(i) Judgment is neither the association of an idea with a sensation, nor the liveliness or strength of an idea or ideas. At the stage we have reached, we need subject these views to no detailed examination. The ideas which they speak of are psychical events, whereas judgment, we have seen, has to do with meaning, an ideal content which is universal, and which assuredly is not the mental fact. While all that we have is a relation of phenomena, a mental image, as such, in juxta position with or soldered to a sensation, we can not as yet have assertion or denial, a truth or a falsehood. We have mere reality, which is, but does not stand for anything, and which exists, but by no possibility could be true.
We will not anticipate the general discussion of " Asso ciation " (vid. Book II. Part II. Chap. I.), and will pass by those extraordinary views the school holds as to universals. We will come at once to the result. There is an idea, in the sense of a particular image, in some way conjoined with or fastened to a sensation. I have, for instance, sensations of coloured points; and images of movement and hardness and weight are " called up " by these sensations, are attracted to, and cohere with them. And this sounds very well till we raise certain difficulties. An orange presents us with visual sen sations, and we are to add to these the images just mentioned. But each of these images is a hard particular, and qualified by relations which exclude it from all others. If you simply associate this bundle of facts, who would take them as one fact? But if you blend their content, if, neglecting the exist ence, you take a part of the quality of each, and transfer that to the object, then you may call your process by what name you please, but it certainly is not association (Vid. infr. Book II.).
But let us suppose that the ideas are united somehow with the sensation, yet where is the judgment, where is truth or falsehood? The orange is now before my sense or imagi nation. For my mind it exists, and there is an end of it. Or say, " Caesar will be angry." Caesar here is the percep tion, which, when further qualified, becomes " Caesar angry." But this image again is simply what it is, it does not stand for anything, and it can mean nothing.
Let us suppose in the first place that the " idea " main tains itself, then no doubt, as one fact, it stands in mental relation with the fact of the sensation. The two phenomena coexist as a headache may coexist with a syllogism; but such psychical coherence is far from assertion. There is no affirma tion; and what is there to affirm? Are we to assert the relation between the two facts? But that is given, and either to assert it or deny it would be senseless.* Is one fact to be made the predicate of another fact? That seems quite unintelligible. If in short both sensation and idea are facts, then not only do we fail to find any assertion, but we fail to see what there is left to assert.
But in the second place (giving up association proper) let us suppose that the " idea," as such, disappears, and that its mutilated content is merged in the sensation. In this case the whole, produced by blending, comes to my mind as a single presentation. But where is the assertion, the truth or false hood? We can hardly say that it lies in the bare presentation itself. We must find it, if anywhere, in the relation of this presentation to something else. And that relation would be the reference of judgment. But on the present view both the something else and the reference are absent. We have first an unmodified and then a modified sensation.
The only way to advance would be to suppose, in the first place, that, while the " idea " maintains itself, it is dis tinguished from its content; and to suppose, in the second place, that both of these are distinguished from the sensation. We have then two facts, a sensation and an image, and beside these a content held apart from the image. We have now reached a condition which would make judgment possible, but the advance to this condition is not explicable by Associa tion. Nor could the further steps be accounted for. You have the transference of the content from the image to the sensa tion, and the qualification of the latter as a subject; but both would be inexplicable. We may add that it is impossible for a sensation or sensations to serve as the subject in every judgment (vid. Chap. II.). And finally the consciousness that, what my act joins, is joined apart from it, is a fact not *We might say that, on this view, the denial of a falsehood must ipso facto be false.
