Reputation therefore, as a thing which men strive so incessantly to acc[uire and preserve, may be regarded as property. Earned like other property by labour, care, and perseverance — similarly surrounding its owner with facihties for securing bis ends, and affording him as it does a constant supply of food for divers of his desires; the esteem of others is a possession, having many analogies with possessions of a more palpable nature. An estate in the general good-will, appears to many of more worth than one in land. By some great action to have 144 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN CHARACTER.
bought golden opinions, may be a richer source of gratification than to have obtained bank stock or railway shares. There are those to whom a crown of bay leaves would be a gi-eater treasure than a fat legacy. Titles had once a definite pounds, shillings and pence price; and if they are now becoming depreciated in value when compared with the honours spontaneously awarded by the public voice, it is that they do not represent so large an amount of genuine approbation. Men therefore who cultivate character, and live on the hai-vests of praise they reap — men who have invested their labour in noble deeds, and receive by way of interest the best wishes and cordial greetings of society, may be considered as having claims to these rewards of good conduct, resembling the claims of others to the rewards of their industry. Of course this is true not only of such as are distinguished by unusual worth; it is true of all. To the degree in which each has shown probity, kindness, truth or other virtue, and has gained amongst his fellows a reputation for it, we must hold liim entitled to the character he has thus fairly won, as to a species of property; a species of property too, which, without quoting the hackneyed saying of lago, may be described as of greater value than property of any other kind.
Those who hesitate to admit that a good name is property, should remember that it has really a money value. To be accounted honest is to be preferred as one with whom commercial dealings may be most safely carried on. Whoso is said to be pai-ticularly industrious, is likely, other tilings being equal, to get better pay than his competitors. The celebrity attending great intellectual capacity, introduces those possessing it to responsible and remunerative situations. It is quite allowable therefore, to classify reputation under this head, seeing that, like capital, it may bring its owner an actual revenue in hard cash.
The position that a good character is property being granted, a right to the possession of it when fairly earned, is demon- THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN CHARACTER. 145 strable by arguments similar to those used in the two preceding chapters. Such character is attainable ■without any infringement of the freedom of others; is indeed a concrete result of habitual regard for that freedom; and being thus a source of gratification which its owner legitimately obtains — a species of property, as we say — it can no more be taken away from him without a breach of equity, than property of other kinds can. This conclusion manifestly serves as the foundation for a law of hbel.
Possibly this reasoning wiU be thought inconclusive. The position that character is property may be considered open to dispute; and it must be confessed that the propriety of so classifying it is not proveable with logical precision. Should any urge that this admission is fatal to the argument, they have the alternative of regarding slander as a breach, not of that primary law which forbids us to trench upon each other's spheres of activity, but of that secondary one which forbids us to inflict pain on each other. If the destruction of a fellowman's deserved reputation does not amount to a trespass against the law of equal freedom, then the flagitiousness of such an act remains to be treated of in that supplementary department of morals elsewhere generalized under the term negative beneficence. Of these alternatives each must make his own choice; for there seems to be no way of deciding between them with certainty. And here indeed we meet with an illustration of a remark previously made (p. 70), namely, that the division of morality into separate sections, though needful for our due comprehension of it, is yet artificial; and that the hues of demarcation are not always capable of being maintained.
CHAPTEE XIII.
THE RIGHT OF EXCHANGE.
Freedom to exchange his property for the property of others, is manifestly included in a man's general freedom. In claiming this as his right, he in no way transgresses the proper limit put to his sphere of action hy the Hke spheres of action of others. The two parties in a trade transaction, whilst doing all that they will to do, are not assuming more liberty than they leave to others. Indeed their act ends with themselves — does not affect the condition of the bystanders at all — leaves these as much power to pursue the objects of their desires as before. Hence, exchanges may be made in complete conformity with the law of equal freedom.
