the universal pimciple of the state Addition — We may quote heie the celebrated retort given to the hbellei, who excused himself with the remark, “ II flint done rpie je vive ” " Je n'en vois pas la necessite,” was the leply Life is not necessaiy against the higher fact of fiecdom When the holy Ciispinus steals leather to make hoots foi the pool, his act, though moral, is not right, and cannot be justified Till: PHILOSOPHY OF RIOIIT 127 The imi timlai mtciests of tlie iiatuial ■will, viewed as a simple whole, constitute peisoiial leality oi the life In the final lesoit, life, when in collision with anothei’s rightful owneiship, can claim the light of necessity, not on the ground of equity hut of light Ohseive th.it on the one side is placed the infinite desti action of oui oiilei existence, and thciefoio the eomjdete loss of lights, on the othei side an inpiiy to only a paiticiilai.mil liniited embodiment of one’s fiecdom A slight inpiii to a paitieulai possession does not violate the in]iiied man’s right, as such, oi his capaeiti foi light Note — From this right of need flows the beneiit oj competence (beneficiiiM competeninf), by virtue of whuh theieis allowed to the debtoi some of his tools, iinplemeiits, clothes, and means geiieiallv, all of iihi< h aie of couise the piopcity of the creditoi The.illowance covei s so much as is deemed sufficient foi the possible maintenauce of one in the debtoi ’s class Addition — Life, ox the totality of ends, has a light against abstiait right Foi inst.m(e, bv the theft of a loicf of bread a, pioperty is doubtless inpiied Still, if the act was the means of 2 uolouging life, it uould be uiong to consider it as oidinaiy theft If the man whose life is in dangei weie not allowed to picseive himself, he would be without lights, and, since his life is refused him, his whole freedom is denied to him also Many things, it is tiue, must go to secuie litc, esjiecially if we legaid the futuie But to live now IS all that is necessai}', the futuie is not absolute, and remains exposed to accidents Hence only the need of the immediate present can justify a wrong act Tet the act is justified, because the agent, abstaining from it, would commit tdie highest wrong, namely, the total negation of his realized freedom The beneficiwm competentim implies the right to ask that no man shall be wholly sacrificed to mere right 128 Heed reveals the finite and contingent character of 'iin: GOOD AXD co.vsriKxci: both iifflit and well-being, that i& to s<i\, of that abstiact embodiment of fieedom, whicli is not the existence of any particulai peisou, and also of the splicie ot the particulai will, w'liich excluded the univeihalitv of light The onesidednoss oi idealiti’ of these phase's is found in the conception itself Eight has alicady been embodied as the particular will (§ 106), and subiectivitx, m the whole range of its pavticulaiity, is itself the eiubodimcnt of freedom (§ 127), and also, in its character as the infinite lefeiencc of the will to itself, is it imjduitlv the univeisal side of fieedom These two elements in then tiuth and identih, although. 111 the fiist instance, only in lelative lefeience to each other, aie on the one hand the good, as the fulfilled and absolutely definite univeisal, and, on the other hand, conscience, oi an infinite subiectnity, winch is awaie of itself, and detei mines in itself its lontent THIED SECTION The Good and Conscience 129 The good is the idea, oi umtv of the conception of the will with the particulai will Abstiact light, well-being, the suh]ectiyity of consciousness, and the contingency of external leality, aie in their independent and sepaiate existences superseded m this unity, although in their real essence they are contained m it and preserved This unity is realized freedom, the absolute final cause of the world Addihon — Every stage is piopeily the idea, but the earlier steps contain the idea only in moie abstract form The I, as ]ieison, is alieady the idea, although in its most abstiact guise The good is the idea moie completely determined, it IS the unity of the coneeiition of will with the particular will It is not something abstractly right, but THE PHILOSOPHY OF HI&Hr.