j5 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I compatible with the psychology we are considering1®. To sum up the whole— to merge the content of an image in a modi fied presentation, is but one step towards judgment, and it is a very long step beyond association: while conjunction or coherence of psychical phenomena is not only not judg ment, but would not serve as its earliest basis and beginning.* §'14. But the definition, I shall be told, is a "lively idea associated with a present impression," and I shall be asked if lively makes no difference. And I answer, Not one particle; it makes no difference even if you suppose it true, and in addition it is false. The liveliness removes none of the objections we have been developing. Let it be as lively as you please, it is a mere presentation, and there is no judg ment. The liveliness of the idea not only is not judgment, but it is not always even a condition. The doctrine that an idea judged true must be stronger than one not so judged, will not bear confrontation with the actual phenomena. You may go on to increase an idea in strength till it passes into a sensa tion, and there yet may be no judgment. I will not dwell on this point, since the unadulterated facts speak loudly for themselves, but will give one illustration. We most of us have at times the images of the dead, co-inhabitants of the rooms we once shared with the living. These images, mostly faint, at times become distressing, from their strength and particularity and actual localization in those parts of the room which we do not see. In an abnormal state such images, it is well known, may become hallucinations, and take their place in the room before our eyes as actual perceptions. But with an educated man they would be recognized as illusions, and would not be judged to be outwardly real, any more than the fainter and normal images are judged to be anywhere but in our own minds. Yet lively ideas associated with present * It has been often remarked that, on Hume's theory of belief, there can be no difference between imagination and reality, truth and false hood, and that why we make this difference is incomprehensible. J. S. Mill with great openness professed on this head the total bankruptcy of the traditional doctrine. He seems somehow to have thought that a complete break-down on a cardinal point was nothing against the main doctrine of his school, nor anything more than a somewhat strange fact. It was impossible that he should see the real cause of failure. We shall deal with Professor Bain's views lower down.
impressions — if we have not got them here, where are they?
§ 15. We turn with relief from the refutation of a doctrine, long dead and yet stubbornly cumbering the ground, to con sider a fresh error, the confusion of judgment with practical belief. I cannot enquire how far any psychical activity is consistent with the theory of Professor Bain, nor can I dis cuss the nature of a psychical activity which seems physiolog ically to consist in muscular innervation; though I am bound to add that (doubtless owing to my ignorance) Professor Bain's physiology strikes me here as being astonishingly misty. And I must pass by the doubt whether, if we accept his view, we shall find the confusion between image and meaning in any way lessened19.
We must remember that the question, Is judgment always practical, does not mean, Is the will in any way concerned in it. In that case it might be argued that all generation of psychical phenomena comes under the head Will. The ques tion means, Does the essence of judgment lie, not in the production of truth and falsehood — states which alter nothing in the things they represent — but rather in the actual produc tion of a change in real existence. Or, more simply, when an idea is judged to be true, does this mean that it moves some other phenomenon, and that its assertion or denial is nothing but this motion? The doctrine admits that an idea or ideas, when held true, differ vitally from the same when suggested; and it proceeds to assert that the differentia is the effect of the idea on our conduct, and that there is no other differentia at all.
There is a logical mistake we may point out before pro ceeding, for it is the error which has led Professor Bain astray. Assume that an asserted idea causes action, and that an idea, not believed in, does not influence conduct. From these premises can we conclude, Therefore judgment is influence? If, in other words, when A changes to B, we have an unfailing difference q, and q is not found except after A, does this war rant the assertion, that the alteration consists in q? Is it not quite possible that q follows from p, and that p is what really turns A into B? We shall do well to keep our eye on this logi cal fallacy. The assertion we are to examine is not that prac tical influence induces us to judge, or results from a judgment: What is asserted is that judgment is nothing else whatever.
Against this false differentia I shall briefly maintain, (o) that the differentia may be absent from the fact, (b) that it may be present with other facts, (c) that the fact contains other characteristics, which are the true differentia, and are absent from the false one, (d) that the latter has a positive quality which. excludes the fact.
