272 The constitution is lational in so fai as the active workmg diiisious of the state aie in accoid with the nature of the conception This oicuis when eveiy one of its functions is in itselt the totality', in the sense that it etfectually contains the othei elements These elements, too, though expressing the distinctions of the conception, lemain stiictly within its ideality, and constitute one individual whole Note — Concerning the constitution, as concerning leason itself, there has in modern times been an endless babble, which has in Germany been more insipid than anywhere else With us there are those who have pcisuaded themselves that it IS best even at the veiy threshold of government to understand before all other things what a constitution IS And they think that they have furnished mvincible pioof that rehgion and piety should be the HIE STAIE HIE STAIE basis of all then shallowness It is small wonclei if this jnating has made foi icasonahle mortals the woids reason, illumination, light, constitution, lihoity, meie empty sounds, and men should have hecouic ashamed to talk about a political constitution At least as one eliect of this supoi flint V, ivo may hojie to see the conviction be-( omiiiii geiieial, that a jihilosophic acquaintance with such topics cannot pioceed fiom mcie leasonings, ends, grounds, and utilities, much less fiom fooling, love, and inspiration, but only out of the couception It will he a fortunate thing, too, if those who maintain the divine to he incon-( eivahli' and an acquaintance with the truth to be wasted eftoit, ucic honcetoith to lefiam tiom breaking in upon the aiuumeut What of undigested ihetonc and ediflcation thej inanufactuie out of these feehngs can at least lay no claim to philosophic notice Amongst cuiient ideas must be mentioned, in eonnection with § 2 ( 10, that legaiding the necessary division of the tunctions of the state This is a most impoitant featuie, which, when taken in its tiue sense, is rightly regarded as the giiaiantco of jmbhc ficcdom But of this those, who think to speak out of inspiiation and love, neither know 1101 will know' am thing, tor m it lies the element of deteimination thiough the way of leason The principle of the scpaiation of functions contains the essential element c)f difleience, that is to say, of leal rationality. But as appichended by the ahstiai t undei standing it is false when it leads to the view that these seicial functions are absolutely independent, and it is one-sided when it considers the 1 elation of these functions to one another as negative and mutually limiting In such a view each function in hostility to or fear of the others acts towards them as towaids an evil Each lesolves to oppose the others, effecting by this oi)positioa of foices a geneial balance, it may he, hut not a living unity. But the internal selfduection of the conception, and not any other purpose or riii: PUiLosopnr ok rigiii utilitj, contains the absolute source of the different functions On their account alone the political organization exists as intrinsically rational and as the image of eternal reason.
Prom logic, though indeed not of the accepted kind, we know how the conception, and in a conciete naj the idea, determine themselves of thembclves, and thereby abbtractly set up their phases of universality, particnlant v, and individuality. To take the negative a^ the point of di parture, and set up as primary the willing of evil and con-eluent mistrust, and then on this supposition cunninglv to devise breakwaters, which in turn reepnre other bicakvvaters to check their activity, any such coutiivance is the mark of a thought, which is at the level of the negative understanding, and of a feeling, which is characreristic of the rabble (■§ 244) — The functions of the state, the eveciitive and the legislative, as thev aie called, may be maile independent of each other The state is, then, foitlivvilh overthrown, an occuireiicc which wo have wituecsod on a vast scale. Oi, 111 so fai as the state is esicutiallv self-contained, the struggle of oue function to bring the other into subjection effects somehow oi othei a closei unitv, and thus preserves only what is in the state essential and fundamental Addition — 111 tlio state wc must have nothing which is not an e.xprcssiou of rationality The state is the world, which the spirit has made foi itself Heucc it has a definite self-begun and self lelated course Often we speak of the wisdom of God m nature, hut we must not therefore believe that the physical world of nature is higher than the world of spirit. Just so high as the spirit stands above nature, the state stands above the physical hfe We must hence honour the state as the divine on earth, and learn that if it is difficult to conceive of nature, it is lufanitely haidei to appiehend the state That we in modem times have attorned definite views couceining the ■HIE S'lATE state in general, and are peijietually engaged in spealiing about and manufacturing constitutions, is a fact ot much impoitance But that does not settle the whole matter It IS necessaij fuither that we appioach a reasonable question in the mmd of lational beings, that we know what IS essential, and