INI'HODUCIIOX rate may without blushing acknowledge jumentum, which without any arcera was the only legal way to bring a sick man into court as a witness, W'as hold to mean not only a horse but also a carnage oi wagon Further on in this law Ceeeihus found moie evidence of the excellence and accuracy of the old statutes, which for the purpose of non-suitmg a sick man at couit distinguished not only between a horse and a wagon, but also, as Ciecilms cxj^lams, between a wagon coveied and cushioned and one not so comfortably equipped. Thus oue would have the choice between uttei severity on one bide, and on the othei senseless details But to exhibit fully the absurdity of these laws and the pedantic defence otteied 111 then bclialf would give rise to an invincible icpugnance to all sdiolaisliip ot that kind But in Ins manual Mi Hugo speaks also of rationality in connection with Eoman law, and I have been struck with the following loinaiks He fiist of all treats of the epoch extending iiom the oiigin of the Republic to the twelve tables (§§ 38, 39), noticing that m Rome ficoplu had many wants, and w'tuc (omjadled in their labour to use di aught annuals and beasts of burden, as w'e ourselves do, and that the giouiid was an alternation of bill and valley, and tliat the city was set upon a lull, etc These statements nnglit, jiciliaps, have answ'eied to the sense of Montesquieu’s thought, though in them it would be wellnigh impossible to find bis genius But after these preliinuifVry paiagia])hb, be goes on to say in § 40, that the condition of the law was still very far fiom satisfving the highest demands of leason This remark is wholly in place, as the Roman family-right, slavery, etc, give no satisfaction to the smallest demands of reason Yet when discussing the succeeding epochs, Mr Hugo forgets to tell us lu what particulais, if any, the Roman law has satisfactorily met the highest demands of reason Still of the classic juiists, w'ho flourished m the era of the greatest expansion of Roman law as a science, it is said (§ 289) 'iiri: PHILOSOPHY oi moiii that “it has been lonj; since been observed that the Boinan luiists weic educated in philoso2ih} but “few know” (nioie im 11 know now thious^h the numerous editions ot Mi Hugo's manual) “ that theie is no class of wnteis, w ho, as regaids deduction from jirincijilcs, desei ved to be placed beside the mathematicians, and also, as regaids the quite icmaikable way in -whicli they dcielop their conce2itious, beside the modem foundoi of iiietajihysic, as loucher toi this asseition is the notable fact that nowhoie do so many tiichotoinies occur as in the classic juiists and in Kant ” This foim of logical leasouing, extolled by Leibnitz, is ceitaiuly an essential featuie of the science of light, as it is of mathematics and e\erv othei intelligible science, but the logical 2>iocediire of the mere undeistanding, s2)oLen of bv Mi Hugo, has nothing to do with the satislactioii of the elainis of icasoii and with philoso2iliic science Moicoioi, the \ciy laik of logical piocedure, which is chaiacteiistic of the Koinan jurists and pisetois, is to be esteemed as one of then chief viitues, since by iiiuaiis ot it they oliviated the consequences ot uniightooiis and hoiiible institutions Through their want of logic they wcic com2Jelled calhde to 2 Hit sense into iiicie veibal distinctions, as they did when they identified Hanoi um jiossesDio with inhciitaiiee, and also into silly evasions, for silliness is a defect of logic, in oidei to save the lettei of the tables, as was done in the ficlia oi virokpiaig that jpatrotii was a Jihiiii (Heincec “ Aiitiq Kom,” lib 1 tit 11 § 24 ) But it is absurd to place the classic jurists, with their use of trichotomy, along with Kant, and in that way to discern in them the promise of the dovelo2iment of conceptions 4 The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its moie definite place and origin is the will, which is fice Thus treedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom It is the world of JMKODCCMOX 11 sjjiiit, which IS iJiocliiced out of itself, aud is a second nature Addition — Fieedoin of will is best explained by lefereiice to jiliysical natiiie Freedom is a fundamental phase ot will, as weight is of bodies When it is said that iiiattei IS heavy, it might be meant that the piedicate is an iiccident, but such is not the case, for in matter there is nothing winch has not weight, in fact, mattei is weight. That which is heavy constitutes the body, and is the body Just so IS it with ficedom and the will, that which is fiee IS the will Will without fieedom is an empty woid, and irecdom becomes attual only as will, ns subject A leinark may also be made as to the connection of willing and tliinlcing Spiiit in geneial is thought, and by thought man is distinguished fioin the animal But we must not imagine that man is on cue side thinking and on aiiotliei side willing, as though he had will m one iiocket and thought in anotbei Such an idea is vain The distinction between thought and will is only that between a tlieoietical and a piactical lelalion They aio not two sejiaiate faculties The will is a special way ot thinking, it IS thought tianslatiiig itsclt into lealitj', it is the impulse of thought to give itselt leality The distinction between thought and w ill niai be cxpiessed in this way.
