This is not so serious an objection as it appears to be. For although, were there no such sentiment as this supposed one, each faculty in turn might impel its possessor to oppose a diminution of its own sphere of action, yet, during the doinancy of that faculty, there would be nothing to prevent the freedom requisite for its/iiture exercise from being infringed upon. It may, perhaps, be rejoined, that the mere consciousness that there must again occur occasions for the use of such freedom will constitute a sufficient incentive to defend it. But plausible as this supposition looks, it does not tally with facts. We do not find on inquiry, that each faculty has a special foresight — takes thought for its gratifications to come: we find, on the contrary^ that to provide for the future gratification of the faculties at large, is the office of faculties appointed solely for that purpose. Thus, referring once more by way of illustration to the acquisitive instinct, we see that, when this is wanting, the desires for food, for clothing, for shelter, together with those many other desires which property minsters to, do not of themselves prompt that accumulation of property on which the continuance of their satisfaction depends. Each of them, when active, impels the individual to take means for its present fulfilment; but does not prompt him to lay by the means for its future fulfilment. To so prompt him there needs a certain amount of this acquisitive instinct, which, in pursuing its own gratification, incidentally secures to other instincts the means of their gratification.
Similarlj', then, with liberty of action. It is argued, that as each faculty does not look after its own particular fund of necessaries, SO neither does it look after its own particular sphere of activity; and that as there is a special faculty to which the providing of a general fund of necessaries is consigned, so likewise is there a special faculty to which the maintenance of a general sphere of activity is consigned. Or perhaps we may most clearly express the relationship in wliich these two faculties stand to the rest, by saying, that whilst it is the function of the one to accumulate the matter on which the faculties at large are to be exercised, it is the function of the other to preserve the freedom of motion by -which that matter is both obtained and made use of Seeing, however, that this instinct of personal rights is a purely selfish instinct, leading each man to assert and defend his own liberty of action, there remains the question — "Whence comes our perception of the rights of others?
The way to a solution of this difficulty has been opened by Adam Smith in his " Theory of Moral Sentiments." It is the aim of that work to show that the proper regulation of our conduct to one another, is secured by means of a faculty whose function it is to excite in each being the emotions displayed by surrounding ones — a faculty wliich awakens a like state of sentiment, or, as he terms it, " a fellow feeling with the passions of others" — the faculty, in short, which we commonly call Sympathy. As illustrations of the mode in which this agent acts, he quotes cases hke these: — "Persons of dehcate fibres, and weak constitution of bodv, complain that in looking on the sores and ulcers -which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the coiTesponding part of their own bodies." " Men of most robust make observe, that in looking upon sore eyes they often fed a very sensible soreness in tlieir own." " Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedv or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling for their misery, is not more real than that for their happiness." " We blush for the impudence and rudeness of another, though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his behaviour."
To these facts cited by Adam Smith, may be added many others of like import; such as that people — women especially — start or shriek on seeing an accident occur to others; that unpractised assistants at surgical operations often faint; that out of the soldiers drawn up to witness a flogging, usually several drop down in the ranks; that a boy has been known to die on witnessing an execution. We have all experienced the uncomfortable feeling of shame produced in us by the blunders and confusion of a nervous speaker; and most likely every one has some time or other been put into a horrible tremor on seeing another at the edge of a precipice. The converse action of the faculty is equally observable. Thus, we find ourselves unable to avoid joining in the merriment of our friends, whilst unaware of its cause; and children, much to their armoyance, are often forced to laugh in the midst of their tears, by witnessing the laughter of those arouiid them. These and many like evidences prove that, as Burke says, " sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in ruany respects as he is affected."
In tracing our benevolent actions to the influence of such a faculty — in concluding that we are led to relieve the miseries of others from a desire to rid ourselves of the pain given by the sight of miser3% and to make others happy, because we participate in their happiness, Adam Smith puts forth what seems to be a quite satisfactoi7 theory. But he has overlooked one of its most important applications. Not recognising any such impulse as that which ui-ges men to maintain their claims, he did not see that their respect for the claims of others, may be explained in the same way. He did not perceive that the sentiment of justice is nothing but a sympathetic affection of the instinct of personal rights— a sort of reflex function of it.
