though there (hould be nothing in the cafe of that wind or vapour implied in the original fenfe of the word? It feems to me, that we may, by looking into our own minds, plainly perceive certain inflincts, impulfes, and tendencies, which, at proper periods and occafions, fpring up unaccountably in the foul of man. We obferve very vifible figns of the fame in all other animals. And thefe things being ordinary and natural, what hinders but we may conceive it poflible for the human mind, upon an extraordinary account, to be moved in an extraordinary manner, and its faculties ftirred up and actuated by a fupernatural power? That there are, and have been, and are likely to be wild vifions, and hypochondriacal ravings, no body can deny: But to infer from thence, that there are no true infpirations would be too like concluding, that fome men are not in their fenfes, becaufe other men are fools. And though I am no prophet, and confequently cannot pretend to a clear notion of this matter; yet I fhall not therefore take upon me to deny, but a true prophet, or infpired perfon, might have had as certain means of difcerning between divine infpiration and hypochondriacal fancy, as you can between fleeping and waking, till you have proved the contrary. You may meet in the book of Jeremiah with this paffage: * The prophet that hath a dream, 6 let him tell a dream: And he that hath my word, let * him fpeak my word faithfully: what is the chaff to the * wheat, faith the Lord? Is not my word like as a fire, c faith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the * rock in pieces?' * You fee here a diftin&ion made between wheat and chaff, true and fpurious, with the mighty force and power of the former. But I beg pardon for quoting Scripture to you. I make my appeal to the general fenfe of mankind, and the opinion of the wifeft [Dial. VL] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 275 heathens, which feems fufficient to conclude divine infpiration poflible, if not probable, at leaft till you prove the contrary.
X. Alc. — The poffibility of infpirations and revelations I do not think it neceffary to deny. Make the bed you can of this conceflion.
Euph. — Now what is allowed poflible we may fuppofe in fa£t Alc— -We may.
Euph. — Let us then fuppofe, that God had been pleafed to make a revelation to men; and that he infpired fome as a means to inftru£t others. Having fuppofed this, can you deny, that their infpired difcourfes and revelations might have been committed to writing, or that being written, after a long tracl: of time they might become in feveral places obfcure \ that fome of them might even originally have been lefs clear than others, or that they might fufFer fome alteration by frequent tranfcribing, as other writings are known to have done? Is it not even very probable that all thefe things would happen?
Alc. — I grant it.
Alc. — I grant it.
Euph. — And granting this, with what pretence can you reject the Holy Scripture as not being divine, upon the account of fuch figns or marks, as you acknowledge would probably attend a divine revelation tranfmitted down to us, through fo many ages?
Alc— But allowing all that in reafon you can defire, and granting that this may account for fome obfcurity, may reconcile fome fmall differences, or fatisfy us how fome difficulties might arife by inferting, omitting, or changing here and there a letter, a word, or perhaps a fentence: Yet thefe are but fmall matters, in refpe£t. of the " much more confiderable and weighty objections I could produce, againft the confeffed doctrines, or fubjecl: matter of thofe writings. Let us fee what is contained i>)6 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VI.3 in thefe facred books, and then judge whether it is probable, or poflible, fuch revelations ihould ever have been made by God? Now I defy the wit of man to contrive any thing more extravagant, than the accounts we there find of apparitions, devils, miracles, God manifeft in the fleih, regeneration, grace, felf-denial, refurreclion of the dead, and fuch like agri /omnia: Things fo odd, unaccountable, and remote from the apprehenfion of mankind, you may as foon wafh a blackmore white, as clear them of abfurdity. No critical fkill can juilify them, no tradition recommend them, I will not fay for divine revelations, but even for the inventions of men of fenfe.