Possibly it will be said, that in cases where several men are wishing to deal with the same man, and a bargain is ultimately made between him and one of them, the rest are by this event excluded from a certain prospective field for the fulfilment of their wants, which was previously open to them; and that consequently they have had the liberty to exercise their faculties diminished by the success of their competitor. This, however, is a distorted view of the matter. Let us for a moment turn back to first principles. What is it that we have to do? We have to divide out equally amongst all men, the whole of that freedom which the conditions of social existence afford. Observe, then, in respect of trade relationships, how much falls to the share of each. Evidently each is free to ofier; each is free to accept; each is free to refuse; for each may do these to any extent without preventing his neighbours from THE RIGHT OF EXCHANGE. 147 doing the like to the same extent, and at the same time. But no one may do more; no one may force another to part with his goods; no one may force another to take a specified price; for no one can do so without assuming more Tiherty of action than the man whom he thus treats. If, tlierefore, every one is entitled to offer, to accept, and to refuse, but to do nothing more, it is clear that, under the circumstances above put, the closing of an agreement between two of the parties impUes no infringement of the claims of the disappointed ones; seeing that each of them remains as free as ever, to offer, accept, and refuse.
To say that, as a corollary from thisj all interference between those who would traf&c with each other amounts to a breach of equity, is hardly needful. Nor is there any occasion here to assign reasons why the recognition of liberty of trade is expedient. Harmonizing as it does with the settled convictions of thinking people, the foregoing conclusion may safely be left to stand unsupported. Some remarks upon the limits it puts to legislation are indeed called for. But these wiU come in more appropriately elsewhere.
CHAPTEE XIV.
THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH.
The utterance of thought being one species of action, there arises from the proposition that every man is free -within specified bounds to do what he wills, the self-evident corollary, that, with the like qualification, he is free to say what he wills; or, in other words, as the rights of his fellow-men form the only legitimate restraint upon his deeds, so Kkewise do they form the only legitimate restraint upon his words.
There are two modes in which speech may exceed the ordained limits. It may be used for the propagation of slander, which, as we have seen in a foregoing chapter, involves a disregard of moral obligation; or it may be used in inciting and directing another to injure a third party. In this last case, the instigator, although not personally concerned in the trespass proposed by him, must be considered as having virtually committed it. We should not exonerate an assassin who pretended that his dagger was guilty of the murder laid to his charge rather than himself. We should reply, that the having moved a dagger with the intention of taking away life, constituted his crime. Following up the idea, we must also assert that he who, by bribes or persuasion, moved the man who moved the dagger, is equally guilty with his agent. He had just the same intention, and similarly used means for its ftdfilment; the only diiference being that he produced death through a more complicated mechanism. As, however, no one will argue that the interposing of an additional lever between a motive force and its ultimate effect, alters the relationship between the two, so neither can it be said that he who gets a wrong done by proxy, is less guilty than if he had done it himself. Hence, whoso THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH. 149 suggests or urges the infraction of another's rights, must be held to have transgressed the law of equal freedom.
Liberty of speech, then, like Hberty of action, may be claimed by each, to the fullest extent compatible ■with the equal rights of all. Exceeding the limits thus arising, it becomes immoral. Within them, no restraint of it is permissible.
A new Areopagitica, were it possible to write one, would surely be needless in our age of the world and in this country. And yet there still prevails, and that too amongst!men who plume themselves on their hberahty, no small amount of the feeling which Milton combated in his celebrated essay. Notwithstanding the abatement of intolerance, and the growth of free institutions, the repressive policy of the past has occasional advocates even now. Were it put to the vote, probably not a few would say ay to the proposition, that the pubhc safety requires some restriction to be placed on the freedom of speech. The imprisonment of a sociaUst for blasphemy some few years since, called forth no indignant protest against the violation of " the hberty of unlicensed " speaking, but was even approved by staunch maintainers of rehgious freedom. Many would like to make it a penal offence to preach discontent to. the people; and there are not wanting others who would hang up a few demagogues by way of scarecrows. Let us look at what may be said by the advocates of a mild censorship on behalf of their opinions.
