It may indeed be difficult for those who have but little faith in the invisible, to follow out a principle unflinchingly, in spite of every threatening evil — to give up their own power of judging what seems best, from the belief that that only is best which is abstractedly right — to say, " although appearances are against it, yet will I obey the law." Nevertheless, this is the true attitude to assume: the conduct which it has been the object of all moral teaching to inculcate; the only conduct which can eventually answer *.
Even supposing for a moment, that a solitary act of disobedience may pass without evil results — nay, may bring bene- / ' Coleridge clearly expresses such a belief. He says — " This is indeed the main characteristic of the moral system taught by the Friend throughout; that the distinct foresight of consequences belongs exclusively to the Infinite Wisdom which is one with the Almighty "Will, on which all consequences depend; but that for man to obey the simple unconditional commandment of eschewing every act that impUes a self-contradicton, or, in other words, to produce and maintain the greatest possible harmony in the component impulses and faculties of his nature, involves ■ the effects of prudence." — The Fnemd.
44 INTRODUCTION'.
44 INTRODUCTION'.
ficial ones: even supposing this, the wisdom of the act is not thereby proved. For consider the probable effects of a wrong precedent. As Paley truly says, "the bad consequences of actions are twofold, particular and general!' And admitting even that a particular good has been secured, a far greater general evil has been entailed by opening the way to future disobedience. There is no security in this lax creed. One breach of the law leaves a gap for numberless subsequent trespasses. If the first false step has been taken with seeming impunity, it will inevitably be followed by others. School-boy promises of — " only this once" are not to be believed. Make a hole through a principle to admit a soUtary exception, and, on one pretence or other, so many other exceptions will by and by be thrust through after it, as to render the principle utterly goodfor-nothing. In fact, if its consequences are closely traced, dns same plea for licence in special cases turns out to be the source of nearly all the evils that afflict us. Almost every wrong doing is excused by the doer on this ground. He confesses his act is at variance with the moral law, which he admits to be, and in some sort beheves to be, the best guide. He tliinks, however, that his interest requires him now and then to make exceptions. All men do this; — and see the result.
But can we ever be sure that an exceptional disobedience tpill bring the anticipated benefits? Whoso would forsake for a time a confessedly-legitimate guide, should remember that he is falling back upon that expediency-hypothesis of which we have already seen the falsity. He is laying claim to a perfect knowledge of man, of society, of institutions, of events, of all the complex, ever-varying phenomena of human existence; and to a grasp of mind that can infer from these how things -will go in future. In short, he is assuming that same omniscience, which, as we saw, is requisite for the successful INTRODCCTION. 4.'»
can-ying out of such a system. Does he shrink from arrogating as much? Then ohserve his dilemma. He deserts -what he admits to he on the whole a safe rule of conduct, to follow one which is difficult to understand; unsettled in its directions; douhtful in its consequences.
If the foohshness of such conduct needs illustrating hy facts, there are plenty at hand. The constant failure of schemes devised without consulting ethical principles has been already exempUfied (see page 8). Let us now, however, t&ke a few cases specially applying to the present point — cases in which benefit has been sought by going in palpable opposition to those principles — cases in which meu, dissatisfied with the road whose finger-post declares that " Honesty is the best policy," have diverged into the by-ways of injustice, in the hope of more readily attaining their ends.
The enslavement of the neg^'oes serves for a good example. Nothing could have seemed more conclusive than the reasoning of unscrupulous colonists on tliis matter. Here were rich soils, a splendid chmate, and a large market for the sale of produce. Now, could but a sufiiciency of labourers be imported and reduced to servitude, what profit they would bring to their possessors! Maintained at a cheap rate; made to work hard, and to keep long at it, what a surplus would theY not create! Here was a mine of wealth! Well: the planters acted out their thought — did that which, although it might not be just, was apparently "the best policy," so far as they were concerned. Their golden visions have been far from realized however. Slave countries are comparatively poverty-stricken all over the world. Though Jamaica at one time sent us a few overgrown nabobs, yet West-Indian history has been a history of distress and complainings, in spite of continual assistance and artificial advantages. The southern states of America are far behind their northern neighbours in prosperity — are in process of abandoning slavery one after another, in consequence of its ruinous results. Somehow the scheme has not answered as was expected. Though worked in some cases sixteen hours 46 INXnODUCTION.
