ceased to flourish, but it no longer occupies the ground as the one accredited way of " advanced thinking." The present generation is learning that to gain education a man must study in more than one school. And to criticise a writer of whom you know nothing is now, even in philosophy, considered to be the thing that it is. We owe this improvement mostly to men of a time shortly before my own, and who insisted well, if perhaps incautiously, on the great claims of Kant and Hegel. But whatever other influences have helped, the result seems secured. There is a fair field for any one now, I believe, who has anything to say. And I feel no desire for mere polemics, which can seldom benefit oneself, and which seem no longer required by the state of our philosophy. I would rather keep my natural place as a learner among learners.
If anything in these pages suggests a more dogmatic frame of mind, I would ask the reader not hastily to adopt that suggestion. I offer him a set of opinions and ideas in part certainly wrong, but where and how much I am unable to tell him. That is for him to find out, if he cares to and if he can. Would it be better if I hinted in effect th.it he is in danger of expecting more, and that I, if I xiv PREFACE.
chose, perhaps might supply it? I have everywhere done my best, such as it is, to lay bare the course of ideas, and to help the reader to arrive at a judgment on each question. And, as I cannot suppose a necessity on my part to disclaim infallibility, I have not used set phrases which, if they mean anything, imply it. I have stated my opinions as truths whatever authority there may be against them, and however hard I may have found it to come to an opinion at all. And, if this is to be dogmatic, I certainly have not tried to escape dogmatism, 1 1 is difficult again for a man not to think too much of his own pursuit. The metaphysician cannot perhaps be too much in earnest with metaphysics, and he cannot, as the phrase runs, take himself too seriously. But the same thing holds good with every other positive function of the universe. And the metaphysician, like other men, is prone to forget this truth. He forgets the narrow limitation of his special province, and, filled by his own poor inspiration, he ascribes to it an importance not its due. I do not know if anywhere in my work I may seem to have erred thus, but I am sure that such excess is not my conviction or my habitual mood. And to restore the balance, and as a confession possibly of equal defect, I will venture to transcribe some sentences from my note-book. I see written there that " Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." Of Optimism I have said that " The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil." Eclecticism I have found preach PREFACE. XV PREFACE. XV that " Every truth is so true that any truth must be false," and Pessimism that " Where everything is bad it must be good to know the worst," or " Where all is rotten it is a man's work to cry stinking fish." About the Unity of Science I have set down that "Whatever you know it is all one," and of Introspection that " The one self-knowledge worth having is to know one's mind." The reader may judge how far these sentences form a Credo, and he must please himself again as to how seriously he takes a further extract: " To love unsatisfied the world is mystery, a mystery which love satisfied seems to comprehend. The latter is wrong only because it cannot be content without thinking itself right."
But for some general remarks in justification of metaphysics I may refer to the Introduction.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION It is a pleasure to me to find that a new edition of this book is wanted. I am encouraged to hope that with all its defects it has helped to stimulate thought on first principles. And it has been a further pleasure to me to find that my critics have in general taken this work in the spirit in which it was offered, whether they have or have not found themselves in agreement with its matter. And perhaps in some cases sympathy with its endeavour may have led them to regard its shortcomings too leniently. I on my side have tried to profit by every comment, though I have made no attempt to acknowledge each, or to reply to it in detail. But I fear that some criticisms must have escaped my notice, since I have discovered others by mere chance.
For this edition I have thought it best not to make many alterations; but I have added in an Appendix, beside some replies to objections, a further explanation and discussion of certain difficulties.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
TAC.vy Introduction 1-7 ^/ Preliminary objections to metaphysics answered. The task is not impossible, 2, or indefensible, 3-7.
Primary and Secondary Qualities...11-18 Attempt to explain error by taking primary qualities alone as real, II, The secondary shown to be unreal, 12-14. I*ut the primary have no independent existence, 14-17, save as useful fictions, 17-18.
II. Substantive and Adjective...19-24 Problem of Inherence. Relation between the thing and its qualities is unintelligible, 19-24.
III. Relation and Quality 25~34 I. Qualities without relations are unintelligible. They cannot be found, 26-27. They cannot be got bare legitimately, 27-28, or at all, 28-30.
II. Qualities with relations are unintelligible. They cannot be resolved into relations, 30, and the relations bring internal discrepancies, 31.
III. Relations with, or without, qualities are unintelligible, 32-34.
IV. Space and Time 35~43 Their psychological origin is irrelevant, 35. Space is inconsistent because it is, and is not, a relation, 36-38, and its connection with other content is unintelligible, I ime, as usually 1 vices, 39, 40.
And 10 I taken otii- 1 the "now "is XVlii CONTENTS.