H Such, however, must be the case, if that instinct exists, and if this hypothesis of Adam Smith's be true. Here Hes the ex- ; planation of those qualms of conscience, as we call them, felt by men who have committed dishonest actions. It is through ' this instrumentality that we receive satisfaction on paying another what is due to him. And with these two faculties also, originate that indignation which narratives of political oppression excite in us, and that gnashing of the teeth \vith which we read of the slave-dealer's barbarities.
It was elsewhere hinted (p. 71), that though we must keep up the distinction between them, it is nevertheless true that justice and beneficence have a common root, and the reader will now at once perceive that the common root is — Sympathy. All the actions properly classified under the one, and which we describe as fair, equitable, upright, spring from the sympathetic excitement of the instinct of personal rights; whilst those usually grouped under the other, as mercy, charity, good-nature, generosity, amiability, considerateness, are due to the action of Sympathy upon one or more of the other feehngs.
In support of the foregoing theory much detailed evidence can be adduced. If it be true that men's perceptions of justice are generated in the way alleged, it will follow that, other things equal, those who have the strongest sense of their own rights, will have the strongest sense of the rights of their neighbours. Aad, by observing whether this is the case or not, we may put the theory to the proof. Let us do this.
The fii-st illustration that suggests itself is afforded by the Society of Friends. Ever since they appeared in the days of Charles I., the members of that body have been remarkable for their determined assertion of personal liberty. They have shown it in their continued resistance to ecclesiastical power; in the obstinacy with which they successfully defied persecution; in their still-continued refusal to pay church-rates; and even SECONDARY DERIVATrON OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE. 99 in their creed, which does not pei'rait a priesthood. Obsen'e, now, how the sentiment which these peculiarities imply has manifested itself sympathetically. Penn and his followers were the only emigrants of their age who made any acknowledgment to the aborigines for the land they colonized. Of this same sect were the philanthropists who commenced the agitation for abolishing the slave trade; and who were most energetic in carrying it on. Amongst lunatic asylums, the York Retreat was one of the first, if not tlie first, in which a non-coercive treatment of the insane was adopted. They were Quakers too, who years ago hegan publicly to exclaim against the injustice as well as the cruelty of war. And, whilst it may be true that in business they are firm in the assertion of their claims, it is not less true that on the whole they are remarkable for honest dealing.
The English national character, as contrasted with that of other races, will supply a further illustration. We are universally distinguished for our jealous love of freedom — for the firm maintenance of our rights. At the same time we are not less distinguished for the greater equity of our general conduct. Although our hehaviour to the natives of lands on which we have settled has been anything but praiseworthy, it has never been so abominable as that of the Spaniards and others. According to all accounts English merchants are noted everywhere for good faith and straightforwardness. Even amongst the most brutal of our population — even in the prize-ring itself, there is shown in that maxim which forbids the striking of a man when down, a greater sense of what is fair than the people of other countries show. And during these latter times, in which the popular demand for equal political rights has been so loud and so increasing, we have, as a nation, proved our greater regard for the rights of others, by an attempt to put down slavery all over the world.
Conversely, we £nd that those who have not a strong sense of what is just to themselves, are likewise deficient in a sense of what is just to their fellow men. This has long been a commen remark. As one of our living writers puts it — the tyrant is nothing but a slave turned inside out. In earlier days, when feudal lords were vassals to the king, they were also despots to their retainers. In our own time, the Russian noble is alike a serf to his autocrat, and an autocrat to his serf. It is remarked even by school-boys, that the buUy is the most ready of all to knock under to a bigger bully. We constantly observe that those who fawn upon the great are overbearing to their inferiors. That " emancipated slaves exceed all other owners (of slaves) in cruelty and oppression," * is a truth established on numerous authorities. And that where opportunity offers the submissive nature becomes a tyrannical one, is further illustrated by the fact, that the negroes are frequently caught and sold by their own kings.
