Addition — The idea must always p:o on deteimininfr itself within itself, since at the be<?iiming it is only absti act conception However, this initial abstiact conception is never given up, but only becomes inwaidly iichei, tlie last phase being the richest The eailiei and meiely iiniihcit phases reach in this wa\' fiee self-dependence but iii such a mauuei that the conception remains the soul hu li holds eveiythmg togethei, and only tliiongh a pioccilmc immanent within itself airnes at its own distiiu turns Heiici' the last phase falls again into a unity with the fiist, and it cannot be said that the conception evei comes to soinetliiin: new Although the elements of the conceiitioii appeal to have fallen apart when they entei lealitv, this is only a mere appearance Its supeificial chaiaiter is loiealed in the process, since all the pailiculais finally tuin back again into the conception of the unneisal The cmpiiical si leiices usually analyze what they find in pictmial ideas, and if the individual is successfully biouglit back to the geiieial, the general property is then called the conception But this is not our procedure We desiie only to obsciye how the conception detci mines itself, and compels us to keep at a distance eveij thing of oui own spinning and thinking But what we get in this way is one sciies of thoughts and another senes of realized foiras As to these two senes, it may happen that the order of time of the actual manifestations IS paitly different from the order of the conception Thus it cannot, e g,he said that propel ty existed before the familc, and yet, in spite of that it is discussed before the family is discussed The question might also be raised heie, Why do we not begin with the highest, i e, with concrete truth The answer is, because we desire to see truth in the form of a lesult, and it is an essential part IXlRODUCriOX of the process to conceive the conception first of all as abstract The actual senes of realizations of the conception IB thus for us 111 due couise as follows, even although in actuahtj' the order should be the same Our 2 }rocess is this, that the abstiact foims reveal themselves not as self-subsistent but as untrue Division of the WoiJc 33 Accoiding to the stages in the development of the idea of the absolutely free will, A The will IS diiect oi immediate, its conception is theietore abstiact, i e, personality, and its embodied leality is a diiect external thing This is the sphere of abstiact oi formal light.
B The will, passing out of external reality, turns back into itself Its jihase is subiective individuality, and it is contrasted with the univeisal This universal is on its mteinal side the good, and on its external side a presented world, and these two sides aie occasioned only by means of each othoi In this sphere the idea is divided, and exists in sepaiate elements The right of the subjective will IS in a lelatioii of contiast to the right of the woild, or the right of the idea Heie, honevei, the idea exists only implicitly This is the sphere of moiality c The unity and tiuth of these two abstract elements The thought idea of the good is lealized both in the will turned back into itself, and also in the external world Thus freedom exists as real substance, which is quite as much actuality and necessity as it is subjective will. The idea here is its absolutely universal existence, viz, ethical observance. This ethical substance is again, a Natural spirit, the family, h The civic community, or spiiit in its dual existence and mere appeal ance, c The state, or freedom, which, while established in the 'ini: PHILOSOPHY of bighi' free self-dependence of the paiticular will is also universal and objective Tins actual and oiganic spiiit (a) is the spirit of a nation, (/3) is found in the lelation to one another of national spiiits, and (y) passing thiough and hej’ond this relation is actualized and revealed in woild history as the univeisal woild-spiiit, whose light is the highest Note — It IS to be found in the sjicculatii e logic, and heie IS presupposed, that a thing oi content, which is established fiist of all aecoiding to its conception, oi implicitly, has the form, of diiect existence The conception, however, when it has the foini of the conception is exjilicit, and no longer is a direct existence So, too, the piiiieiple, upon which the division of this woik proceeds, is jnesupposed The divisions might he legaided as alieadj settled hy history, since the diffeicnt stages must he iiewed as elements in the development of the idea, and thciefore as springing fioin the nature of the content itself A jihilo-Bophic division is not an external classification of any given material, such a classification as would he made accoiding to one or seveial schemes picked up at landom, hut the inherent distinctions of the conception itself Morality and ethical ohseivance, which are usually supposed to mean the same thing, arc heie taken in essentially clifEeient meanings Meanwhile even imaginative thought seems to make a distinction between them In the usage of Kant the preference IS given to the teim morality, and the piactical principles of his philosophy limit themselves wholly to this standpoint, making impossible the standpoint of ethical observance, and indeed expiessly destroying and abolishing it Although morality and ethics have the same meaning according to their etymology, yet these difEeient words may he used for different conceptions.