It is an assertion often made, as of indisputable truth, that government ought: to guarantee to its subjects " secuiity.and a sense of seourity^." From which maxim to the inference that it is the duty of the magistrate to keep an ear open to the sayings of popular orators, and to stop violent declamation, as being calculated to create alarm, is an obvious step. Were the 150 THE RIGHT OF FEEE SPEECH.
premises good, the deduction might pass; but the premises are more than questionable. That it is the special function of the legislator to guard every man in the peaceable possession of his person and property, all admit; but that the legislator is called upon to quiet the fears aroused by every trifling excitement, is a notion almost too ridiculous for serious argument. Consider a moment to what it leads. Coupled as are the ideas " security and a sense of security," we must suppose that as governors are required to carry home " security" to every individual, so also may every individual claim the " sense of security " at their hands. Here is a pretty prospect for overburdened premiers! If such a doctrine be true, where shall the cares of the statesman end? Must he hsten to the apprehensions of every hypochondriac, in whose morbid imagination Eeform is pictured as a grim ogre of anthropophagous propensities, with pikes for claws and guillotines for teeth? If not, why not?
" Sense of security" in such an one has been destroyed by the violent denunciations of some hot patriot; he wishes his trepidations allayed by the suppression of what he thinks dangerous speaking; and, according to the hypothesis, his wishes ought to be obeyed. On the same grounds all agitation should be extinguished, for there are invariably some — and not a small number either — who regard the discussion of every public question that comes uppermost with dread, and predict all kinds of disasters from its continuance. Old women of both sexes working themselves into a state of great tribulation over the terrible vaticinations of a Standard, or the melancholy waitings of a Herald, would fain have put down the Free Trade propaganda; and if their "sense of security" had been duly consulted, they should have had their way. Eeligious disabilities too ought, for the like reason, to have been stiU maintained, for the proposal to repeal them was productive of extreme consternation to multitudes of weak-minded people. Prophecies were rife of the return of papal persecutions; every horror narrated in the Btiok of Martyrs was expected to be acted over afresh; and an epidemic fright invalided its thousands.
THE EIGHT OF FREE SPEECH. 151 Credulous individuals listened with raised eyebrows and pendant jaws to the dismal tales of some incipient Titus Gates, and straightway had visions of fire and faggots; each saw himself in Smithfield with a stake at his back and a torch at his feet; or dreamed he was in the torture-chamber of an inquisition, and awoke iu a cold perspiration to find that he had mistaken the squeak of a mouse for the creak of a thumb-screw. Well, here was a woful loss of the " sense of security; " and therefore the authorities ought to have stopped the movement for CathoUc emancipation, by gagging all its advocates, fettering its press, and preventing its meetings.
It is useless to say that these are exaggerations, and that the alarms of nervous valetudinaiians or foolish bigots are to be disregarded. If the fears of a hundred are not to be attended to, why those of a thousand? If not those of a thousand, why those of ten thousand? How shall the Hne be drawn? where is the requisite standard? who shall teU when the sense of jwsecurity has become general enough to merit respect? Is it to be when the majority participate in it? If so, who shall decide when they do this? Perhaps it will be said that the apprehensions must be reasonable ones. Good; but who is to determine whether they are so or not? "Where is the pope who shall give an infallible judgment on such a matter? To all which questions those who would make the preservation of a "sense of security" the limit, to liberty of speech, must first find answers.
Of those animadversions upon state affairs which constitute the legal offence of bringing government into contempt, and of which offence, by the way, all parties might be accused, firom a chartist orator, to the leader of the opposition — fi-om the Times ^ with its burlesques upon the pitiful results of an annual "great talk," to its facetious contemporary who quizzes the eccentricities of a versatile ex-chancellor — of such animadversions the only needful question to be asked is — are they deserved? Are 152 THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH.
the allegations contained in them true? If it can be shown that they are not — that is, if it can he shown that the parties referred to have been unjustly aspersed — that is, if it can he shown that a violation of the law has been committed — there is an end of the matter, so far as the morahst is concerned. But, on the other hand, should they prove to he substantially correct, on what grounds shall the suppression of them be defended? That which is really contemptible ought to be exposed to contempt; and, if so, derogatory charges ought to have full pubhcity. To argue otherwise, is to take up the MacliiaveUian position, that it is right for the legislature to be an imposture, an "organized hypocrisy" — that it is necessary for a nation to be cheated by the semblance of virtue when there is no reahty — that pubHc opinion ought to be in error rather than in truth — or that it is well for the people to believe a lie!