(a) If we test the theory by abstract instances such as, The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, it collapses at once. It is impossible to find always a practical influence exerted by the ideas. We may be answered " But they might exert it, you surely would act on them." And such an answer may pass in the school of " Experience "; but a poor " transcendentalist " will perhaps be blamed if he usurps such a privilege. He at least is not allowed to take tendency and possibility and mere idea for fact. And he can hardly be prevented from pressing the question, Is the influence there or not? If it is not there, then either Professor Bain's theory disappears, or he should alter his definition, and say that an idea passes into a judgment when enriched by potentialities and eventual tendencies20. If these are not ideas we should be told what they are; but if they are only ideas that go with the first ideas, then our answer is plain. In the first place it is not true that they are always there; in the second place it is not true that, when added, they must exert a practical influence.
(b) In the second place ideas may influence me, though I never do hold them for true. The feelings and emotions associated with an idea can often prevent or produce volitions, although the idea is not affirmed as true, and even while it is recognized as false.. Though I do not believe that a slowworm can bite, or a drone can sting, I may shrink from touching them. I may avoid a churchyard though I believe in no ghosts. An illusion no doubt, if recognized as such, does not influence volition either so much, or always in the same way; but still it may operate in spite of disbelief.* And it can hardly be a true view which forces us to say, If you judged it an illusion you would wholly disregard it, for such disregard is judgment.
* It may be said that when it operates the denial is suspended. But I confess I can find no ground for such a statement. At any rate it is certain that the idea can operate though a positive judgment is not there.
I will not dwell on a point it would be easy to illustrate. In passing, however, I may remind the reader of that class of ideas which influences our actions without seeming to be true. I refer to practical ideas, the representation of a satisfied desire which is now felt to be unsatisfied. It is certain that these move us to active pursuit, and it is equally certain they are not judged to be real21; for, if they were, then for that reason they would fail to move us.* (c) But suppose that all judgment did really move to action. Would this show that judgment was nothing but such motion? Most certainly not so. We can observe what takes place in us, when a suggested idea is judged to be true; and clearly an activity (however hard to describe) does show itself there, and yet is not directed (except per accidens) towards making a change in the world and in ourselves. And if this true differentia can be verified, that should settle the question22. And again, apart from direct observation, we can argue indirectly. Assertion and denial, together with the dif ference of truth and falsehood, are real phenomena, and there is something in them which falls outside the influence of ideas on the will. It is comic if the judgment, It will rain to-morrow, is the same as buying an umbrella to-day; or, Put on your thick boots, is a truer form of, It rained hard yesterday. And when a child sees a berry and, as we say, judges, It made me sick before, it seems strange that the act of affirmation should con sist in practical abstention to-day and should be nothing else.
(d) And not only are the genuine characteristics absent from a mere practical attitude, but we find present there a qual ity which is absent from real judgment. The truth of a sug gestion is not a matter of degree, and the act which attributes an idea to reality either refers it, or does not refer it. It can hardly do either a little more or less and to a certain degree (cf. Chap. VII.). In strictness of speech all half-truths are no truths, and, " It is more or less true," really means, " It is true with a qualification," or " More or less of it is true, though as a whole it is not true." But the practical influence of ideas must have degree, and so possess a quality which judgment has not.
For these reasons, each of which can stand almost alone, it seems clear that the doctrine before us has failed. And * I may refer on this point to my Ethical Studies, Essay VII.
one cause of the error seems to lie in the neglect of some important distinctions we may proceed to notice. Judgment is primarily logical, and as such has no degrees; the relation of the ideal content to reality must be there or not there.