Addition — When we speak of light, we mean not only civil right, which is the usual significance of the woid, but also morahty, ethical observance and world-history These belong to this realm, because the conception taking them in iNTRonrcnoN.
their truth, brings them all together Free will, in order not to lemain abstract, must m the first instance give itself leality, the sensible mateiials of this leality are objects, t e, ex.tcrnal things This first phase of freedom we shall loiow as piopeity This is the spheie of formal and abstiact right, to which belong piojierty in the more developed form of contiactand also the injury of right, % e, crime and punishment The fieedom, we have here, we name pel son, or, in othei woi ds, the subject who is free, and indeed fiee independently, and gives himself a leality in things But this direct reality is not adeejuate to freedom, and the negation of this jiliase is moiality In morality I am beyond the fieedom found diiectl}' in tins thing, and have a freedom in nliicli this duectness is superseded I am free m myself, t e, in the subjective In this sphere we come upon my insight, intention, and end, and externahty IS established as incbfEeient The good is now the universal end, which is not to lemain merely internal to me, but to lealizo itself The subjective will demands that its inwaid character, oi jiurpose, shall receive external leality, and also that the good shall be brought to completion in external existence. Morality, hke formal light, is also an abstiaction, whose truth is reached only in ethical observance Hence ethical observance is the unity of the will in its conception with the will of the mdividual 01 subject The primary leality of ethical observance is in its turn natuial, taking the form of love and feeling This is the family In it the mdividual has transcended his prudish jiersonality, and finds himself with hiB consciousness in a totality In the next stage is seen the loss of this pecubar ethical existence and substantive unity.
Here the family falls asunder, and the members become independent one of anothei, bemg now held together merely by the bond of mutual need This is the stage of the cmc community, which has fiequently been taken for the state. But the state does not arise until we reach the third stage, 'iiiij PHILOSOPHY OF rigii'j that stage of ethical obseivance or sjiiril, m ■which both individual mdepcudcnce and univeisal substantivity are found in gigantic union The right of the state is, therefore, higher than that of the othci stages. It is freedom in its most concrete embodiment, ■which yields to nothing but the highest absolute truth of the world-spint FIRST PART.
ABSTRACT RIGHT.
34 The completely free will, when it is conceived abstractly, IS in a condition of self -involved simplicity What actuality it has when taken m this abstiact way, consists in a negative attitude towards reality, and a bare abstract reference of Itself to itself Such an abstract will is the individual will of a subject It, as particular, has definite ends, and, as exclusive and individual, has these ends befoie itself as an externally and directly presented woild Addthon — ^The lemark that the completely free wiU, when it IS taken abstractly, is in a condition of self-involved simplicity must be undeistood in this way The completed idea of the will is found when the conception has realized itself fullv, and in such a mannei that tlie embodiment of the concejitioii is nothuig but the development of the conception itself But at the outset the conception is abstract All its futuie characters aie implied in it, it IS true, but as ret no moie than implied They are, in other words, potential, and aie not yet developed into an articulate whole If I say, “ I am free,” the I, here, is still implicit and has no real object opposed to it But from the standpoint of morality as contrasted with abstiact right theie is opposition, because there I am a particular will, while the good, though within me, is the universal Hence, at that stage, the will contains within itself the contrast between particulai and universal, and in that way is made definite But at the beginnmg such 'IIIE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT a distinction does not occur, liecanse in the fiist abstract unity tlieie is as yet no profjress or modification of any kind That is what is meant by saiiiig that the will has the maik of self -invoiced simplieitj or immediate being The chief thing to notice at tins point is that this ceiy absence of definite featuies is itself a definite feature Absence of determinate character exists wheie thuie is as yet no distinction between the will and its content But when this lack of definiteness is set in opposition to the definite, it becomes itself something definite In othei words, abstiact identity becomes the distinguishing fe.ituie of the will, and the will theieby becomes an individual mil or person 35 This consciously free will has a umveisal side, which consists in a formal, simple and pine rei’eience to itself as a sepaiate and independent unit This lefeieuce