There may be much danger in placing an invalid under the regimen proper to people in robust health. For a dyspeptic, chicken-broth may be in all respects better suited than more substantial fare.. And whoso is suffering under an attack of influenza, will do wisely to avoid a blustering north-wester, or even a gentle breeze from the south. But he would be thought more than silly who inferred from such facts that sohd food and fresh air are bad things. To ascribe any evil results to these, rather than to the unhealthy condition of the patients, would imply extremely crude ideas of causation.
Similarly crude, however, are the ideas of those who infer that unhmited hberty of speech is improper, because productive in certain states of society of disastrous results. It is to the abnormal condition of the body politic that all evils arising from an unrestrained expression of opinion must be attributed, and not to the unrestrained expression itself. Under a sound social regime and its accompanying contentment, nothing is to be reared from the most uncontrolled utterance of thought and THE RIGHT OF FEEE SPEECH. 163 feeling. On the other hand it may happen that where disease exists, exposure of the sore places of the state to the cold breath of criticism, -wiU superinduce alarming symptoms. But ■what then? A Louis PhDippe, a General Oavaignac, or a Louis Napoleon, may find excuse in a corrupted and disorganized state of things for espionnage, censorships, and the suppression of public meetings. But what then? If a nation cannot be governed on principles of pure equity, so much the worse for the nation. Those principles remain true notwithstanding. As elsewhere pointed out (p. 37), there must necessarily exist incongruity between the perfect law and the imperfect man. And if e'nls are entailed upon a people by immediate and entire recognition of the law of equal freedom, in the matter of speech as well as in that of action, such evils are merely significant of the incomplete adaptation of that people to the social state, and not of any defect in the law.
CHAPTEK XV.
FURTHEK RIGHTS.
Did circumstances demand it, sundry other chapters of the same nature as the preceding ones, could be added. Were this France, it might he needfiil formally to deduce from the law of equal freedom, the right to move from place to place ■without leave of a government official. In addressing the Chinese, some proof that a man is at hherty to cut his clothes after whatever fashion may best suit him, would perhaps he called for. And, similarly, there might he found in different times and places, many other directions in which the law of equal freedom required asserting. But it is unnecessary now to repeat over again the reasoning so many times used. These that we call rights, are nothing but artificial divisions of the general claim to exercise the faculties — applications of that general claim to particular cases; and each of them is proved in the same way, by showing that the particular exercise of faculties referred to, is possible without preventing the hke exercise of faculties by other persons. The reader has already seen the most important rights thus estabUshed; and the establishment of such minor ones as have not been touched upon, may safely be left with himself CHAPTEK XVI.
THE EIGHTS OF WOMEN.
Equity knows no difference of sex. In its vocabulary the word man must be understood in a generic, and not in a specific sense. The law of equal freedom manifestly applies to the whole race— female as well as male. The same a priori reasoning which estabUshes that law for men (Chaps. III. and IV.), may be used with equal cogency on behalf of women. The Moral Sense, by virtue of which the masculine mind responds to that law, exists in the feminine mind as well. Hence the several rights deducible from that law must appertain equally to both sexes.
This might have been thought a self-evident truth, needing only to be stated to meet with universal acceptation. There are many, however, who either tacitly, or in so many words, express their dissent from it. For what reasons they do so, does not appear. They admit the axiom, that human happiness is the Divine will; from which axiom, what we call rights are primarily derived. And why the dififerences of bodily organization, and those trifling mental variations which distinguish female from male, should exclude one half of the race from the benefits of this ordination, remains to be shown. The onus of proof lies on those who affirm that such is the fact; and it would be perfectly in order to assume that the law of equal freedom comprehends both sexes, until the contrary has been demonstrated. But without taking advantage of this, suppose we go at once into the controversy.
Three positions only are open to us. It may be said that women have no rights at all — that their rights are not so great as those of men — or that they are equal to those of men.