When I think an object, I make of it a tliought, and take from it the sensible Thus I make of it something which IS essentially and diiectly mine Only' in thought am I self-contained. Conception is the penetration of the object, which is then no longer opposed to me From it I have taken its own peculiar natuic, winch it had as an independent object in opposition to me. As Adam said to Eve, “thou ait flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone,” so says the spiiit, “ This object is spiiit of my spirit, and all alienation has disappeared ” Auv idea is a universalizing, and this process belongs to thinking To make something universal is to think The “ I ” is thought and the iiniijii: PHILOSOPHY of right •tersal. Wlieii I say "I,” I let fall all j)articnlarity of character, natuial endowment, knowledge, age The I is emptv, a iiomt and simple, but in its simplicity aetive. The gaily colouiod woild is bofoie me, I stand opposed to it, and in this i elation I cancel and transcend the opposition, and make the content niy own The I is at home m the woild, when it knows it, and still nioie when it has conceived it So much foi the theoietical i elation The practical, on the other hand, begins with thinking, with the I itself It thus appeals fiist of all as placed in opposition, because it exhibits, as it weie a sepaiation As I am practical, I am active, I act and deteimme mjself, and to determine myself means to sot up a distinction But these distinctions are again mine, my own deteiinmations come to me, and the ends aio mine, to which I am impelled Even when I let these distiiu tions and determinations go, setting them in the so-called external woild, thev leinain mine They are that which I have done and made, and bear the tiace of iiiy spirit That is the distinction to be diawn between the theoietical and the piactical lelations And now the connection ot the tno must be also stated The theoietual is essentially contained in the practical Against the idea that the two aie sejiaiate inns the fact that man has no will wnthout intelligence The will holds within itself the theoietical, the will detennines itself, and this deteiinmation is in the fiist instance internal That which I will I place before my mind, and it is an object for 1110 The animal acts according to instinct, is impelled by something internal, and so is also practical But it has no will, because it cannot place before its mind what it desiies Similaily man cannot use his theoretic faculty or think without will, for in thinking we are active The content of what is thought receives, indeed, the form of something existing, but this existence is occasioned by our activity and by it established These distinctions of theo- IMRODUCriON.