Belief, on the other hand, is primarily psychological, and, whether theoretic or practical, exists in a degree, (a) Intel lectual belief or conviction is the general state which corre sponds to the particular acts of judgment. To believe that A is B may mean that, whenever the idea A — B is suggested, I go on to affirm it; or, further, that the idea fills much space in my mind, is a persistent habit and ruling principle, which dominates my thoughts and fills my imagination, so that the assertion A — B is frequently made and has wide intellectual ramifications and connections. I should believe A — B less, if it more seldom arose, by itself or by implication, and had in ferior influence. I should believe less still if, when A — B was suggested, I sometimes doubted it; and even less, if I affirmed it more seldom, and then with hesitation, against doubts, and with inability to maintain the attitude. On the other hand I should not believe at all, if I only were more or less convinced, perceiving more or less reason on both sides, inclined in one direction, but unable to cross the line and to affirm, (b) But in practical belief, beside these degrees of intellectual convic tion, there is another element of more and less. Not only is the truth of the intellectual content more or less present, but in addition it can influence my will more or less. A desire stronger or more persistent, or more dominant generally, may answer to it on the one side, or on the other a weaker and more fleeting impulse. Beside existing more or less, it can move more or less. It is, I think, not easy to keep clear of con fusion unless these ambiguities are noticed and avoided. But the main logical mistake which Professor Bain has committed is to argue from the (false) premise, " Belief must induce ac tion," to the inconsequent result " Belief is that inducement." * * In the third edition of his Emotions (1875) Prof. Bain apparently reconsiders the question, but I can neither tell if he abandons his theory, nor what it is that, if so, he puts in its place. As I am entirely unable to understand this last theory, my remarks must be taken to apply to the earlier one. Since this volume was written I have made acquaintance with Mr. Sully's criticism on Prof. Bain's doctrine (Sensa- § 1 6. (ii) Leaving now the first group of erroneous views we may proceed to consider another collection. These may be classed as labouring under a common defect, the false notion that in judgment we have a pair of ideas. We were engaged with this fallacy in § n, and it will meet us again in the following chapter, so that here some brief remarks may suffice. In their ordinary acceptation the traditional subject, predicate, and copula are mere superstitions24. The ideal matter which is affirmed in the judgment, no doubt possesses internal relations, and in most cases (not all) the matter may be arranged as subject and attribute25. But this content, we have seen, is the same both in the assertion and out of it26. If you ask instead of judging, what is asked is precisely the same as what is judged. So that it is impossible that this internal relation can itself be the judgment; it can at best be no more than a condition of judging. We may say then, if the copula is a connection which couples a pair of ideas, it falls outside judgment; and, if on the other hand it is the sign of judgment, it does not couple. Or, if it both joined and judged, then judgment at any rate would not be mere joining. I will dwell here no more on the general error. We shall see its effects in some mistaken views we may proceed to notice.
(a) Judgment is not inclusion in, or exclusion from, a class. The doctrine that in saying, " A is equal to B," or " B is to the right of C," or " To-day precedes Monday," I have in my mind a class, either a collection or a description, of " things equal to B," or " to the right of C," or " preceding Monday," is quite opposed to fact. It is as absurd as the assertion that, in " It is our son John," or " It is my best coat," or " 9 = 7 + 2," I think of a class of " our sons John," or " my best coats," or " that which is equal to 7 + 2." If the view stood apart from implied preconceptions, and by itself as an interpreta tion of fact, it would scarcely, I think, be so much as discussed. And, as we shall be forced to recur to it hereafter (Chap. VI.), we may so leave it here.
lion and Intuition, 2nd ed. 1880). But he, I find, treats Prof. Bain's third edition (1875), in which an earlier edition of his own criticism is treated with the greatest respect, as if it either had no existence, or at all events was somehow irrelevant to the issue. For myself I must say that for the reason given above I confine myself to the earlier theory.23 (b) Judgment is not inclusion in, or exclusion from, the subject. By the subject I mean here not the ultimate subject, to which the whole ideal content is referred, but the subject which lies within that content, in other words the grammatical subject. In " A is simultaneous with B," " C is to east of D," "E is equal to F," it is unnatural to consider A, C, and E as sole subjects, and the rest as attributive. It is equally natural to reverse the position, and perhaps more natural still to do neither, but to say instead, " A and B are synchronous," " C and D lie east and west," " E and F are equal." The ideal complex, asserted or denied, no doubt in most cases will fall into the arrangement of a subject with adjectival qualities, but in certain instances, and those not a few, the content takes the form of two or more subjects with adjectival relations existing between them. I admit you may torture the matter from the second form into the first, but, if torture is admitted, the enquiry will become a mere struggle between torturers. It requires no great skill to exhibit every subject together with its attributes as the relation between independent qualities (subjects), or again even to make that relation the subject, and to predicate all the remainder as an attribute. Thus, in " A is simultaneous with B," it is as easy to call " exists in the case of AB " an attribute of simultaneity, as it is to call " simultaneous with B " an attribute of A. We may finally observe that existential judgments do not lend themselves easily to the mistake we are considering. And such negative judgments as " Nothing is here," will be found hard to persuade. But on both these points I must refer to the sequel (Chaps. II. and III.J.