is also a self-conscious one though it hasnotmthei content The subject IS thus so far a person It is implied in peisuiiality that I, as a distinct being, am on all sides coiiijiletelv bounded and limited, on the side of inner cajuice impulse and appetite, as well as in mv diioct and cisible outer life But it IS implied likewise that I stand in absolutely jniie relation to myself Hence it is that in this fiiiitude I know mvself as infinite, umveisal and free Note — Personahtc does not aiise till the subiect has not merely a geneial consciousness of himself in some determinate mode of concrete existence but rather a consciousness of himself as a completely abstract I, in which all concrete limits and values are negated and declared invalid Hence personality involves the knowledge of oneself as an object, raised, however, Iw thought into the realm of pure infimtude, a lealm, that is, in which it is purely identical with itself Inchviduals and peoples have no personality, if they haie not reached this puie thought and self-cousciousuess In this way, too, the absolute or completed mind or spirit may be distmgmshed from its ABSrilACr HIGIIl' mere semblance The semblance, though self-conscious, is aware of itself only as a mcicly natural will with its external obiects The other, as an abstract and pure I, has itself as its end and ob]ect, and is thcrefoie a person Addition — The abstract will, the will which exists for itself, IS a pel sou The highest aim of man is to be a pel sou, and yet again the meie abstraction “person” is not held in high esteem Pei son is essentially different fiom sub]ect Subject is only the possibility of personalitv Any living thing at all is a subject, while person is a subject which has its subjectiiity as an object As a jjerson T exist foi luj'self Peisonahty is the free being in puie self-conscious isolation I as a peison am conscious of fioedoin I tan abstiact mjsclf fiom eveiy thing, since nothing IS betoio me except puie personality Notwithstanding all this I am as a jiaiticular peison completely limited I am of a eeit<iiu age, height, m this space, and so on Thus a poison is at one and the same time so exalted and so low Iv a thing In hiiii la the unity of mfinite and finite, ol limit and unlimited The dignity of peisonahty can sustani a contradiction, which neithei contains nor could toloiato anything natuial 3l) (ll Peisonahty implies, in general, a capacity to possess lights, and constitutes the conception and abstract basis of abstiact light This light, being abstract, must be foimal also Its mandate is Be a person and lespect otheis as jieisons 37 (2) The paiticulaiity of the wdl, that phase of the will, namely, which implies a consciousness of my specific intciests, IS doubtless an element of the whole consciousness of the will (§ 34), but it is not contained in mere abstract personality It is mdeed present in the form of apjietile, want, impulse and landom desire, but is distinct as yet from the personality, which is the essence of freedom. — In treating of formal right therefore, we do not trench upon special interests, such as my advantage or my ■lUE PlIILOSOPUY OF RIO 111’ well-being, nor bare we here to do iiitli any special leasoii or intention of the will Addition — Since the particular pliases of the person have not as yet attained, the ioiin ot fieedom, everything lelatingto these eleiiionts is sofai a inattei of iiulilteieuce When anyone bases a daiin upon his iiieie foiinal light, he inaj be wholly selfish, and often such a claim comes fiom a coutiacted lieait.uid mind Uiicivili/ed man, in geneial, holds fast to his lights, iihile a moic gcueious disposition IS aleit to see all sides of the cpiestioii Abstiact right IS, moieovei, the hist meie possibility, and in coiitiast Mitli the whole contcvt ot a gnen i elation is still foi mal The possession of a i ight gii es a cei tai u aiil hoi it 3, it IS tiiie, but it IS not, tbeietoie, absohitelj’ iiecessaiy that I insist upon a light, which is only one asjiect of the whole niattei In a vioid, 2><>i»s>ibilitv is something, which means that it eithei may 01 maj not exist 38 In coutiast v ith the deejiei significance of a i oin 1 etc act in all its moial and social healings, abstiact light is only a jiossibihtv Such a light is, tlieiefoie, onl} a iieimission or indication of legal i>oi\ei Because ot this abstiact chaiacter of light the onh iiilenhich is unconditionally its own IS ineielj the neuatiie iiimciiilo not to iniure peisonahty 01 anything 11111011 of necossitj’ belongs to it Hence we have heie onlj' jiiohibitions, the jJositive foim of command having in the last lesoit a jiiohibition as its basis 39 ( 3 ) A pel son in his direct and definite individuality IS related to a given external nature To this outer world the personality is opposed as something subjective. But to confine to mere subjectivity the peisonahty, which is meant to be infinite and universal, contradicts and destroys its natuie It bestiis itself to abiogate the limitation by giving itself reality, and piocecds to make the oiitei visible existence its own.