retical and practical are inseparable, they are one and the same, and in every activity, whether of thought or will, both these elements are found It is worth while to recall the older way of proceeding with reg.ud to the ficcdom of the will “First of all, the idea of the will was assumed, and then an effort was made to deduce fioni it and establish a definition of the will Next, the method of the older empirical psychology was adopted, and difteient perceptions and geueial phenomena of the oidinarv consciousness were collected, such as remorse, guilt, and the like, on the giound that these could be explained only as pioceedmg out of a will that is free. Then from these pheuomena was deduced the so-called proof that the will is free But it is more convenient to take a short cut and hold that freedom is given as a fact of consciousness, and must be believed in The nature of the will and of fieedom, and the proof that the will is fiee, can be shown, as has alieady been obseived (§ 2), only m connection with the whole Tho giouud piiiiciplos of the pieiiiises — that spirit is in the first iiistauce intelligence, and that the phases, through which it passes in its devclojiment, namely fiom feeling, thiough imaginative thinking to thought, are the way by which it produces itself as w'ill,w hich, in turn, as tliepractical spiiit in general, is the most diiect truth of intelligence — I have pi esented in iiiv “ Eucvclojiffidia of the Philosophical Sciences ” (Heidelbcig, 1817), and hope some day to bo able to give of them a iiioie complete exposition. There is, to my mind, so much the moie need for me to give my contribution to, as I hope, the more thorough knowledge of the nature of spirit, since, as I have theie said, it would be difiicult to find a philosophic science m a more neglected and evil plight than is that theory of spint, which is commonly called psjchology — Some elements of the conception of will, resulting from the premises enumerated above are mentioned in this and the followmg paragraphs As to 1-i niL PHILOSOPHY Ot HK.Ur these, appeal may moreover he made to every indiMdual to see them m his onu self-consciousness Everjone will, in the first place, find in himself the ability to ahstiact himself fiom all that he is, and in this way prove himself able of himself to set eierj" content within liiinself, and thus have in Ins own consciousness an illustration ot all the subsequent ]iliases 5 The will contains (a) the element of jiure indeterniiuateuess, i e, the pure doublin" of the I back in thoug-ht upon itself In this piocess, everv limit or content, pi esent though it be directly by way of nature, as in want, appetite or inipiilsc, 01 given in any specific wav is dissohed Thus we liav e the limitless infinitude of absolute abstraction, or univei 'alltv, the puie thought of itself Note — Those who tieat thinking and willing as two special, peculiar, and separate faculties, and, further, look upon thought as detiimental to the will, especiallv the good will, show fiom the very stait that the\ know nothing of the natuie ot willing — a lemark which we shall be < ailed upon to make a numbei ot times upon the same attitude of mind — The will on one side is the possibility of abstiai -tion trom eieiy aspect iii which the I finds itself or has set itself up It leckons anv content as a limit, and flees from it Tins IS one ot the forms of the self- direction of the will and IS by imaginative thinking insisted upon as of itself freedom It is the negative side of the will, or freedom as appiehended by the understandiug This freedom IS that of the void, which has taken actual shape, and is stilled to passion It, while remaining purely theoretical, appeals in Hindu religion as the fanaticism of pure contemplation, but becoming actual it assumes both in politics and religion the form of a fanaticism, which would ilestiov the established social order, remove all individuals susp(‘(ted of desiring any kind of older, and demolish any organization which then sought to rise out of the rums Only in devastation does the negative will feci that it has IMHODLCllOX.
IMHODLCllOX.
reality It iiiteuds, indeed, to bnutf to pass some positive social condition, such as imiveisal equality or unneisal religious life But in fact it does not ivill the iiositive reality ot any such condition, since that ivould carry in its train a system, and intioduce a separation hy way of institutions and between individuals But classification and obiective system attain self consciousness on h' bi- destroyingnegative freedom Negative freedom is actnated by a mere solitary abstiact idea, whose leah/ation is nothing but the fury of desolation Addition — This jihiise of uill implies that I break loose fioiii everything, giie up all ends and bury myself in absti action It IS man alone nho c<iu let go everthiug, even life He can eoiumit suicide, an act impossible for the animal, which alwais lemaius only negative, abiding in a state foieign to itselt, to uhicli it must meiely get accustomed Man IS ]iuie thought ot himself, and only in thinking has he the ponei to gne himself uuiieisalitv and to extinguish m