has a real rontent, whose substance constitutes bolli Uf^ht and well-being 130 111 tins idea well-being has value, not indepeiideiitly as the realization of the separate paiticular will, but only as univeisal well-being, as nnivcisal, that is, in its essence, intrinsically or in accordance with fieedoni Hence, n ellbeing is not a good, if sepaiati-dfiom iinht, iioi is light a good, if sepaiatcd fiom well-beiinr Fmi jimtilui ought not to have poeat wunrhis as a consequence The good i arij -mg a necessity to be actiiab/ed by the paiticulai mil, and comprising the vital essence of such a will, has absolute right over the meie abstract right of 2 'ro])erty and the particulai ends of well-being It eithci of these eleincuts is distinguished fiom the good, it has lalidity only in so far as it accoids with the good and suboidinatcs itself to it 131 The subiective will finds lu the good the suiiioniely essential, and has woitli and inuiit oiilv as its insight and intention accoid with the good In so f.ir as the good in this place is still the abstiact idea of the good, the subjective will is not yet earned iij) into it, and made one mth it It stands to the good in a i elation of the follomng hind As the good is foi it what is leal and substantial, it ought to make the good its end and icalizc it, and on the othei hand it is only thioiigli the niediiiin of the subjective will that the good can be lealized Addition — The good is the tiutli of the paiticnlai will But the will is only that to which it sets itself It is not inherently good, but becomes what it is only by its work On the other side the good apart fiom the subjective will 18 only an abstraction having no reality Beality first comes to the good through the private will Thus the development of the good contains these tliiee stages fl) Poi me, as willing, the good should be jiaiticulai mil, and I should know it (2) "We should say u hat tiling is good, and develop the particular phases of the good (3) THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE We deteimiiio the iiidepeudent good, particulaiizmg it as infinite and independent subjectivity This innei determination IS conscience 132 It IS the light of the subjeitive will that it should legal d as good what it lecogiiizes as authoritative It is the individual’s light, too, that an act, as the outer realization ol ail end, should be counted light or wioiig, good or evil, lawful 01 unlawful, act oi ding to his inowledge of the woith it has when objectnelj" leali/ed N'lfe — The good is in geneiiil the essence of the will in its substautiie and uuiveisal chaiatlei, the wiU in its tiutli It CMsts solely in and bj means of thought The doctiines that inau cannot uudei stand the tmth liut must deal with appeal ances oul\,and that thinking does harm to the good will, take away fioiii spiiit all its mtellectnal and ethical uieiil and value The light to admit uothiug, which I do not legaid as leasonable, is the highest light of the subject But because of its subjective (haiaitei it is a foimal light So that oil the o])posite hand the light to the subject of the leasouable oi objectne lemams Because of its toi mal natuie insight may be either tiuth or ineio ojnnioii and eiioi Wliolhor or not the individual attains to the light of his insight belongs, at least from the uioial staudpoiut, to his paiticulai subjective character I cau malve it a claim upou mj self, aud leg.iid it as a subjective light, that I should be com meed that the grounds of an obligation aie good I m.iy even claim that I should know them in then conception and nature But my demand for the satisfaction of my conviction as to what is good, what allowed and what not allowed, aud also as to my lesponsibility, does not infrmge upon the right of objectivity Eight of insight into the good is different from right of insight (§ 117) with legaid to action as such The right of objectivity means that the act must he a change in the actual world, he recognized theie, aud m.general be llli: PHILOSOPHY OF RIOIIT.