46 INXnODUCTION.
out of the twenty-foui-; though supported on "a. pint of flour and one salt herring per day;" though kept to his work by whips, yet did not the slave bring to his owner the large profit calculated upon. Indeed it has turned out that, under like circumstances, free labour is much cheaper. And then, besides the disappointment, there came results that were never looked for. Slavery brought in its train the multiplied curses of a diseased social state; a reign of mutual hatred and terror; of universal demoralization; of sin-begotten recklessness; of extravagant expenditure; of bad cultivation, exhausted soils, mortgaged estates, bankruptcy, beggary. After all, the moral law would have been the safest guide.
When Philip of Valois swore the officers of his mint to conceal the debasement of the coinage, and to endeavour to make the merchants believe that the gold and silver pieces were of full value, he thought that although perhaps unprincipled, such a measure would be vastly profitable. And so no doubt believed the other kings, who, in the " good old times," almost universally did the like. They overreached themselves, however, as all such schemers do. It is true that their debts were diminished " in proportion to the reduction in the'value of the currency; but their revenues were at the same time reduced in the like ratio. Moreover, the loss of their reputation for honesty made them afterwards unable to borrow money, except at proportionately high rates of interest, to cover the risk ran by the lender." So that they not only lost on the creditor side of their accounts what they gained on the debtor side, but put themselves at a great disadvantage for the future. After centuries of dearly-bought experience, the practice was reluctantly abandoned, and is now universally exploded as essentially suicidal — -just as suicidal in fact as all other infiingements of the rule of right.
Let us remember also, the failure of those attempts to profit at the expense of our American colonies; and the disastrous results to which they led. Our governors thought it would be highly beneficial to the mother country, if the colonies were constrained to become her customers; and in pm'suance of this conclusion, not only prohibited the settlers from purchasing certain goods from any other counti^ than England, but actually denied them the right to make those goods for themselves! As usual the manoeuvre proved worse than abortive. The outlay required to keep open this national truck-shop was greater than the receipts. Nay, indeed, that outlay was wholly thrown away, and worse than thrown away; for it turns out that artificial trades so obtained entail loss upon both parties. Then too came the punishment, the resistance of the settlers, the war of independence, and the hundred and odd millions added to our national burdens!
What an astounding illustration of the defeat of dishonesty by the eternal laws of things we have in the history of the East India Company! Selfish, unscrupulous, worldly-wise in pohcy, and with unlimited force to back it, this oligarchy, year by year, perseveringly carried out its schemes of aggrandisement. It subjugated province upon province; it laid one prince after another under tribute; it made exorbitant demands upon adjacent rulers, and construed refusal into a pretext for aggression; it became sole proprietor of the land, claiming nearly one-half the produce as rent; and it entirely monopoUzed commerce: thus uniting in itself the character of conqueror, ruler, landowner, and merchant. With all these resources, what could it be but prosperous? From the spoils of victorious war, the rent of milhons of acres, the tribute of dependent monarchs, the profits of an exclusive trade, what untold wealth must have poured in upon it! what revenues! what a bursting exchequer! Alas! the Company is some 50,000,000/. in debt.
Protected trades, too, have afforded many proofs of the impolicy of injustice. The history of the wool business some centuries ago might be quoted as one; but let us take the more recent case of silk. Under the now happily exploded plea of protection to native industry, the silk manufacturers were freed from aU foreign competition. Their prices were thus artificially raised, and all the nation was compelled to ■i^ INTRODUCTTON'.
■i^ INTRODUCTTON'.
buy of them. And so, having a large market and high profits, the)' thought their prosperity ensured. They were doomed to disappointment, however. Instead of a brisk and extensive trade, they obtained a languishing and confined one; and that branch of manufacture, wliich was to have been a pattern of commercial greatness, became a by-word for whining poverty. How utterly absurd, under such a lamentable state of things, must have appeared the proposal to return towards equitable dealing by lowering the duties! What " impi'acticables " must those, men have been thought, who, because monopoly was unjust, wished to expose the almost ruined manufacturers to the additional difficulty of foreign competition! Could anything be more contrary to common sense? Here surely was a case in which " abstract principles " must give way to " policy.'' No: even here, too, obedience to the moral law proved to be the best. EebeUion against it had been punished by accumulated distresses: a partial submission was rewarded by an increase of prosperity. Within fourteen years from the date at which the duties were lowered, the trade had more than doubled itself — had increased more within that period than during the preceding century. And those who, but a short time before, were unable to meet their French compeers in the home-markets, not only began to compete witli them in the marts of other nations, but to send large quantities of goods to France itself.
