p. 256. With regard to Redintegration — without wishing to commit myself to any decided view — I have assumed that to be fact which is generally taken to be so, viz., that among the members of a series there is reproduction only forwards, i.e. from a to b and not also from b to a. The first member in the series cannot therefore be recalled by any later member directly. This must be done indirectly and through the common character and the unity of the series. This character, because associated with the whole series inclusive of the end, can, given the end, recall the beginning. But in what this character and unity consists is a most difficult problem. It is a problem however which calls for treatment by any one who tries to deal systematically with the principles of psychology. It will be understood that in this Note I am speaking of mere serial reproduction, but that on the other hand I am not assuming that even reproduction forwards, from a to b, can be taken ultimately as merely direct. l Chapter xxi. In Part III, Chapter iii, of Mr. Hobhouse's work on the Theory of Knowledge, I find an argument against " subjective idealism " which it may be well to consider briefly. The same argument would appear also suited, if not directed, to prove the reality of primary qualities taken as bare. And though this is very probably not intended, and though I find the argument in any case difficult to follow, I will criticise it, so far as I understand it, from both points of view.
The process seems to consist, as was natural, in an attempt at removal by elimination of all the conditions of a relation A-B, until A-B is left true and real by itself. And A-B in the present case is to be a relation of naked primary qualities, or again a relation of something apart from and independent of myself. After some assertions as to the possibility of eliminating in turn all other psychical facts but my perceptive consciousness— assertions which seem to me, as I understand them, to be wholly untenable and quite contrary to fact — the naked independence of A-B appears to be proved thus. Take a state of things where one term of the connection is observed, and the other is not observed. We have still here to infer the existence of the term unobserved, but an existence, because unobserved, free (let us say first) from all secondary qualities.
But I should have thought myself that the conclusion which follows is quite otherwise. I should have said that what was proved from the premises was not that A-B exists naked, but that A-B, if unconditioned, is false and unreal, and ought never to have been asserted at all except as a useful working Action. In other words the observed absence of one of the terms from its place, i.e. the field of observation, is not a proof that this term exists elsewhere, but is rather here a negative instance to disprove the assumed universal A-B, if that is taken unconditionally. Of course if you started by supposing A-B to be unconditionally true, you would at the start have assumed the conclusion to be proved And, taken as directed against Solipsism, the argument once more is bad, as I think any argument against Solipsism must be, unless it begins by showing that the premises of Solipsism are in part erroneous. But any attempt at refutation by way of elimination seems to me even to be absurd. For in any observation to find in fact the absence of all Ccenesthesia and inner feeling of self is surely quite impossible. Nor again would the Solipsist lightly admit that his self was co-extensive merely with what at any one time is present to him. And if further the Solipsist admits that he cannot explain the course of outward experience, any more than he can explain the sequence of his inmost feelings, and that he uses all such abstract universals as your A-B simply as useful fictions, how can you, by such an argument as the above, show that he contradicts himself? A failure to explain is certainly not always an inconsistency, and to prove that a view is unsatisfactory is not always to demonstrate that it is false. Mr. Hobhouse's crucial instance to prove the reality of A-B apart from the self could to the Solipsist at most show a sequence that he was unable to explain.1 How in short in this way you are to drive him out of his circle I do not see — unless of course he is obliging enough to contradict himself in advance by allowing the possibility of A-B existing apart, or being real or true independently and unconditionally.
The Solipsist, while he merely maintains the essential necessity of his self to the Universe and every part of it, cannot in my opinion be refuted, and so far certainly he is right For, except as a relative point of view, there is no apartness or independence in the Universe. It is not by crude attempts at elimination that 1 The position of the Solipsist I understand to be this, that no reality oc (act has any existence or meaning except the reality of his self. And when he is pressed as to an order of phenomena which he cannot explain, I do not see how on and from his own premises he is to be precluded from appealing to unknown conditions in his self. 'Surely,' he might rcnly, *on any view no one can actually explain everything, and merely for the sake of explaining things somewhat better I decline to assert what is demonstrable nonsense. And the only proper course is, as I have pointed out, to show that his premises arc partly mistaken.
6l6 EXPLANATORY NOTES.
you can deal with the Solipsist, but rather (as in this chapter I have explained) by showing that the connection which he maintains, though really essential, has not the character which he assigns to it. You may hope to convince him that he himself commits the same fault as is committed by the assertor of naked primary qualities, or of things existing quite apart from myself — the fault, that is, of setting up as an independent reality a mere abstraction from experience. You refute the Solipsist, in short, by showing how experience, as he has conceived it, has been wrongly divided and onesidedly narrowed.
p. 268. On the question whether and how far psychical states are extended, see an article in Mind, N.S. No. 14.