adequate to what has validity theie IVlioso -nill act in this actual world has therein submitted to its laws, and lecognized the light of obieetivity Similarly in the state, which is the ob]eLtivity of the concejition of reason legal responsibility docs not ada]>t itselt to iihat any one peison holds to he leasoualile 01 iinicasoiiable It does not adhere to siib]e(tiTe insight into light oi niong. good oi evil, or to the claims nliicli an individual makes foi the satisfaction of his coni ictioii 111 this ohjoctiie field the light of insight IS leckoned as insight into what is legal oi illegal, or the actual law It limits itself to its sim})lpst meaning, namely, knowledge of oi acqnaintam e with what is lawful and binding Tliioiigli the jnihlicity of the laws and through geiiei al customs the state leiiioves fiom the light of insight that nlueli is foi the suhiect its foimal side It lenioves also the element of < haute, which at oui picsent standijoint still thugs to it The right of the snl»]oct to know the act as good or evil, legal or illegal, has the lesiilt of lessening oi ahohshing lesponsihility in the case of childien, imbeciles, and lunatics, although the condilnms of this responsibility cannot be definitely stated But to lake into consideration momentaiy tasciuation, the allurement of passion, diunkenness, or the stiength ot vhat aie called sensual impulses geneially, that impulse alone being cveepted which forms the hasis of the light of need (§ 120^, to eousider these things in estimating the chaiaitei of a dime and its liability to punishment, or to suppose that these circumstances will remove the guilt of a criminal act, is to neglect right and the true dignity of manhood (§ 100, and § 119, noie) The nature of man is essentially universal. His consciousness does not exist as a mere abstract moment of time or in isolated parts Just as the imendiaiy sets on file not a separate piece of wood an inch long, which he touches with his match, hut the univoisal involved in it, namely the house, so he does not exist merely in one single THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE moment, oi in. one isolated passion foi revenge If so, lie ■would be an animal, wlucli, because of its dangeious and passionate iiatuie ivould have to be be killed It is claimed that the ciiiiunal in the moment of his act must have presented clcaily to liiiiiself the nature of the wrong he is doing and of Ills liability to j'uuishnicnt, if the act is to be counted to him foi a crime This i laiin seems to preserve to him the right of his moral sub]ectivity, but it really demos to him that indwellmar intolligont nature, "which in its active pioscncc has no afcnity w'ltb the cleai images of purely auiinal jisycholog}' Only in the case of lunacy IS intelligence so distorted as to be scpaiated fiom the consciousness of paiticulai things and the doing of them The spheie, in which cucumstances are adduced as grounds foi leniency, is not that of light but of mercy 133 Since the good is the essence of the ■will of the particulai subject, it is his obhgation As the good is distinct fiom jiaiticularity, and particularity occurs in the subjective "will, the good has at the outset only the charactei of univoisal abstiact essence This abstiact universal is duty Hence duty, as is requiicd by its character, must bo done foi duty’s sake Addition — The essence of the will is for me duty Tet if I know no more than that the good is my duty, it is for mo still abstract Duty should be done for duty’s sake, and it is my objective natuie in the tiuest sense which I realize in duty, m doing it I am self-centied and free It IS the signal merit of the standpoint of the Kantian philosophy of action that it has made prominent this signification of duty.
134 Since an act requires its own special content and definite end, and duty in the abstract contains no such end, there arises the question. What is duty ^ No answer is at once forthcoming, except “To do right, and to consider one’s own well-being, and the general well-bemg, the wellbeing of others ” (§ 119).
Addition — Pieciscly the same question was piojiosed to Jesus, when it was a&lccd of him, “ What should be done to obtain eternal life^*” The uiiiveisal good cannot, if abstractli'- taken, be icalized It it is to be leah/ud, it must be given a 2 Jaiticulai content 135 The two ijoints of this answer, being each of them conditioned aud limited, aie not in fact continued in duty itself, but effect the tiansition into the higliei sjiheie of the unconditioned, oi dutj In so iai as dutj" is the uui\eis,il or essence ot the inoial consciousness, and nicielv lefeis itself to itself within itself, it is ouh an abstiait iiiiiveisality, and has foi its chaiacteiistic an ideutiti nithout content, an abstiact j^ositive, an absence ot di'finitc charactei Note — It IS iiiqioilant to be cleai that the inue unconditioned self-diiectioii of tho will is the loot ot dull This doctrine of volition attauicd to a fiiiii basis and slaitmgpoint fiist of all 111 the Ilautian iihilosoi>h\ tliiough the thought of the luhuite autonomy ot the mil (§ 131 ) Yet if this nieiely nioial standpoint does not jiass into the coiicefjtion of the ethical s) stem, this philosiqilucal aci^uisitioii 18 reduced to einiity foiinalism, aud inoial science is i onverted into ineie rhetoiic about duty foi clutj’s sake From such a position can be denied no inheiciit doctiiiie of duties Mateiials, it is tiue, may be intioduced fiom without, and in this way specihc duties may be secuied, but from dutj, whose chaiacteiistic is au absence of contradiction 01 foimal concoid with itselt, a chaiacteiistic which IS no more than the establishment of abstiactindefimteuess, no specific duties can be deduced Noi, fuithei, if any specific content ot action comes uj) foi coiisideiatiou, is theie in this 2irinciple any way of judging whethei it is a duty or not On the conliaiy, all manner of wiong and immoral acts may be by such a method justified The moie detailed Kantian statement, the suitability of an act to be presented as a universal rule, imphes indeed THE fiOOD ASD CON'SCIENCE the moie concieto notion o£ a condition, but loally contains no otbei principle than absence of coiitidcliction, oi formal identity The rule that theie should be no piivate jiropeity contains of itself no contiadiction, noi does the piopositioii that thi>i or that paiticiilar nation or family should not c.vist, 01 that no one should live at all Only if it IS leally fixed and assumed that piivate projierty and human life shouhl exist and be lesjiei ted, is it a contradiction to coiniiiit theft oi niiiidm There can be no contiadietion excejit of soiiiethiiiff that exists or of a content, which IS assumed to he a fixed piinciple Only such a couleiit can an ait a'^ice xvith oi coiitiadict But duty wliK h must bo xxilled only as such, and not for the sake of a content, is a foimal identity excluding all content and specihe chdiactei.