himself all that is paiticulai and definite Negatnc tieedom, or tioedom ot the understanding, is oiie-sided, let as tins oiie-sidedness contains an essential fcatuie, it IS not to be disc aided But the defect of the undei standing is that it exalts its one sideduess to the sole and highest jilace This toini of fieedoni frequently oecurs m histuiy By the Hindus, e y, the highest freedom is declared to be peisisteucu in the consciousness of one’s simple identity with hiiiiselt, to abide in the einiity space of one’s own inner being, like the colourless light of pure intuition, and to 1 enounce every activity of life, every purpose and eveiy idea In this way man becomes Biahma, theieisno longci any distinction between finite man and Biahma, every diffeience having been snallowed up in this universality A moie concic'te manifestation of this fieedoiu is the fanaticism of jjolitical and leligious life Of this nature was the teiiible epoch of the Fiench Kevolutioii, by which all distinctions iii talent and authontv weie to have iiii; PHILOSOPHY oi higiu been supei seeled In tins time of upbeaval and commotion any specific thing ■nas mtoleiable Fanaticism -wills an abstraction and not an aiticulate association It finds all distinctions antagonistic to its indefmitencss, and supersedes them Hence in the French Kevolutioii the people abolished the institutions which thev theinsehes had set up, since eieiy institution is immical to the ahstiact selfconscionsncss of equality 6 (j 3 ) The I IS also the tiansitiou fiom blank in definiteness to the distinct and definite estahlishmoiit of a definite content and object, -whether this content be gii en by nature or produced out of the conception of spiiit Thiough this establishment of itself as a definite thing the I beconies a reality This is the absolute eleiiieut ot the hnitudo oi specialization of the I Note This second element in the charaLteii/atiou of the 1 IS just as negative as the first, since it annuls and leplaces the fiist abstiact negatnity As the ]-)aiti(,ulai is contained in the univeisal, so this second jihase is contained already in the first, and is only an establishing of -what the first is implicitly The first phase, if taken mdepondentl}, IS not the tiue infinitude, le, the concrete universal, oi the conception, but limited and onesided In that it is the abstraction from all definite chaiacter, it has a definite character Its abstract and one-sided nature constitutes its definite chaiactci, its defect and finitude The distinct chaiacteiization of these t-wo phases of the I IS found 111 the philosoph-tr of Fichte as also in that of Kant Only, 111 the exposition of Fichte the I, when taken as unlimited, as it IS in the fiist proposition of his “ Wissensehaftslehie,” is merely positive. It is the universalitj and identity made by the understanding. Hence this abstract I IS m its independence to be taken as the truth, to which by way of mei c addition comes in the second proposition, the limitation, or the negative in general, whethci it be 111 the form of a given external limit or of an activity IN'iRODUCTIOV.
of the I — To aj)pi eheiid the negative as immanent in the univeisal oi self-identical, and also as in the I, was the next step, which speculative philosophy had to make Of this want they have no piesentinicnt, who like Fichte never apprehend that the infinite and finite aie, if separated, ahstiact, and must he seen as immanent one in the other Adilthon — This second element makes its appearance as the opposite of the fiist, it is to he uudei stood in its gencial foim it belongs to fiecdom hut does not constitute the whole of it Heie the I passes over from blank indeteiininateness to the distinct establishment of a sjiecific chai actei as a content oi object I do not will merely, hut I will something Such a wiU, as is analysed in the preceding pai agrapli, wills only the abstract universal, and thciefoie wills nothing Hence it is not a wiU The paitieulai thing, which the will wills is a limitation, since the will, in oidci to be a will, must in general limit itself Limit 01 negation consists in the will willmg something Paiticulaiizing is thus as a lulc named finitude Ordmary reflection holds the first element, that of the mdefimte, foi the absolute and higliei. and the hunted for a meie negation of this indefiniteucss But this ludefiuiteness is itself only a negation, in coiitiast unth the definite and finite The I IS solitude and absolute negation The mdefimte will IS thus quite as much one-sidcd as the will, which continues meiely in tlic definite 7 (y) The will is the unity of these two elements It is particularity turned back witbin itself and thus led hack to universality, it is individuality, it is the self -direction of the I Thus at one and the same time it estabhshes itself as its own negation, that is to say, as definite and hmited, and it also abides by itself, in its self -identity and nniversahty, and in this position icmaius purely self -enclosed — The I determines itself in so fai as it is the refeience of negativity to itself; and yet in this self-refeience it is inc TiiK PHILOSOPHY ov uiGiir.