distinguish it from what is merely stiilnng Thus, the functions of the state must indeed be distinguished, and yet each must of itself form a whole, and also contain the other elements Wlien we speak of (he distinctive activity of any function, we must not fall into the egregious error of supjiosing that it should exist 111 abstiact independence, since it should lather be distinguished meiely as an element of the conception If the distinctions weie to subsist m abstiact independence, it is as clear as light that two indopondent things are not able to constitute a unity, but must lather introduce strife As a lesult, citliei the whole woild would be cast mto disordci, 01 the unity would bo lestoied by force Thus, m the French Bei olution at one time the legislative function had swallowed up the executive, at iinolher time the executive had tisiiipcd the legislative function It would be stupid in such a case to incsent the moral claim of harmony If we cast the responsibility of the matter upon feelmg, we have indeed got iid of the whole trouble But, necessary as ethical feeling is, it cannot evolve from itself the functions of state Whence it comes to pass that since the definite functions are the whole imphcitly, they comprise 111 their actual existence the total conception. We usually speak of the three functions of state, the legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative corresponds to universality, and the executive to particularity; but the judicial IS not the third element of the conception The individuality uniting the other two lies beyond these spheres 273 The political state is divided into three substantive branches: iiii: piiiLOsopiiy OF nioiu (a) The powei to fi\ and ostahlisli the uuiveisiil Thi> IS legislation (b) The poiver, ■which bungs iiaiticulai spheics anil individual cases iindei the univeisal This is the i miction of government (c) The function of the piiucc. as the siihiei (n ity with which rests the final decision In this liinctiou the otiioi two aie bi ought into an individual unity II is at once the ciiluiinatiou and beginning ol the wliole Tins is constitutional monarchy Note — The peifectiiig of the state into a i onstitnfional monarchy is the woik of the moileiii woild, in is huh the substantive idea has attained the iiitiintc foim This is the descent ot the spiiit oi the ssoild lulo it'cll, the fiee peifection by s’lituc of svhich the idea sets loose tiom itsell its own elements, and nothing but its os\n elenienis, and makes thorn totalities, at the same tune it holds them within the unity of the comeiition. in nhidi is found then real rationality Tho storv ot this tiue election ot tin ethical litc IS the sul))oct luattei of uiiiveisal Moild-histoii Tile old classification of < oiisiitiitious mto uioiiaicln aiistocincv, and demoiiacvis based upon the siibstantiio unity winch has not vet been dividiMl This iiiiilv has no mternal distinctions, is not an intiiusicalli developed organization, and has not attained depth and (onciete rationality Fiom the standpoint oi the am lent woild the classification is collect, because the iiiiitv of tin* iuuient state was a substaiilivo whole, not as yet tiillj niatuie and unfolded. The distinctions predicated of it must hence be external, and lefer merely to the number of persons in whom this substantive unity should find an abode But these vaiious foims of the state, winch belong in this way to diffeient wholes, are in constitutional monarchy lowered to tin'll piopei place as elements In monarchy we have a single person, in its executive seveial, m legislation the multitude. But, as we have said, such merely quantita- THE STATE 27‘J tive distinctions aic supeificial, and do not account for the conception Similaily, it is not to the point to speak so much as we do of the demociatic or aristocratic element in the monaichy foi the phases, dcsciibed by these terms, ]ust in so fai as they occui in a monarchy, aie no longer demociatic and aii&tociatic It IS thought by some tliat the state is a mere abstraction ■which oidcrs and commands, and that it may be left undecided, oi bo logaided as a tiifle, whether one or several 01 all stand in tlie chief place in the state — “ All these forms,” sai s Fichte (“ Natiiiiccht,” Pt I, p 196), “are light, and can pioduce and piesoive imiveisal light, if only tlieic be pieseut an ephoiat ” The ephoiat was invented by Fichte, and defined as a ncedlul couuteipoise to the highest 2 >owei Such a view sjniugs fiom a shallow conception ot the state It is tiue,indoed, that in a primitive conditioii of society these distinctions have little or no meauiug So Mo'cs, when uniiig lules to the jicople in the case of then choosing a king made no other alteration 111 the lustitulioiis than to lomiiiaiid that the king’s horses and wives should not be too iiuiiieious, or his tieasure of gold and silioi too huge (Dent xiii 16, and fol ) — Fuithci, it IS tiiie that lu one sense these thiee forms are even ioi the idea a iiiattei ol no coiicoin I mean monarchy m its limited and ex( lusue siguihcation, in accordance with which it stands b_\ the side ot cleinociacv and aiistotracv. But such a leiuaik has a meaning the oiiposite oi Fichte’s.