Euph. — I had always a great opinion of your fagacity, but now, Alciphrony I confider you as fomething more than man: Elfe how mould \t be poflible for you to know, what or how far it may be proper for God to reveal? Methinks it may confift, with all due deference to the greateft of human understandings, to fuppofe them ignorant of many things, which are not fuited to their faculties, or lie out of their reach. Even the councils of princes lie often beyond the ken of their fubje&s, who can only know fo much as is revealed by thofe at the helm; and are often unqualified to judge of the ufefulnefs and tendency even of that, till in due time the fcheme unfolds, and is accounted for by fucceeding events. That many points contained in Holy Scripture are remote from the common apprehenfions of mankind, cannot be denied. But I do not fee, that it follows from thence, they are not of divine revelation. On the contrary, fhould it not feem reafonable to fuppofe, that a revelation from God fhould contain fomething different in kind, or more excellent in degree, than what lay open to the common fenfe of men, or could even be difcovered by the rr>oft fagacious philofopher? Accounts of feparate fpirits, good or bad, prophefies, miracles, and fuch things, are undoubtedly ftrange: But I would fain fee how you can prove them impoffible or abfurd.
Alc. — Some things there are fo evidently abfurd, that it would be almoft as filly to difprove them as to believe them: And I take thefe to be of that clafs.
XL Euph. — But is it not poffible, fome men may fhew as much prejudice and narrownefs in rejecting all fuch accounts, as others might eafinefs and credulity in admitting them? I never durft make my own obfervation or experience the rule and meafure of things fpiritual, fupernatural, or relating to another world, becaufe I mould think it a very bad one,, even for the vifible and natural things of this: It would be judging like the Siamefe, who was pofitive it did not freeze in Holland, becaufe he had never known fuch a thing as hard water, or ice, in his own country. I cannot comprehend why any one, who admits the union of the foul and body, fhould pronounce it impoffible for the human nature to be united to the divine, in a manner ineffable and incomprehenfible by reafon.
Neither can I fee any abfurdity in admitting, that finful man may become regenerate, or a new creature, by the grace of God reclaiming him from a carnal life, to a fpiritual life of virtue and holinefs. And fince the being governed by fenfe and appetite, is contrary to the happinefs and perfection of a rational creature, I do not at all wonder that we are prefcribed felf-denial. As for the refurret~tion of the dead, I do not conceive it fo very contrary to the analogy of nature, when I behold vegetables left to rot in the earth, rife up again with new life and vigor, or a worm to all appearance dead, change its nature, and that, which in ks firft being crawled on the earth, become a new fpecies, and fly abroad with wings. And indeed when I confider, that the foul and body are things fo very different and heterogeneous, I can fee no reafon to be 27S MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VI.]
pofitive, that the one muft neceffarily be extinguished upon the diflblutlon of the other; efpecially fince I find in myfelf a ftrong natural defire of immortality, and I have not obferved that natural appetites are wont to be given in vain, or merely to be fruftrated. Upon the whole, thofe points which you account extravagant and abfurd, I dare not pronounce to be fo till I fee good reafon for it.
XII. Cri. — No, Alciphron, your pofitive airs muft not pafs for proofs; nor will it fuffice to fay, things are contrary to common fenfe, to make us think they are fo: By common fenfe, I fuppofe, mould be meant either the general fenfe of mankind, or the approved reafon of thinking men. Now I believe that all thofe articles, you have, with fo much capacity and fire, at once fummed up and exploded, may be fhewn to be not difagreeable, much lefs contrary to common fenfe, in one or other of thefe acceptations. That the Gods might appear and converfe among men, and that the Divinity might inhabit human nature, were points allowed by the heathens; and for this I appeal to their poets and philofophers, whofe teftimonies are fo numerous and clear, that it would be an affront to repeat them to a man of any education. And though the notion of a devil may not be fo obvious, or fo fully defcribed, yet there appear plain traces of it, either from reafon or tradition. The later Platonijls, as Porphyry and lamblichus, are very clear in the point, allowing that evil demons delude and tempt, hurt and poffefs mankind. That the ancient Greeks, Chaldeans, and Egyptians, believed both good and bad angels, may be plainly colle&ed from Plato, Plutarch, and the Chaldean oracles. Origen obferves, that almoft all the Gentiles, who held the being of demons, allowed there were bad ones.* There is even fomething as early as Homer, that * Origen. 1. 7. contra Celfum.