These are but a few samples from a univei-sal experience. If diligently traced, the results of abandoning the riff/it to pursue the politic will uniformly be found to end thus. Men who are insane enough to think that they may safely violate the fundamental laws of right conduct, may read in such defeats and disasters their own fate. Let them but inquire, and they will find that each petty evil, each great catastrophe, is in some way or other a sequence of injustice. Monetary panics, South-Sea bubbles, Eailway manias, Irish rebeUions, French revolutions,— these, and the miseries flowing from them, are but the cumulative effects of dishonesty. A bitter experiences teaches all men when it is too late, that, alike in national and individual affairs, entire submission is the wisest course. Even Napoleon, after his seeming success, his triumphs, his profound statesmanship, his far-seeing "policy," ended in the behef that " There is no power without justice."
Yet this commentary on the moral code — this History as we call it — men for ever read in vain! Poring with microscopic eye over the symbols in which it is written, they are heedless of the great facts expressed by them. Instead of collecting evidence bearing upon the all-important question — What are the laws that determine national success or failure, stability or revolution? — they gossip about state intrigues, sieges andbattles, court scandal, the crimes of nobles, the quarrels of parties, the births, deaths, and marriages of kings, and other hke trifles: Minutiee, pettifogging details, the vanity and frippery of bygone times, the mere decorations of the web of existence, they examine, analyze, and learnedly descant upon; yet are blind to those stem reahties which each age shrouds in its superfiffial tissue of events — those terrible truths which glare out upon us from the gloom of the past. From the successive strata of our historical deposits, they diligently gather all the highly-coloured fragments, pounce upon everything that is curious and sparkUng, and chuckle like children over their glittering acquisitions; meanwhile the rich veins of wisdom that ramify amidst, this worthless debris, lie utterly neglected. Cumbrous volumes of rubbish are greedily accumulated, whilst those masses of rich ore, that should have been dug out, and from which golden truths might have been smelted, are left unthought of and unsought.
But why all this laboured examination into the propriety, or impropriety, of making exceptions to an ascertained ethical law? The very question is absurd. For what does a man really mean by saying of a thing that it is " theoretically just," or " true in principle," or " abstractedly right "? Simply that E E it accords with what he, in some way or other, perceives to he the estahUshed arrangements of Divine rule, ^^^len he admits that an act is "theoretically just," he admits it to he that which, in strict duty, should be done. By " true in principle," he means in harmony with the conduct decreed for us. The course which he caUs " abstractedly right," he beUeves to be the appointed way to human happiness. There is no escape. The expressions mean this, or they mean nothing. Practically, therefore, when he proposes to disobey, he does so in the hope of improving on this guidance! Though told that such and such are the true roads to happiness, he opines that he knows shorter ones! To the Creator's silent command — "Do this; " he repUes that, aU things considered, he thinks he can do better! This is the real Infidehty; the true Atheism: to doubt the foresight and efficiency of the Divine arrangements, and with infinite presumption to suppose a human judgment less falhhle! When will man " cease his frantic pretension of scanning this great God's World in his small fraction of a brain; and know that it has verily, though deep beyond his soundings, a Just Law; that the soul of it is good; — that his part in it is to conform to the Law of the Whole, and in devout silence follow that, not questioning it, obeying it as unquestionable." * ) Briefly reviewing the argument, we mark first, that physical laws are characterized by constancy and universality, and that there is every reason to beheve the like true of ethical ones. It is inferred, that if so, there is no safety but in entire obedience, even in spite of threatening appearances. This inference is enforced by the consideration, that any departure from principle to escape some anticipated evil, is a return to the proved errors of expediency. It is again enforced by the fact, that the innumerable attempts of a stifi'-necked worldly wisdom to * Advice, by the way, which in these latter days the giver might properly enough take home to himself.
INTEODUCTION. 61 benefit by disobedience have failed. And it is yet farther enforced by the reflection, that to think we can better ourselves by deserting the road marked out for us, is an impious assumption of more than divine omniscience.