It would mean that these foims aie a matter of indiffeience, because they collectively aie not in accordance 'with the idea in its rational development (§ 272), nor can the idea m any one of them attain its light and actuality. Hence, it IS idle to ask which of these foims is to be preferred We siieak of them now as having only an historical luteiest Heie, as m so many othci places, must he recognized the penetrating vision of Montesquieu, who discusses this HIE PHILOSOPHY OF HIGH I (iuestion m liis cclebiated description of the jmiuijiles of these foims of govemmeiit But this desciiption ive must not misunderstand, if ire aieto do it lustice He, as is ivell known, stated that Yiitue was the principle of democracy Democracy does in fact lest upon sentiment as iijion a form which is merely substantive And it is still under this form that the rationality of the absolute will e\ists iii democracy But he goes on to say that England in the seventeenth century proved bj’ a beautiful spectacle that its efforts to found a democracy weic unavailing owing to a lack of Tiitue in the loaders And he adds that, when in a republic virtue disajipears ambition seizes upon those whose minds are capable of it, and giced seizes ujion all, and the state, becoming a general picy, maintrims its strength only thiough the power of some indiiiduals and the extravagance of all Upon this Mew it must bo remarked that when society becomes ci\ili/od, and the powers of particularity are develo2ied and freed, the virtue of the lulers IS not enough Not mere sentiment, but the form of rational law is lequired, if the whole is to bo able to keep itself together, and give to the doveloiied jiowers of liarticulaiity the right to expand positively as well as negatively Similaily should be set aside the misconception that, since in a demociatic reiiublic the sentiment of iirtue is the substantive foim, it is wanting, or at least unnccessai v, in a monaichy, and also the misconceiition that the legally constituted agencies of a s} stematized organization aie opposed to and incompatible with virtue Moderation, or the principle of aiistocracy, implies the incipient separation of public power and private interest And yet these two are here in such close contact that aiistocracy is always by its very nature on the veige of passmg into the severest foim of tyranny or anarchy, and so bunging on itself destruction "Witness Eoman history Montesquieu, by creditmg monarchy with the principle niE STAIE of honour, refeis, it is clear, not to the patruirchal oi any of the ancient monaichies, noi, on the other side, to the monarchy which has developed into an objective constitution, but to a feudal monarchy, in which the relations of political light to lawful piivale pioperty and the privileges of individuals and corporations are confirmed Since in this form of constitution state-life depends upon privileged poisons, in whose liking is laid a laige part of what must be done loi the mamtenance of tlie state, the objective element of these tiansactions is giounded not on duty but on iiniiginiitive thought and opinion Thus, instead of duty it IS only honour which keeps the state together.