Whoever maintains the first of these dogmas, that women have no rights at all, must show that the Creator intended women to he wholly at the mercy of men — their happiness, their liherties, their lives, at men's disposal; or, in other words, that they were meant to be treated as creatures of an inferior order. Few will have the hardihood to assert this.
From the second proposition, that the rights of women are not so great as those of men, there immediately arise such queries as — If they are not so great, hy how much are they less? What is the exact ratio between the legitimate claims of the two sexes? How shall we tell which rights are common to both, and where those of the male exceed those of the female? Who can show us a scale that wiU serve for the apportionment? Or, putting the question practically, it is required to determine by some logical method, [whether the Tiu"k is justified in plunging an ofiending Circassian into the Bosphorus? whether the rights of women were violated by that Athenian law, which allowed a citizen, under certain circumstances to sell his daughter or sisterPj whether our own statute, which permits a man to heat his wife in moderation, and to imprison her in any room in his house, is morally defensible? whether it is equitable that a married vjoman should be incapable of holding property? whether a husband may justly take possession of his wife's earnings against her will, as our law allows him to do? — and so forth. These, and a multitude of similar problems, present themselves for solution. Some principle rooted in the nature of things has to be found, by which they may be scientifically decided — decided, not on grounds of expediency, but in some definite, philosophical way. Does any one holding the doctrine that women's rights are not so great as men's, think he can find such a principle?
If not, there remains no alternative but to take up, the third position — that the rights of women are equal with those of men.
THK RIGHTS OF WOMEN. 157 Whoso urges the mental inferiority of women in bar of their claim to equal rights ■with men, may be met in various ways.
In the first place, the alleged fact may he disputed. A defender of her sex might name many whose achievements in government, in science, in literature, and ia art, have obtained no small share of renown. Powerful and sagacious queens the world has seen in plenty, from Zenohia, down to the empresses Catherine and Maria Theresa. In the exact sciences, Mrs. Somerville, Miss Herschel, and iliss Zomhn, have gained applause; in political economy. Miss Martineau; in general philosophy, Madame de Stael; in poUtics, Madame Eoland. Poetry has its Tighes, its Hemanses, its Landons, its Brownings; the drama its Joanna BaiUie; and fiction its Austens, Bremers, Gores, Dudevants, &c., without end. In sculpture, fame has been acquired by a princess; a picture hke "The Momentous Question" is tolerable proof of female capacity for painting; and on the stage, it is certain that women are on a level with men, if they do not even bear away the pahn. Joining to such facts the important consideration, that women have always been, and are stiU, placed at a disadvantage in every department of learning, thought, or skiU. — seeing that they are not admissible to the academies and universities in which men get their training; that the kind of life they have to look forward to, does not present so great a range of ambitions; that they are rarely exposed to that most powerful of all stimuh — necessity; that the education custom dictates for them is one that leaves uncultivated many of the higher faculties; and that the prejudice against blue-stockings, hitherto so prevalent amongst men, has greatly tended to deter women from the pursuit of literary honours; — adding these considerations to the above facts, we shall see good reason for thinking that the alleged inferiority of the feminine mind, is by no means self-evident.
But, waiving this point, let us contend with the proposition on its own premises. Let it be granted that the intellect of ir)8 THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN.
woman is less profound than that of man — that she is more uniformly ruled by feeling, more impulsive, and less reflective, than man is — let all this be granted; and let us now see what basis such an admission aflFords to the doctrine, that the rights of women are not co-extensive with those of men.
1. If rights are to be meted out to the two sexes in the ratio of their respective amounts of intelligence, then must the same system be acted upon in the apportionment of rights between man and man. Whence must proceed aU those multiplied perplexities already pointed out. (See pp. 107 and 108.)
2. In Kke manner, it wiU follow, that as there are here and there women of unqnestionably greater ability than the average of men, some women ought to have greater rights than some men.
3. Wherefore, instead of a certain fixed allotment of rights to all males and another to all females, the hypothesis itself involves an infinite gradation of rights, irrespective of sex entirely, and sends us once more in search of those unattainable desiderata— a standard by which to measure capacity, and another by which to measure rights.