40 Eight IB at first the simple and direct concrete ABS'IRACl BIGHT.
existence iiliicli fieedom gives itself diiectly This unmodified existence is (a.) Possession oi piopcity Heie fieedom is that of the ahstiact will in geneial, or of a sepaiate peison who relates hiinself only to himself (6) A peison hy distinguishing himself from himself becomes i elated to anothei peison, although the two have no fixed existence foi each other except as owners Their imiilicit identity heeonics realized through a transference of jn operty by mutual consent, and with the preservation of then lights This is contract (cl The will in its reference to itself, as in (a), may he at vaiiance not with some other peison, (6), hut within itself As a jiarticulai will it nia> differ from and be in opposition to its tiue and absolute self This is wrong and erime Note — The division of lights inlo personal right, real light, and light to actions is, like many other divisions, intended to systematize the mass of unorganized material But this diMSiou utterly confuses lights which presuppose such conoiete relations as the family or the state with those which lefei to mcie ahstiact pcisonahty An example of this confusion is the classification, made popular by Kant, ot lights into Beal Eights, Personal Eights, and Personal Eights that aie Eeal in kind It would take us too fai afield to show how contoited and ii rational is the classification of lights into personal and real, a classifi.cation which lies at the foundation of Eoman law The right to actions concerns the administration of justice, and does not fall under this bianch of the subject Clearly it IS only personahty which gives us a right to things, and therefore personal nght is m essence real right A thing must be taken in its universal sense as the external opposite of freedom, so that in this sense my body and my life are things. Thus leal right is the light of personahty as such In the intcipretaticn of jiersonal light, found in Eoman law, a man is not a person tiU he has reached a certain 'HIE PHILOSOPHY of bight.
status (Heineccii “ Elem Jm Civ § Ixxv ) In Eoniaii law personality is an attribute of a class and is contiasted with slavciy The so-called peisonal light of llouiau law includes not only a light to slaves, a class to 11111011 probably belong the childien, not only a light oiei the class which has been deiinved of right (aij)itis dimtnnho), but also family lelations With Kant, faniilv lelations aic wholly personal lights which aie leal in hind — The Eoman peisonal right is not the light of a pci&on as such, but of a special peison It will be aiteiwaids shoun that the familv 1 elation is really liased iijion the lenuuciation of peisonality It cannot but seem an inveited method to treat of the rights of jieisous who belong to definite cl.isses before the univeisal right of peisonality — Atcoidiiig to Kant personal lights aiise out of a contiact or agi cement that I should give 01 perfoim something, this is the jus ad lem of Eoman law which has its soiiice in an nHujatio Only a peison, it is true, can jieifoim a thing lliiongh contiact, and furthei, only a peison tan accpiiio the light to such a peiforniance Yet wo cannot, theiefon', call such a right personal Eveij' soit of light is light of a person, but a right, which vpungs out of contiact, is not a right to a person, but only to something external to him, or to be disclosed of by him, and this is alwaj s a thing FIEST SECTION Pbopebtt 41. A person must give to his freedom an external sphere, in order that he may reach the completeness implied in the idea Since a person is as yet the first abstract phase of the completely existent, infinite will, the external sphere of freedom is not only distinguishable from him but directly different and separable Addition — The reasonableness of property consists in PBOPKHTY its satisfying our needs, but in its supeiseding and replacing the subjective phase of personality It is in possession first of all that the peison becomes lational The fiist lenlization of my freedom in an external object is an imiieifect one, it is tiue, but it is the only lealization possible so long as the abstract personality has this firsthand 1 elation to its object 42 That which is defined as diffcient fiom the free sjnrit IS both in its own natuie and also for this spiiit the exteinal It is an object, something not fiee, impersonal and without lights N(/te — “Thing,” lilce “objoctiie,” has two opposite meanings When wc sav “ That is the thing or fact,” “ It depends on the thing itself, not on the peison,” we mean by “ thing ” that which is leal and substantive But it is also eonliasted with peison, which lieio includes nioie than a paiticnlar