The reasons for thus specially insisting on implicit obedience ■will become apparent as the reader proceeds. Amongst the conclusions inevitably foUo-wing from an admitted principle, he ■will most likely find several for which he is hardly prepared. Some of these will seem strange; others impracticable; and, it may be — one or two whoUy at variance with his ideas of duty. Nevertheless should he find them logically derived from a fundamental truth, he ■will have no alternative but to adopt them as rules of conduct, which ought to be followed without exception. If there be any weight in the considerations above set forth, then, no matter how seemingly inexpedient, dangerous, injurious even, may be the course which morality points out as " abstractedly - right," the highest ■wisdom is in perfect and fearless submission. ■ PART I.
CHAPTER I.
PART I.
CHAPTER I.
There does not seem to exist any settled idea as to what a Moral Philosophy properly embraces. Moralists have either omitted to prelude their inquiries hy any strict definition of the work to he done, or a definition of a very loose and iadiscriminating character has been framed. Instead of confining themselves to the discovery and application of certain essential principles of right conduct, they have attempted to give rules for all possible actions, under all possible circumstances. Properly understood the subject matter for investigation lies withiu comparatively narrow hmits; but, overlooking these, they have entered upon a multitude of questions which we shall shortly find to be quite beyond their province.
As already said (p. 15) the moral law must be the law of the ' perfect man — the law ia obedience to which perfection consists. There are but two propositions for us to choose between. It may either be asserted that moraUty is a code of rules for the behaviour of man as he is — a code which recognises existing defects of character, and allows for them; or otherwise that it is a code of rules for the regulation of conduct amongst men as they should be. Of the first alternative we must say, that any proposed system of morals which recognises existiag defects, and countenances acts made needful by them, stands self-condemned; seeing that, by the hypothesis, acts thus excused are not the best conceivable; that is^are not perfectly right — ^not perfectly moral, and therefore a morality -which permits them, is, in SO far as it does this, not a morality at all. To escape from this contradiction is impossible, save by adopting the Other alternative; namely, that the moral law ignoring all jvicious conditions, defects, and incapacities, prescribes the coniduct of an ideal humanity. Pm-e and absolute rectitude can alone be its subject matter. Its object must be to determine the relationships in which men ot<ght to stand to each other— to point out the principles of action in a normal society. By successive propositions it must aim to give a systematic statement of those conditions under which human beings may harmoniously combine; and to this end it requires as its postulate, that those human beings be perfect. Or we may term it the science of social life; a science that, in common with all other sciences, assumes perfection in the elements with which it deals.
» Treating therefore as it does on the abstract principles of right conduct, and the deductions to be made from these, a system of pure ethics cannot recognise evil, or any of those conditions which evil generates. It entirely ignores wrong, injustice, or crime, and gives no information as to what must be done when they have been committed. It knows no such thing as an infraction of the laws, for it is merely a statement of what the laws are. It simply says, such and such are the principles on which men should act; and when these are broken it can do nothing but say that they are broken. If asked what ought any one to do when another has knocked him down, it will not tfill; it can only answer that an assault is a trespass against the law, and gives rise to a wrong relationship. It is silent as to the manner in which we should behave to a thief; all the information it affords is, that theft is a disturbance of social equihbrium. We may learn from it that debt impHes an infraction of the moral code; but whether the debtor should or should not be imprisoned, cannot be decided by it. To all questions which presuppose some antecedent unlawful action, such as — Should a hamster defend any one whom he helieves to he guilty? Ought a man to hreak an oath which he has taken to do something wrong? Is it proper to publish the misconduct of our fellows? the perfect law can give no reply, hecause it does not recognise the premises. In seeking to settle such points on purely ethical principles, morahsts have attempted impossibilities. As well might they have tried to solve mathematically a series of problems respecting crooked lines and broken-hacked curves, or to deduce from the theorems of mechanics the proper method of setting to work a dislocated machine. No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth, but such as depend upon truths that are themselves absolute.
Before there can he exactness in an inference, there must be exactness in the antecedent propositions. A geometrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight; and that his circles, and ellipses, and pai'aholas shall agree with precise definitions — shall perfectly and invariably answer to specified equations. If you put to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with, he tells you that it cannot be answered. So Ukewise is it with the philosophical morahst. He treats solely of the straight man. He determines the properties of the straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself; shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows how a community of straight men is constituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him. He may state what he thinks about it — may give an approximate solution; but anything more is impossible. His decision is no longer scientific and authoritative, but is now merely an ojpinion.