Hoic it IS natnial to put a second question — ^Who shall flame the constitution"'' This question seems intelligible at fiist glance, but ou closer examination turns out to be mcaniiiglc'is It piosupposcs that no constitution exists, but ineiely a colloition ot atomic individuals How a heap of ludii iduals is to obtain a constitution, whether by its own ofEoits 01 by means of ollieis, whether by goodness, thought, 01 foice, must bo left to itself to decide, for with a inoie mass the concejilion has nothing to do. If the question, howovoi, lal^es foi gianted the existence of an actual constitution, then to make a constitution means only to iiiodity it, the pieiious CMsteiice of the constitution inipliing that any change must be made constitutionally But it is stiK tly essential that the constitution, though it is begotten 111 time, should not be contemplated as made It 18 lathei to be thought of as above and beyond what is made, as self -begotten and self-centied, as divine and perpetual Addition — The piinciple of the modern world as a whole 18 freedom of subjectivity, the pimciple that all essential aspects of the sjniitual whole should attain their light by self-dei elopmeut From this standpoint one can hardly raise the idle question, as to whuh form is the better, monarchy or democracy. We venture to reply simply that IIIE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
the forms of all constitutions of the state are one-snled, it they are not able to contain the principle of fieo snblectivity, and do not know how to coiiespond to completed leasoii 274 Spiiit IS leal only in what il knows itself to bo The state, which is the nation’s spud, is the lai\ which permeates all its relations, ethical obsoiiances, and the consciousness of its individuals Hence the constitution of a people du])euds inainl}' on the kind and chaiactci ot its self-consciousncss In it aic tound both its suli^ectivo fieedom and the actu.ility of the constitution Note — To think of giviusr to a jieojde a cousitntion d piioii IS a whim, ovcilookinir ]iieiisol_\ that element which rendeis a constitution something moie than a piodiict of thought Eioiy nation, thoiotoie, has the i onstitutioii which suits it and belongs to it Addition — The state must lu its (oiistitiition penetrate all its aspects Hapoleon insisted upon giving to the Spanish a constitution o piion, but the pioiect tailed A constitution is not a iiieie maniitai tine, but the woikol centuiics It is the idea and the lonsiiousuess oL what is leasonable, iii so fai as it is developed in a peojile Hence no constitution is iiieieh created That w Inch Napoleon gave to the Spanish was moie lational than what tliev had before, yet they viewed it as something foieign to them and rejected it bei ause they wcic not snihcientlv developed In a constitution a people must embodv then sense of iisrht and repioducc then conditions Otheivvise the constitution may exist externally, but it has no significance or truth Often, indeed, the need of and longing foi a better constitution may arise in individuals, but that is difterent from the whole multitude’s being satuiated by such a notion This general conviction comes later The principle of morality and inner conviction advocated by Sociates came of necessity into being in Ins day, but time had to elapse before it could reach general selt-consciousness.
A The Function of the Pi ince 275 The function of the pimce contains of itself the thiee elements of the totality (§ 272), (1) the univeisality of the constitution and the Ians, (2) counsel, or reference of the p.uticulav to the unneieal, and (3) the final decision, oi the selE-deteiiumation, into which all else letums and fiom nhich it leccives the boginniiif' of its actuality This absolute sclf-dcteiniination, constitutiug the distmi'iiishiu!' piinciplc of the piintely function, as such, must 1)0 the hist to be considcied Achhtuiv — We becfiu mill the piincoly fnnclion or the factoi of indiMduality, because in it the three phases of the state aio inter-i elated as a totality The I is at onre the most ludicidual.uid the most uuiveisal The indnidual o(i uis also in uatuie, but thoie leality is equal to iiou-ide<ihty, and its paits exist exteiiuilly to one anolhei. Heueo it is not self-comiilete existence, in it the diffeient iiidiMdu.ilities subsist side bvside In spmt, on the other hand, all dift'ei eiiccs exist onh as ideal oi as a unity The state as spiiitual is the inteipiot.itiou of all its elements, but iiidividuaht V is at the same time the soul, the vital and soM'ieij'ii jnuuijile, xihuh cinbiaces all diffeiences 27(i (1) The basal puut ijde of the political state is the substantive umtv, n liii h is the ideality of its elements (a) In this ideahli the paiticulai functions and ofiBces of the state aie pist as iiiiu b dissohed as letained. Indeed, thej' arc retained only as baling no indcqiendent authority, but such and so cxtcnsic e an authority as is yielded them m the idea of the whole They pioeeed, theiefoie, from the power of the state, and ai e the flexible limbs of the state as of then own simplified self.