PACES V. Motion and Change and its Perception. 44~53 Motion is inconsistent; is not so fundamental as Change, 44, 45. Change is a new instance of our dilemma and is unintelligible, 45~49- Perception of Succession is not timeless, 49-51. Its true nature, 51-53.
VI. Causation...54-61 Effort to avoid the contradiction of Change. But the Cause and its Effect are not compatible, 54, 55. Illusory attempt at explanation, 55, 56. The Cause spreads to take in all the conditions, and yet cannot be complete, 56-58. Its relation to its effect is unintelligible, Causal sequence must be, and cannot be, continuous, Whether an original datum, or not, is irrelevant, 62. It has a meaning which implies change in time, 63, and self-caused change, 64, 65. Passivity what and how connected with Activity. Occasion what, 65. Condition and Sum of Conditions, 66-68.
Activity and Passivity imply one another, but are inconsistent, 68-70.
Our previous results have ruined Things, 71. Things must have identity which is ideal, and so appearance, 72, 7^. Everyday confusion as to Things' identity, IX. The Meanings of Self...75-102 The Self at last, but what does it mean? 75, 76. Self as body excluded, 77- I- Self as total contents of experience at one moment, 77. II. Self as average contents of experience, 77-79. HI- Essential self, 80, 81. Personal identity, 81-86. IV. Self as Monad, 86-87. V. Self as what interests, 88. VI. Self as opposed to Not-self, 88-96. Each is a concrete group, 89, 90. But does any content belong solely to self, 90, 91, or to Not-self, 91, 92? Doubtful cases, 92-94. Self and Not-self on the whole are not fixed, 95, 96. Perception of Activity, its general nature, 96-100. VII. Self as CONTENTS. XIX PACKS X. The Reality of Self...103-120 Self is doubtless a fact, but, as it appears, can it be real? 103-104. (a) Self as Feeling proves for several reasons untenable, 104-107. (6) Nor is self-consciousness in better case, 107-m. (c) Personal Identity useless, and so also functional unity of self, 11 2-1 14. {d) Self as Activity, Force, or Will, 114-117. (e) Self as Monad, 1 17, 1 18. Conclusion, 119, 120.
XI. Phenomenalism 1 21-126 Result so far, 121. Phenomenalism as a remedy, 121, 122. But it does not include the facts, itself for one, 122. And its elements are unintelligible, 123. And difficulty as to past and future and Identity, 123, 124. And what are Laws, 124, 125? Final dilemma, 125, 126.
XII. Things in Themselves...127-132 S Separation of Universe into two hemispheres is indefensible, 127-129, and only doubles our difficulties, 129-131. Appearances are facts, which somehow must qualify reality, 131, 132.
JBooft iff.— Vealftg.
XIII. The General Nature of Reality. 135-143 Result, so far, mainly negative, 135; but we have an absolute criterion, 136. Objection based on development, 137. Our criterion is supreme, and not merely negative. It gives positive knowledge about reality, 137-140. Further, the Real is one substantially. Plurality of Reals is not possible, 140-143.
XIV. The General Nature of Reality (cont). 144-161 The Absolute is one system, and its matter is Experience, 144-147. But has it more than theoretical perfection, 147, 148? No answer from any practical postulate, 148-155. Ontological Argument, 149, 150. Practical and theoretical Axioms, 151-154.
But, indirectly, theoretical perfection seems to imply perfection on all sides, 155-158.
< >ur knowledge of the Absolute is incomplete, but positive. Its sources, 1 59- 161.
XX CONTENTS.
XV. Thought and Reality Nature of Ideality, 162, 163. This visible in judgment through contrast of predicate with subject, 163-165. Truth what, 165; is based on Ideality of the Finite, Puzzle about the relation of thought to reality, 167. Thought is dualistic, and its subject and predicate are different, 168-170. And if thought succeeded in transcending dualism, it would perish as thought, 170-172. But why should it not do so? 173-175.
But can we maintain an Other to thought, 175, 176? Yes, if this Other is what thought itself desires and implies. And that is the case, 176-180. The relational form implies a completion beyond itself, 180-182. Our Absolute is no Thing-in-itself, 183.
A good objection must be founded on something discrepant, not merely something unexplained, 184-186. Problem of Error. It involves a dilemma, 186. Error is Appearance and false Appearance, 187, 188. It is rejected by Reality because it makes that discordant, 188-191. But it belongs to Reality somehow, 191. Error can be made truth by division and rearrangement, 192-194. And its positive discordance can be absorbed, 194-196. This possible solution must be real, 196.