is thought by the learned cardinal, Bejfarionfi to allude to the fall of fatan, in the account of Atey whom the poet reprefents as caft down from heaven by Jove, and then wandering about the earth, doing mifchief to mankind. This fame Ate is faid by Hefiod, to be the daughter of difcord; and by Euripides, in his Hippolytus, is mentioned as a tempter to evil. And it is very remarkable, that Plutarchy in his book De vitatido are alienoy fpeaks after Empedocles, of certain demons that fell from heaven, and were banifhed by God, Daimones theelatoi kai ouranopeteis. Nor is that lefs remarkable, which is obferved by Ficinus from Pherecydes Syrus, that there had been a downfal of demons, who revolted from God: and that Opione* us (the old ferpent) was head of that rebellious crew.**-— Then as to the other articles, let any one confider what the Pythagoreans taught, of the purgation and lufis, or deliverance of the foul: What moil philofophers, but efpecially the fates, of fubduing our paflions: What Plata and Hierocles have faid of forgiving injuries: What the acute and fagacious Arijlotle writes, in his Ethics to iV7comachus, of the fpiritual and divine life, that life which, according to him, is too excellent to be thought human; infomuch as man, fo far forth as man, cannot attain to it; but only fo far forth as he hath fomething divine in him: And particularly, let him reflect on what Socrates taught, to wit, that virtue is not to be learned from men, that it is the gift of God, and that good men are not good by virtue of human care or diligence, ouh einai authropinen epimeleian e agathoi agathoi gignontai* Let any man, who really think*, but confider what other thinking men have thought, who cannot be fuppofed prejudiced in favor of revealed religion; and he will fee caufe, if not to think ** Vid. Argum. in Phaedrum Platonis.
* Vid, Plat, in Protag, & alibi paflim.
28o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VL] with reverence of the chriftian doctrines of grace, felfdenial, regeneration, fan£tification, and the reft, even the moft myfterious, at leaft to judge more modeftly and warily, than he who ihall, with a confident air, pronounce them abfurd, and repugnant to the reafon of mankind. And in regard to a future ftate, the common fenfe of the Gentile world, modern or ancient, and the opinions of the wifeft men of antiquity, are things fo well known, that I need fay nothing about them. To me it feems, the Minute Philofophers, when they appeal to reafon and common fenfe, mean only the fenfe of their own party: A coin, how current foever among themfelves, that of other men will bring to the touchftone, and pafs for no more than it is worth.
Lys. — Be thofe notions agreeable to what or whofe fenfe they may, they are not agreeable to mi A. And if I am thought ignorant for this, I pjjty thofe who think me fo.
XIII. I enjoy myfelf, and follow my own courfes, without remorfe or fear: Which I mould not do, if my head were filled with enthufiafm; whether gentile or chriftian, philofophical or revealed, it is all one to me. Let others know or believe what they can, and make the beft on't, I, for my part, am happy and fafe in my ignorance.
Cri. — Perhaps not fo fafe neither.
Lys.— Why, furely you won't pretend that ignorance is criminal?
Cri. — Ignorance alone is not a crime. But that wilful ignorance, affected ignorance, ignorance from lloth, or conceited ignorance, is a fault, might eafily be proved by the teftimony of heathen writers: And it needs no proof to mew that if ignorance be our fault, we cannot be fecure in it as an excufe.
Lys. — Honed Crito feems to hint, that a man mould take care to inform himfelf, while alive, left his neglect be punifhed when he is dead. Nothing is fo pufillanimous and unbecoming a gentleman as fear: Nor could you take a likelier courfe to fix and rivet a man of honor in guilt, than by attempting to frighten him out of it. This is the Hale, abfurd ftratagem of priefts, and that which makes them, and their religion, more odious and contemptible to me, than all the other articles put together.