Or perhaps the point may be most conveniently enforced, by using the science of the anunal man, to illustrate that of the moral man. Physiology is defined as a classified statement of the phenomena of bodily life. It treats of the functions of our several organs in their normal states. It explains the relationships in which the members stand to each other — what are their respective duties — how such duties are performed, and why they are necessary. It exhibits the mutual dependence of the vital actions; points out how these are maintained in due balance, and describes the condition of things constituting perfect health. Disease it does not even recognise, and can therefore solve no questions concerning it. To the inquiry — What is the cause of fever? or, what is the best remedy for a cold? it gives no answer. Such matters are out of its sphere. Could it reply it would be no longer Physiology, but Pathology, or Therapeutics. Just so it is with a true morality, which might properly enough be called — Moral Physiology. Its office is simply to expound the principles of moral health. Like its analogue, it has nothing to do with morbid actions and deranged functions. It deals only with the laws of a normal humanity, and cannot recognise a wrong, a depraved, or a disordered condition.
Hence it appears, that in treating of two such matters as the right of property, and the impropriety of duelling, as paits of the same science, moralists have confounded together subjects that are essentially distinct. The question— What are the right principles of human conduct? is one thing; the question— What must be done when those principles have been broken through? is another, and widely - different thing. Whether this last admits of any solution — whether it is possible to develope scientifically a Moral Pathology and a Moral Therapeutics seems very doubtful. Be this as it may, however, it is very clear that a system of pure Ethics is independent of these. And it will be considered so throughout the ensuing investigations.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
All evil results from the non- adaptation of constitution to conditions. Tliis is true of everydiing tliat lives. Does a shrub dwindle in poor soil, or become sickly when deprived of light, or die outright if removed to a cold cUmate? it is because the harmony between its organization and its circumstances has been destroyed. Those experiences of the farmyard and tlie menagerie which show that pain, disease, and death, are entailed upon animals by certain kinds of treatment, may all be generalised under the same law. Every suiFering incident to the human body, from a headache up to a fatal illness — from a bum or a sprain, to accidental loss of life, is similarly traceable to the having placed that body iu a situation for which its powers did not fit it. Nor is the expression confined in its application to physical evil; it comprehends moral evil also. Is the kindhearted man distressed by the sight of misery? is the bachelor unhappy because his means will not permit him to marry? does the mother mourn over her lost child? does the emigrant lament leaving his fatherland? are some made uncomfortable by having to pass their lives in distasteful occupations, and others fr'om having no occupation at aU? the explanation is stiU the same. No matter what the special nature of the evil, it is invariably referable to the one generic cause — want of congruity between the faculties and their spheres of action.
Equally true is it that evil perpetually tends to disappear. In virtue of an essential principle of Hfe, this non-adaptation of CO THE EVANESCENCE OF EVIL.
an orgaDism to its conditions is ever being rectified; and modification of one or both, continues until the adaptation is complete. Whatever possesses vitaUty, from the elementary cell up to man himself, inclusive, obeys this law. We see it illustrated in the acclimatization of plants, in the altered habits of domesticated animals, in the vaiTing characteristics of our own race. Accustomed to the brief arctic summer, the Siberian herbs and shrubs spring up, flower, and ripen their seeds, in the space of a few weeks. If exposed to the rigour of northern winters, animals of the temperate zone get thicker coats, and become white. The greyhound which, when first transported to the high plateaus of the Andes, fails in the chase from want of breath, acquires, in the course of generations, a more efficient pair of lungs. Cattle which in their wild state gave milk but for short periods, now give it almost continuously. Ambling is a pace not natural to the horse; yet there are American breeds that now take to it without training.