Main difficulties made by an error, 197. Several senses of evil. Evil as pain, 198-200; as failure to realize End, 200, 201; and as immorality, 201-203. ln no sense is it incompatible with the Absolute. And no diversity is lost there, 203, 204.
XVIII. Temporal and Spatial Appearance Time and space are inexplicable, but not incompatible with our Absolute, 205. Question of origin irrelevant, and appeal to "fact of consciousness" idle, 206.
Time points to something beyond itself in several ways, 207-210. It is transcended, 210.
Unity of Time. There is none, 210-214. My " real'' world — what, 212. Direction of Time. There is none, or rather there may be any number, 214-218. Sequence in Causation is but appearance, 218-220.
Space, whatever is its origin, transcends itself, 221, CONTENTS. x Q PAGKS XIX. — The This and the Mine...223-240 Their general nature, 223. They are positive and negative, 224. Feeling as immediate experience of reality, 224, 225. The This as feeling of reality, and as positive fragmentariness, 226, 227.
The This as negative. It transcends itself, 227, 228. The This as unique and as Self-will, 228, 229.
Is there more than content in the This? 230-233. Does any content stick in the This? 233. No, it only seems to do so through our failure, 234-240. The " merely mine," what, 237.
XX. — Recapitulation 241-246 Result so far, 241, 242. Individuality and Perfection, are they merely negative? 243-245. Perfection and quantity, 245. There is but one perfect being, 246.
XXI. — Solipsism 247-260 Problem stated, 247, 248. The Experience appealed to is Direct or Indirect, 248.
I. Direct Experience does not give my self as sole substantive, 248-250.
II. But can we transcend direct experience at all? Or is the this-mine " unique "? No, not in sense of "exclusive," and we are forced to go beyond, 251-254. Then, if so, can we stop at our past and future self, or must we conclude also to other souls? 254, 255. Neither can be demonstrated, but both depend on the same argument, 255-258. Nor would unreality of other selves prove Solipsism, 258. Everything is, and also is not, my experience, 258, 259. Truths contained in Solipsism, 260.
Nature— meaning of, and origin of for us, 261, 262. In its essence there is an Antinomy. It is relation of unknown to unknown, 263-265. It is a mere system of the conditions of some phenomena, and an inconsistent abstraction, 266, 267.
Is all Nature extended? 267-269. Is any part of Nature inorganic? 270-272. Is it all relative to finite souls? 273-280. These questions not important, 280, 281. Identity of Nature, 281-283. Position of physical OCC, 283-286. Unity of Nature, 286-288. Solidity, 288-290. Infinity of Nature, 290-292. Its Uniformity, 292. Nature is contingent, in what sense, 293, XX11 CONTENTS.
XXIII. — Body and Soul 295-35^ They are phenomenal and furnish no ground for an objection, 295-297. Body, what, 297, 298. Soul, what, 298. It is not the same as experience. This shown from point of view of the individual, 299-304; and of the Absolute, 305-307.
Objections discussed. (1) If phenomenal, is the soul a mere appendage to the organism? Problem of continuity and of dispositions. The soul an ideal construction, 307-316. (2) Does the series imply a transcendent Ego? 316. (3) Are there psychical facts which are not Relation of Body and Soul. They are not one thing, 323,358. They are causally connected, 324, 325. One is not the idle adjective of the other, 326-331. The true view stated, 333-335; but the connection remains inexplicable, 336, 337. How far can body or soul be independent? 337-342, Communication between Souls, its nature, 342-347.
Identity of diverse souls, its nature and action, 347-352. Identity within one soul, and how far it transcends the mechanical view, 353-57.
XXIV. — Degrees of Truth and Reality. 359-400 The Absolute has no degrees, but this not true of Existence, 359, 360. Truth — nature of, 360, 361. It remains conditional, 361. Hence no total truth or error, only more or less of Validity, 362, 363.
The Standard, what. It has two features which are essentially connected, 363-365. Approach to this measures degree of relative truth, 365. All thought, even mere imagination, has some truth, 365-370. The Standard further specified, in relation to mere phenomena, 370, and to higher appearances, 370-372. No other standard possible, 372-374. And ours is applicable everywhere, 375-377. The world of Sense, its proper place. Neither mere Sense nor mere Thought is real, 378-381. The truer and more real must appear more; but in what sense? 381, 382.
Complete conditions not same as Reality, 383. Unseen Nature and psychical Dispositions, 383, 384. Potential Existence, what, 384-387. Possibility and Chance and external Necessity, relative and absolute, 387-394. Degrees of Possibility, 394. The Ontological Proof, its failure and justification, 395-397. Bastard form of it, 398, 399. Existence necessary, in what sense, 400.