Cri. — I would fain know why it may not be reafonable for a man of honor, or any man who has done amifs, to fear? Guilt is the natural parent of fear; and nature is not ufed to make men fear, where there is no occafion. That impious and profane men fhould expect divine punifhment, doth not feem fo abfurd to conceive: And that, under this expectation, they mould be uneafy, and even afraid, how confident foever it may or may not be with honor, I am fure confids with reafon.
Lys. — That thing of hell and eternal punifhment is the mod abfurd, as well as the mod difagreeable thought that ever entered into the head of mortal man.
Cri. — But you mud own, that it is not an abfurdity peculiar to chridians, fince Socrates, that great free-thinker of Athens, thought it probable there might be fuch a thing as impious men for ever punifhed in hell. * It is recorded of this fame Socrates, that he has been often known to think for four and twenty hours together, fixed in the fame podure, and wraped up in meditation.
Lys. — Our modern free-thinkers are a more lively fort of men. Thofe old philosophers were mod of them whimfical. They had, in my judgment, a narrow, timorous way of thinking, which by no means came up to the frank humor of our times.
* Vid. Platon. in GorgJa.
INI m Cri. — But I appeal to your own judgment, if a man, who knows not the nature of the foul, can be affured by the light of reafon, whether it is mortal or immortal?
An fimul inter eat nobifcum morte peremptay An tenebras orci vifat vajlafque lacunas?
Lys. — But what if I know the nature of the foul? "What if I have been taught that whole fecret by a modern free-thinker? A man of fcience who difcovered it not by a tirefome introverfion of his faculties, not by amufing himfelf in a labyrinth of notions, or flupidly thinking for whole days and nights together, but by looking into things, and obferving the analogy of nature.
XIV. This great man is a philofopher by fire, who has made many procefies upon vegetables. It is his opinion that men and vegetables are really of the fame fpecies; that animals are moving vegetables, and vegetables fixed animals -, that the mouths of the one, and the roots of the other, ferve to the fame ufe, differing only in pofition; that bloffoms and flowers anfwer to the mod indecent and concealed parts in the human body; that vegetable and animal bodies are both alike organized, and that in both there is life, or a certain motion and circulation of juices, through proper tubes or vefTels. I mall never forget this able man's unfolding the nature of the foul in the following manner. The foul, faid he, is that fpecific form, or principle, from whence proceed the diftincT: qualities or properties of things. Now, as vegetables are a more Ample and le£s perfect compound, and confequently more eafily analyfed than. animals, we will begin with the contemplation of the fouls of vegetables. Know then, that the foul of any plant, rofeniary for inftance, is neither more nor lefs than its effential oil. Upon this depends its peculiar fragrance, tafte, and medicinal virtues, or, in other words, its life and operations. Separate or extract this elTential oil by chymic art, and you get the foul of the plant: What remains being a dead carcafs,.without any one property or virtue of the plant, which is preferv-€d entire in the oil, a drachm whereof goes further than feveral pounds of the plant. Now this fame effential oil is itfelf a compofition of fulphur and fait, or of a grofs unctuous fubftance, and a fine fubtile principle or volatile fait imprifoned therein. This volatile fait is properly the eflence of the foul of the plant, containing all its virtue, and the oil is the vehicle of this mo ft fubtile part of the foul, or that which fixes and individuates it. And as, upon feparation of this oil from the plant, the plant died, fo a fecond death, or death of the foul, enfues upon the refolution of this effential oil into its principles; as appears by leaving it expofed for fome time to the open air, fo that the volatile fait, or fpirit, may fly off; after which the oil remains dead and infipid, but without any fenfible diminution of its weight, by the lofs of that volatile effence of the foul, that ethereal aura, that fpark of entity, which returns and mixes with the folar light, the univerfal foul of the