^.273. I would here request the reader's attention to the fact that, while for me "soul" and "finite centre" are not the same (p. 529), I only distinguish between them where it seems necessary.
p. 313. In the fourth line from the bottom of this page I have altered "the same. Or" into "the same, or." The full stop was, I presume, inserted by an error. In any case I have removed it, since it may lead some reader, if not careful, to take the words "we should call them the same" absolutely. This in fact I find has been done, but the meaning was not really, I think, obscure. I am in the first place not maintaining that no continuous existence at all is wanted for the individual identity of a soul or of anything else. On the contrary I have in several places asserted the opposite. I am speaking here merely of an interval and a breach in continuous existence. And I certainly am not saying that all of us would as a fact assert individual identity despite this breach or interval. I am pointing out that, whether we assert it or deny it, we are standing in each case, so far as I can see, on no defensible principle.
I am far from maintaining that my answer to the question, "What is the soul, especially during those intervals where there seems to be no consciousness," is wholly satisfactory. But willing and indeed anxious as I am to receive instruction on this matter from my critics, I cannot say that I have been able as yet to gain the smallest fresh light on it.
p> 333* Without entering here into detail, I will venture to make a remark which I cannot think quite uncalled-for. You cannot by making use of a formula, such as " psycho-physical parallelism" — or even a longer formula — absolve yourself from facing the question as to the causal succession of events in the body and the mind. When we say, for example, that the physical prick of a pin causes pain, is this assertion in any sense true or is it quite false? Is the pain not really to any extent, directly or indirectly, the effect of the prick? And, if it is not, of what else is it the effect, or can it again happen quite uncaused and itself be effectless? Clear answers to these questions are, I should say, more easily sought than found.
/. 348. On the question whether and in what sense difference depends on a relation, see Note B, and for a discussion of Resemblance, see Note C. The controversy, mentioned in the footnote to p. 348, was continued in Mind, N.S. Nos. 7 and 8, and I would venture to refer any reader interested in the matter to it /• 356. On the topic of Association holding only between universals the reader should consult Hegel, Encyklopddie, §§ //• 363-4- The argument in these pages, the reader will observe, depends on the truth of certain doctrines. (a) A merely external relation has no meaning or existence, for a relation must (at least to some extent) qualify its terms, (b) Relations imply a unity in which they subsist, and apart from which they have no meaning or existence, (e) Every kind of diversity, both terms and relations alike are adjectives of one reality, which exists in them and without which they are nothing. These doctrines are taken as having been already proved both in the body of this work and in the Appendix.
From this basis we can go on to argue as follows. Everything finite, because somehow together in one whole with everything else, must, because this whole is one above the level of bare feeling, co-exist with the rest at the very least relationally. Hence everything must somehow, at least to some extent, be qualified from the outside. And this qualification, because only relational (to put it here in this way), cannot fall wholly inside the thing. Hence the finite is internally inconsistent with and contradicts itself. And whether the external qualification is merely conjoined in some unintelligible way to its inner nature, or is connected with that intrinsically — may for our present purpose be ignored. For anyhow, however it comes about, the finite as a fact will contradict itself.
From the side of the Whole the same result is manifest For that is itself at once both any one finite and also what is beyond. And, because no 'together' can in the end be merely external, therefore the Whole within the finite carries that outside itself.
By an attempt to fall back upon mire feeling below relations nothing would be gained. For with the loss of the relations, and with the persistence of the unity, even the appearance of independence on the part of the diversity is gone. And again feeling is self-transcendent, and is perfected mainly by way of relations, and always in a Whole that both is above them and involves them (p. 583).
6l8 EXPLANATORY NOTES.
The way to refute the above would be, I presume, to show (a) that merely external relations have in the end, and as ultimate facts, a meaning and reality, and to show (£) that it is possible to think the togetherness of the terms and the external relations— for somehow, I suppose, they are together — without a self-contradiction, manifest directly or through an infinite process of seeking relations between relations and terms.
p. 366, footnote. I may remark here that I am still persuaded that there is in the end no such thing as the mere entertainment of an idea, and that I, for example, went wrong when in my book on Logic I took this to exist. It seems to be, on the contrary, the abstraction of an aspect which by itself does not exist. See Mind, N.S., No. 60.
p. 398, footnote. To the references given here add Mind, N.S., iv, pp. 20, 21 and pp. 225, 226.
