in the I; and that the immediacy pecuhar to it is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other. For, in the case of both, what I "mean" is rather something non-essential; and the object and the I are universals, in which that Now and Here and I, which I "mean," do not hold out, do not exist. We arrive in this way at the result, that we have to put the whole of sense-certainty as its essential reahty, and no longer merely one of its moments, as happened in both cases, where first the object as against the I, and then the I, was to be its true reality. Thus it is only the whole sense- certainty itself which persists therein as immediacy, and in consequence excludes from itself all the opposition which in the foregoing had a place there.
This pure immediacy, then, has nothing more to do with the fact of otherness, with Here in the form of a tree passing into a Here that is not a tree, with Now in the sense of day-time changing into a Now that is night-time, or with there being an other I to which something else is object. Its truth stands fast as a self-identical relation making no distinction of essential and non-essential, between I and object, and into which, therefore, in general, no distinction can find its way. I, this I, assert, then, the Here as tree, and do not turn round so that for me Here might become not a tree, and I take no notice of the fact that another I finds the Here as not-tree, or that I myself at some other time take the Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day. I am directly conscious, I intuit and nothing more, 1 1 am pure intuition; I am — seeing, looking. For myself I stand by the fact, the Now is day-time, or, again, by the fact the Here is tree, and, again, do not compare Here and Now themselves with one another; I take VOL. I.— H 98 Phenomenology of Mind my stand on one immediate relation: the Now day.
Since, then, this certainty will cease to exist if m^ direct its attention to a Now that is night or an I to whoi it is night, let us go to it and try to point to the No that is asserted. We must let ourselves foint it oh for the truth of this immediate relation is the trul of this ego which restricts itself to a Now or a Here. Were we to examine this truth afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would have no meaning at all; for that would do away with the immediacy, which is of its essence. We have therefore to enter the same point of time or of space, indicate them, show them to ourselves, i.e. turn ourselves into the very same I, the very same This, which is the subject knowing with certainty. Let us, then, see how that immediate is constituted, which is shown to us.
The Now is pointed out; this Now. " Now "; it has already ceased to be when it is pointed out. The Now that is, is other than the one indicated, and we see that the Now is just this — to be no longer the very time when it is. The Now as it is shown to us is one that has been, and that is its truth; it does not have the truth of being, of something that is. No doubt this is true, that it has been; but what has been is in point of fact not genuinely real, it is not, and the point in question concerned what is, concerned being.
In thus pointing out the Now we see then merely a process which takes the following course: First I point out the Now, and it is asserted to be the truth. I point it out, however, as something that has been, or as something cancelled and done away with. I thus annul Sense-certainty 99 and pass beyond that first truth and in the second place I now assert as the second truth that it has been, that it is superseded. But, thirdly, what has been is not; I then supersede, cancel, its having been, the fact of its being annulled, the second truth, negate thereby the negation of the Now and return in so doing to the first position: that Now is. The Now and pointing out the Now are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is an immediate simple fact, but a process with diverse moments in it. A This is set up; it is, however, rather an other tliat is set up; the This is superseded: and this otherness, this cancelhng of the former, is itself again annulled, and so turned back to the first. But this first, reflected thus into itself, is not exactly the same as it was to begin with, namely something immediate: rather it is a something reflectedinto-self, a simple entity which remains in its otherness, what it is: a Now which is any number of Nows. And that is the genuinely true Now; the Now is simple daytime which has many Nows within it — hours. A Now of that sort, again — an hour — is similarly many minutes; and this Now — a minute — in the same way many Nows and so on. Showing, indicating, pointing out [the Now] is thus itself the very process which expresses what the Now in truth really is: namely a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together. And the pointing out is the way of getting to know, of experiencing, that Now is a universal.
The Here poiuted out, which I keep hold of, is hkewise a this Here which, in fact, is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Eight and Left. The Above is itself likewise this manifold otherness — above, below, etc. The Here, which 100 Phenomenology of Mind was to be pointed out, disappears in other Heres, and these disappear similarly. What is pointed out, held fast, and is permanent, is a negative This, which only is so when the Heres are taken as they should be, but therein cancel one another; it is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here that is " meant " would be the point. But it is not: rather, when it is pointed out as being, as having existence, that very act of pointing out proves it to be not immediate knowledge, but a process, a movement from the Here " meant " through a plurality of Heres to the universal Here, which is a simple plurality of Heres, just as day is a simple plurality of Nows.