world, and only fource of life, whether vegetable, animal, or intellectual; which differ only according to the grofsnefs or finenefs of the vehicles, and the different textures of the natural alembics, or, in other words, the organized bodies, where the abovementioned volatile effence inhabits and is elaborated, where it a£ts and is acted upon. This chymical fyftem lets you at once into the nature of the foul, and accounts for all its phaenomena. In that compound which is called man, the foul, or effential oil, is what commonly goes by the name of animal fpirit: For you mufl know, it is a point agreed by chymifls, that fpirits are nothing but the more fubtile oils. Now in proportion, as the effential oil of the vegetable man is more fubtile than that of other vegetables, the volatile fait that impregnates it is more at liberty to a&: Which accounts for thofe fpecific properties and actions of human kind, which diftinguifh them above other creatures. Hence you may learn why, among the wife ancients, fait was another name for wit, and, in our times, a dull man is faid to be infjpid or infulfe. Aromatic oils, matured by great length of time, turn to falts: This fhews why human kind grow wifer by age. And what I have faid of the twofold death or diflblution, firft, of the compound, by feparating the foul from the organical body, and fecondly, of the foul itfelf, by dividing the volatile fait from the oil, illuftrates and explains that notion of certain ancient philofophers: That as the man was a compound of foul and body, fo the foul was compounded of the mind, or intelletl:, and its sethereal vehicle: And that the feparation of foul and body, or death of the man, is, after a long tracl: of time, fucceeded by a fecond death of the foul itfelf; to wit, the feparation or deliverance of the intellect from its vehicle, and re-union with the fun.
Euph. — O Lyjicles> your ingenious friend has opened a new fcene, and explained the mod obfcure and difficult points in the clearer! and eafieft manner.
Lys. — I muft own this account of things ftruck my fancy. I am no great lover of creeds or fyftems: But when a notion is reafonable, and grounded on experience, I know how to value it.
Cri. — In good earneft, Lyjicles, do you believe this account to be true?
Lys. — Why then, in good earneft, I do not know whether I do or no. But I can aflure you the ingenious artifl himfelf has not the leaft doubt about it. And to believe an artifl in his art, is a jufl maxim and fhort way to fcience.
[Dial. VI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 2S5 Cri. — But what relation hath the foul of man to chymic art? The fame reafon, that bids me truft a fkilful artifl in his art, inclines me to fufpe£r. him out of his art. Men are too apt to reduce unknown things to the ftandard of what they know, and bring a prejudice or tincture from things they have been converfant in, to judge thereby of things in which they have not been converfant. I have known a fiddler gravely teach, that the foul was harmony; a geometrician very pofitive, that the foul mud be extended; and a phyfician, who having pickled half a dozen embryos, and diiTeclied as many rats and frogs, grew conceited, and affirmed there was no foul at all, and that it was a vulgar error.
Lys. — My notions fit eafy. I fhall not engage in pedantic difputes about them. They who don't like them may leave them.
Euph. — This, I fuppofe, is faid much like a gentleman.
XV. But pray, Lyficles> tell me whether the clergy come within that general rule of yours: That an artift may be trufted in his art?
Lys. — By no means.
Euph. — Why fo?
Lys. — Becaufe I take myfeifto know as much of thofe matters as they do.
Euph. — But you allow that, in any other profefllon, one that hath fpent much time and pains, may attain more knowledge, than a man of equal or better parts, who never made it his particular bufinefs.
Lys. — I do.
Euph. — And neverthelefs, in things religious and divine, ycu think all men equally knowing.
Lys. — I do not fay all men. But I think all men of fenfe competent judges.
Euph. — What! are the divine attributes and difpenfations to mankind, the true end and happinefs of rational Creatures, with the means of improving and perfecting their beings, more eafy and obvious points, than thofe which make the fubjecl: of every common profeflion?