Chapter xxiv. The doctrine of the Criterion adopted by me has in various quarters been criticised, but, so far, I venture to think, mainly without much understanding of its nature. The objections raised, for example, by Mr. Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 495-6, I cannot understand in any sense which would render them applicable. I will however in this connection make some statements which will be brief, if perhaps irrelevant.
(i) I have never held that the criterion is to be used apart from, instead of on, the data furnished by experience, (ii) I do not teach that, where incompatible suggestions are possible, we must or may affirm any one of them which we fail to perceive to be internally inconsistent. I hold on the contrary that we must use and arrange all available material (and that of course includes every available suggestion) so that the reality qualified by it all will answer, so far as is possible, to our criterion of a harmonious system. On this point I refer specially to Chapters xvi, xxiv, and xxvii, the doctrines of which, I venture to add, should not be taken as non-existent where my views are in question, (iii) I do not think that where a further alternative is possible a disjunction is complete. But I have always held, and do hold, J. S. Mill's idea of the Unmeaning as a third possibility to be the merest nonsense, (iv) I do not admit but deny the assumption that, if our knowledge could be consistent, it could then be made from the outside to contradict itself, (v) And I reject the idea that, so far as our knowledge is absolute, we can rationally entertain the notion of its being or becoming false. Any such idea, I have tried to show, is utterly unmeaning. And on the other hand, so far as our knowledge is liable to error, it is so precisely so far as it does not answer to the criterion, (vi) Finally I would submit that the sense in which this or that writer uses such principles as those of Identity and Contradiction, and the way in which he develops them, cannot always safely be assumed d priori by any critic This is all I think it could be useful for me to say in this connection, except that I would end this Note with an expression of regret The view adopted by Mr. Hobhouse as to the nature of the criterion has, it seems to me (I dare say quite wrongly), so very much that is common to myself, as well as also to others,1 that I am the more sorry that I have not the advantage of his criticism on something which I could recognize as in any degree my own.
/. 407, Footnote. On the subject of Hedonism I would add references to the International Journal of Ethics^ Vol iv, pp.
//. 458-9. We cannot, if we abstract the aspects of pleasure and pain and confine ourselves to these abstractions, discover directly within them an internal discrepancy, any more than we could do this in every abstracted sensible quality. But since these aspects are as a fact together with, first, their sensible qualities and, next, the rest of the world, and since no relation or connection of any kind can be in the end merely external, it follows that in the end the nature of pleasure or pain must somehow go beyond itself.2 If we take pleasure and pain, or one of them, to be not aspects of sensation but themselves special sensations, that will of course make no real difference to the argument. For in any case such sensations would be mere aspects and adjectives of their whole psychical states. I would add that, even in psychology, the above distinction seems, to me at least, to possess very little importance. The attempt again to draw a sharp distinction between discomfort and pain would (even if it could be successful) make no difference to us here.
p. 463, Note. The account of Will, given in Mindy No. 49, has been criticised by Mr. Shand in an interesting article on Attention and Will, Mind, N.S. No. 16. I at once recognized that my statement in the above account was defective, but in principle I have not found anything to correct. I still hold Will always to be the self-realization of an idea, but it is necessary to provide that this idea shall not in a certain sense conflict with that which 1 Mr. Hobhouse seems to me (I suppose mistakenly) to adopt somehow in the end, as the criterion of truth and reality, the idea of a consistent allinclusive system. If and so iar as he does this, I naturally think he is right, but I think he would be wrong if and so far as he simply assumed this principle as ultimate. But as to what his view in the end actually is I could nturc an opinion, partly perhaps because I have been able to give but a 1 imited time to his work.
1 Cf. the Note on p. 363, and Notes A and B of this Appendix.
in a higher sense is identified with the self. By 'higher* I do not mean 'more moral,' and I am prepared to explain what I do mean by the above. I would on this point refer to an article by Mr. Stout (in Mind, N.S. No. 19) with which I find myself largely though not wholly in agreement. I must however hope at some future time to deal with the matter, and will here state my main result. "It is will where an idea realizes itself, provided that the idea is not formally contrary to a present resolve of the subject" — so much seems certain. But there is uncertainty about the further proviso, "Provided also that the idea is not too contrary materially to the substance of the self." Probably, the meaning of " will " being really unfixed, there is no way of fixing it at a certain point except arbitrarily.