It is clear from all this that the dialectic process involved in sense-certainty is nothing else than the mere history of its process — of its experience; and sensecertainty itself is nothing else than simply this history. The naive consciousness, too, for that reason, is of itself always coming to this result, which is the real truth in this case, and is always having experience of it: but is always forgetting it again and beginning the process all over. It is therefore astonishing when, in defiance of this experience, it is announced as " universal experience " — nay, even as a philosophical doctrine, the outcome, in fact, of scepticism — that the reality or being of external things in the sense of " Thises," particular sense objects, has absolute validity and truth for consciousness. One who makes such an assertion really does not know what he is saying, does not know that he is stating the opposite of what he wants to say. The truth for consciousness of a " This " of sense is said to be universal experience; but the very opposite is universal experience. Every consciousness of itself Sense-certainty 101 Sense-certainty 101 cancels again, as soon as made, such a truth as e.g. the Here is a tree, or the Now is noon, and expresses the very opposite: the Here is not a tree but a house. And similarly it straightway cancels again the assertion which here annuls the first, and which is also just such an assertion of a sensuous This. And in all sense-certainty what we find by experience is in truth merely, as we have seen, that " This " is a universal, the very opposite of what that assertion maintained to be universal experience.
We may be permitted here, in this appeal to universal experience, to anticipate * with a reference to the practical sphere. In this connection we may answer those who thus insist on the truth and certainty of the reality of objects of sense, by saying that they had better be sent back to the most elementary school of wisdom, the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus; they have not yet learnt the inner secret of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For those who are initiated into these mysteries not only come to doubt the being of things of sense, but get into a state of despair about them altogether; and they themselves partly bring about the nothingness of those things, partly they see those things accomplish their own nothingness. Even animals are not shut off from this wisdom; but show they are deeply initiated into it. For they do not stand stock still before things of sense as if these were things fer se, with being in themselves: they despair of this reality altogether, and in complete assurance of the nothingness of things they fall-to without more ado and eat them up. And all nature proclaims, as animals do, these open secrets, these * Cf. Analysis of Desire, p. IGG fF.
102 Phenomenology of Mind mysteries revealed to all, which teach what the truth of things of sense is.
Those who put forward such assertions really themselves say, if we bear in mind what we remarked before, the direct opposite of what they mean: — a fact which is perhaps best able to bring them to reflect on the nature of the certainty of sense-experience. They speak of the " existence " of external objects, which can be more precisely characterised as actual, absohitely particular, wholly personal, individual things, each of them not like anything or anyone else; this is the existence which they say has absolute certainty and truth. They " mean " this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have written on: but they do not say what they " mean." If they really wanted to say this bit of paper which they "mean," and they wanted to say so, that is impossible, because the This of sense, which is " meant," cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is inherently universal. In the very attempt to say it, it would, therefore, cruinble in their hands; those who have begun to describe it would not be able to finish doing so: they would have to hand it over to others, who would themselves in the last resort have to confess to speaking about a thing that has no being. They " mean," then, doubtless this bit of paper here, which is quite different from that bit over there; but they speak of actual things, external or sensible objects, absolutely individual, real, and so on; that is, they say about them what is simply universal. Consequently what is called mispeakable is nothing else than what is untrue, irrational, something barely and simply " meant."
If nothing is said of a thing except that it is an actual Sense-certainty 103 tiling, an external object, this only makes it the most imiversal of all possible things, and thereby we express its likeness, its identity, with everything, rather than its difference from everything else. When I say "an individual thing," I at once state it to be really quite a universal, for everything is an individual thing: and in the same way " this thing " is everything and anything we like. More precisely, as this bit of paper, each and every paper is a " this bit of paper," and I have thus said all the while what is universal. If I want, however, to help out speech — which has the divine nature of directly turning the mere " meaning " right round about, making it into something else, and so not letting it ever come the length of words at all — by pointing out this bit of paper, then I get the experience of what is, in point of fact, the real truth of sense-certainty. I point it out as a Here, which is a Here amongst other Heres, or is in itself simply many Heres together, i.e. is a universal. I take it up then, as in truth it is; and instead of knowing something immediate, I " take " something " truly," I fer-ceive {wahrnehne, per-cipio).