Good and Evil and their degrees are not illusions, but still are appearances, 401, 402. Goodness, what, 402.
CONTENTS. XXIII The merely pleasant, why not good, 403. Pleasure by itself not good, 404-407. Good is not the satisfied will, but is in general the approved, 407, 408. How far is it "desirable"? 408, 409.
Goodness is a one-sided inconsistent aspect of perfection, 409, 410. The Absolute both is and is not Goodness, more specially, as Self-realization, 412, 413, Its double aspect as Self-sacrifice and Self-assertion, 414. What these are, 415-418. They come together but are transcended in the Absolute, 419. But popular Ethics asserts each as ultimate, and hence necessarily fails, 420-429. Relativity of Goodness, 429, 430.
Goodness as inner Morality, 431, 432. Is inconsistent and ends in nothing or in evil, 432-436.
The demands of Morality carry it beyond itself into Religion, 436-438. What this is, and how it promises satisfaction, 439-442. It proves inconsistent, and is an appearance which passes beyond itself, 442-448; but it is no illusion, 448-450. The practical problem as to religious truth, 450-453. Religion and Philo- XXVI. The Absolute and its Appearances.. 455-510 Object of this Chapter, 455-457. The chief modes of Experience; they all are relative, 458. Pleasure, Feeling, the Theoretical, the Practical, and the./Esthetic attitude are each but appearance, 458-466. And each implies the rest, 466-468.
But the Unity is not known in detail. Final inexplicabilities, 468-470. The universe cannot be reduced to Thought and Will, 469. This shown at length, 470-482. The universe how far intelligible, 482, 483. The primacy of Will a delusion, 483-485.
Appearance, meaning of the term, 485, 486. Appearances and the Absolute, 486-489. Nature, is it beautiful and adorable? 490-495. Ends in Nature — a question not for Metaphysics, 496, 497. Philosophy of Nature what, 496-499.
Progress, is there any in the Absolute, 499-501; or any life after death, 501-510?
XXVII. Ultimate Doubts 5!I-55a Is our conclusion merely possible? 5 12. Preliminary statement as to possibility and doubt. These must rest on positive knowledge, 512-518.
This applied to our Absolute. It is one, 518-522. It is experience, 522-526. But it docs not (properly speaking) consist of souls, 526-530; nor is it (properly) XXIV CONTENTS.
personal, 531-533. Can the Absolute be called happy?
Knowledge is conditional or absolute, and so is impossibility, 535-538. Finite knowledge is all conditional, 539-542. It varies in strength and in corrigi- In the end not even absolute truth is quite true, and yet the distinction remains, 544, 545. Relation of truth to reality, 545^547- Our result reconciles extremes, and is just to our whole nature, 547-549. Error and illusion, 549, 550. The presence of Reality in all appearances, but to different degrees, is the last word of philosophy, Appendix — Introduction Note A. Contradiction and the Contrary Note B. Relation and Quality. Note C. Identity...Explanatory Notes...
The writer on metaphysics has a great deal against him. Engaged on a subject which more than others demands peace of spirit, even before he enters on the controversies of his own field, he finds himself involved in a sort of warfare. He is confronted by prejudices hostile to his study, and he is tempted to lean upon those prejudices, within him and around him, which seem contrary to the first. It is on the preconceptions adverse to metaphysics in general that I am going to make some remarks by way of introduction. We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole. Any such pursuit will encounter a number of objections. It will have to hear that the knowledge which it desires to obtain is impossible altogether; or, if possible in some degree, is yet practically useless; or that, at all events, we can want nothing beyond the old philosophies. And I will say a few words on these arguments in their order.
(a) The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible has no right here to any answer. He must be referred for conviction to the body of this treatise. And he can hardly refuse to go there, since he himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena. He is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles. And this is so plain that I must excuse. myself from dwelling on the point. To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts, himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise. But this introduction is not the place to discuss a class of objections which are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical views, and which a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel. So far as is necessary, they will be dealt with in their proper place; and I will therefore pass to the second main argument against metaphysics.
(6) It would be idle to deny that this possesses great force. " Metaphysical knowledge," it insists, " may be possible theoretically, and even actual, if you please, to a certain degree; but, for all that, it is practically no knowledge worth the name." And this objection may be rested on various grounds. I will state some of these, and will make the answers which appear to me to be sufficient.