Since the above was written an enquiry into the nature of volition, with a discussion of many questions concerning conation, activity, agency, and attention, has appeared in Mind. See Nos. 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 49, and parts of 51.
p. 513. With regard to the "familiar Greek dilemma," the attentive reader will not have failed to observe that, when I later on, p. 544, maintain that no possible truth is quite true, I have explained that this want of truth is not the same thing as intellectual falsehood or fallibility. The "sceptical" critic therefore who still desires to show that I myself have fallen into this dilemma, will, I think, do well still to ignore pp. 544-7.
A probability, I may here go on to remark, of many millions to one against the truth of some statement may be a very good and sufficient reason for our putting that, for some purpose or purposes, on one side and so treating it as nothing. But no such probability does or can justify us in asserting the statement not to ' be true. That is not scepticism at all, but on the contrary it is mere dogmatism. Further I would here repeat that any probability in favour of general scepticism which rests on psychological grounds, must itself be based on an assumption of knowledge with regard to those grounds. Hence if you make your sceptical conclusion universal here, you destroy your own premises. And, on the other side, if you stop short of a universal conclusion, perhaps the particular doctrine which you wish to doubt is more certain by far than even your general psychological premises. I have (p. 137) remarked on this variety of would-be scepticism, and I find that a critic in the Psychological Review, Vol i, No. 3, Mr. A. Hodder, has actually treated these remarks as an attempted refutation on my part of scepticism in general. It probably did not occur to him that, in thus triumphantly proving my incompetence, he was really giving the measure of his own insight into the subject. With reference to another "sceptical" KXPLANATORY NOTES. 621 criticism by another writer I may perhaps do well to emphasize the fact that for me that which has no meaning is most certainly not possible. I had, I even thought, succeeded in laying this down clearly. See for instance p. 503.
/. 520. The reader will recall here that, so far as diversity does not imply actual relations, it involves presence as a mere aspect in a felt totality. See pp. 14 1-3 and Note B.
pp. 527-8. With regard to this question of some element of Reality falling outside of finite centres I find but little to add. The one total experience, which is the Absolute, has, as such, a character which, in its specific aspect of qualitative totality, must be taken not to fall within any finite centre. But the elements, which in their unity make and are this specific " quality," need not, so far as I see, to the least extent fall outside of finite centres. Such processes of and relations between centres, as more or less are not experienced by those particular centres, may, for all we know, quite well be experienced by others.
And it seems more probable that in some form or other they are so experienced. This seems more probable because it appears to involve less departure from given fact, and because we can find no good reason for the additional departure in the shape of any theoretical advantage in the end resulting from it We may conclude then that there is no element in the process of making all harmonious within the Absolute which does not fall within finite centres. What falls outside, and is over and above, is not the result but the last specific character which makes the result what it is. But even if some of the matter (so to speak) of the Absolute fell outside of finite centres, I cannot see myself how this could affect our main result, or indeed what further conclusion could follow from such a hypothesis. The reader must remember that in the Absolute we in any case allow perfections beyond anything we can know, so long as these fall within the Absolute's general character. And on the above hypothesis, so far as I see, we could not go one single step further. It could not justify us in predicating of the Absolute any lower excellence, e.g. self-consciousness or will or personality, as such, and still less some feature alien to the Absolute's general nature. But to predicate of the Absolute, on the other hand, the highest possible perfection, is what in any case and already we are bound to da The reader who finds this collection of references useless, as well as faulty and incomplete, is requested to treat it as nonexistent.
Absolute, and pleasure and pain. See Pleasure.
— contents of, 1 44 foil.
— contains and harmonizes all — knowledge of, 159 foil.
— knowledge, 536 foil.
— main aspects of, irreducible, 457 foil. Cf. Inexplicable.
— not itself without me, 260.
— not same as God, 448.
— not sum of things, 486 foil.
— perfection of. See Perfection.
Abstract, Abstraction, 17-18, Activity (Cf. Energy, Force, Resistance, Will), chap, Adjective, must make a differ- Appearance, all must appear in Appearance, degrees of reality — the highest is incapable of, — must qualify Reality, 13 1-2, — not explained away, 204.
Body, an ideal construction, — and secondary qualities, 268, — and soul, chap, xxiii — my, continuity of, 311.