Othoi autiiioniies and developinouts of the Kantian position 111 which is shown liow the nioial standpoint of icldtion w'andeis aimlessly aiouud without being able to find a wdv ot escdiie fioni the ineic abstiact impeiative, I have gix'on in the “ Ph.inomenologie dcs Geistes ” Afhhtinii — Although we exalted the standiioint of the Kantian jihilosoiihy, in so fai as it nobly insists that duty should accoid with leason, jet its xvedkuess is that it lacks all oi game tilling The piopositioii, “ Considei if thy maxim can he set up as a nun ci sal lule” xvould be all light, if we already had defanitc lules concerning what should he done A pimciple that is suitable foi universal legislation alieady presupposes a content If the content IS pieseiit, the application of the law is an easy matter But in the Kantian tlieoiy the rule is not to hand, and the ciitenou that theie should lie no contiadiction produces nothing Wlieie there is nothing, there can be no contiadiction 136 Owing to the abstiact uatnie of the good, the other side of the idea, i e, paiticuLiiitj' in geneial, falls within subjectivity. This subjectivity, universahzed by being llli; PHILOSOPHY OF uioiir turned back into itself, is absolute certitude * of itself within itself In this chaiactei it establishes paiticulaiity, it determines and judges This is conscience Addition — We may sjieak in a lofty stiain of duty, and this way of speaking elevates niciiikmd, and widens the heart Yet if nothing definite comes of it, it at last glows tedious Sjiiiit demands and is entitled to a ])ai titular content But conscience is the deepest inteiiial solitude, tioni winch both limit and the external liaiu wholly disappeared It IS a tlioiough-goiiig letieat into itself Man in Ins conscience is no longci bound by the ends of paitieulaiity Tins is a higher standjioint, the standpoint of the modem woild We liaie now aiiived at the stage of I onsciousness, which imolies a lecoil ujion itself Eailier ages w'eie iiioie sensuous, and had befoie them something external and given, wliothei it was lehgiou oi laiv But oonscience is awaie of itself as thought, and knows that my thought is for me the only thing that is binding 137 Tiuc conscience is the disposition to desiie what is absolutely good It lias tlieieiore fixed rules, wbicli are toi it indeiieiidently objective jiliases and duties Distmguisbcd liom this, which is its content oi tiiith, conscience IS oiil\ the foimal side of the actiiity of the will, and the will as paiticiilar has no content jieciiliarly its own Tlie obj'ectiie sjsteiii of lules and duties and the union of them with the subjective consciousness apjiear fiist in the spheie of ethical obsoivance But at the foinial standpoint of moiality, conscience is devoid of objective content.
It 18 merely an infinite certitude of itself and is formal and abstract It is the certitude of a particulai subject.