Thus we find the proposed theory to be supported both by direct and converse evidence. One quaUfication must be made, however. There is no necessary connection between a sense of what is due to self, and a sense of what is due to others. Sympathy and instinct of rights do not always coexist in equal strength any more than other faculties do. Either of them may be present in normal amount, whUst the other is almost wanting. And, if devoid of sympathy, it is possible for a man who has a sufficient impulse to assert his own claims, to show no corresponding respect for the claims of his fellows. The instinct of rights being of itself entirely selfish, merely impels its possessor to maintain his own privileges. Only by the sympathetic excitement of it, is a desii-e to behave equitably to others awakened; and when sympathy is absent such a desii-e is impossible. Nevertheless this does not affect the general proposition, that where there exists the usual amount of sympathy, respect for the rights of others will be great or small, according as the amount of the instinct of personal rights is great or small. And thus in the average of cases, Fonr Years in Oie Pacific. By Lieut. Walpole.
we may safely conclude that a man's sense of justice to himself, and his sense of justice to his neighbours, bear a constant ratio to each other.
Further proof that there exists the mental arrangement here described, may be found in the fact, that some of the peculiar moral notions traceable to it are perfectly in harmony with certain of the abstract conclusions arrived at in the preceding chapter. We find in ourselves a conviction, for which we can give no satisfactory reason, that we are free, if we please, to do particular things which it is yet blamable to do. Though it may greatly diminish his happiness, a man feels that he has a right, if he likes, to cut off a limb, or to destroy his property. Whilst we condemn the want of consideration he shows towards some miserable debtor, we yet admit that the hard creditor is, in strict justice, entitled to the uttermost farthing. Notwithstanding our disgust at thei selfishness of one who refuses to afford some friendly accommodation, we cannot deny that he is quite at liberty so to refuse. Now these perceptions, which, if the hypothesis be true, are referable to the instinct of personal rights acting in the one case directly, and in the other cases sympathetically, quite accord with foregoing inferences.
We found that the law of equal freedom was the fundamental law. We found (p. 82) that no other limitations of activity could be as authoritative as that which it sets up. And we found further (p. 89) that in this, our state of adaptation, it would be wrong to estabhsh any fixed boundary to the liberty of each, save the similar Uberty of others. Such a correspondence between our instinctive beliefs, and the conclusions previously arrived at, lends additional probabihty to the hypothesis here advanced.
That there exists in us a mental mechanism by which the essential pre-requisite to greatest happiness is recognised and enforced, seems therefore abundantly manifest. We find the general principles of our structure to imply some such provision. In that Moral Sense, of whose existence we elsewhere saw the probabihty, we have an agent apparently answering to the requirement; and in this first condition to greatest happiness, we discover the axiom which the Moral Sense was to respond to. That man does possess a feeling which responds to this axiom, is evidenced by the more or less complete expression spontaneously given to it in poUtical dogmas, in laws, and in the sayings of daily hfe: further proof of its existence being found in the fact, that those who nominally repudiate the belief it gives utterance to, themselves profess that belief in a disguised and incorrect form. By an analogy drawn from the impulse to accumulate, we are shown that an impulse to maintain liberty of action, is most Hkely essential to the completeness of the human constitution. How this impulse to maintain liberty of action can generate regard for the liberty of action of others, is explicable by an extension of Adam Smith's doctrine of Sympathy; and that our sentiment of justice is really due to a sympathetic excitement of such impulse, numerous facts conspire to prove. Lastly, we find that the convictions originated in us after the manner here supposed, correspond ^vith the results of abstract reasoning, not only as to the possession by each of a right to exercise his faculties, and as to a consequent hmit of that right, but as to the pecuhar sacredness of that right and this limit.
CHAPTER VI.
Thus are we brought by several routes to the same conclusion. Whether we reason our way from those fixed conditions under which only the Divine Idea — greatest happiness, can be realized— whether we draw our inferences from man's constitution, considering him as a congeries of faculties — or whether we listen to the monitions of a certain mental agency, which seems to have the function of guiding us in this matter, we are alike taught as the law of right social relationships, that — Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man. Though further quahfications of the liberty of action thus asserted may be necessary, yet we have seen (p. 89) that in the just regulation of a community no further qualifications of it can be recognised. Such further quahfications must ever remain for private and individual application. We must therefore adopt this law of equal freedom in its entirety, as the law on which a correct system of equity is to be based.
Some wUl, perhaps, object to this first principle, that being in the nature of an axiomatic truth — standing towards the inferences to be drawn from it in the position of one, it ought to be recognisable by all; which it is not.
Respecting the fact thus alleged, that there have been, and are, men impervious to this first principle, there can be no question. Probably it would have been dissented from by J 04 FIRST PRINCIPLE.