— my, perception of, 263-4.
— not potentially the soul, 314.
Causation cannot be demonstrated, 335-6.
Cause and Effect, identity of, — and Effect, reciprocity ot, Cause implies abstraction from — is inconsistent, chap. vL, foil.
Change is ideal, 166.
— is inconsistent, chap, v., — perception of. See Succession.
Comparison, 113, 578. Compatible, 390-1. Conditions complete, not Real- Conditional. See Potential.
— and conditioned, 540-1. Consciousness. See Feeling, Self-consciousness.
istence, Ideal, Finite.
Contingent, 236-7.
Continuity, chap, iv., 319.
— and existence, 309 foil., 589.
— and velocity, 42. Contradiction, how got rid of, Contrary, 22, 562 foil.
Criterion (cf. Standard), 2, 136, — theoretical and practical, 147.
Degrees of a fact, what, 376.
— of goodness, chap. xxv.
« — of truth and reality, chap.
Desert, 432~3- Desirable, 408-9. Development. See Potential.
— and Validity, 137.
Difference. See Identity, Quality, Relation. Direction of time, 214 foil. Discord and pain, 157 foil., 610.
— theoretical and practical, 155 foil.
Discretion. See Continuity. Dispositions, psychical, 312, Distinction and Thought, 477 559, 620, and cf. Criterion.
End, The, every aspect may be — collision of, 430.
Energy, conservation of, 331.
Error, chapters xvi., xxiv., xxvi., xxvii. And see Truth, Event, 317.
— everything psychical is, 5 1-2, — how estimated, 370, 376. Evil. See Good. Evolution. See Potential, Progress, Development.
— degree of truth in, 370, 377 foil. Experience and reality, 144.
— as only my states, chap. xxi.
— direct and indirect, ibid.
— in a sense all is my, 260, — main aspects of, 458 foil.
— outer and inner, 346.
Extension. See Space.
— of Nature, 267.
Fact, what, 317. See Existence, Event.
Faith, 443.
Fallibility, universal, 512, 620.
496. And see Abstraction. Finite centres of Experience, Activity, Energy, Resistance.
Form. See Relational.
Formal Act, 435-6.
Good, and desire, 402 foil, 409.
— and evil, chapters xvii., xxv.
— inconsistent, 409 foil. Goodness and truth, 402-3, — moral, 413 foil.
Habit, what, 355.
Humanity, 529.
Idea and its own existence, 169, Idea is what it means, 51, 398.
Ideality. See Finite and Relativity.
foil.
Ignorance. See Privation, Negation. Illusion. See Appearance. Imaginary and real, 212 foil., foil. Inconceivable. See Impossible. Individual, only one, 246. Individualistic attitude, 309.
Infinity of Nature, 176.
— of presented subject, 290 foil. Inherence, 19 foil. Inorganic, 270 foil. Intelligible, all is, 171, 174, 176, Introspection, 93, no, 232.
foil.
Knowledge, ambiguous, 159.
— absolute and conditional, 5 35 foil.
— perfect, 517.
SS Cf. Nature.
Metaphysics, Introduction, 453- Mine. See This.
foil., 431 foil.
— origin of, 431.
Motion is inconsistent. Chap.
Nature, chap, xxii., 490 foil., — extension of, 267.
— identity of, 281.
— infinite, 290 foil.
— is it beautiful, etc.? 490 foil.
— mere, not original, 261.
— philosophy of, 496 foil.
Necessity. See Chance, Possibility, Impossibility.
Negation and privation, 97- 100, 240. See Privation.
— implies unity, 228.
Now. See Time, Succession, or Appearance, Event, This.
Occasion, 65, 326. Ontological Proof, 149-50,394- Organism, 270. Cf. Body. Origin, irrelevant, 35, 62, 206- Other to thought, 175 foil.
Pain and Pleasure, and the Passivity. See Activity.
— only one thing has, 246.
— theoretical and practical, 147 foil., 373 foil.
— two aspects of, 363 foil., 411, 414 foil.
Self. Pleasure. See Pain. Pleasant and good, 403 foil. Possible and Possibility, 142, 512 foil.
Predication, 20. Cf. Judgment. Present. See Time, Succession. Principles cannot, as such, exist, 377 foil.
foil., 538. And cf. Negation.
Probability, 504 foil., 620.
Psychology and Metaphysics, Quality and extension, 289, Cf. Relation. Qualities primary and second- — sensible, same for all? 344.