Note. — Conscience expresses the absolute claim of the subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from itself what right and duty are, and to lecognize nothing except what it thus knows to be good. It asseits also that ^ Grewissbeila ^ Gewissen.
iHi: f.ooD AXD cons(1i:n(j: what it so knows and wills i& light and duty m very tmth Conscience, as the unity of the bub]ect’s will ■nitli the absolute, is a holy place which it would be saeiilege to assault But whethei the conscieme of a certain individual IS piopoitionate to this idea ot conscience, in other woids, whethei what the individual conscience holds and gives out to be good is really good, can be ascertained only bv ail exaiiiinatioii of the contents of the intended good Eight and duty, viewed as ahsoluteh leasonable phases of will, aie not in essence the jiaiticulai projieity of an individual Noi do they assume the ioiui of j)ei ecption or any other phase of uioie individual sensuous consciousness They aie the iiniveisal 2uoducts oi thought, and exist m thefoiiiiof laws and piinci2<les Conscience is therefoie subject to the ludgment whetboi it is true or not, and its a 2 ) 2 '<i‘il nieiely to itself is cliiectly 02>poscd to what it wills to be, the rule, that is, of a loasouable absolutely valid way of acting Poi this icason the state cannot recognise conscience in its peculiai foiin as subjective consciousness, 2ust as subjective opinion, oi the dogmatic appeal to a subjective ojuuion, can be of no avail in science The elements nliich aic united in tine conscience can be sepaiated The detoi mining subjoc nvity of consciousness and will ma\ sepaiate itself fiom the tine content, proceed to establish itself, and leduec the tiue content to a foim and unreality Tims the term con sc lence is ambiguous On the one hand it is jiiesupposed m the identity of subjective consciousness and will with the tme good, and is theiefore maintained and recognized to he a holy thing On the other hand it is the meie subjective retuim of consciousness into itself, claiming the aiithoiity which conscience in its first foim possesses solely because of its absolutely valid and rational content Now, at the inoi'al standpoint, distmgmslied as it is iii this treatise from ethical obseivance, there occuis only the foimal conscience The true conscience is mentioned here only to emphasize Till: PlIILOSOPlIl OP RIGHT.
tlie differeiiLC betiveen tbe two and to remove the possibility of supiiosiii'; tliat liere, wbeie the formal coiiscieiico alone is coiisideicd, the aigiimeut is concerned witli the true But to leiieat, the tine conscience looms up oiilv in the sequel, and has to do mth the pioperlv social disposition The lehmous conscience, hoiceiei, does not liolouq to this s]iheio at all Addition — ^Wlieii we speak of conscience, it iiiai easilv be supposed that because ol its abstiact inuei foim, it is already the absoluteh true < onsi lem e But conscience as true wills absolute ^ood and absolute dutv As we must here deal with the abstiact trood, i onscieiice is so fai devoid of tins objective content, and is at fiist only the nifimte certitude of itself 138 Subjeetivitv, as abstiact solf-deteimmatioii and pure ceititude ouly of itself, dissolves within itself all definite lealization of iijfht and dutv It passes pidtrment within itself, deteimincs solely out of itself what is qood, and makes this self-pioduced I'oodits content It hestons reality upon a good which is at fiist onlv piesonted and intended Note — The self-consciousness, nhich has icached absolute letuiii into itself, is conscious of itself as soiiietliing over which nothing that exists oi is given to it can oi ought to have any power Tins tendeuev to look within, and know and decide fiom oneself what is light and good, assumes a moic genoial foiin in histoiv. apjieaimg at epochs such as that of Socrates, the Stoics, etc, when the accepted ethical principles could not satisfy the better will TVlien the visible world has become untrue to freedom, the will no longer finds itself in the established morality, and IS forced to seek the harmony, which the actual woild has lost, in the inner ideal life Since the right, which selfconsciousness acquires in this wav, is foimal, everything dejienda upon the nature of the content, which it gives itself., Tin: GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.