subject, and then it means the ojiposite of the leal and substantive, and is something meiely exteinal — What IS external foi the fioe spiiit, which is diffeient fioni meie consciousness, is absolutely external. Hence nature is to be conceived as that winch is external in its veiv self Addition — Since a thing has no subjectivity it is external not meiely to a subject, but to itself Space and time are external I, as sensible, am external, spatial, and tempoial Mv faculty of sonse-poicepliou is external to itself An animal may perceive, but the soul of the animal has as its object not itself, but something external 43 The person in his diiect conception and as a separate individual has an existence which is purely natural This existence is something paitly inalienable, partly atm in its natuie to the external woild — As the individual is consideicd in his first ahstiact simplicity, leference is here made only to those features of peisonality with which he IS diiectly endowed, not to those which he might proceed to acquire by voluntary effort 'lUL PHILOSOPHY OF UlOHl Note — Mental endowments, science, art, sucli matteis of religion as sermons, masses, prajeis, blessings of consecrated utensils, inventions also, aie objects of exchange, lecogni'/ed things to be bounht and sold Tt is possible to ask, also, if an aitist oi scholar is iii legal possession of his art, science, oi capacity to pieach or read mass, and the cjuestion is put on the piesumption that these objects aie things Yet one hesitates to call such gifts, Icnoiv ledge, powers, nieie things, because although they may be baigained foi as a thing, they have an innei spiiitual side Hence the understanding becomes confused as to how they aieto beregaidcd atlaw Befoicthenndeistandingalwajs arises an exclusive disjunction, which in this case is that something must be eithei a thing oi not a thing It is like the disjunctive judgment that a thing must be either finite or infinite But, though knowledge, talents, etc, aie the jiossession of the fiee mind, and theiofoic internal to it, they maybe relinquished and given an exteiual existence (See below) They would then tall nuclei the category of things They are not direct objects at the hist, but the spirit lowers its inner side to the level of the directly extei nal Accoiding to the unjust and immoial finding of the Koman law, children were things for their father, and he was in legal possession of them At the same time he was related to them ethically by the tie of love, although the value of this relation was much weakened by the legal usage In this legal relation there occurs a completely wrong union of thing and not-thmg The essential feature of abstract right is that its object IS the person as such, with only those elements added which, belonging to the external and visible embodiment of his freedom, are directly different fiom him and separable Other phases it can include only after the conscious operation of the subjective will Mental endowments, the sciences, etc., come up for treatment only from the stand- PROPi:iii\.
point of legal iiossesiion The possession of the body and the uiiud, which is acquiied by education, study and habit, IS an inward propei ty of the spirit, and does not fall to be eonsideied lieie The piocoss by which a mental possession passes into the external woild and comes iindei the latogorv of a legal piopeity, mil be taken up later, under I ebiK^iishmevt 44 A person has the light to diiect his will upon any object, as his leal and positive end The object thus becomes his As it has no end m itself, it leoeives its meaning and soul fiom his will Mankind has the absoliilc light to appiopiiate iill that is a thing Note — There is a philosojihy which ascribes to the impeisonal, to sepaiato things, as they aic diiectly apprehended, an independent and absolutely complete leality. Tlicie IS also a philosophy which affirms that the mind lanuot know what the tiiith oi the thing in itself is Those jihilosophiea are diicitly lonliadicted by the attitude ot the lice will to these things Although the so-called evtoriial things seem to hare an independent leality in ( onsciousiiess as peicoiving and imagining, the free will is the idealization oi tiuth of such leality Addition — A man may own anything, because he is a tice will, and is tlioiefoie self-contained and self-dependent But the nieie object is of an opposite nature. Eveiy man has the light to turn his will upon a thing or make the thing an object of his will, that is to say, to set aside the mere thing and lecieate it as his own As the thing is in its nature external, it has no purpose of its own and contains no infinite lefeience to itself; it is external to itself. An animal also