Aristotle, who considered it a " self-evident maxim that nature intended barbarians to be slaves." Cardinal Julian, who " abhorred the impiety of keeping faith with infidels," might possibly have disputed it. It is a doctrine which would scarcely have suited the abbot Guibert, who, in his sermons, called the free cities of France " those execrable communities, where serfs, against law and justice, withdraw themselves from the power of their lords." And perhaps the Highlanders, who in 1748 were reluctant to receive their freedom on the abolition of the heritable jurisdictions, would not have admitted it. But the confession that the truth of this first principle is not self-evident to all, by no means invalidates it. The Bushman can only count as high as three; yet arithmetic is a fact: and we have got a Calculus of Functions by the aid of which we find new planets. As, then, die disabiUty of the savage to perceive the elementary truths of number is no argument against their existence, and no obstacle to their discovery and development, so, the circumstance that some do not see the law of equal freedom to be an elementary truth of ethics, does not prevent its being one.
So far indeed is this difference in men's moral perceptions from being a difficulty in our way, that it serves to illustrate a doctrine already set forth. As explained in Chapter II., man's original circumstances "required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his o^ti;" whereas his present circumstances require that " each individual shall have such desires only as may be fully satisfied without trenching upon the abiUty of other individuals to obtain like satisfaction." And it was pointed out that, in virtue of the law of adaptation, the human constitution is changing from the form that fitted it to the first set of conditions to a form fitting it for the last. Now it is by the growth of those two faculties which together originate what we t€rm a Moral Sense, that fitness for these last conditions is secm-ed. In proportion to the strengths of sympathy, and the instinct of personal rights, will be the impulse to conform to the law of equal freedom. And in the mode elsewhere FIRST PKINCIPLE. 105 shown (p. 26), tbe impulse to conform to this lawwill generate a correlative belief in it. Only, therefore, after the process of adaptation has made considerable advance, can there aiise either subordination to this law, or a perception of its truth. And hence any general recognition of it during the earlier stages of social development must not be looked for.
To the direct evidence that has been accumulated in proof of our first principle, may now, however, be added abundant indirect evidence furnished by the absurdities into which a denial of it betrays us. He who asserts that the law of equal freedom is not true, that is, he who asserts that men have ■not equal rights, has two alternatives. He may either say that men have no rights at all, or that they have unequal rights. Let us examine these positions.
Foremost of those who deny rights altogether, stands that same Sir Eobert Filmer akeady named, with his dogma, that " men are not naturally free." Starting thus, he readily finds his way to the conclusion, that the only proper form of government is an absolute monarchy. For, if men are not naturally free, that is, if men have naturally no rights, then, he only has rights to whom they are specially given by God. From which inference to " the divine right of kings" is an easy step. It has become very manifest in later times, however, that this divine right of kings, means the divine right of any one who can get uppermost. For since, according to its assertors, no man can be supposed to occupy the position of supreme ruler in opposition to the will of the Deity, it follows that whoever attains to that position, whether by fair means or by foul, be he legitimate or be he usurper, has Divine authority on his side. So that to say " men are not naturally free," is to say that though men have no rights, yet whoever can get power to coerce the rest has a right to do so!
But this doctrine betrays its supporters into a still more serious dilemma. On referring back to Chapter IV., we shall find that the denial of rights amounts to a libel on the Deity. For, as we there saw, that which a man has a right to, is that which God intended for him. And to say that man has no right to freedom of action, is to say that God did not mean him to have it. Without freedom of action, however, man cannot fulfil his desires. Then God willed that he should not fulfil them. But the non-fulfilment of the desires produces misery. Therefore, God intended that he should be miserable. By which absurdity we may safely consider the position disproved.
For espousing the other alternative, namely, that men's rights are unequal, no conceivable motive can be assigned but a desire to ensure the supremacy of the best. There are not a few good sort of people who commonly reply to strictures upon social inequalities by quoting that couplet, which, beginning with the postulate — " Order is heaven's first law," ends with the inference — " Some are, and must be, greater than the rest." And on this maxim, with ludicrous inconsistency, they found a defence of conventional distinctions. Not daring to trust "heaven's first law" to itself, they wish to help it by artificial classification. They fear that the desired " order" will not be maintained unless it is looked after; and so these " greater than the rest" are picked out by official divination; ranged in tiers; and ticketed with their respective values.