II PERCEPTION: OR THINGS AND THEIR DECEPTIVENESS* [In this as in the preceding section apprehension is effected under conditions of sense. But whereas in the preceding type of consciousness the universality which knowledge implies and requires no sooner appeared than it melted away, here in Perception we start from a certain stahility in the manner of apprehension, and a certain constancy in the content apprehended. The universality in this case satisfies more completely the demands of knowledge. The problem for further analysis is to find the form which the universal here assumes and to determine the way in which the unity of the object (the "thing") holds together its essential differences. The result shows that the unity of the thing qua unity is only admissible as an unqualified or non-sensuous unity. It is an universal, but as such, not conditioned by sense; it is a pure or "unconditioned" universal — a thought proper. Being undetermined by^sense, it transcends sense-apprehension, and so transcends perception proper, and compels the mind to adopt another cognitive attitude in order to apprehend it. This new attitude is Understanding.
The following section is thus indirectly an analysis of the principle and a criticism of the position of pure sensationalism. It shows that the doctrine "esse est percipi " must give way to the principle "esse est iutelligi.'']
IMMEDIATE certainty does not make the truth its own, for its truth is something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This. Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments immediately distinguished within it are also universal; 7 is a imiversal, and the object is a universal. That * Cp. Wissenschaft der Logik, Buch 2, Absch. 2, Kap 1. Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften, etc.
Perception 105 principle has arisen and come into being for us who are tracing the course of experience; and our process of apprehending what perception is, therefore, is no longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the case with the apprehension of sense-certainty; it is a logicalty necessitated process. With the origination of the principle, both the moments, which as phenomena merely fell at our feet as bare facts, have come into being: the one, the process of pointing out and indicating, the other the same process, but as a simple fact — the former the process of perceiving, the latter the object perceived. The object is in its essential nature the same as the process; the latter is the unfolding and distinguishing of the elements involved; the object is these same elements taken and held together as a single totality. For us (tracing the process) or in itself,* the universal, qua principle, is the essence of perception; and, as against this abstraction, both the moments distinguished— that which perceives and that which is perceived — are what is non-essential. But in point of * This expression refers to the distinction already made in tlie Introduction, between the point of view of the Fhenoincnology and that of the actual consciousness whose procedure is being analysed in the Phenomenology. That is "for us" which we (i.e. the philosophical "we") are aware of by way of anticipation, but which has not yet been evolved objectively and explicitly; it is intellig-ible, but not yet intellectually realised. That is "in itself" (an sich), which is implicit, inherent or potential, and hence not yet explicitly developed. The terms "for us" and "in itself" are thus strictly alternative: the former looks at the matter from the point of view of the philosojjhical subject, the latter from the point of view of the object discussed by tlie philosopher. Tlie implicit nature of the object can only be "for us" who are tliinking about the object: and what m have in mind can only be implidtly true of the object. The alternative disappears when the explicit nature of the object is what "we" explicitly take the object to be.
106 Phenomenology of Mini fact, because both are themselves the universal, ol' the essence, they are both essential: but since they are related as opposites, only one can in the relation (constituting perception) be the essential moment; and the distinction of essential and non-essential has to be shared between them. The one characterised as the simple fact, the object, is the essence, quite indifferent as to whether it is perceived or not: perceiving, on the other hand, being the process, is the insubstantial, the inconstant factor, which can be as ■well as not be, is the non-essential moment.
This object we have now to determine more precisely, and to develop this determinate character from the result arrived at: the more detailed development does not fall in place here. Since its principle, the universal, is in its simphcity a mediated principle, the object must express this explicitly as its own inherent natiu-e. The object shows itself by so doing to be the thing with many properties. The wealth of senseknowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, where all that wealth was merely something alongside and by the way; for it is only perception that has negation, distinction, multiphcity in its very nature.