is external to itself, and is, s fai, a thing Only the will is the unlimited and absolute while all other things in coutiast with the will are merely 1 dative To appiopiiate is at bottom only to manifest the majesty of my will towards things, by demonstrating that they aie not self-complete and have no pin pose Tin: PHILOSOPHY of nioin of then own This is biou<»lit about by my instilling into the object another end than that which it pimianly had When the living thing becomes my piopeity it gets anothei soul than it had I gne it my will Fiee will is thus the idealism which lefuses to hold that things as they arc can be self-complete Kealisiii on the othei hand declaics tlieiii to be absolute m then finite foi in But this realistic philosophv is not shaicd in by the animal, which by consuming things pioies that they aiv not absolutc-lv mdependent 45 To have something in my powei, even though it be exteinallv, is possession The speiial fact that I make something my own thiough natiiial want, impulse oi capiice, IS the special interest of possession But, when I as a flee will am in possession ot something, I get a tangible existence, and in this wa\ fiist became an actual will This is the tuic and legal natuie of inoperti, and constitutes its distnictne chaiacter Note — Since oui wauls ai(> looked upon as piiiiiaiy, the possession of piojieiti appeals at fiist to be a means to their satisfaction, but it is ic^alh the fust embodiment of freedom and an independent end 46 Since pi operty makes objective mv peisoual ludmdual will, it IS lightly desciibed as a piivate possession On the othci hand, common piopeity, nliich may be jiossessed by a nuinbei of sepaiate iiidiMilnals, is a niaik of a loosely joined company, m which a m,iii may oi may not allow his share to remain at his own choice Jfofe — The elements of nature cannot become piivate propel ty — In the agiaiian laws of Eoiiie may be found a conflict between collective and private owneiship of land Private possession is the more leasoiiable, and, even at the expense of other lights, must win the victor} — Propeity bound np with familv tiusts contains an element which is opposed to the light of pcisouality and private owneiship Tet private possession must be kept subject to the higher PHOPritir PHOPritir spheies of light, to a coipoiate body, e j, or to the state, as happens when jjiivate owueiship is entrusted to a socalled moial peisoii, as in moitinain Yet these exceptions aie not to he based on chance, piivate eapiice oi peisonal benefit, but only on the latioual oiganization of the state The idea of Plato’s “ KcpuWic” doesawiongto the person, 111 legal ding him as unable to hold iiioiieity The theory of a pious, tiieudh, oi even couipulsoiy biotherliood of iiieu, who aic to possess all then goods in common, and to banish the pimciplc of pinatc ouneiship, easily presents itself to one who fails to undoistand the uatuie of fieedom of spurt and the nature of light, thiough mistaking their definite phases Tlieie is a moral oi religious side, also When tile fiicnds of Epitnins jnoposod to establish a couimumtv ol goods, he dissinulod them on the giound that the plan indicated a lack ot coulideiice m one another, and that those -who iiiisti listed one another could not be friends Diog Lacit” 1 X ii m) Achhti'iii — In piojieitv mv will is pcisoiial But the person, it must be observed, is tins particular indixidual, aud, thus, piopeitv is the embodiment of this jiaiticular u ill Since pi 02101 ty giv es x isil >le existence to my will, it must be legaicled as “tins ” and hence as “mine ” This IS the im2>oilaut doctiine ot the necessity of 2iii’''ato pio-Xieity It e\ce2itious iiiav be made bj' the state, the state alone can be sufteied to make them But frequently, and es2>ecially ni our tune, it has restored private tiossession. Tlius, for instance, many states have rightly abolished cloisters, because jicisons, hving together in these institutions, have ultimately no such light to property, as the person has 47 As a poison, I am au individual in only its simplest asjjcct, moio defiuitelv, I am alive in a iiaiticular bodily organism My body is as to its content iny universal uiidiffeientiated external existence, it is the leal possibihty of all definite phases But also as a peisoii I have my life 'llir. I’lllIOSOPlIY OF lU&Hl and body, as I have other things only in so fai as they express mj will Note — The Tiew that the individual, not in his actualized existence but in his diiecl conception, is to be taken siniph as living and having a physical oigainsm folloxvs fiom the conception of that phase of Lie and spiiit, ■which we know as soul The details of this conceiition aic found in the philosophy of natiiie