Not only, however, does the theory thus fall to pieces under the mere process of inspection; it is absurd on the very face of it, when freed firom the disguise of hackneyed phraseology. For what is it that we mean by rights? Nothing else than fireedom to exercise the faculties. And what is the meaning of the assertion that woman is mentally inferior to man? Simply that her faculties are less powerful. What then does the dogma, that because woman is mentally inferior to man she has less extensive rights, amount to? Just this,— that because woman has weaker faculties than man, she ought not to have like liberty with him, to exercise the faculties she has!
BeKef always bears the impress of character- is, in fact, its product. Anthropomorphism sufEiciently proves this. Men's wishes eventually get expressed in their faiths— their real faiths.
that is; not their nominal ones. Pull to pieces a man's Theorj' of Things, and you will find it based upon facts collected at the suggestion of his desires. A fiery passion consumes all evidences opposed to its gratification, and fusing together those that serve its purpose, casts them into weapons by which to achieve its end. There is no deed so vicious but what the actor makes for himself an excuse to justify; and if the deed is often repeated, such excuse becomes a creed. The vilest transactions on record — Bartholomew massacres and the Uke — have had defenders; nay, have been inculcated as fulfilments of the Divine will. There is wisdom in the fable which represents the wolf as raising accusations against the lamb before devouring it. It is always thus amongst men. No invader ever raised standard, but persuaded himself that he had a just cause. Sacrifices and prayers have preceded every mihtary expedition, from one of Ceesar's campaigns, down to a border foray. God is on our side, is the universal cry. Each of two conflicting nations consecrates its flags; and whichever conquers sings a Te Deum. Attila conceived himself to have a "divine claim to the dominion of the earth: " the Spaniards subdued the Indians under plea of converting them to Christianity; hanging thirteen refractory ones in honour of Jesus Christ and his apostles: and we EngHsh justify our colonial aggressions by saying that the Creator intends the Anglo-Saxon race to people the world!
An insatiate lust of conquest transmutes manslaying into a virtue; and, amongst more races than one, implacable revenge has made assassination a duty. A clever theft was praiseworthy amongst the Spartans; and it is equally so amongst Christians, provided it be on a sufiiciently large scale. Piracy was heroism with Jason and his followers; was so also with the Norsemen; is so stiU with the Malays; and there is never wanting some golden fleece for a pretext. Amongst money-hunting people a man is commended in proportion to the number of hours he spends in business; ia our day the rage for accrunulation has apotheosized work; and even the miser is not without a code of morals by which to defend his parsimony. The ruling classes argue themselves into the hehef that property should be represented rather than person — that the landed interest should preponderate. The pauper is thoroughly persuaded that he has a right to reUef. The monks held printing to be an invention of the devil; and some of our modem sectaries regard their refractory brethren as under demoniacal possession*. To the clergy nothing is more obvious than that a state-church is just, and essential to the maintenance of rehgion. The sinecurist thinks himself rightly indignant at any disregard of his vested interests. And so on throughout society.
Perhaps the slave- owner's assertion that negroes are not human beings, and the kindred dogma of the Mahometans, that "women have no souls'", are the strangest samples of convictions so formed. In these, as in the foregoing cases, selfishness finds out a satisfactory reason why it may do what it wills — collects and distorts, exaggerates and suppresses, so as ultimately to cheat itself into the desired conclusion. Does any one doubt that men can really believe things thus palpably opposed to ^he plainest facts? Does any one assert that those who profess opinions so manifestly absurd must be hypocrites? Let bim beware. Let him consider whether selfishness has not deluded him into absurdities almost as gross. The laws of England, and the pubUc opinion of England, countenance doctrines nearly as preposterous as these that look to us inconceivable; nay, the very same doctrines somewhat softened down. For what, when closely examined, is this notion that the rights of women are not equal with those of men? Simply an evanescent form of the theory that women have no souls.
That a people's condition may be judged by the treatment which women receive under it, is a remark that has become " SpeecR of Mr. Garland, one of the Conference Methodists.