Addition — In the simple conception of conscience all definite phases of will are dissolved, and must proceed out of it again Eiorytliing that is lecognized as right or duty can in the fii st instance be proved by thought to be woithlcss, limited, and merely' icUtive But subjectivity, though it dissolves all content, must develop it again out of itscdf Evciy thing which conics to pass in ethical obseivauco, is to be jiioduced by this activity of spirit But, oil the othei side, this standpoint is defective, because it IS meiely abstract When I am conscious of my freedom as imiei substantive reality', I do uo act, yet if I do act aud seek piinciplcs, I must tiy to obtain definite characters foi my act The demand is then made that this definite context shall be deduced fioin the concejjtion of the free will Hence, if it is light to absorb right aud duty into subjectiiity, it is on the other hand wrong if this abstract basis of action is not again evolved Only in times when reality IS a hollow, unspiiitual, and shadowy existence, can a retreat be permitted out of the actual into an inner life Socrates apjieaicd at the time of the decay of the Athenian deinociacy He dissolved what was established, and fled back into himself, to seek theie what was right and good In oui own time also it occuis nioic oi less fiecjueutly that revcience foi the established is wanting, and that man holds Ins own will as foi himselt valid and authoiitative 139 Self-consciousness, aifiiiiiiug to be vanity' all otheiwisc valid maiks of action, and itself consisting of puie luwaidness of will, may possibly convert the absolute universal into meie capnee It may make a principle out of what IS peculiar to particularity, iilacing it over the universal and realizing it m action This is evil Note — If conscience is taken as formal subjectivity, it is on the verge of being transfonned into evil In a selfcertitude, which exists for itself, knows and decides for itself, both moiahty and evil have then common loot.
The ongm of evil in general lies in the mystery, i e, the bJ>eculatl^el■>loct'Ss, of freedom, m the necessity of fieedom to use out of its natural state, and find itself ivitlini it&elf 111 opposition to the natural In this opposition the natuial will IS contiadictoiy of itself and iiiconipatilile with itself, and comes m this divided state into existence Hence the particularity of the will itself letoives the fuithei uiailc of evil Paiticulaiity has a twofold ch.imctei, exliiliited heie 111 the opposition of the natuial to the luiiei will Tliioiigli this opposition the iiniei phase ot will gets only a lelative and formal existence, and theieloie has to cieate its content out of the eleiiients of the natuial will, siii li as desiie, impulse, and inclination These desiies and iinjnilses mav be either good oi eiil But again, owingtothcii iiieie natiiialness, then are contingent, and the will, as at piesent constituted, takes them in then (oulingent cliaiacici as its content and bungs them nndei the foiin ot paitiinlaiity It thus becomes opposed to univeisality, the iiinei oliiectiie leality 01 the good, which, since it invohes the ictiiin of the inll into itself and a ( onsciousness awaie of itself, stands at the othei extieinc tiom the diiect objectivity of what 16 ineiely natuial Thus also is this niiKU condition of the will ecil Man is consequently evil at once by natuie or of hiinself and thioiigh his leflectioii ivithiu himself Evil 18 not hunted solely eithei to iiatuie as su<h. unless it weie the natuial condition of a will-nliich confines itself to its paiticulai content, or to the lefleitiou which goes into itself and includes cognition, unless it weie to adheie to an antagonism to the good Along with the jihase, that evil of necessity is, goes insepaiably the phase that evil of necessity shall not be In other words, evil is that which is to be supeiseded Nevertheless, evil fiom the first stand jioint of disruption must mate its appearance, since it constitutes the division hetw'een the unreasoning beast and man We must not, howevci, lemain at this standpomt, oi cling to the paiticular as though it in contrast with the universal were essential.
THE GOOD AXD CONSCIEXCD but must overcome it, and set it aside as null and void Fuithor, as to tins necessity of evil, it is subjectivity, or the infinity constituted by the loflex action of consciousness, ■winch has this opposition befoie itself and exists m it If it remains theie, i c, if it is evil, it exists simply for itself, counts itself as independent, and is mere caprice Hence the individual subject as such has the guilt of his evil AclchtwH — Abstiact ccititudc, which is aware of itself as the basis of ci ervtlnng, involves the possibility of willing the uuivoisality of the conception, but also the possibility ot making a ininciple out of a paiticular content and lealiziug it This second possibility is evil To evil always belongs tlie abstiactioii inudied in self-certitude, and man alone, just in so fai as ho can be c\il, is good Good and evil are insepaiable, their unit v Ijing in this, that the conception becomes objective to itself and foithwith, as an object, involves distinction The evil will wills somethmg that IS ojiposed to the unneisality of will, but the good will is 111 accoidance with its tiue coiicejition