The This, then, is estabhshed as not This, or as superseded, and yet not nothing {simfliciter), but a determinate nothing, a nothing with a certain content, viz. the This. The sense-element is in this way itself still present, but not in the form of some particular that is "meant" — as had to be the case in immediate certainty— but as a universal, as that which will have the character of a property. Cancelhng, superseding, brings out and lays bare its true twofold meaning which we Perception 107 Perception 107 found contained in the negative: to supersede {aufheben) is at once to negate and to preserve. The nothing being a negation of the This, preserves immediacy and is itself sensuous, but a universal immediacy. Being, however, is a miiversal by its having in it mediation or negation. When it brings this exphcitly out as a factor in its immediacy, it is a specifically distinct determinate property. As a result, there are many such properties set up at once, one the negation of the other. Since they are expressed in the simple form of the universal, these determinate characters — which, strictly speaking, become properties only by a further additional characteristic— are self-related, are indifferent to each other, each is by itself, free from the rest. The simple selfidentical universahty, however, is itself again distinct and detached from these determinate characteristics it has. It is pure self-relation, the " medium " wherein all these characteristics exist: in it, as in a bare, simple unity, they interpenetrate without affecting one another; for just by participating in this universahty they are indifferent to each other, each by itself.
This abstract universal medium, which we can call " Thinghood " in general or pure essential reality, is nothing else than the Here and Now as this on analysis turned out to be, viz. a simple togetherness of many Heres and Nows. But the many (in the present case) are in their determinateness themselves simply universals. This salt is a simple Here and at the same time manifold: it is white, and also pungent, also cubical in shape, also of a specific weight, and so on. All these many properties exist in a simple Here, where they inter- penetrate each other. None of these has a different Here from the others; each is every- 108 Phenomenology of Mind where in the same Here where the others are. And at the same thne, without being divided by different Heres, they do not affect each other in their interpenetration; its being white does not affect or alter the cubical shape it has, and neither affects its sharp outhne, and so on: on the contrary, since each is simple relation to self, it leaves the others alone and is related to these merely by being also along with them, a relation of mere indifference. This " Also " is thus the pm:e universal itself, the " medium," the " Thinghood " keeping them together.
In this relation, which has emerged, it is merely the character of positive universality that is first noticed and developed. But there is still a side presented to view which must also be taken into account. It is this. If the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent to each other, and were entirely related to themselves alone, they would not be determinate; for they are so, merely in so far as they are distinguished and related to others as their opposites. In view of this opposition, however, they cannot exist together in the bare and simple imity of their " medium," which unity is just as essential to them as negation. The process of distinguishing them, so far as it does not leave them indifferent, but effectually excludes, negates one fj'om another, thus falls outside this simple " medium." And this, consequently, is not merely an " also," an unity indifferent to what is in it, but a " one " as well, an excluding repelling imity.
The " One " is the moment of negation, as, in a direct and simple manner, relating itself to itself, and excluding an other: and is that by Vvfliich " Thinghood " qua Thing is determined. In the case of the property, Perception 109 negation becomes specified, assumes a determinate character, which is directly one with the inxmediacy of being, an immediacy which, by this unity with negation, is universahty. Qua the " one," however, negation takes a form in which it is freed from this unity with the object, and exists j^er se on its own account.
These moments taken together exhaust the nature of the Thing, the truth of perception, so far as it is necessary to develop it here. It is (1) a universahty, passive and indifferent, the " also " which forms the sole bond of connection between the quahties, or rather constituent elements, " matters," existing together; (2) negation, hkewise in a simple form, or the " one," which consists in excluding properties of an opposite character; and (3) the many properties themselves, the relation of the two first moments — the negation, as it is related to that indifferent element, and in being so expands into a manifold of differences, the focal point of particularity radiating forth into plurality within the " medium " of subsistence. Taking the aspect that these differences belong to a "medium" indifferent to what is within it, they are themselves imiversal, they are related merely to themselves and do not affect each other. Taking, however, the other aspect, that they belong to the negative unity, they at the same time mutually exclude one another; but do so necessarily in the shape of properties that have a separate existence apart from the " also " connecting them. The sensuous universahty, the immediate unity of positive being and negative exclusion, is only then a property, when oneness and pure universahty are evolved from it and distinguished from one another, and when that sensuous universality combines these with one another. Only after this relation of tlie unity to those pure essential moments is eiiccted, is the " Thing " complete.