Lys.-— Perhaps not: but one thing I know, fome things are fo manifeftly abfurd, that no authority fhall make me give into them. For inflance, if all mankind fhould pretend to perfuade me that the Son of God was born upon earth in a poor family, was fpit upon, buffeted, and crucified, lived like a beggar, and died like a thief, I fhould never believe one fyllable of it. Common fenfe fhews every one, what figure it would be decent for an earthly prince, or ambafiador, to make; and the Son of God, upon an embafly from heaven, mud needs have made an appearance beyond all others of great eclat, and, in all refpects, the very reverfe of that which Jefiis Chrift is reported to have made, even by his own hiftorians.
Euph.< — O Lyficles, though I had ever fo much mind to approve and applaud your ingenious reafoning, yet I dare not affent to this for fear of Crito.
Lys. — Why fo?
Euph.— Becaufe he obferved juft now, that men judge of things they do not know, by prejudices from things they do know. And I fear he would object that you, who have been converfant in the grand monde, having your head filled with a notion of attendants, and equipages, and liveries, the familiar badges of human grandeur, are lefs able to judge of that which is truly divine: and that one who had feen lefs, and thought more, would be apt to imagine a pompous parade of worldly greatnefs, not the moft becoming the author of a fpiritual religion, that was defigned to wean men from the world, and raife thern above it.
Cri. — Do you think, Lv/icles, if a man fhould make his entrance into London, in a rich fuit of clothes, with a hundred gilt coaches, and a thoufand laced footmen, that this would be a more divine appearance, and have more of true grandeur in it, that if he had power with a word to heal all manner of difeafes, to raife the dead to life, and (till the raging of the winds and fea?
Lys. — Without all doubt it muft be very agreeable to common fenfe to fuppofe, that he could reft ore others to life, who could not fave his own. You tell us, indeed, that he rofe again from the dead: but what occafion was there for him to die, the juhVfor the unjuft, the Son of God for wicked men? And why in that individual place? Why at that very time above all others? Why did he not make his appearance earlier, and preach in all parts of the world, that the benefit might have been more extenfive and equal? Account for all thefe points; and reconcile them, if you can, to the common notions and plain fenfe of mankind.
Cri. — And what if thofe, as well as many other points, fhould lie out of the road that we are acquainted with; muft we, therefore, explode them, and make it a rule to condemn every proceeding as fenfelefs, that doth not fquare with the vulgar fenfe of man? That, indeed, which evidently contradicts fenfe and reafon, you have a right to difbelieve. And when you are unjuftly treated, you have the fame right to complain. But I think you mould diftinguifh between matter of debt and matter of favor. Thus much is obferved in all intercourfe between man and man *, wherein acts of mere benevolence are never infilled on, or examined and meafured with the fame accurate line as matters of juftice. Who but a Minute Philofopher would, upon a gratuitous diftribution of favors, inquire, why at this time, and not before? why to thefe perfons, and not to others? Various are the natural abilities and opportunities of human kind. How wide a difference is there in refpecl: of the law of nature, between one of our ftupid ploughmen and a Minute Philofopher! Between a Laplander and an Athenian! That conduct, therefore, which feems to you partial or unequal, may be found as well in the difpenfation of natural religion as of revealed, and if fo, why it fhould be made an objection againft the one more than the other, I leave you to account. For the reft, if the precepts and certain primary tenets of religion appear, in the eye of reafon, good and ufeful; and if they are alfo found to be fo by their effects, we may, for the fake of them, admit certain other points, or doctrines, recommended with them, to have a good tendency, to be right and true; although we cannot difcern their goodnefs or truth by the mere light of human reafon, which may well be fuppofed an inefficient judge of the proceedings, counfels and defigns, of Providence, and this fufficeth to make our conviction reafonable.