(c) Judgment is not the assertion that subject and predi cate are identical or equal. This erroneous doctrine is the natural result of former errors. You first assume that in judgment we have a relation between two ideas, and then go on to assume that these ideas must be taken in extension. But both assumptions are vicious; and, if we consider the result, asking not if it is useful but whether it is true, we can hardly, I think, remain long m hesitation. That in " You are standing before me," or " A is north of C," or " B follows D," what we really mean is a relation either of equality or identity is simply incredible; and torture of the witness goes to such lengths that the general public is not trusted to behold it.* However useful within limits the equation of the terms may be found, if you treat it as a working hypothesis (vid. Book II. Part II. Chap. IV.), yet as a truth it will not bear any serious examination. Let us look at it more closely.
(i) If what is asserted be equality, then that of course is identity in quantity, and is nothing else whatever27. And I must venture to complain of the reckless employment of this term. To use the sign — for qualitative sameness, or for individual identity (I do not ask here if these are different), is surely barbarous. No harm perhaps may come, but there should be some limit to the abuse and confusion we allow ourselves in practice. Let us then first take equality in its proper sense, to stand for an identity in respect of quantity. But, if so, if the subject and predicate are equated, if " Negroes are men," when written " All negroes = some men," is on a level with 2= 12 — 10 — if what is said and signified is that between the terms, if you compare them numerically, there is no difference whatever, we can at once pass on. It is certain that some judgments, at least, can not express this relation of quantity, and it is certain again that, of those which can, it is only a very small class which do. Illustration is hardly wanted. " Hope is dead " would mean that, " In hope and a fraction of dead things there is exactly the same sum of units." And, in asserting that " Judgment is not an equation," I should express my belief that to divide both by 2 would not give the same quantity.
But the sign = does not seem to mean equality. It does not mean that the units of the subject and predicate are iden tical in quantity. It would appear to mean that they are the same altogether. The identity it asserts is not quantitative, but seems absolute. In " All Negroes = some men," the " = " rep resents exclusion of difference both quantitative and qualitative.
(ii) The identity is (a) not likeness; it is not a relation con sisting in a partial qualitative identity, definite or indefinite. " Iron — some metal " can hardly mean " Some metal is similar to iron." Not only do the facts exclude this interpretation, but the theory would not work with it. If " similars " and " like-* Vid. Jevons, Principles of Science, Chap. i. § 12.
ness " are phrases that occur, this is a proof that here, as in the case of =, the theory does not mean what it says, or quite know what it is doing. That when A is like B you may write one for the other, is of course quite untrue (cf. Book II.).
(b) The identity again is not definitely partial, consisting in sameness in some particular point or points of quality. For, on this interpretation, you could make no advance, until the point of sameness had been specified. And even then the equational theory would not work.
(c) Unless we suppose that both sides differ only in name, and that this difference of names is the import of the judgment — a view we shall glance at in a future chapter (Chap. VI.) — we must take the sign = to mean total sameness to the exclusion of all difference. But, if so, the theory must reform itself at once, if it desires to be consistent. It will not be true that " Negroes = some men," for certainly " some men " are not " = negroes." Nor again will it be true that negroes are equal to a certain stated fraction of mankind. That stated fraction is an universal adjective which might be applicable to other men as well as to negroes. If "is " or " = " stands for " is the same as," then it is as false to say " A is H B," as it was before to say " A is some B." " Some B" covers not only the B which is A; it may hold just as much of the other B, which we take as not-A. And it is so with " ^ B "; that applies just as much to the % which are not-A, as it does to the third which is identical with A. The quantification of the predicate is a half-hearted doctrine, which runs against facts, if " = " does mean equal, is ridicu lous if " = " comes to no more than plain " is" and is down right false if " = " stands for " is the same as."