Addition — This ideality of elements is like the life of an organized body Life exists in eieiy pait There is but one life in all points, and there is no opposition to it Any part separated from it is dead. Such is also the ideahty 'IIIE rilll-OSOPHY OF RIGHT of all individual occupations, functions, and coipoiafions, great as may lie their impulse to subsist and do foi themselves It IS as in the oigauism, wheie the stomach assumes indeiicndcnce, and vit is at the same tune sucrseded and saciificed by becoming a member of one -whole 277 (/j) The paiticulai offices and agencies of the state, being its essential elements, aie intiniafelv connected imIIi it To the individuals, -who manage and coutiol them, the}’ are att,iched in virtue not ot llieir diri'ct jieisoiiality but ot their objectiie and univeisal cpialities With particulai personality, as.such, the\ aie -loiiii'd only externally and accidentally The business and functions of the state cannot therefore lie junate ]iro])eili Addition — The agencies of the state aie attached to individuals, -who nevertheless aie not anthonzed to dischaige their offices through natuial htuess. but b>’ loason of their obiective cpuilification Capaciiv, skill, diaiacter, belong to the paiticulaiity of the indnidiial, who must, howciei, be adapted to his special business In education and tiammg An oflice can, tlieiefoie, be neithei sold noi bequeathed Foimeilv in Fiance seats in ])ailiament -were saleable, and this is still the case -with any position of officer in the English aiiny below a ceitain guide These tacts dejiended, oi depend, upon the inecliaival constitution of certain states, and aie now giadiiallv vanishing 278 These tno characteiistics, namely (/3) that the particulai offices and functions of the state have indcqiendent and fii ill footing ueithei m themselves, nor in the pai ticular will ot individuals, but (a) ultimately in the unity of the state as in their simple self, constitute the sovereignty of the state 'Note — Tins is sovereignty on its inner side It has an outer side also, as we shall see — In the older feudal monarchy the state had an outer aspect, but on its inner side not only was the iiionaich at no tune soveieign, but neither was the state Partly were the several offices and 'HIE SlA'iH functions of the state and civic life dispeised iii independent corporations and communities (§ 273, note), wliile the whole was ratliei an aggregate than au organism Paitly, too, were these functions the jnivate pi uperty of individuals who, when it was proposed that they should act, consulted then own opinion and wish.
The idealism, winch constitutes sovereignty, is that jioint of view in aecoi dance with which the so-called ^^aits of an animal oigainsm aie not jiarts but membeis or 01 game elements Their isolation or independent subsistence would be disease The same pnnciple occurs in the abstiaet conceptioii of the will (see note to next §) as the negatnit}', winch by lefoiiing itself to itself reaches a univcisality, which definitely moulds itself into individuality (§ 7) Into this concietc uniiersality all particularity and dcfaniteuess aie taken uj), and icceive a new significance It is the absolute soK-detci mining ground To apprehend it wo must be at home with the com option in its tiue substance and subiectivity Because soveieignty is the ideality of all particular powcis, it easily gives use to the common misconception, which takes it to be mcic foicc, empty wilfulness, and a synonc m foi despotism But despotism is a condition of lawlessness, m which the paiticular will, whether of monarch oi people (ochlociacy) counts as law, oi rather instead of law Soveieignty, on the contiaij% constitutes the element of the ideality of paiticiilai spheres and offices, in a condition w'bich is lawful and constitutional H'o particular sphere is independent and self-sufficient in its aims and methods of woi king It docs not immerse itself in its own sepal ate vocation. On the conti-ary, its aims are led by and dependent upon tbo ami of the whole, an aim which has been named in geueial teims and indefinitely the wellbeing of the state This ideality is manifested in a twofold way. (1) In tunes of peace the particular spheres and busmesses go im: PHILOSOPHY of righi’ then wav of satisfying then pailieulai offieos and cMids Accoidiug to meie iiiiconscioiis necessity fcolf-beckint; lioic veeis lound to a contiibution in behalf of niiitual pic'-eiiation and the piosei'vation of the yyliole 183) But, also, thiough a diieet influent e fioin above is it that these employments aie coiitiiiuallv biought batk and limited bv the aim of the Mhole (see “ Function of Cioveinment,” ^ 280), and led to make duett eftoits foi its pieseiialiou (2) In circumstaiites of disliess, iiiteiiialoi evteinal, the oiuaiiisiii consisting ot its paititiilais, comes togethei into the simple conception of soieieignti, to whiih is iiiti listed the sufety of the state, oven at the saciifa<e of vliatis at otliei times justifiable It is hcie that