different to its own definite tliaiacter This it knows as its o-wn, that is, as an ideal oi a nieie possibility, by which it IS not bound, but rathei exists iii it merely because it establishes itself theie — This is the liccdom of the will, constitutin'^ its conception or substantiTe reality. It is its gravity, as it weie, ]ust as gravity is the substantive leality of a body Note — Evciy self-conseiousne<s knows itself as at once universal, oi the possibility of abstracting itself from everything definite, and as particular, with a fixed ob]ect, content or aim These two elements, however, are only abstractions The conciete and tiue, — and all that is true is concrete, — is the universality, to which the particular is at first opposed, but, when it has been tinned back into itself, IS in the end made equal — This unity is individuality, but it IS not a simple unit as is the individuality of imaginative thought, but a unit in terms of the conception (“ Encyclopaedia of the Philosojihical Sciences,” §§ 112-114) In other words, this individuahty is properly nothing else than the conception The first two elements of the will, that it can abstidct itself fioin everything, and that it is definite through either its own activity or something else, aic easily admitted and comprehended, because in then separation they are untrue, and chaiacteiistic of the mere understanding But into the thud, the tiue and speculative — and all truth, as far as it is conceived, must be thought sjieculatively — the understanding declines to venture, always calling the conception the mconceivable The proof and more detailed explanation of this inmost reserve of speculation, of infinitude as the negativity which refers itself to itself, and of this ultimate source of all activity, life and consciousness, belong to logic, as the purely speculative philosophy Here it can be noticed only in passing that, in the sentences, " The will is umversal,” “ The will directs itself,” the will is already regarded as piesupposed subject 01 substratum; but it is not something finished and uni- IXittODUClIOX veisal befoie it detoiiiiiucs itself noi yet before this deteimination is supeiseded and idealired It is ivill only irben its activity IS self -occasioned, and it has returned into itself Addition — What ive jiiopcily call will contains the two above-mentioned cleiiienta The I is, first of all, as such, pine activity, the umveisal which is by itself Next this iiniveisal detei mines itself, and so fai is no longer by itself, but establishes itself as anothoi, and ceases to be the univeisal The thud step is that tlie will, while in thishmitatiou, i e, in this othei, is bv itself While it limits itself, it yet lemains with itself, and does not lose its hold of the uiiivei sal This is, then, the conciete conception of fieedom, while the othei two elements have been thoioughly absti act and one-sided But this tom lete freedom we already have in the foim of peiception, as in fiiendship and love Heie a man is not one-sided, but limits himself willingly in icfeieiioe to anothoi, and jet in this limitation knows himself as Imnsolf In this detenu ination he does not feel himself detei mined, but m the contemjdation of the othei as another has the feeling of himself. Freedom also lies neither m iiideteiminateness nor in determmateness, but in both The w ilf ul man has a will which limits itself wholly to a jiaiticulai ob]ect and if he has not this will, he supposes himself not to bo fiee But the will is not bound to a paiticulai ob)ect, but must go fuithei, foi the nature of the will is not to be one-sided and confined Fice will consists in willing a definite object, but in so doing to be by itself and to retmn again into the universal 8 If we define this particulaiizing (fi § 6) further, we reach a distinction in the foims of the wiU (a) In so far as the definite chaiacter of the will consists in the formal opposition of the subjective to the objective or external diiect existence, we have the foimal will as a self consciousness, which finds an outei woild befoie it The process by which individuality turns back in its defimteness into itself, IS the translation of the subjective end, through the THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIGHT intervention of an activity and a means, into objectivity In the absolute spiiit, in -which all definite ehaiacter is thoioughlv its own and tiue (“ Eucydop ” § 3(13), consciousness IS onlj'- one side, naniclv, Ihc manifestation or appearance of the will, a phase which docs not lequiie detailed consi delation