XVI. It is an allowed point, that no man can judge of this or that part of a machine taken by itfelf, without knowing the whole, the mutual relation or dependence of its parts, and the end for which it was made. And, as this is a point acknowledged in corporeal and natural things, ought we not, by a parity of reafon, to fufpend our judgment concerning the moral fitnefs of a fingle unaccountable part of the divine economy, till we are more fully acquainted with the moral fyftem, or world of fpirits, and are let into the defigns of God's providence, and have an extenfive view of his difpenfations pari:, prefent, and future? Alas! Lyficles> what do you know even of yourfelf, whence you come, what you are, or whither you are going? To me it feems, that a Minute Philofopher is like a conceited fpe£tator, who never looked behind the fcenes, and yet would judge of the machinery; who from a tranfient glimpfe of a part only of lome one fcene, would take upon him to cenfure the plot of a play.
Lys. — As to the plot I won't fay; but in half a fcene a man may judge of an abfurd a£tor. "With what color or pretext can you juftify the vindictive, froward, whimfical behavior of fome infpired teachers or prophets? Particulars, that ferve neither for profit nor pleafure, I make a fhift to forget: but, in general, the truth of this charge I do very well remember.
Cri. — You need be at no pains to prove a point, I {hall neither juftify nor deny. I would only beg leave to obferve, that it feems a fure fign of fincerity in the facred writers, that they mould be fo far from palliating the defeels, as to pubiifh even the criminal and abfurd actions of thofe very perfons, whom they relate to have been infpired. For the reft, that there have been human paffions, infirmities, and defects in perfons infpired by God, I freely own: nay, that very wicked men have been infpired, as Balaam, for inftance, and Caiaphas, cannot be denied. But what will you infer from thence? Can you prove it impoflible that a weak or finful man fliould become an inftrument to the fpirit of God, for conveying his purpofe to other finners, or that divine light may not, as well as the light of the fun, fhine on afoulveflel without polluting its rays?
Lys.— To make fhort work, the right way would be to put out our eyes, and not judge at all.
Cri. — I do not fay fo, but I think it would be right, if fome fanguine perfons, upon certain points, fufpedted their own judgment.
Alc. — But the very things faid to be infpired, taken by themfclves, and in their own nature, are fometimes fo wrong, to fay no worfe, that a man may pronounce them not to be divine at firft fight •, without troubling his head N n 79o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VI.]
about the fyftem of Providence or connexion of events: As one may fay that grafs is green, without knowing or confidering how it grows, what ufes it is fubfervient to, or how it is connected with the mundane fyftem. Thus, for inftance, the fpoiling of the Egyptians, and the extirpation of the Canaanites, every one, at firft glance, fees to be cruel and unjuft, and may, therefore, without deliberating, pronounce them unworthy of God.
Cri. — But, Alciphron, to judge rightly of t he fe things, may it not be proper to confider, how long the Ifraelites had wrought under thofe fevere tafk-mafters of Egypt, what injuries and hardfhips they had fuftained from them, what crimes and abominations the Canaanites had been guilty of what right God hath to difpofe of the things of this world, to punifh delinquents, and to appoint both the manner and the inftruments of his juftice? Man, who has not fuch a right over his fellow-creatures, who is himfelf a fellow-finner with them, who is liable to error as well as paffion, whofe views are imperfect, who is governed more by prejudice than the truth of things, may not improbably deceive himfelf, when he fets up for a judge of the proceedings of the holy, omnifcient, impaflive Creator and Governor of all things.
XVII. Alc — Believe me, Criio, men are never fo induftrious to deceive themfelves, as when they engage to defend their prejudices. You would fain reafon us out of all ufe of our reafon: can any thing be more irrational? To forbid us to reafon on the divine difpenfations, is to fuppofe they will not bear the teft of reafon; or, in other words, that God acts without reafon, which ought not to be admitted, no, not in any fingle inftance: For if in one, why not in another? Whoever, therefore, allows a God, muft allow that he always a&s reafonably. I will not, therefore, attribute to him actions and proceedings that