These people, and others akin to them, who hold that rights are unequal, belong to that large class who believe in nothing but externals — who can recognise no forces but those of prescription— votes, authority, rank, and the like — who " adore an institution, and do not see that it is founded on a thought."
A modicum of penetration, however, would show them that the great need none of this patronage at their hands. Real superiority will assert itself without factitious aid. Do away with disturbing arrangements, and, just in proportion to the force resident in each, will be the influence each exercises upon the rest. Allow things to take their natural course, and if a man have in him that which transcends the common, it must eventually draw to itself respect and obedience.
But even were it admitted that, to ensure supremacy of the best, Hberty of action should he apportioned out to men in the ratio of their merits, the maintainers of unequal rights would be none the forwarder; for there remains the question — how are relative merits to be determined? Where are the standards by which we may test tlie respective values of different kinds and degrees of abihty? We cannot appeal to pubhc opinion, for it is not uniform. And were it uniform, there is no reason to think that it would be correct. On the contrary, if anything is to be gathered from surrounding facts, very erroneous estimates would be formed by it. Can confidence be placed in the judgments of men who subscribe Hudson- testimonials, and yet leave the original projector of railways to die in poverty? Are those fit to decide upon comparative greatness who ornament their drawing-room tables with a copy of Burke's Peerage; who read through the lists of court presentations, and gossip about tlie movements of the haut ton — people who would trace back their lineage to some bandit baron — some Pront-dehoeuf, rather than to a Watt or an Arkwright? Is any dependence to Tdc placed on the decision of an authority which has erected half-a-dozen pubUc monuments to its Wellington, and none to its Shakspeare, its Newton, or its Bacon? — an authority that awards to the door-keeper of its House of Commons i£74 a year more than to its astronomer royal? According to Johnson,, " the chief glory of every people arises from its authors: " yet our literary men are less honoured than people of title; the writers of our leading journals are unknown; and we see much more respect shown to a Eothschild or a Baring than to our Faradays and our Owens.
If, then, pubUc opinion is so fallible a test of relative merits, where shall a trustworthy test he found? Manifestly, if the freedom to which each is entitled varies with his worth, some satisfactory mode of estimating worth must be discovered before any settlement of men's right relationships can become possible. Who now will point out such a mode?
Even were a still further admission made — even were we to assume that men's respective claims could be fairly rated — it would still be impossible to reduce the theory of unequal rights to practice. We' should yet have to find a rule by which to allot these different shares of privilege. Where is the scale that would enable us to mark off the portion proper for each individual? What unit of measure must be used for this kind of division? Supposing a shopkeeper's rights to be symbolized by ten and a fraction, what number will represent those of a doctor? What multiple are the hberties of a banker of those of a seamstress? Given two artists, one half as clever again as the other, it is required to find the Umits within which each may exercise his faculties. As the greatness of a prime minister is to that of a ploughboy, so is full freedom of action to — the desired answer. Here are a few out of numberless like questions. When a method for their solution has been found, it will be time enough to reconsider the theory of unequal rights.
■ Thus to the several positive reasons for aflirming that every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infi'inges not the equal freedom of any other man, we must now add the foregoing negative ones. Neither of the alternatives, to which the rejection of this first principle leaves us, is acceptable. The doctrine that men have naturally no rights leads to the awkward inferences, that might makes right, and that the Deity is a malevolent being. Whilst to say that men have unequal rights is to assume two impossibilities; namely, that we are able to determine the ratios of men's merits; and having done this, to assign to each his due proportion of privilege.
CHAPTER VII.
APPLICATION OF THIS FIRST PRINCIPLE.
The process by -which we may develop this first principle into a system of equity, is sufficiently obvious. We have just to distinguish the actions that are included under its pennit, from those which are excluded by it — to find what lies inside the sphere appointed for each individual, and what outside. Our aim must be to discover how far the territory of may extends, and where it borders upon that of may not. We shall have to consider of every deed, whether, in committing it, a man does, or does not, trespass upon the ordained freedom of his neighbour — whether, when placed side by side, the shares of liberty the two parties respectively assume are equal. And by thus separating that which can be done by each without trenching on the privileges of others, from that which cannot be so done, we may classify actions into lawful and unlawful.