The, first reason for refusing to enter on our field is an appeal to the confusion and barrenness which prevail there. " The same problems," we hear it often, " the same disputes, the same sheer failure. Why not abandon it and come out? Is there nothing else more worth your labour? " To this I shall reply more fully soon, but will at present deny entirely that the problems have not altered. The assertion is about as true and about as false as would be a statement that human nature has not changed. And it seems indefensible when we consider that in history metaphysics has not only been acted on by the general development, but has also reacted. But, apart from historical questions, which are here not in place, I am inclined to take my stand on the admitted possibility. If the object is not impossible, and the adventure suits us — what then? Others far better than ourselves have wholly failed — so you say. But the man who succeeds is not apparently always the man of most merit, and even in philosophy's cold world perhaps some fortunes go by favour. One never knows until one tries.
But to the question, if seriously I expect to succeed, I must, of course, answer, No. I do not suppose, that is, that satisfactory knowledge is possible.
How much we can ascertain about reality will be discussed in this book; but I may say at once that I expect a very partial satisfaction. I am so bold as to believe that we have a knowledge of the Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete. But I dissent emphatically from the conclusion that, because imperfect, it is worthless. And I must suggest to the objector that he should open his eyes and should consider human nature. Is it possible to abstain from thought about the universe? I do not mean merely that to every one the whole body of things must come in the gross, whether consciously or unconsciously, in a certain way. I mean that, by various causes, even the average man is compelled to wonder and to reflect. To him the world, and his share in it. is a natural object of thought, and seems likely to remain one. And so, when poetry, art, and religion have ceased wholly to interest, or when they show no longer any tendency to struggle with ultimate problems and to come to an understanding with them; when the sense of mystery and enchantment no longer draws the mind to wander aimlessly and to love it knows not what; when, in short, twilight has no charm — then metaphysics will be worthless. For the question (as things are now) is not whether we are to reflect and ponder on ultimate truth — for perhaps most of us do that, and are not likely to cease. The question is merely as to the way in which this should be done. And the claim of metaphysics is surely not unreasonable.
Metaphysics takes its stand on this side of human nature, this desire to think about and comprehend reality. And it merely asserts that, if the attempt is to be made, it should be done as thoroughly as our nature permits. There is no claim on its part to supersede other functions of the human mind; but it protests that, if we are to think, we should sometimes try to think properly. And the opponent of metaphysics, it appears to me, is driven to a dilemma. He must either condemn all reflection on the essence of things, — and, if so, he breaks, or, rather, tries to break, with part of the highest side of human nature, — or else he allows us to think, but not to think strictly. He permits, that is to say, the exercise of thought so long as it is entangled with other functions of our being; but as soon as it attempts a pure development of its own, guided by the principles of its own distinctive working, he prohibits it forthwith. And this appears to be a paradox, since it seems equivalent to saying, You may satisfy your instinctive longing to reflect, so long as you do it in a way which is unsatisfactory. If your character is such that in youf thought is satisfied by what does not, and cannot, pretend to be thought proper, that is quite legitimate. But if you are constituted otherwise, and if in you a more strict thinking is a want of your nature, that is by all means to be crushed out. And, speaking for myself, I must regard this as at once dogmatic and absurd.
But the reader, perhaps, may press me with a different objection. Admitting, he may say, that thought about reality is lawful, I still do not understand why, the results being what they are, you should judge it to be desirable. And I will try to answer this frankly. I certainly do not suppose that it would be good for every one to study metaphysics, and I cannot express any opinion as to the number of persons who should do so. But I think it quite necessary, even on the view that this study can produce no positive results, that it should still be pursued. There is, so far as I can see, no other certain way of protecting ourselves against dogmatic superstition. Our orthodox theology on the one side, and our common-place materialism on the other side (it is natural to take these as prominent instances), vanish like ghosts before the daylight of free sceptical enquiry. I do not mean, of course, to condemn wholly either of these beliefs; but I am sure that either, when taken seriously, is the mutilation of our nature. Neither, as experience has amply shown, can now survive in the mind which has thought sincerely on first principles; and it seems desirable that there should be such a refuge for the man who burns to think consistently, and yet is too good to become a slave, either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry. That is one reason why I think that metaphysics, even if it end in total scepticism, should be studied by a certain number of persons.
And there is a further reason which, with myself perhaps, has even more weight. All of us, I presume, more or less, are led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both chastens and transports us. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of thus experiencing the Deity. No one, probably, who has not felt this, however differently he might describe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics. And, whereever it has been felt strongly, it has been its own justification. The man whose nature is such that by one path alone his chief desire will reach consummation, will try to find it on that path, whatever it may be, and whatever the world thinks of it; and, if he does not, he is contemptible. Self-sacrifice is too often the " great sacrifice " of trade, the giving cheap what is worth nothing. To know what one wants, and to scruple at no means that will get it, may be a harder self-surrender. And this appears to be another reason for some persons pursuing the study of ultimate truth.