heie Additimi — The considciation of the definite natuie of the will belongs to the undei standing, and is not in the first instance speculative The will as a whole, not only in tlie sense of its content, but also in the sense of its foi m, is determined Deteimmate chaiactcr on the side ot term is the end, and the execution of the end The end is at fiist merely something internal to me and sub-|ccti\e, but it is to be also objective and to cast away the defect of meie subjectivity It mav be asked, why it has this defect When that which is deficient does not at the same time transcend its defect, the defect is foi it not a defect at all The animal is to us defective, but not foi itself The end, in so fai as it is at fiist nieiely ouis, is foi us a defect, since freedom and will are foi us the uniti of subjectiie and objective The end must also be established as objectiie, but does not in that ay attam a new one-sided character, but lathei its reahzatiou 9 (6) In so fai as the definite phases of will aie its own pecuhai piopeity oi its paiticulaiization turned back into itself, they aie content This content, as content of the will, IS foi it, by viituc of the foim given in (a), an end, which exists on its inner or subjective side as the imaginative will, but by the operation of the activity, which converts the snbjective into the objective, it is realized, completed end 10 The content or determinate phase of -wiU is in the first instance diiect oi immediate Then the will is free only in itself oi for us, i e, it is the will in its conception Only when it has itself as an object is it also foi itself, and its imphat freedom becomes realized.
I>’TRODrClION.
I>’TRODrClION.
'Note — At tills standpoint tte finite implies that wliatever is in itself, or accoidmg to its conception, has an existence or manifestation different fiom ivliat it is for itseK For examine tlie abstiact separateness of natuie is in itself space, but for itself time Heie, two things are to be observed, (1) that because the tiuth is the idea, when any object oi phase is apjnchcnded only as it is in itself or in conception, it is not as yet appiehcnded m its truth, and yet (2) that, whatevoi exists as conception or in itself, at the same tune exists, and this existence is a peculiar form of the object, as e q space The separation of existencein-itself 01 implicit existence fiom cxistence-for-itself or explicit existence is a chaiacteiistic of the finite, and constitutes its appcaiaiKc oi meiely external reality An example of this is to hand in the sepaiation of the natural xvill fiom foimal light The uiului standing adheres tc meio implicit existence, and in accoidauce with this position calls ficedom a capacitv, since it is at this point only a possibility But the undeistaudma; icgards this phase as absolute and peionnial, and consideis the lelation of the will to what it wills 01 lealily as an apphcation to a given mateiial, which does not belong to the essence of freedom In tins xvay the uiidei staiuhug occupies itself with mere absti actions, and not with the idea and tiuth Addihon — The will, which is will only aceoidmg to the conception, is free inijdicitly, but is at the same time not free To be tiuly tiee it must have a truly fixed content, then it is explicitly free, has freedom for its object, and is freedom Wliat is at fiist merely in conception, %e, implicit, IS only diiect and natural. We are familiar with this in pictoi lal thought also The child is implicitly a man, at fiist has icason implicitly, and is at first the possibility of leason and fieedom He is thus free nieiely accoidmg to the conception That which is only implicit does not yet exist in actuality. A man, who 18 implicitly rational, must cieate himself by working Till: Pinio^.oPiii ov Bi&iu.
through and out of himself and hv iGLOUstiuctiug himself within himself, hefoie he can become also explicitly rational 11 The will, which is at fiist only implicitly fiee, is the direct 01 natuial will The distinctive jiliase", which the self-determming conception sets up in the will, ajipeai lu the direct will, as a dnectlv piesent content They aie impulses, apjictites, inclinations, bv which the will finds itself detei mined by natuic Now tins content, iMtli all its attendant phases, jiiocc-eds fioni tlie latiouality of the will, and istheiefoie iiii 2 ilicitlyiational, but let loose in its immediate diiectuesB it has not as yet the foiin of lationality The content is indeed foi me and niv own, but the foim and the content aie yet difteient The will is thus in itself finite