idealism attains its pi'tiihai lealizatiou 321) 279 (2) Soveieignty, at fiist only the iiiiiveisal thought of this ideality, exists meielv as a siibiettnity assuied of itself, and as the abstiact and so I’ai gioundless selfdiiection and ultimate decision of the Mill, by -Mitue of this quality the state is mdiiidual and one But in the nest place sub]octmty exists m its tiutli oiih as a subject, and peisoualily as a peison lu the constitution, nliicli has matuied into i ational icaliti. each of the tliiee elements of the conception has itsoivn independent, leal, and sepaiate embodiment Hence, the element iihuh implies absolute decision is not individuality in geiieial but one iiidiMdual, the monaich A^ofe — The iiiteiual de\ clopiiieiit of a sticme, nhose whole content is deduced out ot the simjile conception — the only method which is deserving of the name phdosojjhic, — leveals the peculiaiity that one and the same conception, here the will, which at the beginning is abstract because it is the beginning, yet contains itself, condenses of it«elf its own characteristics, and in this way acquiies a concrete content Tlius it is fundamental iii the personality, which IS at fiist in simple right abstiact It then develops itself through the diileient foims of subjectivity, and aiK sTAii: aiK sTAii: at laijt in absolute riyht, the state or the complete, concrete objectivity of the will, attains to the personality of the state and its conscious assuiance of itself This final term gives to all particulaiities a now form by taking them up into its ])Uio self It ceases to hesitate between leasons 'in 0 and enn, and deciding by an “ I will,” initiates all action and reality Pcisoiialitv, fuilhei, oi subjectnity generally, as infinite and sel£-ieteirmg, has tiuth only as a person or independent subject This independent existence must be one, and the tiiilli wliiih it has is of tlio most dneet or immediate liiiid The jieisoiiality of the state is actualized only as a jieisoii, the monarch — Peisoiiality expresses the conception as such, M hile jiei son contains also the actuality of the coiiceplioii Heiue (he concejition becomes the idea or tiulh, only wlieii it leceiies this additional character —A so-called iiioial peison, a society, congregation, or family, be It as concicte as it may, possesses personality only as an element and abstiactly It h,ts not reached the truth of its existence But the state is this very totality, m which the moments of the conception gam reality in accordance with then peculiar truth — All these phases of the idea have been aheacly exjilaiiied, bolli in tlieii abstract and in then concieto loiins, in the couise of this treatise Here, hovsecei, they need to be lejK'ated, because we, while easily admitting them iiicccraeal in their pailiciilar forms, do not soieadilv lecogiiise and apprehend them in their true place as elements of the idea The conception of monarch offers great difficulty to abstract reasonings and to the leflective methods of the uudei standing The understanding never gets beyond isolated deteiuniuations, and ascribes merit to mere reasons, or finite points of view and what can be deiived from them. Thus the dignity of the monaieh is represented as something derivative not only in its form but also m its essential chaiactci. But the conception of the monarch is not 'iiii: PHILOSOPHY of right deiivative, but purely sclf-origm.itecl Akin to this mistaken notion IS the idea that the light of the moiiarih is based upon and receives its unconditional natuio fiom divine authority The misconcoptioiis that are allied to this idea are well-known, besides, philosojiliy sets itselt the task of conceiving the divine The phiase “ sovereignty of the poojdc,” can he used iii the sense that a people is in gcneial selt-depcudciit in its foreign relations, and constitutes its own state Such are the people of Gicat Britain, foi example But tlie people of England, Scotland, Ireland, Venice, Geiio.i, oi Ceylon have ceased to be a soveieign people, since the\ no loiigei have independent princes, and the ihicT goveinmeiit is not exclusively their own Further, it m.iv be said tli.it niteuial sovereignty resides ni the people it, as was already iiointed out (§§ 277-278), we speak in geneial teims, and mean that soiereigiity acciues to the whole state But the sovereignty of the people is usually in modeiii times opposed to the sovereignty of the iiioiiaich This new of the sovereignty of the people may he traced to a contused idea of what is meant bv “the people ’’ The peoiile ajiait from their monarch, and the common meinbciship necessarily and directly associated with him, is a formless mass It is no longer a state In it occur none of the characteristic features of au equipped whole, such as sovereignty, government, law-courts, magistiatcs, piofcssions, etc, etc When these elements of an organized national life make their appearance in a people, it ceases to he that undefined abstraction, which is indicated by the mere general notion " people ”