Man exhibits just the same adaptabOity. He alters in colour according to temperature — lives here upon rice, and there upon whale oU — gets larger digestive organs if he habitually eats innutritions food — acquires the power of long fasting if his mode of life is irregular, and loses it when the supply of food is certain — becomes fleet and agile in the wilderness and inert in the city — attains acute vision, hearing, and scent, when his habits of life call for them, and gets these senses blunted when they are less needful. That such changes are towards fitness for surrounding circumstances no one can question. When he sees that the dweller in marshes lives in an atmosphere which is certain death to a stranger — when he sees that the Hindoo can he down and sleep under a tropical sun, whilst his white master with closed bhnds, and water sprinklings, and punkah, can hardly get a doze — when he sees that the Greenlander and the Neapolitan subsist comfortably on their respective foods — blubber and macaroni, but would be made miserable by an interchange of them — when he sees that in other cases there is stiU this fitness to diet, to climate, and to modes of life, even the most sceptical must admit that some law of adaptation is at work. Nay, indeed, if he interprets facts aright, he will find that the action of such a law, is traceahle down to the minutest ramifications of individual experience. In the drunkard who needs an increasing quantity of spirits to intoxicate him, and in the opium eater, who has to keep taking a larger dose to produce the usual effect, he may mark how the system gradually acquires power to resist what is noxious. Those who smoke, who take snuff, or -who hahitually use medicines, can furnish hke illustrations. Nor in fact, is there any permanent change of hodily state or capability, which is not to be accounted for on the same principle.
This universal law of physical modification, is the law of mental modification also. The multitudinous differences of capacity and disposition that have in course of time grovm up between the Indian, African, Mongolian and Caucasian races, and between the various subdivisions of them, must all be ascribed to the acquirement in each case of fitness for surrounding circumstances. Those strong contrasts between the characters of nations and of times awhile since exemplified (p. 34) admit of no other conceivable explanation. Why all this divergence from the one common origiaal type? If adaptation of constitution to conditions is not the cause, what is the cause?
There are none, however, who can with anything Hke consistency combat this doctiine; for aU use arguments that presuppose its truth. Even those to whose prejudices the theory of man's indefinite adaptabihty is most opposed, are continually betraying their involuntary belief in it. They do this when they attribute differences of national character to differences in social customs and arrangements: and again when they comment on the force of habit: and again when they discuss the probable influence of a proposed measure upon pubHc moraUty: and again when they recommend practice as a means of acquiring increased aptitude: and again when they describe certain pursuits as elevating and others as degrading: and again when tbey talk of getting used to anything: and again when they advocate certain systems of mental discipline — when they teach that virtuous conduct eventually becomes pleasurable, and when they warn against the power of a long-encouraged vice.
In fact, if we consider the question closely, no other arrangement of tilings can be imagined. For we must adopt one of three propositions. We must either affirm that the human being is wholly unaltered by the influences that are brought to bear upon him — his circumstances as we call them; or that he perpetually tends to become more and more un<ed to those circumstances; or that he tends to become fitted to them. If the first is trae, then all schemes of education, of government, of social reform — aU instrumentalities by which it is proposed to act upon man, are utterly useless, seeing that he cannot be acted upon at aU. If the second is true, then the way to make a man virtuous is to accustom him to vicious practices, and vice versa. Both of which propositions being absurd, we are compelled to admit the remaining one.
Keeping in mind then the two facts, that all evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions; and that where this non-adaptation exists it is continually being diminished by the changing of constitution to suit conditions, we shall be prepared for comprehending the present position of the human race.
By the increase of population the state of existence we call social has been necessitated. Men living in this state sufifer imder numerous evils. By the hypothesis it follows that their characters £ire not completely adapted to such a state.
In what respect are they not so adapted? what is the special qualification which the social state requires?
It requires that each individual shall have such desires only, as may be fully satisfied without trenching upon the ability of other individuals to obtain like satisfaction. If the desires of each are not thus limited, then either all must have certain of their desires ungratified; or some must get gratification for them at the corresponding expense of others. Both of which alternatives necessitating pain, imply non-adaptation.
But why is not man adapted to the social state?
Simply because he yet partially retains the characteristics that adapted him for an antecedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society are the respects in which he is fitted for his original predatory life. EEis primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances require that he should not do so; and in as far as his old attribute stOl clings to him, in so far is he unfit for the social state. All sins of men against each other, from the cannibalism of the Carrib to the crimes and venahties that we see around us; the felonies that fill our prisons, the trickeries of trade, the quarrelings of nation with nation, and of class with class, the corruptness of iustitutions, the jealousies of caste, and the scandal of drawingrooms, have their causes comprehended under this generalization.