To be consistent we must not merely quantify the predi cate, we must actually specify it. The men that are negroes are not any and every set of men, who have a certain number. They are those men who are negroes, and this is the predicate. Negroes = negro-men, and iron = iron-metal. The predicate now really and indeed seems the subject, and can be substi tuted for it. The idea is a bold one, and its results have been considerable; but if we look not at working power but at truth, the idea is not bold enough, and wants courage to remove the last contradiction.
That A should be truly the same as AB, and AB entirely identical with A, is surely a somewhat startling result. If A = A, can it also be true that to add B on one side leaves the equation where it was? If B does not mean o, one would be inclined to think it must make some difference. But, if it does make a difference, we can no longer believe that A = AB, and AB = A. If "iron-metal" is the same as "iron," how misleading it is to set down the two sides as different terms. If there really is a difference between the two, then your statement is false when by your " = " you deny it. But if there is no difference, you are wrong in affirming it, and in opposing " iron " to " iron-metal."
There is only one issue. If A is AB, then the A that is AB is not A but — AB. Both sides of the assertion are just the same, and must be so stated. Negro-men are negro-men, and iron-metal is iron-metal.* For consider the dilemma. B either is or is not an addition to A. If it is not an addition, its insertion is gratuitous; it means nothing on either side, may fall upon whichever side we choose, is absurd on both alike, and should be got rid of — then A = A. But if B is an addition, then A = AB cannot be true. We must add B on both sides, and AB = AB. In short B must disappear or have a place on each side.
We have now reached consistency, and the reader may ask, Is the result still false? I do not like to seem obstinate, and I prefer to reply, Do you think it is true? 1 will accept your answer. If you say that identical propositions are all false, I shall not contradict you (cf. Chap. V. § i), for I also believe that a judgment which asserts no difference is nothing. But if you pronounce on the side of truth, I should like to ask a question. For an assertion to be true must it not assert something, and what is it that you take to be asserted above? That where there is no difference, there is no differ ence, that AB will be AB as long as it is AB? You can hardly mean that. Is the existence of AB what is secretly asserted? But, if so, we should say openly " AB exists," and our reduplication of AB is surely senseless. We know that it exists, not because we double it, but, I suppose, because we know of its existence.
* Cf. Lotze, Logik, 80-2.
2,6 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I But what then do we assert by AB = AB? It seems we must own that we do not assert anything. The judg ment has been gutted and finally vanishes. We have followed our premises steadily to the end, and in the end they have left us with simply nothing. In removing the difference of subject and predicate we have removed the whole judgment.* § 17. We have seen the main mistakes of the foregoing doctrines. It is a more pleasing task to consider the main truth which each one of them has seized, (i) The views we began to criticize in § 13, have avoided the error of subject predicate and copula. They have seen that in judgment the number of ideas is not the main question, and that the essence of the matter does not lie in the ideas, but in some thing beyond them. Nor, to be more particular, is the impli cation of will in all judgment a complete mistake. It is true that, in an early stage of development, the intelligence is so practical that it hardly can be said to operate independ ently. It is true again that, in the evolution of self-con sciousness, the opposition of idea and reality depends, to a degree I will not here discuss, upon volitional experience. And in these points there is truth in the theory, which, how ever much he may abandon it, we shall place to the credit of Professor Bain. And the view that in judgment we have an association of idea with sensation, and a coalescence of both elements, is far from being wholly destitute of truth. For (as we shall see in the following Chapter) the subject in all judgment is ultimately the real which appears in per ception; and again it holds good that the lowest stage, in the development of judgment and inference alike, is the red integration of ideal elements with sensuous presentation, in