This, then, is the way the " Thing " in perception is constituted, and consciousness is perceptual in character so far as this " Thing '"' is its object: it has merely to " take " the object [ccvpio — ^QT-eeption'] and assume the attitude of pure apprehension, and what comes its way in so doing is truth {das Wahre). If it did something when taking the given, it would by such supplementation or elimination alter the truth. Since the object is the true and universal, the self-same, while consciousness is the variable and non-essential, it may happen that consciousness apprehends the object wrongly and deceives itself. The percipient is aware of the possibihty of deception; for, in the universaHty forming the principle here, the percipient is directly aware of otherness, but aware of it as null and naught, as what is superseded. His criterion of truth is therefore scl/'-sameness, and his procedure is that of apprehending what comes before him as self-same. Since, at the same time, diversity is a fact for him, his procedure is a way of relating the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another. If, however, in this comparison a want of sameness comes out, this is not an untruth on the part of the object (for the object is the self-same), but on the part of perception.
Let us now see what sort of experience consciousness forms in the course of its actual perception. We, who are analysing the process, find this experience already contained in the development (just given) of the object and of the attitude of consciousness towards it. The experience will be merely the development of the contradictions that appear there.
Perception 111 The object which I apprehend, presents itself as purely " one " and single: also, I am aware of the " property " (Eigenschaft) in it, a property which is universal, thereby transcending the particularity of the object. The first form of being, in which the objective reahty has the sense of a " one," was thus not its true being; and since the object is the true fact here, the untruth falls on my side, and the apprehension was not correct. On account of the universality of the property {Eigenschaft) I must rather take the objective entity as a commu7iity {Gemeinschaft) in general. I further perceive now the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding this other. Thus, in point of fact, I did not apprehend the object rightly when I defined it as a " commonness " or commimity with others, or as continuity; and must rather, taking account of the determinateness of the proj^erty, divide the continuity and set down the object as a " one " that excludes. In the divided " one " I find many such properties, which are not attached to one another, but indifferent to one another. Thus I did not apprehend the object correctly when I took it for something that excludes. The object, instead, just as formerly it was merely continuity in general, is now a universal common medium where many properties in the form of sense universals subsist, each for itself and on its own account, and, qua determinate, excluding the others. The simple and true fact, which I perceive, is, however, in virtue of this result, not a universal medium either, but the particular property by itself, which, again, in this form, is neither a property nor a determinate being, for it is now neither attached to a distinct "one" nor in relation to others. But the particular quahty is a property only when 112 Phenomenology of Mind attached to a " one,'' and determinate only by relation to others. By being this bare relation of self to self, it remains merely sensuous existence in general, smce it no longer contains the character of negativity; and the mode of consciousness, which is now aware of a bemg of sense, is merely a way of " meaning " (Meinen) or " intending," i.e. it has left the attitude of perception entirely and gone back into itself. But sense existence and " meaning " themselves pass over into perception: I am thrown back on the beginning, and once more dragged into the same circuit, that supersedes itself in every moment and as a whole.
Consciousness, then, has to go over this cycle again, but not in the same way as on the first occasion. For it has found out, regarding perception, that the truth and outcome of perception is its dissolution, is reflection out of and away from the truth into itself. In this way consciousness becomes definitely aware of how its perceptual process is essentially constituted, viz. that this is not a simple bare apprehension, but in its apprehension is at the same time reflected out of the true content back into itself. This return of consciousness into itself, which is immediately involved and implicated in that pure apprehension — for this return to self has proved to be essential to perception — alters the true content. Consciousness is aware that this aspect is at the same time its own, and takes it upon itself; and by so doing consciousness will thus get the true object bare and naked.
In this way we have, now, in the case of perception, as happened in the case of sensuous certainty, the aspect of consciousness being forced back upon itself; but, in the first instance, not in the sense in which Perception.113