Real See Imaginary. Reality and appearances, 486 foil. See Appearance.
— and originality. See Origin.
— and thought See Thought.
CC Criterion.
Relations are all intrinsical, — and qualities, chap, iii., 142, 572 foil.
— hold only between phenomena, 322, 445 foil.
— origin of, 438.
Self, all is state of. See Experience.
— and other selves, 254 foil.
— and pleasure, 407.
Self and series, 316 folL — meanings of, chap. ix.
folL — my past and future, 256 foil., — new might be made, 85, 503.
chap. xxiv. Solidity, 288-90. Solipsism, chap, xxi., 145, 523 foil., 615. Cf. Experience. Soul and souls, a what, 298 foil. J— an ideal construction, 306, — and finite centres, 226, 529, — connected with body, chap.
xxiii.
— identity of contents of, 344 foil.
— identity of several, 347 foil.
— interaction of, 343 folL — origin of, 337.
— separation of, 343 foil.
— suspension of, 338.
— origin of, 221.
— self-contradictory, chaps, iv., xviii.
Spiritual, what, 498-9. Spiritualism, 503, 506. Standard. See Criterion.
Succession, perception of, 49- — permanent in, 52.
Subject and object, 460.
Thisness, 175, chap. xix. Things, chap. viii.
— and properties, 19 foil. Thought and existence, 374, — and ideality, 472.
— and judgment, 366 foil.
— and reality, chap, xv., 276, — dualistic, 168 foil.
— more than its object, 169, foil., 460 foil.
— not primary or self-evident, Time, chaps, iv., xviil — disregarded by Science, 208.
Time, unity of, chap, xviii. Truth, chap, xv., 462, 544 foil — and existence, 166.
chap, xxvii.
— degrees of, chap. xxiv.
— must not exclude its own Unity, knowledge of, 159-60.
— substantial, 140.
— ultimate, 468 foil., 519 foil. Unknowable, 128. Unknown, how far possible, Vacuum. See Space.
— and resolve, 463.
— and thought, 89, 469 foil.
— not primary, 477 foil.
— supremacy of, 483 foil. World, our not = universe, 200, — our want of unity in, 2 1 3 foil., Standard, Perfection, Good.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, PLYMOUTH, ENGLAND Library of Philosophy General Editor: Professor J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D.
ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout. Two Vols. •./. net.
APPEARANCE AND REALITY. By F. H. Bradlrt. it*, ntt.
ATTENTION. By Prof. W. B. Pill»bu«y. ioi. td net.
CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY. By Prof. G. Villa. 10*. td. net.
HISTORY OF ESTHETIC. By Dr. B. Bosanqubt. io* td. ntt.
HISTORY OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM. By Prof. E. Albbe.
iox. td. ntt. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By Dr. J. E. Eromank.
Vol. I. Ancient and Mediaeval. Third Edition. 151.
Vol. II. Modern. Fifth Edition. 15*.
Vol. III. Since Hegel. Third Edition. m.
HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY: Ancient and Patristic By G. S. Brett, MA tor. td. ntt.
MATTER AND MEMORY. By Henri Bcrcson. Translated by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer. iot. td. ntt.
NATURAL RIGHTS. By Prof. D. G. Ritchie. 10*. td. ntt.
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Dr. J. Bonar. lot.ti. net.
RATIONAL THEOLOGY SINCE KANT. By Prof. O. Pfleidbrer.
tor. td. net.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. By G. W. F. Hegel. Translated by J. B. Baillie. Two Vols. aw. ntt.
THOUGHT AND THINGS; or, Genetic Logic By Prof. M. Baldwin. Vol. I. Functional Logic. \ Vol. II. Experimental Logic Y 10s. td. net ptr rW.
Vol. III. Real Logic (I., Genetic Kimstemology). j TIME AND FREE WILL. By Henri Bergson. Translated by F. L. Pogson.
tor. td. ntt. VALUATION: THE THEORY OF VALUE. By Prof. W. M. Urban.
to*, td. ntt. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By G. M. Stratton.
1 or. td. ntt.
THE GREAT PROBLEMS. By Prof. Bernardino Varisco. Translated by Prof. R. C Lodge. ioj. td. ntt.
KNOW THYSELF. By Prof. Bernardino Varisco. Translated by Dr. Guglielmo Salvador!. 10/. td. ntt.
LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, LTD.
Bradley BD Ill- Appearance and reality.B8